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Wordtrade Reviews: Renovating Utopian Drifts

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Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise, most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON POETRY AND PAINTING (2 VOLS.) by Jean-Baptiste Du Bos, edited translated with an Introduction and Notes by James O. Young and Margaret Cameron [Series: Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, & Brill's Texts and Sources in Intellectual History, Brill, 9789004448292]

Jean-Baptiste Du Bos' **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON POETRY AND PAINTING**, first published in French in 1719, is one of the seminal works of modern aesthetics. Du Bos rejected the seventeenth-century view that works of art are assessed by reason. Instead, he believed, audience members have sentiments in response to artworks. Their sentiments are fainter versions of those they would feel in response to actually seeing what the work of art imitates. Du Bos was influenced by John Locke's empiricism and, in turn, had a major impact on virtually every major eighteenth-century contributor to philosophy of art, including Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot, Rousseau, Herder, Lessing, Mendelssohn, Kames, Gerard, and Hume. This is the first modern, annotated and scholarly edition of the **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS** in any language, that takes all the editions into account.

Earlier in his life Du Bos was a diplomat and historian, as well as a traveler with knowledge of intellectual life in England, the Netherlands, and Italy. He published the fourth version of his **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON POETRY AND PAINTING** but the book is best read in the enlarged and rearranged later editions, the fourth (1740) being the last Du Bos supervised. Our editors consulted all editions. It is divided into three parts, of which the third is devoted to the archaeology of classical drama, not addressed here. The first part, formally a discussion of the relative beauties of painting and poetry, is also an informal flow of ideas set off by differences between the arts, often with finely detailed instances; the second part is an anthropology of art. "It is not a methodical book; but the author thinks and makes the reader think" (Voltaire). He is commonly associated with the new empiricist psychology of John Locke, although too much can be made of this.

It is the function of the arts to feed the soul's hunger for activity at times when attention to both external perception and internal reflection is disordered, the painful condition of ennui. The most immediate medium for this is an appeal to the passions—these being what we are destructively led into by our need for psychic activity—as surrogates for passions: thus strong subject matters. But painting differs from poetry in many ways. It engages our attention through manner more than matter of representation, its mecanique being more difficult than that of poetry and able to retain attention even with banal matter. But its subject matter is defining: it cannot represent complex thoughts in its actors, and only generic passions; but it is inherently more specific about individual character and attributes like age and temperament than would be tolerable in poetry. It must represent one instant. Unlike poetry it can only represent matter already known to the beholder; yet its power derives partly from using not the artificial signs of language but natural signs (including gesture) whose energy does not depend on the beholder's culture. Taste, a sixth sense as it were, is determined by individual physical organization, different persons being most affected by different stimulations, so it is not discussible; anything like the debate between color and design in painting is absurd.

Part 2 is a sustained discussion of three interrelated topics: genie, its constitution and nurture; historical, moral, and climatic determinants of genie, with regard to periods and regions; and the mechanisms of reception and "the public". The public has less authority and effect in evaluating painting than poetry because painting is the more technical, and also because, unlike the case of poetry and language, the public has no active experience of creation in its medium.

The book, much reprinted, was translated into English in 1748, but Du Bos's ideas were particularly fruitful in Germany. He was important to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, and Johann Georg Sulzer valued him, strangely, for making the first attempt to base the theory of art on a general principle. In the next century some of his ideas were still crucial for the aesthetic of Jena Romanticism, though they were not explicitly acknowledged, presumably because no longer directly derived.

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Excerpt from Editors Introduction

Du Bos' **Critical Reflections**

jean-Baptiste Du Bos' Critical Reflections on Poetry and Painting is a remarkable and erudite book. By turns fascinating and frustrating, insightful and misguided, it occupies an important place in the history of aesthetics, philosophy of art, art criticism, art history, and related disciplines. It was enormously influential in the eighteenth century: it was in the library of every educated European for over half a

century. It was certainly in David Hume's library and had a huge impact on his thought. Moreover, it continues to provide insights into questions that still occupy philosophers of art. Despite the work's importance, it continues to be under-appreciated, in part because of the lack of a good English translation, and the lack of an annotated scholarly edition in any language. This publication aims to make Du Bos' work accessible to a wide audience and to make the case that it is a work of very considerable historical importance and continuing philosophical interest.

Du Bos' book certainly deserves to be widely read by those interested in aesthetics and art Voltaire wrote that it was "the most useful book ever written on these matters in any European country." It has been described as a book that was "for at least fifty years ... the most influential work of its kind." Lord Chesterfield recommends it in a letter to his son: "I shall point out a book, which I believe will give you some pleasure; at least it gave me a great deal. I never read it before. It is **REFLEXIONS SUR LA POESIE ET LA PEINTURE, PAR L'ABBEE DE BOS**, in two octavo volumes; and is, I suppose, to be had at every great town in France. The criticisms and the reflections are just and lively." It remains essential for understanding the development of aesthetics as an independent philosophical sub-discipline. As Rémy G. Saisselin wrote, it is "indispensable reading for those who would understand eighteenth-century French and other European aesthetics, even the British." A good critical edition is long overdue.

After this brief introductory section, this Introduction to the **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS** is divided into nine additional sections. Section 2 of this Introduction provides a biographical sketch of Du Bos, one of the most important men of letters in the first half of the 18th century, but a man whose life is, today, almost corn-pletely unknown. Next (Section 3), this Introduction provides a brief overview of this sprawling, baggy, but intriguing and influential work. The subsequent sections provide more detailed expositions and evaluations of the most influential and important parts of Du Bos' work These detailed sections include (Section 4) an assessment of Du Bos' contributions to the development of aesthetics as a sub-discipline within modern philosophy; (Section 5) an assessment of the impact of the Critical Reflections on David Hume; (Section 6) an overview of Du Bos' important contribution to the Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns; (Section 7) a review of Du Bos' theory of the influence of climate on genius; and (Section 8) an investigation of Du Bos' views on epistemology and philosophy of science, views that are strikingly original in the context of early-18th-century France. After a note (Section 9) on the text and this translation, the Introduction concludes with suggestions for further reading (Section 10).

An Overview of the **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS**

As already indicated, Du Bos' book is rather rambling and unsystematic. Du Bos is much given to digression. One of his digressions, on ancient theatrical performances, was eventually expanded into a treatise on the subject. (This expanded digression was transplanted from Volume One of the early editions of the Critical Reflections and became Volume Three of the 1740 edition and subsequent editions.) Nevertheless, it is possible to identify the important themes that run through the work.

Du Bos begins by considering the question of what makes experience of poetry and painting sources of a "striking pleasure" (94). (He focuses on these two arts, but in the course of the book he considers sculpture, engraving, dance, and music. Du Bos makes clear that these are all imitative arts and we value experience of them for the same reason.) His answer is that poems and paintings are imitations of objects in the world. This answer situates Du Bos in a long tradition, stretching back to Plato and

Aristotle, that regards the fine arts as imitative arts. The question then becomes one of why imitations are a source of a striking pleasure.

Du Bos' answer is that imitations produced by the arts arouse in us emotions that are weaker versions of the emotions that these objects would have aroused, had we experienced them. When these emotions are pleasant, Du Bos has an easy answer to the question of why we enjoy experience of works of painting and poetry: they arouse the same pleasant emotions as the pleasant objects they represent arouse. It is more difficult to explain why we enjoy experience of imitations of unpleasant subjects: Du Bos' examples are a representation of the sacrifice of Jephthah's daughter and Le Brun's painting of the Massacre of the Innocents. We feel unpleasant emotions when viewing these works, yet we return to them time after time, apparently enjoying the experiences. The enjoyment of representations of tragic subjects is sometimes called the Paradox of Tragedy. Du Bos tells us that the experience of representations of unpleasant subjects is rewarding for two reasons. For a start, although representations of unpleasant events will arouse the emotions that experience of these events would arouse, these emotions are not as intense or enduring. Secondly, he holds that these emotions, while unpleasant, are better than the alternative: the ennui that habitually besets people whose minds are unoccupied. The unpleasant emotion aroused by Le Brun's painting is not very unpleasant, is fleeting, and better than the pain of ennui, which is an existential state of pain or suffering, and certainly more than what we today call `boredom In the course of the Critical Reflections Du Bos supplements this account of the pleasure that we take in the experience of works of art.

Du Bos returns to the Paradox of Tragedy much later in 1.44. There, Du Bos adopts a position akin to that adopted by Aristotle in his Poetics. Aristotle spoke of catharsis, or the cleansing, of emotions such as fear and pity. Du Bos speaks of the purging of emotions. "The faithful depiction of the passions suffices to make us afraid and make us resolve to avoid them with all of the determination of which we are capable" (318). Du Bos uses the example of Medea, the subject of an opera by Marc-Antoine Charpentier and a play by Pierre Corneille. Medea "is depicted in such a manner that we acquire a horror of the passion for vengeance, that is capable of compelling us to such disastrous excess" (320).

In the course of his opening remarks, Du Bos introduces a key concept that will play a role throughout the work: the concept of sentiments. According to Du Bos' view, works of art cause sentiments in us. The capacity of artworks to cause these sentiments is what gives artworks their value. But Du Bos never carefully defines sentiments. He comes closest to doing so when he says that 'The first ideas born in the soul, when it receives a lively stimulus, ... we call sentiments" (237). The sentiments that art arouses are not, on Du Bos' view, some special sort of aesthetic experience. On the contrary, as already noted, these sentiments are fainter versions of the sentiments that objects in nature inspire in us. According to Du Bos, everyone is born with a sense of beauty, that is, a capacity for forming the sentiments aroused by works of art. He holds that, "We have in us a sense intended to judge the value of works that imitate touching objects in nature." He refers to this as a "sixth sense" (519). Du Bos also compares the sense of beauty to gustatory taste. He was among the first 18th century writers to do so and the analogy between taste in art and taste in food had enormous implications for subsequent aesthetics.

In addition to commenting on the state of mind to which artworks move audiences, Du Bos has a good deal to say about the artist's state of mind. He believes that artists feel the sentiments that their works inspire in audiences: the artist's "goal is to make us share his sentiments" (354). The same is true of

performing artists. Du Bos refers to "Horace's maxim: to make others cry one ought to be emotionally afflicted." The artist, perhaps, experiences more intense sentiments than the audience does. The artist must be in a state of 'enthusiasm' in order successfully to create. This state of enthusiasm can border on madness. Du Bos is not as clear as he could be on this point, but this state of enthusiasm is the experience of intense sentiments inspired by objects the artist experiences or imagines. Enthusiasm must be balanced by "a fortunate arrangement of the organs" (360) of the brain. (Notice the physical explanation of the creative process.) Here Du Bos is pioneering an expression theory of the arts, according to which artists express emotions in their works.

Du Bos explicitly states that we judge artworks by means of sentiment, not by means of a process of rational appraisal. In emphasizing the importance of sentiments or passions, Du Bos breaks with a long tradition of art criticism. According to this tradition, criticism is a matter for rational judgement. According to Du Bos, in contrast, we feel that an artwork has aesthetic value; we do not judge that it does. According to Du Bos, "imitations have their effect ^n us, they make us laugh or cry, they engage us before reason has had the time to act or examine. We cry at a tragedy before having discussed whether the object that the poet presents to us is capable of touching by itself or whether it is well imitated" (2.22). Du Bos ridicules what he calls a "geometrical" (2.23) evaluation of artworks: a dispassionate and a priori appraisal. Experience, not reason, tells us that a work is pleasing. Someone can tell that a ragout tastes good without knowing anything of cookery or its rules. Similarly, audience members can `taste' that a poem or a painting is pleasing.

There are, Du Bos believes, rules that artists ought to follow in creating works of art In essence, the rules that artists ought to follow come down to being faithful to nature, that is, imitating nature well. Painters, for example, must ensure that the objects represented in their works observe the laws of physics. Du Bos calls this mechanical vraisemblance. (See below, Section 6, for an explication of the concept of vraisemblance.) Painters ought also to strive for poetical vraisemblance. "Poetic vraisemblance consists, in short, in giving to the persons in a picture their features and their known characteristics." People ought to be represented in ways that are appropriate to their age, sex, nation, and social status. Writers of pastoral poetry are criticized for peopling their works with characters who "have no resemblance to the inhabitants of our countryside or to our contemporary shepherds" (1.22). This said, although artists ought to follow certain rules, since artworks are judged by means of sentiment, we do not judge using rules, and successful artists can break the rules. Du Bos holds that, 'people always prefer poems that touch over poems that obey the rules" (246). He illustrates this point by saying that nearly everyone prefers Ariosto to Tasso, despite the fact that Ariosto breaks many rules of poetry.

Although Du Bos believes that copying nature is essential to the fine arts, there is an important distinction between an artist and an historian. The artist must represent "events in a way that moves us." "This is what distinguishes an artist from an historian, who must not embellish his narrative with circumstances drawn from his imagination or invent situations to make the events he describes more interesting" (201). The artist, in contrast, imagines nature as it could be. Consequently, imagination is a crucial feature of the successful artist. Tragic poets are permitted to make their heroes more admirable than ordinary people, but comic poets ought to imitate people as they actually are. According to Du Bos, while experiencing works of art, there is no suspension of disbelief. He makes clear (1.43) that we are fully aware, while viewing a play that we are not seeing the events represented in the play. Similarly,

with rare exceptions, we are not deceived by paintings. We are aware that we see an imitation and not the object imitated.

All of the arts are representational in Du Bos' view, but not all arts represent in the same way. In the course of the **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON POETRY AND PAINTING**, Du Bos makes a contribution to philosophy of language by distinguishing between the natural signs found in painting and the artificial signs found in language. The artificial signs of language are employed by the poet (1.40).

Du Bos makes this distinction in the context of the discussion of a question that was of considerable interest to him and other 18th-century writers. This is the question of whether poetry or painting is the more affecting art. Du Bos' verdict is that, at any given moment, a painting is more affecting than a poem. He adopts this view on the grounds that vision is the dominant sensory modality and painting employs natural, rather than artificial signs. Du Bos recognizes, however, that poetry has certain advantages over painting. In particular, a play can represent a series of events over a period of time and, in this way, have a huge emotional impact. Setting poetry to music can also enhance its emotional effects.

The view that we judge works of art by means of sentiment, in conjunction with the view that everyone has the capacity to form these sentiments, leads to one of Du Bos' most striking conclusions. This is the view that the general educated public is the best judge of the worth of works of art. Professional artists will often be less capable judges than informed audience members. This is because professional artists will tend to judge works by rational assessment of technique and fidelity to rules rather than by concentrating on the sentiments they feel. Professional artists may also be prejudiced by membership in an artis- tic clique. They may uncritically repeat received judgements of artworks rather than relying on their sentiments.

Everyone is endowed with a sense of beauty but this sense can be refined. In particular, the sense of beauty can be improved by experience of a wide range of works in some genre. Taste can become more delicate. Even after taste has been refined, it will vary from nation to nation, and according to certain circumstances of the person who judges. Certain works will please us best when we are young, and others when we are older. Certain works please the French, given their national interests, more than they please audiences from other nations.

While there is some variation in the works that please audiences, there will be widespread agreement about which are the most pleasing works. One of Du Bos' most striking hypotheses is the view that the broad, educated public is the best judge of the quality of artworks (2.22). This public is a more reliable judge of aesthetic value than are artists and professional critics, who may be prejudiced. The broad, educated public can generally determine within a short time, certainly not more than a few years, whether a work of art is good. It may, however, take longer, on Du Bos' view, for the full value of a work to be known. He states that it may take a century to know a work's full merit. Here Du Bos is defending the Test of Time: when a work can repeatedly please audiences over a lengthy period of time, this is decisive evidence of its high value. That is, the fact that a work has consistently pleased audiences establishes that a work will continue to please.

The reputation of works, once established, will not be undermined and will continue to grow. In particular, the reputation of the best Greek and Roman poets will, on Du Bos' view, never decay. Du Bos is also confident that the best French writers of the 17th century, including Corneille, Molière, and

Racine, certainly wrote works of high value. Du Bos contrasts the case of artworks with that of scientific theories: the fact that a scientific theory has been held for a long time by a lot of people does not guarantee that it is true. The difference here is attributable to the fact that people feel that a work of art is valuable, and feelings of pleasure cannot be mistaken, while there is an element of reasoning in science and reason can go astray. Moreover, people often accept scientific and philosophical views on the authority of other people, while they make their own judgements about artworks on the basis of what they feel.

Although Du Bos maintains that art is valuable as a source of pleasure or, better, pleasing sentiments, there are passages in his book that suggest that works of art can be valuable in other ways. In particular, art can promote virtue. "Dramatists worthy of writing for the stage have always regarded the obligation to inspire hatred for vice and love for virtue as the primary obligation of their art" (319). Artists promote virtue, not by providing audience members with moral knowledge so much as by inspiring them with proper passions: "The depiction of virtuous actions stirs up our souls. Somehow it elevates and excites in us praiseworthy passions, such as love for country and glory". Elsewhere, Du Bos speaks of learning "maxims" from poetry. Still, his considered opinion seems to be that we value art primarily as a source of pleasure: "We can acquire some knowledge by reading a poem, but this is scarcely the motive for opening the book" (244).

A major theme of the **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS** is the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns, which will be investigated in Section 6. The Quarrel was a debate, conducted throughout Europe, concerning the relative merits of ancient and modern writers and artists. What had been a long simmering dispute burst into passionate argument with the publication of Charles Perrault's Le siècle de Louis le Grand [The Era of Louis the Great] (1687). The debate continued into the middle of the 18th century in works such as Charles Batteux's Fine Arts Reduced to a Single Principle (1746). Edward Young's Conjectures on Original Compositions (1759) can be seen as one of the works that sealed the victory of the Modems.

Du Bos' contribution to the debate is judicious and well informed. He carefully examines the visual arts of the ancient world and comes to the conclusion that modem sculptors have not surpassed or even equalled their ancient counterparts, except in the sculpting of bas-reliefs. Du Bos acknowledges that it is difficult to make judgements about the relative merits of ancient and modem paintings since so few ancient paintings survive. He believes, however, that in design, expression, and artistry, the available evidence suggests that modem painters have not attained greater heights than the painters of antiquity. According to Du Bos, in poetry the ancients have a significant edge over modem writers. In part this is owing to the fact that Latin is better suited to writing poetry than modem languages and, in particular, French. Du Bos allows that in the natural sciences, moderns have made significant advances over the ancients. This is not because modems are able to reason better than the ancients, but because modems have had more experience, a great deal of it fortuitous.

Much of Book Two is devoted to a consideration of artistic genius, as we will discuss in Section 7. Du Bos holds that geniuses are born, not made. He breaks with traditional views on the origin of genius. In particular, he rejects the Platonic conception of genius, according to which the genius is divinely inspired. He does say, in passing, that a "poet needs divine inspiration". His considered view, however, is that there is a physical cause of artistic genius. In particular, Du Bos provides a physiological explanation of

genius. The genius has a well-formed brain and other physiological advantages over those who lack genius. Artists born without this fortunate arrangement will never be able to make up for its absence.

Du Bos is interested in the question of why certain eras produce more geniuses than others. He identifies four eras when geniuses are particularly numerous. He calls them the era of Plato (the great flourishing of the arts in 5th- and 4th-century BC Greece), the era of Augustus (the period in the 1st century BC and the 1st century AD when Roman art reached its apogee), the era of Leo x (the Renaissance), and the era of Louis XIV (the period when French art thrived in the 17th century). Du Bos considers, in a quite systematic and historically well-informed manner, the hypothesis that moral, or what we would call social, causes explain why certain ages and nations produce more geniuses. He reaches the conclusion that social causes cannot fully explain the phenomenon in question, though social causes can certainly encourage the flourishing of the arts.

Consequently, Du Bos turns to consider the hypothesis that physical causes are responsible for the periodic thriving of the arts. He is sceptical about physical explanations, since he is aware that the empirical evidence is limited and science imperfect. Yet he feels that he has enough evidence to begin giving an empirical account of artistic genius. Unfortunately, the physical explanation that Du Bos gives for the flourishing of the arts is wildly implausible (Section 7). He defends the view that climate and the quality of air is responsible for the fact that certain ages and nations are more given to artistic genius than others. England is unable to produce painters of the first rank because the climate is too cold. He attributes the quality of the air to types of rock in certain countries and to earthquakes that expose harmful substrata. There is also a long discussion of the baleful effects on air quality, and genius, of Rome's decaying sewer system.

Du Bos' account of genius is not merely implausible. His position is also distressingly prejudiced. He does not believe that certain nations are inherently more talented than others. We are all, he says, children of Adam and any differences in genius are attributed to climate and air quality. Nevertheless, Du Bos' position on genius is, if not racist, then at least guilty of Orientalism and other forms of cultural prejudice. As Du Bos' editors and translators, we have no desire to minimize or excuse his prejudices.

As should by now be apparent, Du Bos takes care to advance empirical evidence for his views. He calls experience "the best teacher that humankind has". As noted above in the biography of Du Bos, he was a friend of John Locke and influenced by Locke's empiricism to the point of swimming against the Rationalist or Cartesian tide in France. In the context of a discussion of whether moderns can think more critically than the ancients (according to Du Bos, they cannot), he articulates an empiricist approach to the philosophy of science. Advances in the sciences are owed to an expanded range of experiences. Scientific advances are not a matter of inferring new principles from a set of axioms (Section 8).

Book Three of the **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS** is, from a modern philosophical perspective, the least interesting. Nevertheless, it is, from a historical point of view, quite important. Modern philosophy of music may be said to have begun in the 15th century when several writers began to ask why the music of their day was not able to have the dramatic effects on listeners that music was reported to have had in the ancient world. We find, for example, Franchino Gaffurio and Bartolomeo Ramos de Pareia asking this question. The most famous answer to this question was given by members of the Florentine Camerata, such as Vincenzo Galilei. The members of the Camerata argued that ancient tragedies had

been sung and early operas, such as Monteverdi's Orfeo and Poppea, were thought to be works that closely resembled ancient models. Du Bos argues persuasively that the Camerata's conception of ancient tragedy was seriously flawed. The debate about the relative merits of ancient and modern music lasted almost the end of the 18th century. It is still being contested by Thomas Robertson as late as 1784. Du Bos does not so much contribute to this debate as remove some of the misconceptions about ancient music, and ancient theatrical performances in general. His contribution is a necessary first step towards an assessment of ancient performances.

Book Three is a detailed investigation of the performance practices of the ancient stage. Du Bos advances a number of hypotheses that would have been novel in their day. In particular, he argues that most ancient tragedies were not sung in anything like the way that modern operas are sung. They were notated. That is, the way in which they were to be declaimed was noted on the text, but they were not sung. In conjunction with this point, Du Bos notes that the extension of the term 'music' was much greater in the ancient world than it is in the modern. Acting and the declamation of tragedies came under the rubric of music in the ancient world, while they do not do so any longer. Du Bos also writes extensively about pantomimes in the ancient world. The volume concludes with a discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of ancient and modern stagecraft. Book Three is now primarily of interest to students of the history of classical scholarship. Remarkably, however, Du Bos is conspicuous by his absence from standard histories of classical scholarship. This strikes us as an egregious oversight. However, even for the general reader, Book Three is full of fascinating anecdotes and information. It is still worth reading if only for this reason. <>

Moliere: The Complete Richard Wilbur Translations by Moliere, Foreword by Adam Gopnik, Translated by Richard Wilbur [The Library of America, 9781598537093]

All of Richard Wilbur's unsurpassed translations of Molière's plays–themselves towering achievements in English verse–are brought together for the first time in this two-volume gift set.

One of the most accomplished American poets of his generation, Richard Wilbur (1921-2017) was also a prolific translator of French and Russian literature. His verse translations of Molière's plays are especially admired by readers and are still performed today around the world. "Wilbur," the critic John Simon wrote, "makes Molière into as great an English verse playwright as he was a French one." Now, for the first time, all ten of Wilbur's unsurpassed translations of Molière's plays are brought together in two-volume boxed set, fulfilling the poet's vision for the translations.

The first volume comprises Molière's delightful early farces The Bungler, Lovers' Quarrels, and The Imaginary Cuckhold, or Sganarelle; the comedies The School for Husbands and The School for Wives, about the efforts of middle-aged men to control their young wives or fiancés, which so delighted female theater goers in Moliere's seventeenth-century France; and Don Juan, Molière's retelling of the timeless story, performed only briefly in the playwright's lifetime before pious censure forced it to close and not part of the repertoire of the Comédie-Française until 1847.

The second volume includes the elusive masterpiece, The Misanthrope, often said to occupy the same space in comedy as Shakespeare's Hamlet does in tragedy; the fantastic farce Amphitryon, about how Jupiter and Mercury commandeer the identities of two mortals ; Tartuffe, Molière's biting satire of religious hypocrisy; and The Learned Ladies, like Tarfuffe, a drama of a household turned suddenly upside down. These volumes include the original introductions by Richard Wilbur and a foreword by Adam Gopnik on the exquisite art of Wilbur's translations.

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Excerpt Foreword by Adam Gopnik

Indispensable translations mark the intersection, and sometimes the head-on collision, of two sensibilities, and usually two eras. In English, the King James Version of the Bible, most obviously, brings Solomon's time and Shakespeare's into direct overlap, while Alexander Pope's Homer is a still more extreme, inspired collision of archaic Greece and eighteenth-century London. Even Scott Moncrieff's version of Proust, though made close in time to the original, marks a distinct space between the severe French symbolist sounds of Proust's fin de siècle and the somewhat more glossily aestheticized sensibility of the English one—so that Proust's austere title In Search of Lost Time becomes the more self-consciously poetic (and Shakespearean) Remembrance of Things Past.

Yet for a translation of a classic to remain impressive in our minds, the original and the new version need somehow to rise from an allied point of view. Some secret concord needs to exist between the two eras for the translation to remain golden. The King James Bible triumphs because it was translated into English at a time when elaborate metaphoric rhetoric and polysyndeton, extended composition through the simple dignity of "ands," were natural to English style. Pope's Homer was united with Homer's Homer by a shared love in their audiences for large-scale poetic storytelling, and more patience than we have today for long speeches in high diction and endless-seeming lists. The same taste that could put up with all the minor dunces in The Dunciad was necessary to put up with all the lists of ships in The Iliad.

No translations mark the intersection of two authors and two ages more strikingly than do Richard Wilbur's translations of ten comedies by the seventeenth-century French playwright Molière (1622-

1673). Wilbur's first translation, The Misanthrope, published in 1955, was soon followed by his Tartuffe in 1963, with the last, Lovers' Quarrels, appearing more than a half century later, in 2009. All are now collected here by Library of America in two volumes.

Miraculously theatrical in ways that more academic translations are not, Wilbur's Molière is nonetheless miraculously authentic to the original, written in a flowing, vigilantly smooth version of Molière's rhyming couplets, instead of in the lumpy prose of previous English translations. At once readable and stage-friendly, his translations achieve the improbable end of making seventeenth-century French prosody completely playable in English, while remaining true to the essentials of French grand siècle style. Wilbur took Molière's Alexandrines, the eleven-syllable rhymed line of classic French theatre and turned it into a more English-friendly iambic pentameter, the ten-syllable heroic couplet of Pope. To do this, he drew on living resources in the American language of his time, particularly on the reality that American ears had become accustomed, both in the then-booming business of light verse and in ambitious musical theater—of which Wilbur himself was to write a supreme example in his lyrics for Leonard Bernstein's Candide—to accepting easy rhyme as an aid to emotion.

Well, a better playwright than Molière does not exist, and a better translation of a great writer's plays does not exist—but though that is nearly that, all that need be said, it is not quite that. The intersection of author and translator is something far more than a library or even a theatrical triumph. The overlap between Wilbur and Molière is social as much as stylistic. To put it simply—or perhaps to state it as simply as a complicated case can be put—though Molière made his life in and around courts, his role was to become the first great comic poet of the emerging and ascendant middle classes, portraying their domestic concentrations, their appetite for erudition, their constant insecurities, and their easy readiness to be wowed b^ fashions and trends. Wilbur came to Molière at a moment when that same bourgeoise in America was newly

ascendant in another way—when a highly educated postwar GI culture had taken happy possession of a European cultural heritage then undermined on its own ground, a time when all the heritage of European culture seemed in need of American succor and American support. Clive James recalled a Wilbur visit to London in 1962, the height of the period, as offering "the epitome of cool ... somehow it seemed plausible that the traditional high culture of Europe should be represented ... by an American who looked like a jet jockey.... The internationalization of a mind like Wilbur's, its seemingly relaxed roaming in the European tradition, fitted the picture perfectly." James, writing in 1972, felt obliged to dilute his admiration with a tincture of derision; later on, he would have muted the tone. But the basic picture is sound; much of the confidence and optimism of that postwar epoch is still caught, however improbably, in Wilbur's translations. Wilbur's Molière lives both as masterpieces of the translator's art and as witness to a hopeful (and still not quite finished) American moment.

Wilbur tells us that he had first come upon the idea of translating Molière in 1948, when he saw a production of Cyrano at the Comedie-Francaise. Wilbur had been one of the great generations of GI aesthetes, those young boys who unthinkingly and instantly threw themselves into the draft and the war, making for a democratized experience of the military alien to post-Vietnam generations—but also meaning that the experience of the war in Europe could offer a sentimental education in European culture, if you survived. (Two great American art historians of Picasso and Rodin respectively, William Rubin and Albert Elsen, would recall in later life how they met on a troopship leaving New York, when they were the only soldiers too aesthetically fastidious to rush to the other side of the deck to look at

the Statue of Liberty.) This European education could take very odd forms indeed. The great critic Randall Jarrell came away infatuated with the German romantic culture that had been to some degree causal of the worst of nationalist excess.

Wilbur, instead, became a Francophile. With his elegant French hand-tooled on the soldiers' road to Paris, he was known as a master craftsman already, after the publication of his shimmeringly precisionist first collection of poetry, The Beautiful Changes (1947). But the craftsmanship was metrical and largely expressed in unrhymed verse, and so his decision to write Molière over in English rhyme was far from self-evident. English has, famously but truly, a scarcity of rhyme words, even as it lends itself almost too easily to alliteration. Anyone who dips even a big toe in versification starts to recognize the limited familiar repertory of rhyme words tumbling toward the listener: every chance will produce a romance, and then a dance. An instant, illuminating, ironic illustration of this truth about the scarcity of rhyme in English: a search for rhymes for that word, "scarcity," in English provides ... precisely zero true rhymes. (You could toy with "ferocity" or the like, or go the Larry Hart route and rhyme it, playfully mis-stressed, with a word pair: i.e., "There's always such a scary scarcity / of honest folks here in our fair city.") The French word for scarcity, by contrast, rareté, has such an abundance of rhymes that it makes an English rhymester weep, with engage, écarté, and retardé leading the charge and many more coming up behind. In French, as in Italian and the other Romance languages, rhyme comes so easy that it can just sneak by our attention on its way to speech. That's how Molière uses it. Not quite invisible, it simply adds the artful tone that iambs do in English.

Rhyme in its nature stylizes and distances an emotion. It's why even the most Francophile of English speakers find something puzzling in Racine: that much rhyming seems "ofF' for the tragic passions. A Cleopatra who says, in effect, "Give me that knife from off the shelf / Now I have to kill myself" is inescapably comic. Pope's rhetorical exercises in rhyming pathos—his "Eloisa to Abelard"—are DOA to modern readers, as much as his epistles are alive. In English, rhyme belongs almost exclusively to extravagant humor, with Gilbert and Sullivan being both the apotheosis and the cul de sac of this truth. You can't go further in that direction without becoming wholly mechanized.

Wilbur accepted this circumstance of the difficulty of English rhyme, and its inherent bend to the comic, by ingeniously underplaying it. There is not much showy rhyme in Wilbur's Molière, hardly a moment when one is self-consciously impressed by the ingenuity of the rhyme scheme. Scrolling down a random page of his version of The School for Wives, one finds all the standards: care and there, bliss and this, two and you, role and soul. (One rhyme alone—you would be / and nonentity—is witty, and works.)

The rhymes themselves can be commonplace, because the act of rhyming is not. Wilbur knows that whereas in French, rhyme is neutral, in English, rhyme, smoothly and consistently appliqued, injects a rolling comic energy irresistibly into the text. Its simple presence is enough to produce an effect of ingenuity. Wilbur himself speaks of the importance of making the repetitions in Molière, which are part of the high style of aphoristic argument, land as elegance rather than irritate as overemphasis—Wilbur points out that there is scarcely a metaphor in all of Molière's writing—and that the rhymed couplet is essential to this task.

Yet if rhyming in English is inherently comic, the art and wit of rhyming in English is, as Ogden Nash understood, to land self-consciously on a "find" when you find one. Impressive on every page, Wilbur's wit is particularly so when stretched out across dialogue, so that the exchanges are both perfectly

unstilted and idiomatic, and still delight with the ingenuity of each line "tag." Take, for instance, the moment when Alceste, in The Misanthrope, responds to the miserable sonnet of Oronte. In French, Oronte says, "Je voudrais bien, pour voir, que de votres manière / Vous en composassiez sur la même matière," and Alceste replies, "Je'n pourrais, par malheur, faire d'aussi méchants; / Mais je me garderais de les montrer aux gens." This exchange becomes, in Wilbur, "Come now, I'll lend you the subject of my sonnet / I'd like to see you try to improve upon it," with Alceste's rejoinder rendered as "I might by chance write something just as shoddy / But then I wouldn't show it to everybody." It is typical of Wilbur's skill that the translation is both nearly literal, word for word, and still inspired: Molière's unemphatic rhyme of gens and méchants is expressed as the Cole Porterish, more self-consciously inventive, "shoddy" and "everybody"—a rhyme that, it seems fair to say, has rarely, if ever, been found in English before, and gives us wit along with point.

The insistence on rhyme, particularly the play of invisible, "perfect" rhyme with marked "foregrounded" rhyme, that one finds in Wilbur's Molière was part of a larger, though still select, "return to rhyme" in American literary culture in the fifties and sixties, part of a mini—rappel à l'ordre, a recall to order, of the time. Ignited by the American Auden's long, neoclassical poems of the forties—particularly his wartime meditation written in Swiftian couplets, "New Year Letter," and the slightly later satiric masterpiece "Under Which Lyre"—rhyme for a period of twenty years or so seemed a vital affirmation of tradition that also, in its self-conscious artifice, had a modernist twang: it guyed the undue inaccessibility of high modernism while, with the elegant knowingness of its revivalist urge, remaining under its umbrella of self-conscious irony. Couplets were as romantic as couples. John Updike, who saw himself first as a light-verse writer, wrote in praise of rhyme, with Wilbur perhaps in the back of his mind, in the early sixties. Updike said that "by rhyming, language calls attention to its own mechanical nature and relieves the represented reality of seriousness.... Light verse, an isolated acolyte [isolated, that is, from the main ground of modernism], tends the thin flame of formal magic and tempers the inhuman darkness of reality with the comedy of human artifice." The composer and lyricist Stephen Sondheim, another exact contemporary of Wilbur's, insisted in a parallel way on rejecting in theatre music the increasingly slack—and differently expressive—diction of American pop music, which would lead at last to the sixties revolution in lyric writing. Bob Dylan could, eventually, win the Nobel Prize for Literature while rhyming, in one famous song, "divorced" and "force." Sondheim insisted on lyric writing in favor of true rhyme schemes, seeing in "perfect" rhyme the same kind of formal magic, imposed by the sheer obdurate resistance of rhyme to easy composition—a sign of the resistance of intelligence to kitsch. To this day Broadway circles are the last place in American culture where a prosodic distinction has religious force, with the true-rhyme/near-rhyme distinction inspiring bitter quarrels and feuds. (One major Broadway composer came away from the great and rap-based Hamilton indignant and unhappy at Lin Manuel Miranda's rhyme of "country" and "hungry" in the now famous line "I'm like my country / I'm young, scrappy and hungry.")

It is no accident, as the academics say, but an act of fraternity that Sondheim, in his slightly perverse way, placed Wilbur's one-time-only Broadway lyrics, for Candide, alongside those of Heywood Dubose, the one-time-only lyricist for Porgy and Bess, at the very top of the American theatrical pile. So Wilbur's is a period style in the best sense. A smooth surface of unostentatious rhyme could suggest a sensibility at once firmly modernist and still comfortably classicized, rather like the glittering windowed surfaces of fifties skyscrapers, the Seagram Building and Lever House, gleaming daughters of the Bauhaus at home among the Beaux-Arts buildings on Park Avenue.

Yet Wilbur's Molière reaches us for more profound reasons than its skillful surface. Wilbur himself has neatly articulated Molière's universality: his subject is what happens to social groups—the microsociety of a family or the larger society of a social class—when an unbalanced figure appears within it. And Molière could speak to an American audience because the moral pluses and minuses were remarkably unaltered. Having an uncomfortable truth seeker and teller in our midst provokes the same mixture of exasperation and admiration in 1952 Cambridge as it might in seventeenth-century Paris. The writer Larry David has made a brilliant career as a comedian on just this basis, as the man who will innocently say the uncomfortable truth—that a parent's death suddenly creates an all-purpose excuse for avoiding obligatory socializing. An unplugged fanatic like Tartuffe is always going to have an unsettling effect on a family—though today our fanatic may as easily be a yoga enthusiast or a New Age seer as a puritanical hypocrite. (There is no more memorable description of a modern Tart^fle than that in Michael Downing's Shoes Outside the Door, of the Zen roshi who, dazzling his adepts with Americanized Zen, turned out to have a lecherous interest in Women students.)

Both timeless and timebound, Molière is not our contemporary in some facile and fatuous way: he is not a radical, certainly, in our sense, nor even a romantic, in the nineteenthcentury sense—he is a common-sense realist, opposed to putting ideas and obsessions and idées fixes in place of people and relationships, and believing not in an ordered but a balanced world. What he is almost uniquely good at doing—perhaps only Jane Austen among the world's masters equals him here—is conveying the quality that Wilbur celebrates in his poetry, that quality of unschooled intelligence we call common sense. Common sense these days is condemned as a conspiracy by the privileged against the excluded; the suspicious circles of what counts as "common" are, we're told, an indictment against the sense. But Molière reaches out across the centuries to remind us that in truth common sense has legs as long as laughter itself The model of patriarchal order in the plays is not merely impotent; the common sense of the other characters, their knowledge of actual human possibility, leaves it instantly disregarded as absurd. The plays are filled with patriarchal impositions, but the patriarchal figure is always ridiculous, and quickly shown to be completely incompetent and ineffective. In both The School for Wives and The School for Husbands the protagonists are men so terrified of femininity and the power of women's minds that they bend their worlds right out of shape in order to keep their wards or fiancees ignorant and subordinate. Molière's point, first made in The School for Husbands and italicized in The School for Wives, is that this is not only a repugnant activity but a ludicrous one, doomed to comic failure. The repressed, cloistered women are instinctively aware of their own repression,

and respond to it by making their own clear-eyed choices of suitors and potential husbands. Sganarelle and Ariste, in The School for Husbands, are counterpoised as bad and good suitors, a grand siècle Goofus and Gallant: Sganarelle treats his intended as both prey and potential danger; Ariste treats his intended as a full human being; one relationship ends absurdly, the other happily. In The School for Wives, Arnolphe paranoia about feminine choice is so extreme that it compels him to have isolated his object of desire since she was a child. Both Arnolphe and Sganarelle get schooled by the very women they thought they were schooling. The common sense of the women X-rays the patriarchal hypocrisies and then obliterates their absurdities.

Molière's great theme is the folly of fanaticism of every kind: the religious fanaticism in Tartuffe, where a self-seeking pseudo-holy man warps a family's life, or the social fanaticism in The Misanthrope, where the proudly plainspoken Alceste has to be instructed by his mistress and his friends that too much candor is

egocentric and vain, not admirable. Molière is no philistine; he is the poet of common sense, not merely in his ridicule of the idea that life can be lived by a rule of excessive piety or in his exposure of erudition for its own sake, but by being most fully alive on the stage when dramatizing their opposite. He holds what every professor wants for a satirist: a set of positive ideas made more positive by not being ideas. Molière loves natural actions and affections, including that of lust. In The Learned Ladies, Molière's feminist point is not that the ladies should not be learned, but that their natural wit, all that they know already from their own experience, is more profound than what their lecherous tutors, with their extravagantly abstract ideas, wish to teach them. Molière escapes fatuity in his candor that what restores a universe unbalanced by intellectual obsession is, most often, normal erotic appetite. In Molière, sex is always the rejuvenating juice of common sense. Alceste loves Célimène, in part because she is clearly his only intellectual equal in the play, but also because he is sexually infatuated with her, and the intensity of his desire, though it makes him miserable, humanizes him. She, in turn, cannot understand his raging jealousy at the attraction she offers to other men; she is not being flirtatious—or not merely flirtatious, or "coquettish"—in her insistence that her plethora of suitors is not a sign of bad faith but exactly an extension of the same sincerity of affect that Alceste claims to admire as a virtue, and cultivates in himself. Being flirtatious with many, she is being true to herself. Tartuffe is shown as a hypocrite in his lecheries, but a human being in his appetites. It's the purpose of comedy to restore energy to sanity—to make common sense come alive to our dramatic imagination by making the pious certitudes that censure common sense look as loony as they are.

Those values are Wilbur's values, too, yet expressed in his poetry more often in an elegiac and wistfully observant key than in a satiric or wholly comic one. Moliere releases Wilbur's lyricism into laughter. There's no harm in small white lies; it's egocentric to give way to undue passion; what matters in life is not hierarchical order but emotional ease. Easy does it, Molière says, and our romantic-trained minds still rebel a little against the fatuity of the injunction. But he's right. A more truly radical feminism, a better form of family piety, emerge when we recognize the folly of trying to live by maxims and morals and principles and plans, instead of by the equilibrium of actual existence.

A romantic Molière has been the desideratum of some since the romantic period began. Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously said that he could not understand why anyone laughed at Alceste, and many a modern reading of Molière tried to make him "radical" in this sense—readings in which the balancing forces are seen as pernicious and the unbalancing disruptive force benign, or subversive.

Perhaps if there is a backward blessing in this latest and hardest recent disruption, the pandemic of 2020-2021 under which these lines are written, it may be its reminder that domestic balance is in itself a good thing, to the degree it can be achieved. Once again subject to the vagaries of an untamable and vindictive-seeming Nature, we have a keener sense of the values of the circle drawn around us to keep Nature

away. On stage as in mid-plague, there is nothing like a mask to regulate our passions. And nothing like high comedy in rhyme, rolling down the page and affirming the primacy of unaffected affection, to blow away our bourgeois blues. <>

Rider Haggard and the Imperial Occult: Hermetic Discourse and Romantic Contiguity by Simon Magus [Series: Aries Book Series, Brill, 9789004470224]

In **Rider Haggard and the Imperial Occult**, Simon Magus offers the first academic monograph on the world of occult thought which lies behind and beneath the fictional writing of H. Rider Haggard. It engages with a broad scope of religious, philosophical and anthropological ideas. Many of these were involved in debates within the controversies of the Anglican Church, which occurred in the face of Darwinism, and the criticism of the Bible.

The book follows three main intellectual currents involved in the promulgation of these ideas, namely the reception of ancient Egypt, the resurgence of Romanticism and the ideas of the Theosophical Society, all couched within the context of Empire.

Jean-Pierre Brach: In early 1890, the noted French writer (and future Nobel Prize laureate) Anatole France (d. 1924) remarked that 'a certain knowledge of the occult sciences is becoming necessary for the understanding of a great many literary works of our time'.

Admittedly, Rider Haggard's works may not have been what A. France positively had in mind when he wrote this sentence, but France's words would nevertheless apply to them in a relevant manner. There is, however, more to it than meets the eye, as evidenced by Simon Magus' brilliant analysis, insofar as the present book is not just about Haggard's frequent engagement with occult topics, the supernatural or fringe spiritualist beliefs. What these pages really account for is the subtle cross-fertilization at work between Haggard's literary enterprise and a number of elements pertaining to the religious and cultural environment of the period, inasmuch as their interactions also implicate the use of 'hermetic discourse' and esoteric perspectives, thus pointing to some revealing facets of the author's complex esthetic and spiritual outlooks.

The task undertaken here is obviously much more complex than the (perfectly respectable, at any rate) study of some literary escapade stemming from a practicing occultist, or of an *homme de lettres* peppering his artistic endeavours with occult elements borrowed intentionally - two cases of which we know so many fascinating examples, moreover.

We must be aware that, at all times, but perhaps most specifically during the nineteenth century, with its tendency to uphold poetry and writing as the most exalted form of inspiration, almost on a par with mystical ecstasy, and to extol the creative writer as the priest of the new and superior religion of 'Art', the study of esoteric ideas is really inseparable from that of their literary clothing. This is not, of course, to reduce esotericism to an obscure artistic trope or a bookish mannerism but, on the contrary, to underline the significance attached to its intrinsic expression(s), from Éliphas Lévi's ornate rhetorics to Aleister Crowley's poems or Austin O. Spare's draughtsmanship.

To put it in the words of the Swedish painter and esotericist I. Aguéli: 'To read *within* the words, rather than *behind* them.'

In many ways, esotericism reveals itself as a means of conversing at once with the living and the dead, the visible and the invisible, mankind and angelic or divine entities.

Love is in fact the apex or paradigm of such an exchange, and it is rooted in the eternal 'Other side' of reality - as we understand it - transcending the barrier poetically known as the 'Veil of Isis'.

Seen from this particular viewpoint, esotericism represents an integral part of the dynamics (and perhaps also of the assets) of mainstream European culture, in its attempts to reconcile the inner and outer worlds of man. If, accordingly, imagination forms a constant mainstay of esoteric doctrine as such,

its role is of course equally central in fashioning a kind of visionary literature meant to shape 'platonic' ideals and translate them in a manner capable of elevating the mind of the reader towards Beauty and 'perfect Reality', in order to transcend (and transform) more mundane concerns.

This metaphysical halo of literary achievements is one of the foundations of Haggard's beloved New Romance: the perception of any superior truth, including Religion itself, must come from within, and relies on an inner intuition nourished by a higher wisdom source. Such an intuition is in fact a common heritage of humanity in general, whether 'civilized' or 'savage' (to use Haggard's words), and a common feature of nineteenth-century spiritualism, under the frequent guise of the 'individual Self'.

This is not to say that ordinary reality or the common use of reason are being neglected or devalued in the process, but that their role is rather to assist, here, as a reminder of the nature of true spiritual awareness, which is *in*, but not *of*, this world.

Scripture, myth, archeological history, all feed into a type of narrative designed by Haggard to re-enchant the perception of Christian spirituality and transcribe it along the lines of a new cultural and theological atmosphere, that of late Victorian England. Haggard's artistic sensitivity has likely enabled him to tune in to one of the main historical functions of esotericism, which is to revitalize the inner dimension of (any) religion (including of course Christianity), by renewing its sense of the supernatural and revisiting its sapiential core, with both theoretical and transformative aims. This, taking into account that it is of course a commonplace to state that any tradition is also, by essence and simultaneously, a return to the roots as well as an innovative re-reading of its constituent elements - and the more so if one feels tempted to equate 'tradition' with Antiquity (and/or the East) and its criticism/resurgence with Modernity (and the West).

A correlative aspect of Haggard's involvement with esotericism, and one that is highly consistent with other, contemporary understandings of it, is his sustained fascination with Nature and with a potential secret knowledge pertaining to its hidden or 'night side', which appears either as attainable in this world or as a pursuit to be continued in the next, depending on perspective. Here, the topic of Egypt and of its supposedly powerful magic is obviously a case in point, as shown by certain passages of Haggard's *The World's Desire* and of other works examined by S. Magus. Under British control at the time, both Egypt and India were looked upon as the 'keys to the East' and as repositories of arcane lore, since time immemorial. Along with occultism, academic knowledge is called upon to facilitate and enrich the cultural, political and spiritual dialogue between what S. Magus evocatively terms 'the Imperial centre and the colonial periphery'. Through such an exchange, both parties mutually integrate some of each other's religious structures and, in so doing, attempt to reinforce their own core beliefs and values with new themes, perspectives and arguments. If a coming scholarly study by Perry Myers carefully unravels the maze of political and ideological ambiguities at work underneath this type of relations between states and cultural entities, within a British colonial historical context, the present volume is an otherwise prominent showcase for Simon Magus' uncanny flair for literary hermeneutics, in deciphering the very same ambiguities that the so-called metaphysical novel, and Haggard's *oeuvre* in particular, are interlaced with.

Rider Haggard and the Imperial Occult represents a remarkably insightful criticism of the intricate relationship between esotericism and literature, *a propos* one of Britain's most popular and admired writers. Among many other merits, it illustrates how adroitly Rider Haggard manages in his works to

hold on - so to speak - to both ends ('Home and colonial') of the proverbial stick and, in so doing, to convey his spiritual convictions through a *corpus* of fiction, thus mining one of the mother lodes of literary success : the elusive fence between fact and fiction.

Let Simon Magus be lauded for this eminently readable and captivating academic study, which sheds a revealing - and yet elegantly reticent - light on the mysteries of Rider Haggard's religious and cultural stance. *Jean-Pierre Brach*

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Part I

Although Egypt was never part of the British Empire, the longstanding presence of the British in Egypt and the socio-political backdrop of intercultural exchange between Westminster Hall, the Khedival Palace and the Sublime Porte forms the historical context for the dialectics and dialogism of religious ideas discussed in the following account. By the time of the British occupation in 1882, as Ailise Bulfin observes,

German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck viscerally summed up the relationship between Egypt and the British Empire: "Egypt is of the utmost importance to England on account of the Suez Canal, the shortest line of communication between the eastern and western halves of the Empire. That is like the spinal cord which connects the backbone with the brain."

Bismarck had based this assessment at least in part on the shipping access to British India: the canal reduced the journey time by sea to four weeks. History would certainly prove Bismarck correct. As Bulfin has it: 'Sever the cord and the empire would be effectively paralysed,' and indeed the eventual loss of the canal and British withdrawal during the Suez Crisis of 1956, marked the end of British control in Egypt and sounded the death knell of the British Empire itself.

The attitude towards Egypt and its culture changed considerably throughout Victoria's reign. At its commencement, Egypt was very much seen as the biblical Oppressor and the locus of the Israelites' sojourn in bondage. Mid-century Unitarian Egyptologists were more receptive to the Higher Criticism coming from Germany, and though questioning of the Bible, remained critical of Egypt. For example, Samuel Sharpe wrote in his *Egyptian Mythology and Egyptian Christianity* in 1863 that 'Christians shall at length acknowledge that many of those doctrines which together now make up orthodoxy, or the religion of the majority, as distinguished from the simple religion which Jesus taught and practised' reached Europe from Egypt via Alexandria. Sharpe goes on to specify from a Unitarian stance:

The following are the principal doctrines which are most certainly known to be common to Egyptian Mythology and modern orthodoxy, as distinguished from the religion of Jesus. They include the Trinity, the two natures of Christ, and the atonement by vicarious sufferings.

However, during the 1840s to the 1870s Nonconformists lost ground to the next generation of biblical archaeologists who rejected Higher Criticism. As Michael Ledger-Lomas and David Gange have argued: 'Until the later nineteenth century, 'Germanism' occasioned splenetic reactions in both Britain and America. Yet […] the dread of 'rationalism' and 'neology' strengthened commitment to finding concrete proofs of the veracity of biblical narratives.'[6] After 1880 there was a distinct emphasis on Christian apologetics and a more positive view of Egypt as a precursor of and preparation for the Christian

dispensation. In addition, the establishment of the British Protectorate in 1882 and the dominance of the 'Egyptian Question' in public political discourse is likely to have influenced the more positive appraisal of Egyptian religion – albeit ancient Egypt – and its comparison and compatibility with Empire as Christendom. It is of note that the archaeological society known as the Egypt Exploration Fund (eef) was founded in the same year as the Protectorate, and it should come as no surprise to discover that Rider Haggard would later become a fully paid-up member with his subscription of £2 2s.[7] As Gange and Ledger-Lomas have observed:

> Although almost all major denominations – from Catholicism and the Church of England, to Methodism and the Plymouth Brethren – are represented in the Early eef, founded in 1882, there are no known Unitarians among its initial membership. Favourable estimation of Egyptian achievements had quickly become, it seems, orthodox.'

The following section considers how the developing ideas of Egyptology and biblical archaeology were absorbed by Rider Haggard and made their way into a number of his Egyptian Romances. The emphasis on religious comparativism in relation to points of Christian doctrine and the search for evidence of biblical narratives in Egypt are particular points of focus.

Haggard was fascinated by Egypt. In particular, this section seeks to delineate his Christian Egyptosophical speculations, and interrogate more broadly the academic biases and religio-political agendas of Victorian Egyptology. It will also seek to contextualise these in terms of the rifts in the Anglican Communion in response to Higher Criticism, and Broad Church liberal reform. It examines the response of an emergent Egyptology to the attacks on Anglican orthodoxy, including the factionalism between Anglican Trinitarians and the Unitarian Church. We shall open with a discussion of how such doctrinal questions were approached by an Anglican gaze directed towards ancient Egypt in a search for archaeological evidence of biblical narratives, and theological precedence in the primordial truth of Egyptian religion. The section considers in some detail how such debates found their way into Haggard's Egyptian romances, and the influence of his friend Wallis Budge. Budge promulgated the notion of an 'original monotheism' in ancient Egypt: behind the panoply of theriomorphic deities there was a 'hidden monotheism' concealed by the hierocracy from the polis, 'the One for the wise, the many for the mass.' This idea was directly adopted by Haggard. In a number of his romances, Haggard also focuses specifically on the history of the pharaoh Akhenaten during the Eighteenth Dynasty − the so-called 'Amarna heresy.' The pharaoh famously abandoned the pantheon of Egyptian gods in favour of the worship of the solar disc – the Aten. In drawing on this 'Atenism', Haggard conflates a historically veridical monotheism with Budge's speculative 'original monotheism'. The discussion of Akhenaten will also elaborate upon Jan Assmann's mnemohistorical figure of Moses, and deploy Assmann's consideration of the 'Hebrew Moses' versus the 'Egyptian Moses', in a discussion of the reasons for Haggard's specific use of the latter. Finally, as further evidence of Budge's Christian Egyptosophical thought, I have documented what I have termed an *Osiride Christology*, where Osiris is presented as a type of Christ the Redeemer. This idea is again directly adopted by Haggard to emphasise the miraculous aspects of Christ, as described in Pauline epistolary literature; specifically, his divine nature, his death and resurrection, and substitutionary/vicarious atonement, all of which had been recently queried by Broad Church divines.

The discussion broadens to consider the concept of time in ancient Egypt, and the importance of the contrasting 'pagan' cyclical time and the linear time associated with Christian eschatology. It also

considers the notion of the cyclical rise and fall of civilisations as manifest in Haggard's oeuvre and his reflections on the fragility of empire and its decay. It considers the *temenos* of ancient Egypt as the progenitor of Western culture, and the sacred locale of the Exodus.

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Part 2

In his *Egyptian Myth and Legend* (1907), the journalist and folklorist Donald Mackenzie wrote that

> Herodotus was informed by the sages of Egypt that souls of the dead passed through "every species of terrestrial, aquatic, and winged creatures", and, after a lapse of about three thousand years, "entered a second time into human bodies". If that belief were as prevalent at present in these islands as it was in Celtic times, we might be at pains to convince the world that Shelley was a reincarnation of Akhenaton.[1]

Whether or not we are in agreement with Mackenzie's assumptions, it allows us to travel with his 'Poet King' and join him born again as the author of *Ozymandias*, to consider Rider Haggard's esotericism in relation to European Romanticism, and its instauration as the New Romance of the 1880s. Inevitably, we must begin our discussion with the perennial – and possibly by now the traditional argument of what constitutes the 'Romantic'. As this will involve some considerable conceptual difficulties, this overview is rather more extended and involved than those of the other two sections. As Hans Eichner has observed, 'Romanticism is an unpleasantly vague term, whose meaning depends only too often on the preoccupations of the person who happens to use it.'[2] Lovejoy also initially averred with considerable scepticism:

> There is no hope of clear thinking on the part of the student of modern literature, if – as, alas! has been repeatedly done by eminent writers – he vaguely hypostatizes the term, and starts with the presumption that "Romanticism" is the heaven-appointed designation of some single real entity, or type of entities, to be found in nature.

Indeed, as Hanegraaff points out, Lovejoy's inescapable conclusion was that 'romanticism has meant very different things to different people; apparently it is impossible to reach a consensus even about fundamentals. Lovejoy concludes that scholars should learn to use the word "romanticism" only in the *plural*.'[4] Thus, he saw a number of 'Romanticisms': a German Romanticism beginning in the 1790s, an English one from the 1740s; one French one commencing in 1801 and another in the second decade of the nineteenth century. Lilian R. Furst agreed with the importance of acknowledging *difference* in the Romantic movements of the English, French and German trajectories. As she points out, 'It is in fact perfectly feasible to study and characterise the English poetry of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries without ever having recourse to the epithet Romantic'. In contrast to German and French theoretical writings, it seldom appears in the works of Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley or Keats. This reflects the more practical, empirical-critical tradition in England which was less concerned with the theoretical definition as these authors were less focused on the profundity of philosophical concern found in Germany, or the importance of the contrast with the Neo-Classical tradition in France. As Furst points out, not least amongst the problems is the language difference:

> In each language the word was endowed with special meanings not acceptable nor even readily comprehensible to the poets of other lands; for instance, Friedrich Schlegel's and Novalis' – highly personal elaboration of *romantisch* was totally alien to the English and remote from the

> French too. Since the word had so diverse a connotation for the various protagonists, it is evidently erroneous to compare these Romanticisms as if they were based on an agreed definition, as if they meant the same thing. Yet this is just what many comparative studies have attempted to do, led on by the outer deceptive similarity of the words romantic, *romantique* and *romantisch.*

Nevertheless, with these provisos in mind, Furst characterises and considers three dominant themes; *Imagination*, *Individualism* and the *Expression of Feeling*, contrasting the different national emphases and elaborations of these: simplifying greatly, the English on the creative imagination, the Germans with speculative philosophy, and the French with unbridled emotion. Likewise, as Hanegraaff again observes, Lovejoy subsequently revised and consolidated his position, considering that there were a series of idea complexes which were consistent with a 'Romantic period'. For the period of the 1780s and 1790s, these idea complexes were associated with 'three characteristic German words: *das Ganze*, *Streben* and *Eigentümlichkeit,* which may be referred to as *holism* or *organicism*, *voluntarism* or *dynamism*, and *diversitarianism*. In other words, an organic living cosmos the Whole of which, in the Kantian sense, was greater than the sum of its parts; a striving for the Infinite characterised by personal spiritual evolution; and the importance of pluralism and diversity of culture and opinion, as opposed to Enlightenment uniformity.

On the question of a 'Romantic period', in *The Roots of Romanticism* Isaiah Berlin highlights the difficulties of making generalisations about the 'Romantic' when describing even a historical time frame, but contends that it is possible to identify recurring elements and themes within Romanticism when conceived broadly as a literary movement. As he remarks:

> One can say, like Valéry, that words like *romanticism* and *classicism*, words like *humanism* and *naturalism*, are not names which one can operate at all. 'One cannot get drunk, one cannot quench one's thirst, with labels on bottles.' There is much to be said for this point of view. At the same time, unless we do use some generalisations it is impossible to trace the course of human history.

This notion of a Romantic movement is extended to that of a Romantic *Weltanschauung* by Gerald McNiece. McNiece stresses the passion for unity, a lively unity pervading a rich diversity:

> A potential unity of purpose for example, of literature, philosophy, science, religion and mythology provided a motive and energy for much Romantic speculation and aspiration. The celebration of imagination and symbol as synthesising powers capable of reconciling oppositions and producing continually novel combinations may be understood in relation to this powerful drive towards comprehensiveness, Coleridge's multeity in unity. A preoccupation with unity seems to be connected with a preference for idealism. Romantic systems of thought were also, therefore, dominated by a persistent and pervasive strain of idealism and elitist psychology which emphasised the self-consciousness of exceptional men, who were also thought to be capable of drawing from profound layers of unconscious thought.

It is not unlikely that the Haggard as litterateur considered himself to be one of these 'exceptional men'. In Part 2, therefore, I shall consider how Haggard's work demonstrates the contiguities of his ideas with that of the Romantic movement in both its English and German forms, and how this established him as a leading proponent of another of the 'Romanticisms' – that of Saintsbury's 'New Romance'.

Romantic ideas are all-pervasive in Haggard. For example, even in such apparently self-consciously sensational adventure stories as *Allan Quatermain* they are not far below the surface – though easily

missed. In this particular romance, the adventurers Quatermain, Sir Henry Curtis and Umslopogaas find themselves in a canoe on the lake of a volcanic caldera. Quatermain, as narrator, says: 'There in the bows sat old Umslopogaas, like Pleasure in the poem', and Haggard, as 'Editor', corrects him in a footnote: 'Mr Allan Quatermain misquotes – Pleasure sat at the Helm.–editor.' The poem quoted is Gray's *The Bard: A Pindaric Ode* (1757) set during the reign of Edward I and his conquest of the Welsh.[11] It is significant as a proem to our discussion as Gray's ode is considered to have initiated the Celtic Twilight movements, and thus lies at the very root of English Romanticism. The excerpt is doubly significant as it also borrows from the German tradition by the use of Friedrich von Schlegel's *romantische Ironie*. This is an important concept of the so-called Jena School, the *Früromantiker* ('Early Romantics'). As Furst notes, this group was more complex than the earlier straightforward rebels of the *Sturm und Drang*,

who sought to live and create solely according to the dictates of feeling, while the Romantic strives also for knowledge, consciousness, a mastery of those feelings which in turn produced a certain self-detachment, the key to that curious Romantic concept of irony.

However, as Anne K. Mellor points out, whilst some of the English Romantics, notably Coleridge and Carlyle, were familiar with Schlegel's work and absorbed the concept into their tradition, it was not the only source of irony. As she reports: 'By far the most direct and pervasive source of romantic irony as a mode of consciousness in England was the native eighteenth-century Deist "higher criticism" of the Bible.' More broadly, 'Romantic irony was a significant part of the nineteenth-century English "spirit of the age," a recurrent sceptical reaction to the egotistical sublime of Christian fundamentalism, apocalyptic poetry, and Victorian myths of progress and imperialism.'

We have already seen the sense of personal detachment in action when the protean Haggard shifts identity between 'Author', 'Narrator', and 'Editor.' In common parlance, irony is spoken of as a kind of muted sarcasm, but in the Romantic sense it has a metaphysical connotation whereby it problematizes the ontological status of the writing – in Haggard's case between fact and fiction. Romantic irony is a nuanced concept, and a comprehension of it is key to an understanding of the Romantic project. Mellor distinguishes between literary/artistic and philosophical/metaphysical types of irony, though as we shall see in Haggard these two elements are often combined. In the example above, he is more playful: he provides a 'laying bare of device' by 'correcting' himself.

Therefore, alongside Romantic irony, and taking into account the caveats discussed above, my analysis will include the notions of the Romantic *Imaginatio*, the goddess Isis as a living Nature, and other Romantic themes which obtrude upon Haggard's Ayesha Series of novels: the approximations of Love, Sex and Death; the necessity of the unrequited; the striving for the Infinite. Expanding on some of these themes, Ricarda Schmidt, following Paul Kluckholn, describes a series of shared philosophical assumptions amongst the German Romantics which are fundamental to this section:

> Dialectical and cyclical rather than linear thinking; ideas of infinite unity and infinite multiplicity, of the sublime and yearning for the infinite, of hovering above unresolved contradictions and enthusiasm. A merging of the sacred and the profane, of the sublime and the trivial, characterizes Romantic yearning. But this is often expressed in irony, the awareness of the contrast between ideal and reality, which emerges through self-reflection and seeks distance

> from the self (Romantic irony). At times this leads to the conscious destruction of aesthetic illusions, escape from an identity which is little more than role-play.

She further summarises, again from Kluckholn that at the core of Romanticism there is

> An empathetic understanding of nature (as opposed to dissecting nature), a participation in its creativity, an emphasis on the unity of body, soul and spirit, an interest in the unconscious forces of the soul, in the so called 'vegetative' life of the psyche in which dream has prophetic function and provides a connection to the transcendental or divine. Fantasy and emotion play the central role in forming Romantic individuality.

Many of these ideas will emerge as we explore the resurgence of Romanticism in Haggardian New Romance. Haggard's fiction draws extensively on Old Testament narratives for his Romantic poeticised histories. As with that of the Romantic movement, his writing gives evidence of a kind of 'theoretical synaesthesia' which links 'poetry, the novel, philosophy and theology as well.' We shall examine how Haggard drew on both English and German Romantic authors (the latter in translation), and the Romantic elements of the Weimar Classicists Friedrich von Schiller and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. The necessarily poeticised nature of Romantic literary endeavour contributes at least in part to the difficulties we have encountered in trying to pin down and define 'the 'Romantic'. As Friedrich von Schlegel wrote:

> The romantic kind of poetry is still in the state of becoming; that, in fact, is its real essence: that it should forever be becoming and never be perfected. It can be exhausted by no theory and only a divinatory criticism would dare to try and characterise its ideal.

Thus, as Prickett comments, 'Romanticism here is not so much a thing as an Aristotelian *entelechy*, a process of becoming.' I shall elucidate how, in Haggard, this process of becoming extends to the 'striving' human, and spiritual evolutionism in the form of an amalgamation of metempsychosis and reincarnation.

As we have already seen, metempsychosis was not part of the soul-theory of the ancient Egyptians, but the increasing exposure of European intellectuals to Eastern religion from the 1750s onward meant that it would become a preoccupation of German Romantics who looked to India for the topos of their *Östliche Mystik*. In this context, there are certain commonalities between the Romantic orientalist perspective on Egypt and that directed to India. In Part 1, we explored how Christian comparativism saw itself mirrored in Egyptian religion with the idea of an 'original monotheism' in Egypt. It perhaps comes as little surprise then that a similar European response was directed to India. As Wilhelm Halbfass has observed, the orientalist Friedrich Majer (1771–1818) 'was captivated by the idea of an "original monotheism",' which was thought to be present in the most ancient Indian documents:

> It was his conviction that the religious and philosophical situation in Europe could only be clarified and rectified through a return to the Indian origins, and that the sources of the Western tradition found their integrating context and background in Indian thought: "It will no longer remain to be doubted that the priests of Egypt and the sages of Greece have drawn directly from the original well of India; that only Brahmanism can provide those fragments of their teaching which have come down to us with the clarity which they do not possess."

As already noted, Haggard never went to India, and unlike Kipling did not set his romances there. However, he did use Oriental religious and philosophical ideas, and where these are concerned he was very much dependent on the Romantic re-presentations in translation – one thinks of the notion

of *Seelenwanderung* ('transmigration') of a German mythic India – and, as we shall see later, he drew on these representations as they were interpreted and integrated in the Theosophy of Helena Blavatsky.

In the Introduction we touched on Faivre's criteria for what constitutes 'esotericism'. These are four fundamental elements and two other 'relative' components which may be present. These are: *Correspondences* (between Man, Nature and the Divine); *Living Nature*; *Imagination and Mediations*; *Transmutation* (Personal Transformation), and the two other possible inclusions: *Praxis of Concordance* (amounting to a *philosophia perennis* common to two or more religions), and *Transmission* (master to disciple). If we compare these criteria with the ideas we have discussed above as constituting Romanticism, the overlap should be immediately apparent. This is hardly surprising because, as Furst observes:

> In fact, the ideas of Blake, Coleridge and Novalis stemmed in important respects from a common source; the hermetic thought of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which maintained that truth was independent of sensible reality and could therefore only be perceived through mystical intuition.

Part 2 then considers not only the Romantic contiguities of Romanticism and the New Romance but those of the Romantic and the esoteric. It explores in more detail Haggard's Romantic exegesis of Old Testament narratives of Israel in Egypt, the Egyptian Moses and the Exodus. In particular, I shall consider the merging of Romantic and biblical notions of erotic love as a mystical metaphor: the Platonist and Christian ideas of *érōs* and *agápē* – of physical and spiritual love in the context of Haggard's Pauline opposition of the flesh and the Spirit.

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Part 3

concerns Haggard's relation to theosophy in general and Theosophy in particular. By convention Theosophy with a capital 'T' refers to the canon of the Theosophical Society founded by Henry Steel Olcott and the famous Helena Petrovna Blavatsky in 1875. The term theosophy pertains to 'divine wisdom', the transcendental wisdom beyond human *philosophia* which has an ancient lineage. It appears notably for our purposes in the epistles of St Paul − though not as one word, and in various combinations of *theos* and *sophia*. Its appearance as the single word *θεοσοφία* ('theosophia') is generally accredited to the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry. The contiguity of ideas from this *theosophia antiqua* also informs the Christian theosophies of the mystic Jakob Boehme in the context of German pietism, and Emanuel Swedenborg, whose influence has already been explored.

The following chapters will examine Haggard's reception of Theosophy and the reception of Haggardian Romance within Theosophical circles. I shall broaden the compass of Theosophy to consider its interface with anthropology and ethnology. In this regard we consider some of the important antecedents to Theosophical esoteric ethnology and its racial constructs.

We have been concerned in this account with the historicity of Bible narratives. In this context, they are vitally important to an understanding of the origins of Victorian racial anthropology. Central to this development is the history of the so-called Hamitic Hypothesis. This was formulated from the original biblical anthropology, with humanity being descended from the sons of Noah after the Deluge. The three sons Ham, Shem and Japheth giving rise to the Hamitic, S(h)emitic and Japhetic races, which then

diffused through Africa, Asia and Europe respectively. The vagaries of the Hamitic Hypothesis and the historical development of the notion of 'race' are traced by Michael F. Robinson in *The Lost White Tribe* (2016). It has its origin with the Bible story of Ham, who along with his descendants was cursed because he saw his father naked. This became the curse of Ham and his *black* descendants; subsequently this was modified to emphasise the curse of Canaan (Ham's son), thus allowing for the persistence of the notion of Haggard's ancient Egyptians as white and culturally advanced, long after it had ceased to be used to justify the Atlantic slave trade. It is apparent how, divorced from its scriptural roots, the language of Noahic anthropology would fall into confusion and eventual disuse, such that all that remains today is 'Semitic' referring to language, with 'anti-Semitic' indicating a prejudice toward Jewish peoples. Japhetic and Hamitic have disappeared from common parlance. As will become apparent, this discussion is relevant to our study as the theory of the diffusion of the Phoenician Hamites is directly connected with Haggard's anthropology, his creation of the Lost World genre, and his 'lost white races' in Africa.

Central to these final chapters is the emergence of comparative religion, and religious studies as an academic discipline separating from theology. Especially important in this regard, as comparativism took Christianity as its template, is a consideration of the Victorians' reconstructed Buddhism. In addition, I shall further consider how the notions of divine wisdom and secret doctrine are related to the importance of the imagination as a faculty of the seer, and thus the truth of the 'metaphysical' novel.

Theosophy is initially discussed in terms of Haggard's early spiritualistic experiments and exposure to the séance culture of the 1870s and 80s, as this is represented both autobiographically and in his semi-autobiographical fiction. As aforementioned, in his early years Haggard moved in the spiritualist circle of Lady Caithness − the great friend of Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831−1891), the famed founder of the Theosophical Society. I shall document the evidence for the influence of Theosophical ideas in Haggard's romances. Firstly, by the appropriation of leading Theosophists themselves as characters, and secondly, by the use of specific Theosophical ideas, including Blavatsky's 'Masters' or 'Mahatmas', cataclysmic civilisational collapse and temporal cyclicity.

In particular I shall adumbrate the influence of Haggard's avowedly favourite author Edward Bulwer-Lytton on his own writing and on the Theosophy of Helena Blavatsky, documenting the triangle of influence and interest formed by the three authors. The influence of both Bulwer-Lytton and Blavatsky is reflected in Haggard's preoccupation with the theme of reincarnation, demonstrating the British reception and construction of Buddhism: a uniquely Victorian transmigration of the soul accompanied by a spiritual evolutionism, which mirrored the social progressivism of the period. Haggard's romances present the equation and conflation of the ideas of karma and reincarnation with those of sin and redemption.

These discussions will be framed in the broader dialogue between Theosophy and the emergent comparative religion of the period. In addition, I shall locate the esoteric aspects of Rider Haggard's 'lost civilisation' and 'lost world' themes within the compass of Victorian anthropology and the racial theories of Theosophical esoteric ethnology. Haggard's engagement with the developing anthropology and comparative religious studies of the period forms an important facet of the study, and reflects in turn the influence of his close friend the *soi-disant* 'psycho-folklorist' and anthropologist Andrew Lang. In addition, therefore, we shall consider how Haggard, along with Lang, combined anthropological and psychical discourse in a discussion of the late-nineteenth century propensity for intertextuality between journalistic, anthropological and fictional narratives. The scope of Haggard's North-South literary axis of

Africa is crucial in this regard. The white, pre-Islamic, proto-Christian religiosity of the initiates of his 'Old Egypt' contrasted with the 'primitive' intuitive power and spirituality of the contemporaneous Zulu in the South African locale.

There is evidence in Haggard's romances of an over-arching esoteric thematic coherence, with parallel streams of what we may call the 'cyclical continuity' of man, the 'world' (Empire) and the cosmos. These are cycles of decay and renewal, separation and reunion, death and rebirth. In addition, this continuity has evolutionary, genealogical and racial facets, and the threat of degeneration – regression as well as progression − is ever present.

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Oh, kind is Death that Life's long trouble closes,
Yet at Death's coming Life shrinks back affright;
It sees the dark hand, not that it encloses
A cup of light.
So oft the Spirit seeing Love draw nigh
As 'neath the shadow of destruction, quakes,
For Self, dark tyrant of the Soul, must die,
When Love awakes.
Aye, let him die in darkness! But for thee,
Breathe thou the breath of morning and be free!

I began this account with an exploration of some of the religious ideas in Haggard's lesser-known novel *Beatrice*. In the front pages, the poem above is given by way of a prefatory meditation, and beneath it is inscribed 'rückert. *Translated by* F.W.B,' specifying precisely the source from which Haggard lifted it. This is an English translation from the German of the Romantic poet and orientalist scholar, Friedrich Rückert (1788–1866). What is not at first apparent is that this is not Rückert's poem. Elsewhere in the original source is the German version, entitled 'Rückert's translation from the Persian,' and it is a translation of a Persian *ghazal* by Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī (1207–1273), more simply 'Rumi', the famous Sufi mystic and poet. The reasons for opening my conclusions with this poem are that firstly, it is typical of Haggard's writing – the importance of examining 'what is not at first apparent'. The occult is that which is hidden, and one might say that the esoteric is that which is 'hidden in plain sight', after the manner of the hieroglyph, and therefore that which is 'not at first apparent'. During this account, I have had cause to examine Haggard's esotericism, and many of his allusions and source materials, and what is now apparent is the breadth and depth of his reading. Of course, one can always speculate, as his critics often did, as to his awareness of what he was writing, and whether he knew that this poem was ultimately by Rumi, but given his interest in Romantic authors it is safe to accept that he knew of Rückert. My second reason for using this ghazal is that it encompasses one of Haggard's greatest themes. A ghazal is typically written in praise of love in spite of pain, loss and separation; it is often written from the perspective of the unrequited lover. This is the perennial theme of Haggardian romance: that love belongs to eternity and survives physical death; a transcendental *agápē* which outlives the perpetual war of the flesh and the Spirit, and which he derived principally from the letters of St Paul.

We saw previously how in *Stella Fregelius*, the bereft Morris sets out in earnest on an esoteric path to contact the drowned Stella:

> Now, by such arts as are known to those who have studied mysticism in any of its protean forms, Morris set himself to attempt communication with the unseen. In their practice these arts are as superlatively unwholesome as in their result, successful or not, they are unnatural.[4] Also, they are very ancient. The Chaldeans knew them, and the magicians who stood before Pharaoh knew them. To the early Christian anchorites and to the gnostic they were familiar. In one shape or another, ancient wonder-workers, Scandinavian and mediaeval seers, modern Spiritualists, classical interpreters of oracles, Indian fakirs, savage witch-doctors and medicine men, all submitted or submit themselves to the yoke of the same rule in the hope of attaining an end which, however it may vary in its manifestations, is identical in essence.
>
> This is the rule: to beat down the flesh and its instincts and nurture the spirit, its aspirations and powers.

In many ways, this passage neatly summarises the breadth of Haggard's knowledge of the history of esoteric ideas, how their countries of origin have contributed to the Imperial Occult, and how they have been approached in this account. From Bulwer-Lytton's Romantic Chaldean Zanoni, to the magicians and 'Pharaoh' of the Exodus and biblical Egyptology; Haggard's near-gnostic dualism and melancholic acosmism; his Scandinavian seers including Swedenborg, and his Danish extraction and mysticism; the Spiritualists of his youth; the fakirs, Tibetan Mahatmas and Indian mystique of Theosophy; and, of course, the witch-doctors – the Zulu sangomas in the Africa of his youth. As ever with Haggard, it is the Pauline opposition of the flesh and the Spirit which for him is central to these endeavours, as it is to his own religious philosophy. In his Introduction to Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*, H.D. Traill said of the author that he would not have considered himself a philosopher, 'whose own metaphysic was a mere tissue of poetic rhapsodies'.[6] I hope that whilst at times Haggard may have been said to have written rhapsodically, the substance of his philosophy is apparent.

This exploration of that religious philosophy has taken us through a progressive 'unveiling of Isis', dealing with that which is hidden, be it unconscious, forgotten, buried or veiled. This in turn has demonstrated that the 'Veil of Isis' is a polysemic image. To the occultist it conceals the hidden laws of Nature, yet to be revealed. To the Romantic, it is a *natura naturans* that can never be revealed by mere scientific rationalism. Blavatsky felt that her 'occult science' of Theosophy had unveiled Isis; Haggard seems at times to have doubted her conviction. The over-arching concept of the Imperial Occult has allowed us to impose a structure on the processual mechanisms and topoi of syncretic theology, how these ideas appeared in Haggard's romances, and were thus transmitted to the reading public.

Clearly the recourse to the integration of alien religious formations cannot be a restoration of orthodoxy. The implicit Anglo-Catholic theological position involved in revitalising the Anglican faith by restoring the supernaturalism stripped away by attempted Broad Church reform is a problematic one for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is debatable whether one can term such religious structures 'new'. For example, the apparent incorporation of Hindu and Buddhist reincarnationism into Christianity, when a belief in reincarnation -albeit in the form of Greek metempsychosis – persisted amongst individuals that self-identified as Christian as late as the Enlightenment, and was certainly prevalent in the ante-Nicene era. This makes broad statements concerning 'hybridisation' and 'syncretism' problematic, when on occasion what is actually meant is a return to an earlier religious structure, albeit in a modified form. The propensity to accept even the possibility of such changes can be seen superficially as promulgating a liberal and reformist Broad Church perspective. But its aim is quite the contrary – to support and shore up the supernaturalism stripped away by liberal reform, associated with orthodox scriptural and

doctrinal doxa. In other words, the originary trajectories of British occultism were not countercultural at the *outset* – though they would come to have this association – but rather, directed toward the repair of the damage done to High Church Anglican theology, notably following *Essays and Reviews*, with an appeal to tradition, hierarchy, ritual, sacerdotalism, and supernaturalism. The necessity of an instauration of these five elements took the syncretic Victorian *religio mentis* throughout the Empire and beyond.

In Egypt, as we have seen, the retrojective imagination was often as much a motive for archaeological exploration as the much vaunted, nominally dispassionate and scientific approach. Thus, in the Victorian period Egyptology as an emergent science was not always the dominant trajectory. In Colla's observation:

> Textual representations of Egyptian antiquities and fictional narratives on Pharaonic themes were not simply posterior reflections of material practice. On the contrary, archaeology and museum culture anticipated, as much as they proceeded from, the cultural imaginary of Egyptomania and Pharaonism.

As we have seen, just as the forged artefacts are text-objects for Haggard's romances so the actual archaeological finds became text-objects for biblical narratives. In both cases the object serves an identical purpose: it is given as tangible physical evidence for the reality of the narrative. This propensity for intertextuality, the blending of 'fact' and 'fiction', is a key to the understanding of Haggard's literature and its relationship with Victorian Egyptology and anthropology. As we have seen, although Haggard often follows Egyptological disciplinary perspectives and their changes closely, he is selective in terms of how he deploys these for his fictional narratives and their didactic purpose. It is true that in his memoirs and the romances he changes the name of the 'Pharaoh' of the Exodus three times – apparently in order to retain the plausibility of a biblical Egypt in the face of emergent archaeological evidence. In a more specifically esoteric context, Rider Haggard appealed to the 'primordial wisdom' of Egypt. In Haggard's writing, the Egyptosophical and biblical discourses coalesce in the milieu of an Imperial Occult. The comparativism of his religious speculations on a proto-Christianity in Egypt take him away from the proscriptions of a dogmatic or revelation theology. What has to be emphasised is the importance of this idea of hidden Nature behind the 'Veil of Isis,' or in Haggard's use of St Paul's phrase, 'the curtain of the unseen'. Crucial to Haggard's esoteric, proto-Christian Egypt is a Romantic construction of a Saitic Isis as Nature, and the transmission of secret knowledge concerning this hidden Nature, possessed by the initiated Egyptian priesthood.

As I have demonstrated, this New Romantic view of Haggard's owes much to contiguities with the ideas of the English and German Romantics. He provides evidence of the Romantic notions of the Weimar Classicists Goethe and Schiller amongst others. We have seen how German Romanticism looked not only to Egypt but to India. In addition, this led us to explore Victorian constructions of Buddhism and the importance of these in Haggard's romances and correspondence. I have emphasised in particular the Romantic appropriation of the Bible, and have explored how Haggard combines the Romantic ideas of the *Liebestod*, with Platonic *érōs* and Pauline *agápē* in his own philosophy of an *amor aeternus.* For Haggard, 'Love Eternal' survives the grave and his lovers are reincarnated and reunited.

I have marshalled evidence to challenge the argument that Haggard's novels employed esoteric themes merely as literary propagandist devices for the imperialist project. Rather, that the British archaeological presence in Egypt and the importance of this to British culture, combined with a more overt political involvement with the establishment of the British Protectorate in 1882, led to a counter-invasion of

religious and philosophical ideas. Likewise, the colonial presence of the British in South Africa during the tumult of the Zulu War and Two Boer Wars, the process of missionising and the associated rise of comparative religious studies led to a dialogue between the Imperial metropolitan centre and its academics and the colonial periphery, and Haggard engaged with this dialogue. India as the third of our Imperial locales had several centuries of exchange of ideas with Great Britain, but notably after the establishment of the Theosophical Society in 1875 and the hybridisation of religious structures which ensued. We have showed ample evidence for Haggard's deployment of ideas from the Theosophical corpus, notably in the context of his combination of Christian eschatology, temporal cyclicity, and the rise and fall of civilisations.

I would argue that, in the colonial context, the counter-invasion of ideas which is coeval with the New Imperialism served to act as a critique of modernity in general and the colonialist project in particular. In this regard, there was a 'reverse-missionising' aimed at the revitalising of metropolitan religiosity discussed above. I have argued that the engagement with alien religious structures at the turn of the century was the crib of the British nineteenth-century occult revival. Hanegraaff has suggested a qualified definition of occultism as '*all attempts by esotericists to come to terms with a disenchanted world or, alternatively, by people in general to make sense of esotericism from the perspective of a disenchanted secular world*'.[8] In this context, the notion that a Weberian 'disenchantment of the world' ever took place has now been seriously critiqued.[9] It would be more accurate to say that, rather than an attempt at 're-enchantment', there was an attempt at restoring the supernatural to Christian religiosity, albeit in the form of a 'natural supernaturalism', and a failed attempt at buttressing Anglican orthodoxy. These ideas and processes are evident in Haggardian romance, and Haggard was instrumental in their promulgation. In this fashion the rise of the New Romance in literature with its esoteric themes acted as an amplification of biblical narratives – with or without biblical themes – in which the metaphysical novel replaced the pilgrimage with the mystical quest.

We have traced the importance of Africa in Haggard, both in terms of Egypt and Southern Africa. Haggard's North-South spatial axis of Africa is accompanied by an axis of temporal engagement in terms of spirituality: ancient Egypt in the North and contemporaneous i.e. nineteenth-century, 'modern' Africa in the South. In the North he saw ancient progenitors of modern western monotheistic religion; in the South, a paradoxical combination of atavistic intuitive animism and modern savage and 'degenerate' superstition. Haggard's romances evoke the Victorian anthropological legerdemain whereby the Ancient Egyptians became dead moderns and contemporary tribal Africans became 'living fossils'. Nonetheless, we have seen how Haggard problematized and unsettled the ingrained notions of racial hierarchy and assumptions of the superiority of the white male. As Allan Quatermain would have it, 'Civilisation is only savagery silver-gilt. A vainglory is it, and, like a northern light, comes but to fade and leave the sky more dark.' As Chidester remarks, following Chrisman's argument, imperial political economy and spiritual enchantment were not easily separated in Haggard:

> Here was an Imperialist advocating the empire, celebrating its military and economic interests, actively promoting the Shepstone system of indirect rule, and reinforcing all of the racialized, gendered and sexualized tropes of empire through his best-selling novels. But here also was a spiritualist, of sorts, believing in reincarnation, even vaguely recalling his own past lives as a caveman, a black savage, an ancient Egyptian, and a medieval barbarian, while holding on to a romantic ideal of British pastoral life.

Whilst there is no doubt about Haggard as an imperialist, I hope that this account has successfully contested and complicated some of the assertions made in this quote concerning Haggard's use of 'racialized, gendered and sexualized tropes of empire'. Haggard was told about the possibility of his reincarnations as we recall by a 'mystic of the first water' and certainly wrote in fiction about Quatermain's past-lives, amongst others, but there is no documentation of a personal anamnesis, however vague. Likewise, he had been involved in spiritualism in his extreme youth, but as we have seen, his belief system became more complex with age. It is the importance of the exploration of this belief system which I have argued for alongside the well-travelled route of 'Haggard the imperialist', and the evidence for syncretic theology and occultism in his fiction and correspondence.

It is admittedly difficult to comprehend from within a modern or perhaps 'post-modern' *Weltanschauung* inured to the explosion of information technology which has occurred during the 20th and 21st centuries – where people can communicate across vast distances in seconds – that the syncretism and hybridity of ideas described in this account of British nineteenth and early twentieth-century occultism, and its multifarious sources, depended much more on the geopolitics of Empire and the movement and often direct physical contact of different peoples. 'Syncretism' did not simply belong in some abstract realm of ideas but was derivative of a cultural rapprochement. Arguments have been many concerning the nature of these nexi: Self and Other, colonizer and colonized, Imperialist and Subaltern. I have tried to emphasise the counter-invasion of ideas resulting from the Imperialist project and the importance of their interrogation of the colonialist stance. The cultural rapprochement was most important in the missionising project which Haggard critiqued, and which as we have discussed often had in view the promulgation of the miraculous Christ of Pauline Christianity.

In this regard, it is my contention that Haggard turns to St Paul because of the apostle's essentially mystical theology. This goes beyond the scriptural evidence of the Apostle's Damascene *kataphasis* and conversion. It fits readily with the idea of Paul as a promulgator of the miraculous Christ, at least in part responsible in this account for the Osiride Christology prevalent amongst Victorian Egyptologists and Haggard. It dovetails readily with Romantic philhellenism and Paul as an initiate of the Mysteries, and with Blavatskian Theosophy which also draws on the latter and makes Paulinism a continuation of the initiatic Graeco-Egyptian Mysteries, and a component of the Hermetic discourse. To what extent Haggard considered Paul an 'initiate' is another question – but that is not our concern. Haggard's own interest in the spiritual and the mystical led him to seek out the apostle's work, citing him frequently because Pauline mystical theology comports with his own. He did even on occasion hint at personal mystical experience and its transience. Lilias Haggard records a conversation between Haggard and Kipling on the nature of mystical communion. Haggard says:

> I told him that I did believe that as a result of much spiritual labour there is born in one a knowledge of the nearness and consolation of God. He replied that occasionally this had happened to him also, but the difficulty was to 'hold' the mystic sense of this communion – that it passes. Now this I have found very true. Occasionally one sees the Light, one touches the pierced feet, one thinks that the peace which passes understanding is gained – then all is gone again. Rudyard's explanation is that it meant to be so; that God does not mean we should get too near lest we become unfitted for our work in the world. Perhaps …

Here, Haggard contemplates Paul's Epistle to the Philippians: 'The peace of God which passeth all understanding'– the ineffable, apophatic bliss of the *Unio mystica* – and its transience.

As aforementioned, Haggard is also concerned with transience at a more mundane level: the cyclical rise and fall of Empire. As we have seen, these events are often associated with a recrudescence of the Hermetic narrative, and recourse to the wisdom tradition to bolster and revitalise the sclerotic structures of Church and State. As with the collapse of Byzantium and the rise of the Italian Humanism in the *quattrocento*, so with the fading of British Imperialism and the 'occult revival' in the late nineteenth-century, and beyond the Great War. The resurgence of occultism in the nineteenth century was however complicated by an internal tension between the Hermetic-Theosophic and the Romantic; the former with its wisdom attained and the latter which emphasised wisdom's unending pursuit. This aporia of Occultism and Romanticism, as we have seen, found its point of equilibrium in Carlyle's 'Natural Supernaturalism' where there are hidden laws of nature (Occultism) which can never be revealed (Romanticism). Haggard's romance tapped into and revealed these important currents.

The revealing process is as we have seen intimately related to literary hermeneutics. It is at first sight a strange and manifest contrast that the 'progressive' English Realist literature of the mid-1800s deployed biblical typology, whilst simultaneously rejecting the Bible. Haggard's New Romantic literature of the *fin de siècle* transitioned typological hermeneutics into reincarnation, finding, as did the Theosophists, evidence for reincarnation in Scripture. Typology and reincarnationism are intimately linked because of their contrasting interpretations. Typology fits with a linear eschatology, but reincarnationism can only be accommodated if the cycles of reincarnated lives are equated with purgatory/the intermediate period, representing a purification of the soul prior to final judgement and the entry into eternity. However, Haggard's New Romanticism and Theosophical perspective moved beyond both – by conflating the Providential Aesthetic with *karma* and rebirth, and finding the perceived moral economies of the latter as equated with sin and redemption.

The conveyance of such religious and anthropological ideas in Haggard's fiction has foregrounded the importance of text and specifically intertextuality in locating his oeuvre. The Protestant emphasis on the significance of scripture especially in terms of its historicity in turn drove the emphasis on textuality in comparative religion as we have seen. This supremacy of the text fostered in turn the importance of the academic footnote in comparativism, and in turn the use of the footnote by Haggard in his fiction, where he used it both for the purposes of immersion and for factual education. In turn, in the form of Romantic Irony, it problematized the ontological status of his texts as fact or fiction. The footnote remains a mainstay of academicians up to the present day, though the historical links with Higher Criticism, and orientalist and comparativist discourse are largely lost. In any case, as opposed to the strictly historicist approach to historiography, as Gordan Djurdjevic avers, there is an alternative perspective in which

> The presence of imaginative construction or fiction is an inescapable condition in the formulation of *any* account about reality. Reality is structured as fiction (Lacan). There are no facts, only interpretations (Nietzsche). The priest, the poet, the scientist, and the historian are each and every one, from this other point of view, in the final instance all storytellers.

And Rider Haggard was, of course, the 'Great Storyteller'. In this context, the question remains as to why he chose fiction as the main, if not sole vehicle, for his thought. The simple answer is this: for a man who perceived himself as a staunch Anglican, placing his work in a fictional context provided him with a get-out clause – a theological alibi, if you will. In the last analysis, he could simply dissimulate and say that these were merely products of fantasy.

We have considered how the importation of new religious structures was used to revitalise Anglican confession in the face of the threat posed to Scripture by the internal divisions generated and epitomised by the Anglican *Essays and Reviews*, continental biblical historicism and Darwinism. The questions remain as to how such hybridisation could possibly take place. Given the considerable structural differences between, as an important example, Christian and Buddhist doctrine – how can such antipathetical eschatologies and religious structures fit together, and, indeed, why should this process have a revitalising effect? A close study of the complex relationships between *karma* and Providence, reincarnation and typology, and the hybridity with sin and redemption in Haggard's oeuvre has provided us with some possible answers. Given the history of reincarnation in Christian thought, perhaps rather than 'hybridisation' it is a question in such circumstances of revitalising by the restoration of older religious ideas, which naturally reflects the Hermetic ethos of the return of the *prisca theologia.* The Anglo-European and – in recent years – transatlantic Imperial trope of 'former greatness' and its restoration semantically engages in the History of Ideas with a biblical pre-lapsarian state, a classical Golden Age, a Renaissance *prisca theologia*, a Theosophical ancient wisdom, and a post-modern *Ur*-technology.

What, then, are the logical processual mechanisms involved in adapting such historical, or rather, historiographical schemata of Buddhist and/or Hindu thought to Christianity? The larger questions concerning elective salvation and eternal damnation raised in the Anglican Communion were addressed by changes in attitudes toward linear time and temporal cyclicity. Cyclical time was adapted to a linear eschatology in part by changing the Anglican 'intermediate period'/Catholic Purgatory to a series of earthly reincarnations during which the required spiritual purification takes place. This approximated more closely to a reversion to the Greek influence conferring metempsychosis on Early Christianity prior to the establishment of conciliar orthodoxy. The 'counter-invasion' of Buddhism and Hinduism promoted a resurgence of these older ideas.

The questions raised about human agency and autonomy by the challenge to elective salvation and eternal damnation were reflected in *karma* and its contingent rebirth becoming conflated with the moral economies of sin and redemption as we have seen. *Karma* becomes not a law of necessity as in un-reconstructed Buddhism, but of retribution. The emphasis on what is strictly metempsychosis rather than reincarnation resulted in the substitution of an *ethos of perfectibility* for karmic necessity. Old Testament typological criticism relies on Providence and the idea of an over-arching and at least in part predetermined temporal structure. The advance of science and the attacks of historiography served to make typological hermeneutics obsolete, and the Old Testament less relevant, increasingly reduced to the status of fable and allegory. However, as fictional religiosity appropriated the *figura* from the scriptural, typology was continued in the literature of the Victorian period. With the New Romance of the 1880s onward, the emphasis was shifted from the typological to reincarnationism – as promulgated in the reincarnation romances of Rider Haggard. In addition, the religiosity of the Haggard's New Romance acts as an adjunct to scripture by re-presenting Bible stories in fictional form. These reconfigurations pose questioning alternate histories. Although as we have seen, Haggard asserts the literal truth of Scripture, his mystical and esoteric theology simultaneously sidesteps and endorses its historicity, whilst amplifying its religious content.

The shift from typology to reincarnation thus further revitalised a religiosity bogged down with the question of human agency, by postponing the question indefinitely. Reincarnation supports the notion

that karmic necessities are responsible for apparent free will: these necessities were presented by the free will of the previous life – and so on in infinite regress. We have seen how Haggard worked through this quandary in *Stella Fregelius.* To summarise the above, the bridge between linear and cyclical time is provided by the substitution of reincarnationism for typological hermeneutics. Reincarnationism dispels (or at least, suspends) the conundrum of the coexistence of Free Will and Providence.

As we have seen, to a certain extent this shoring-up of a beleaguered Anglicanism was an Imperial concern. Inevitably, if the Empire is seen in the guise of Christendom, and part of the 'White Man's Burden' of civilising is Christian missionising i.e. the justification of Imperial expansion as civilising and Christianising, then the failure of Christian theology to present a coherent front in the face of a scientific *Weltanschauung,* and as a result of doctrinal schism in the Anglican communion, leaves the argument for the Imperial project fundamentally flawed. Haggard remained deeply ambivalent about colonialism, whilst working for the British Empire all his life and having that fact written on his grave. He was doubtful of the value of 'civilising' the 'savage', and was impressed by the power of indigenous spirituality, which he felt that the white man had lost. As a result, he spent much of his life in ideological vacillation as is evident in his work: in this regard we have demonstrated how he frequently subverts conventional colonial hierarchies. In his Introduction to *Allan Quatermain*, Haggard makes his concerns explicit when he says that it is a 'depressing conclusion, but in all essentials the savage and the child of civilisation are identical'. His ambivalence about modernity and civilisation is evident. Although in favour of technological advance, he wrote on afforestation and coastal erosion and was an ecologist and perhaps 'deep' ecologist *avant la lettre.* As a prominent figure amongst London society intelligentsia, he could nevertheless see in urban decay metaphors for the Cities of the Plain: not simply a New Jerusalem among these 'dark satanic mills', but – alongside his New Amarna, Alexandria, or Thebes – a New Sodom and Gomorrah.

In conclusion, though at first sight often assumed to be countercultural and reflective of an alleged Romantic reaction to scientific materialism, we can see that British occultism had the coterminous trajectory with Anglo-Catholicism of restoring the supernaturalism stripped away by attempted Broad Church reform in the wake of *Essays and Reviews.* It sought to restore initiation and the sacerdotalism of the High Church ritual. The challenged 'evidences' were replaced – typology with reincarnation, the miraculous with the magic of occult science, even Christ with Osiris. On a broader canvas, the Imperial Occult is not a simple epiphenomenal manifestation of the attempt to buttress Empire as Christendom, but also an ecumenism extending beyond the Christian church, and the counter-invasion of a panoply of diverse ideas from the Imperial locales which complicated the issue. In the last analysis, the Imperial Occult was not countercultural *ab origin*e, but it would eventually interrogate modernism and the imperial project, notably with the Theosophist Annie Besant as a founder of the Indian National Congress. The number of neologisms and other terms which challenge the very notion of objectivity, 'mnemohistory', 'metageography', 'intertextuality' and 'mediation' are salutary of how much esotericism relies on Romantic theories of knowledge. Rider Haggard's thorough engagement with all of these discourses provides evidence for the internal ambiguities, tensions and perpetual conflicts of an ambivalent imperialist. As Vance succinctly puts it, with regard to the religio-philosophical ideas discussed, 'The popular author of *King Solomon's Mines* (1885) and *She* (1887), and many other works, deserves to be taken more seriously as – among other things – a multicultural religious novelist.'

Amongst those many cultures, Haggard was most at home in Egypt. His romantic fealty with the god Thoth and the Hidden Wisdom of Isis was always profoundly significant for him. It links him – Romantically and otherwise – with the Hermetic discourse and its various tributaries, which we have been concerned to follow during the course of this book. Thoth-Hermes, as the god of writing and magic epitomises the Romantic idea of the imagination and its literary manifestation as a noetic organ which apprehends 'Hidden Wisdom'. Haggard had his letterhead and library stamp written in Egyptian hieroglyphs, and given his love of Egypt it is therefore fitting that we should close with this. It translates as:

> *H. Rider Haggard, the son of Ella, lady of the house, makes an oblation to Thoth, the Lord of writing, who dwells in the moon.*

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Reformation, Revolution, Renovation: The Roots and Reception of the Rosicrucian Call for General Reform by Lyke de Vries [Universal Reform, Brill, 9789004250222]

At the centre of the Rosicrucian manifestos was a call for 'general reformation'. In *Reformation, Revolution, Renovation*, the first book-length study of this topic, Lyke de Vries demonstrates the unique position of the Rosicrucian call for reform in the transformative context of the early seventeenth century. The manifestos, commonly interpreted as either Lutheran or esoteric, are here portrayed as revolutionary mission statements which broke dramatically with Luther's reform ideals. Their call for reform instead resembles a variety of late medieval and early modern dissenting traditions as well as the heterodox movement of Paracelsianism. Emphasising the universal character of the Rosicrucian proposal for change, this new genealogy of the core idea sheds fresh light on the vexed question of the manifestos' authorship and helps explain their tumultuous reception by both those who welcomed and those who deplored them.

CONTENTS

Confessio Fraternitatis

> Whence it is right that deceit, darkness, and slavery withdraw, which, by the gradually advancing instability of the great globe, crept into the sciences, actions, and human governments, by which these have been for the better part obscured [...]. When finally all of this will be removed, as we trust, we shall see it instead substituted with a similar rule that will perpetually remain equal to itself. –Confessio Fraternitatis

***

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, three mysterious texts stirred up much debate in the intellectual world: The Fama Fraternitatis (Fame of the Fraternity, 1614), the Confessio Fraternitatis (Confession of the Fraternity, 1615), and, different from but related to both, the Chymische Hochzeit: Christiani Rosencreutz (Chemical Wedding of Christian Rosencreutz, 1616). While the Chemical Wedding presents a fictional autobiographical narrative, the first two texts are manifestos, mission

statements. Their authors remained anonymous, but claimed to be members of a secret fraternity founded by a Christian Rosencreutz in the early fifteenth century. Written during the third generation of the Reformation, in the midst of early modern scientific transformations, and on the eve of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), these two provocative manifestos called for a general reformation of religious, scientific, and political life and announced the coming of a new era.

No sooner had the manifestos been published than their call received responses from all quarters of Europe. In the years immediately after their publication, hundreds of letters, pamphlets, and books were written by enthusiasts who wished to come into contact with this elusive brotherhood, and all over Northern Europe authors claimed to be members of that enigmatic fraternity. They penned their support and admiration for these revolutionary texts and hailed the harbingers of a new time of prosperity. In response, academic authors, shocked and outraged by these subversive writings, wrote harsh letters and tracts fulminating against the Rosicrucian brethren, their paradoxical mission statements, and the followers that wrote in their wake.4 The Rosicrucian manifestos stirred up so much controversy that for over a decade they were the focus of a large international and intellectually pervasive dispute. By 1625, the Rosicrucian controversy had been discussed in over four hundred texts.

The Rosicrucian response had begun in a somewhat clandestine manner already several years before the first manifesto, the Fama, was published in 1614. The German Paracelsian theosopher and first commentator on the manifestos, Adam Haslmayr (ca. 1562–ca. 1631), gained access to this mysterious material as early as 1610, and soon wrote an Answer to the Fama. Printed in 1612, two years before that manifesto itself would appear in print, he claimed in his audacious reply that he awaited with anticipation the emergence of the brethren from their hiding place. 1610 was also the year that his friend, the German alchemist and editor Benedictus Figulus (real name Benedict Töpfer, 1567-after 1619), acquired a copy of the Fama, presumably thanks to Haslmayr, and ensured its wider distribution. Such was the allure of this manifesto that before long the German ruling elite became involved. In 1611, Prince August von Anhalt-Plötzkau (1575–1653) expressed an interest in the Fama. In a letter dated that year, he asked both Haslmayr and the collector of Paracelsian and Weigelian manuscripts, Karl Widemann (1555–1637), to write a public response to the text.8 Haslmayr's Answer was his fulfilment of this request, and was soon printed numerous times, first by an unknown and presumably secret press, but in subsequent years it was often republished together with editions of the Fama and the Confessio.

Meanwhile to the west of Plötzkau, in Marburg, the Paracelsian physician Johann Hartmann (1558–1631) read the Fama in 1611, in a copy apparently given to him by Figulus. Soon the text reached an international readership as Hartmann gave it to the Danish physician and antiquarian Ole Worm (1588–1655). Whereas the former might have taken a favourable view on the text, the latter was quick to dismiss the Rosicrucian message. Not much later a second Dane, Erik Lange (1559–1643), brother-in-law of the famous astronomer Tycho Brahe (1546–1601), received a copy of this manuscript and rushed into writing a sympathetic letter in support, addressed to the "Lords and brothers of the fraternity and brotherhood of the admirable and everlasting Order of the Rose Cross" (1613).

After the publication of the Rosicrucian manifestos in 1614 and 1615, word of these inventive texts spread much more widely across Northern Europe. A large number of responses ensued to the Rosicrucians' call for reform and their appeal to readers "to examine their own arts precisely and keenly [...] and reveal to us their thoughts in written form in print." Back in German lands, the anonymous author of the preface to a work entitled About the Highest, Very Best and Most Expensive Treasures

(Echo, 1615), attributed to the alchemist Julius Sperber (ca. 1540–1610?), argued that the manifestos were echoes of Adamic and ancient wisdom recently voiced in the works of Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, and Agrippa von Nettesheim. In the same year, 1615, Rosicrucian texts appeared under the pseudonym Julianus de Campis, while in 1617 and 1618 the famous alchemist Michael Maier (1568– 1622) defended the brotherhood against various attacks. In the meantime, the court astronomer and later physician Daniel Mögling (pseudonyms Theophilus Schweighart and Florentinus de Valentia, 1596–1635) discussed, extolled, and defended the manifestos in several of his writings.

Simultaneously in England, the manifestos found an early apologist in the prominent physician and astrologer Robert Fludd (1574–1637), who defended them against fierce attacks by the German physician and putative author of the first chemistry textbook, Andreas Libavius (1555–1616). A few years later Fludd found himself defending Rosicrucianism again, this time against the attacks of the French mathematicians and friends of the famous philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650), Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655) and Marin Mersenne (1588–1648).

Shortly after the written debate between Libavius and Fludd, the tutor and travelling Rosicrucian prophet Philipp Ziegler (ca. 1584-?) came into the picture back on German soil, as he claimed to be a member of the brotherhood. Inspired by the Rosicrucian texts, in March 1619 he announced his arrival in the Bavarian town of Fürth, calling himself "[...] King of Jerusalem, Shiloh, Joseph and David, crowned by the grace of God, foremost brother of the Rosicrucians and invincible Scepter of the King in Sion." Further north, in the town of Giessen just a few years later, in 1623, the physician Heinrich Nolle (Nollius, 1583–1630?) published a work entitled Mirror of the Philosophical Parergon, which was inspired by the Rosicrucian Chemical Wedding and informed by the brethren's reform plans. Also in 1623, posters appeared on church walls across the Rhine, in Paris, proclaiming that the Rosicrucian brethren had now established a presence in the French capital. This was the year that Descartes had returned to Paris, and the philosopher was somewhat perturbed by false accusations of his being one of the Rosicrucian brethren and of having brought the Rosicrucian furore with him to that city.

The manifestos generated also a great deal of excitement in the Dutch Republic, with followers in Amsterdam, The Hague, and Leiden. The movement was thought to be propagated by the enthusiast Peter Mormius (ca. 1580-after 1632), the painter Johannes Symonsz van der Beek, known as Johannes Torrentius (1589–1644), and the printer Govert Basson (d. 1643), who published many Rosicrucian works and owned even more. Torrentius was arguably the best still-life painter of his age. His paintings puzzled all his colleagues and peers, none of whom could discover how they were made and which materials were used—qualities which combined to add to his allure as a mysterious Rosicrucian.

By 1626, the main Scandinavian advocate for the Rosicrucian cause was the Swedish antiquarian Johannes Bureus (1568–1652), who famously claimed that this new movement was in fact a new manifestation of ancient, divine wisdom. Bureus was in contact with the book collector and publisher Joachim Morsius (pseudonym Anastasius Philaretus Cosmopolita, 1593–1653), who must also have been acquainted with Torrentius, as a portrait of the latter in Morsius' album amicorum testifies. Morsius had tried to contact the top-secret brotherhood in a public letter to which, against all odds, he received a reply—a unicum since none other elicited a response.

The overwhelming flood of heterodox tracts and pamphlets written in support of the Rosicrucian movement was met by an equally prolific current of authors, like Libavius and Gassendi, who were

shocked and outraged by these outlandish texts and condemned their authors and supporters alike. But the reaction to Rosicrucianism was not limited to words alone, and soon authorities took legal action against its supporters. Even as early as 1612, Rosicrucianism was perceived as dangerous: in that year, Haslmayr's support of the Rosicrucians got him sentenced to the galleys. He had sent a letter to Maximilian iii (1558–1618), Regent of Tyrol (1602–1612) and later Archduke of Austria (1612– 1618), to ask for money to travel to Montpellier in search of the mysterious brethren. In response, Maximilian did send him to travel, not to Montpellier, but to the galleys departing from Genoa instead, to work as a galley slave for four and a half years. On the day he was sent to the galleys, 31 October 1612, the authorities in Tyrol also issued a warrant for the arrest of his friend Figulus, who was subsequently imprisoned until November 1617.

A few years later, self-professed Rosicrucians were investigated and tried by Lutherans and Calvinists alike. In 1619 the German engineer and Rosicrucian follower Johannes Faulhaber (1580–1635) was placed under investigation by the Lutheran university in Tübingen. In the same year, Philipp Homagius and Georg Zimmermann (dates unknown) were condemned by Calvinist prosecutors by the order of Landgrave Moritz von Hesse-Kassel (1572–1632). No sooner had Homagius found refuge in Giessen than he was investigated again, together with Heinrich Nolle, this time by Lutheran investigators of the Land-grave of Hesse-Darmstadt, Ludwig V (1577–1626).

Heterodox thinkers suspected of Rosicrucianism in the Dutch provinces were treated particularly harshly. Such was the fear of subversive views that when the Court of Holland examined the Rosicrucian matter, they made sure that Torrentius was also investigated, whereupon the artist was interrogated and brutally tortured. Shortly before the case against Torrentius, in 1625, Dutch translations of the Fama and Confessio, the Echo attributed to Julius Sperber, and other unnamed books were sent by the Court of Holland to Calvinist professors of Theology in Leiden for investigation of their "Rosicrucian teachings." In their report, the professors concluded that the Rosicrucian "sect" was an

> error in doctrine [...], possessed, superstitious and magical; in her philosophy she is a fabrication of an erratic mind and a monstrous spirit, vain, useless, and filled with deceit; lastly rebellious towards the state [...].

Religiously, politically, and philosophically, the manifestos and their followers provoked the authorities and were to be condemned. For one reason or another, the Rosicrucian case truly became a Europe-wide controversy.

The Rosicrucian manifestos might easily have been overlooked or ignored, but instead their impact on early seventeenth-century Europe was enormous. What was the controversial message of these short texts that triggered such a passionate response? Literature on the Rosicrucian manifestos and the subsequent movement has largely been concerned with questions of authorship, the networks from which these pamphlets arose, and the early furore. While context is obviously important, the first place to look to understand these manifestos and their explosive aftermath are the contents of the manifestos themselves.



This book studies the manifestos' call for a general reformation in its historical context. This call emerged in a period, the early seventeenth century, that witnessed a large variety of calls for, and attempts at, change. Yet, the "keymarkers" of change in the scientific and philosophical realms are still Francis Bacon and René Descartes. In the religious world they are most prominently Martin Luther and John Calvin. But any understanding of early modern projects of change which relies on the figures just mentioned would be anachronistic. It would also rule out of consideration concepts of reform beyond the strict boundaries of science and religion, respectively. The Rosicrucian manifestos—as well as other texts and movements that call for change, but that are much less known than the heroes just mentioned—fit much less comfortably in, and often challenge, the strict boundary between science and religion. They require fresh,

investigation in order to further develop our understanding of early modern concepts of change and projects of reform.

The Rosicrucian Story

The Rosicrucian manifestos and the related Chemical Wedding give an account of the life of the well-travelled and highly-educated Christian Rosencreutz, who is described as the father of the Rosicrucian fraternity. Rosencreutz is said to have been born in 1378 and to have lived for 106 years, until his death in 1484. His message had been kept secret for 120 years until 1604 when, coinciding with the purported discovery of his vault, the Rosicrucian secrets would be revealed.

The Fama describes the life of the founder of the fraternity and the foundation of the Rosicrucian brotherhood. In his early years, Christian Rosencreutz travelled to the Arab world where he studied physics, mathematics, languages, magic, and Kabbalah. In the Arab cities Damcar and Fez he learned various secrets of nature and translated into Latin the mysterious "Liber M." After his travels in the East, Rosencreutz had become convinced of the necessity for a general reformation and felt compelled to teach others in Europe what he had learned in distant places. He visited several countries, but was disappointed at being unable to find anyone at the time willing to abandon their own teachings and philosophies, which Rosencreutz considered to be false. When he finally returned to Germany, he

gathered around him three men who were to become the first brothers of the Rose Cross. Rosencreutz taught them the secrets of nature and worked with them in private in order to instigate the desired reformation. After four more companions had joined their cause, the eight brothers parted and went their separate ways throughout Europe to improve their knowledge. Once every year, on Rosencreutz's anniversary, they were to return to the house "Sanctus Spiritus," the house of the Holy Spirit, a building constructed by Christian Rosencreutz that was to become the Rosicrucians' sanctuary. They identified themselves as physicians, adapted to the style of dress of the country in which they worked, while each using as their secret mark "r.c." It was agreed that "none should practice any other profession than to cure the sick, without payment." The brethren were supposed to keep the brotherhood secret for 120 years after Rosencreutz's death, and to find a successor each so that the fraternity would continue to exist even after their own deaths.

In 1615, one year after the publication of the Fama, another provocative text issued from the printing presses, the Confessio. Christian Rosencreutz's hope for a general reformation was further developed in this closely related second manifesto, which had already been announced in the Fama. In this text, the authors discussed in more detail the philosophy of their fraternity. The brethren understood the workings of the world according to the hermetic analogy of microcosm and macrocosm, with humans as the microcosm of the universe. The macrocosm—the universe—was full of secrets that were to be revealed, and this revelation, the reader was told, would happen soon. The disclosure of secrets coincided with the dawn of the Rosicrucian philosophy, which was to replace traditional natural philosophy, to provide a new foundation for the sciences, and to form the basis of a broader reformation.

On the reverse side of the brethren's hope for a different future was their negative judgement on contemporary society. In their view, religion and philosophy were deeply rotten, and the contemporary state of affairs needed to be overhauled. At the time when the manifestos were drafted, the old worlds of Roman orthodoxy and of Aristotelian natural philosophy were irreversibly losing their foothold in the Western world. The Lutheran and Calvinist reformations had permanently changed the religious landscape, while the voices of so-called "novatores," challengers of Aristotelian natural philosophy and the medieval university curriculum in general, grew stronger. Religiously and scientifically, the world was undergoing substantial transformations. The authors of the manifestos observed and encouraged these changes, and spread the hopeful prediction of "a general reformation of divine and human things," to which coinciding with the purported discovery of his vault, the Rosicrucian secrets would be revealed.

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Religiously, the brethren defined themselves in opposition to the Turks and the Roman Church, condemning "the blasphemies against our Jesus of both East and West (that is, Mohammed and the pope)," and claiming that they acknowledge only Christ. The manifestos unmistakably originated from the Protestant world, but argued that still further religious changes were necessary.

Scientifically, the academic institutions and their educational programmes were to be reformed and replaced. University scholars ("Gelehrte") were accused of being guided by "pride and ambition" in their studies, which led them to misinterpret the world, spread lies, and sow destruction. The brethren's critique included not only Aristotelian (natural) philosophy, but also academic medicine. Their commitment to medicine as their main task, and one that should be practiced without reward, was contrary to the traditional procedure of ordinary Galenic physicians. Most alchemical practice, too, was considered "an offence to the glory of God." Alchemy was not meant for the making of gold, the brethren insisted, but should instead be used for the production of medicine and the acquisition of knowledge.

The Rosicrucian notion of reform was inherently general: All arts were to be reformed, religion was to be sanctified, philosophy to be changed, and medicine and alchemy to be purified. This transformation was to be initiated by the Rosicrucian brotherhood, and the reader of the Fama was encouraged to reflect upon the arts himself and was hoped to be "sincere and heartfelt towards us," so as to potentially contribute to their reformation. But this reformation implied changes within the divine realm as well, since God was involving himself in new ways in earthly matters.

While the Fama and Confessio were overtly optimistic manifestos, designed to inspire hope, they were also highly enigmatic, and without any attempt to provide a clear explanation of the brethren's philosophy or a detailed description of the changes announced. But their general reformation entailed more than an interpretation of the contemporary situation and a call for action. The language of the reform that was about to take place was infused with what might loosely be called millenarian expectations of a new age. The brethren believed themselves to be living in the last days prior to a new era, which was to precede the Last Judgement and the End Times. These days witnessed the first signs of a hopeful future which would soon be made manifest. The brethren believed that they "may soon rejoice in a happy time." The imminent changes were not only an effectuation of Rosicrucian designs, but were also part of God's plan. The central theme in the Rosicrucian manifestos, the general reformation, is intimately related to the expectation that the end of the present age was at hand and that a new, perfected time would soon be upon us.

While these philosophical and apocalyptic aspects are clearly visible in the Fama and Confessio, the third text, the Chemical Wedding, is very different. The Chemical Wedding is presented as an autobiographical story from the perspective of Christian Rosencreutz. There are neither references in this text to the manifestos, nor do the manifestos refer to the Chemical Wedding, and the central element is no longer a general reformation but a description of a journey culminating in an allegorical alchemical wedding of the King and Queen. The story is divided into seven sections, each covering one day, over which the story plays out.

At the beginning of the story, the protagonist, Christian Rosencreutz, receives from an angel an invitation to the wedding of the King and Queen. He accepts, albeit hesitantly, and he sets out on his arduous journey the following morning.56 After a long and difficult walk on the second day and having overcome several hurdles, Rosencreutz arrives at the castle, his destination, only just in time. There, (the souls of) the guests will be weighed the next they would eagerly contribute. Soon, so went their message, the world would be thoroughly transformed for the better.

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THE DAYS WHICH FOLLOW ARE TAKEN UP WITH FESTIVITIES, DINNERS, TOURS IN THE CASTLE, AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, PREPARATIONS FOR THE WEDDING, DURING WHICH THE SELECT FEW FURTHER DEMONSTRATE THEIR WORTH. THEY ENGAGE IN WORK OF AN ALCHEMICAL NATURE. WHEN SIX ROYAL PERSONS ("KÖNIGLICHE PERSONEN") PRESENT AT THE CASTLE ARE EXECUTED ON THE FOURTH DAY, AS PART OF THE WEDDING PREPARATIONS, THEIR HEADS ARE USED FOR AN ALCHEMICAL PREPARATION FROM WHICH ULTIMATELY THE KING AND QUEEN ARISE, BROUGHT TO LIFE THROUGH FIRE FROM HEAVEN. ON THE FIFTH DAY, ROSENCREUTZ SECRETLY OBSERVES THE SLEEPING VENUS, WHO WAS ALSO IN THE CASTLE BUT WHOM HE LEONHARD THURNEYSSER, QUINTA ESSENTIA (1574), FOL. XXXVII

was forbidden to visit. Rosencreutz's spying on Venus is revealed on the final day, and the book ends with his punishment for having seen her: he is condemned to guard the first portal to the castle until someone else commits the same offence and will have to take his place as guard. The text concludes with the statement that two folios—purportedly dealing with Rosencreutz's return home—are missing, thereby rendering the story incomplete.

Overtly allegorical in character, the Chemical Wedding is even more abstruse than the Fama and Confessio. It does not discuss the brethren's philosophical claims and apocalyptic predictions, and rather than a general reformation it describes an alchemical process that can perhaps be best interpreted as an individual transformation. Unlike the Fama and Confessio, it is not a manifesto in the sense of a mission statement, and hence it does not discuss the mission of the brotherhood to reform the world. For this reason, this book will make only passing references to the Chemical Wedding, while the focus will be on the two manifestos.

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Like their contemporaries, the authors of the manifestos and their followers appealed for what they called a general reformation, which was highly heterogeneous and not restricted to, or informed by, any one confession. According to Reformation historians, "confessionalization" was a widespread process between 1550 and 1650, linking religion and confession to society and politics through social discipline. The formation of confessions, the transformation of the state, and the use of social discipline are seen as interrelated processes, while early modern religion and confession structured, influenced, and transformed social and political life through indoctrination, education, and rituals. This, in turn, created social groups defined and divided according to their confession. This book aims to show how the Rosicrucian manifestos attempted to circumvent this contemporary process of "confessionalization," and in fact opposed confessional doctrines in their proposal of universal change.

The Rosicrucian reformation and its immediate aftermath should be understood against the background of this enlarged perspective of reformation. In the following chapters, several aspects of the manifestos' call for change—in the form of a reformation, a revolution, or a renovation—will be retraced to medieval and early modern traditions up to the start of the Thirty Years' War. Part One (Chapters One and Two) is devoted to the sources of the manifestos. In order to understand the Rosicrucian call for a general reformation, it is essential to study first the origins of this idea. Medieval and early modern interpretations of, and prophecies about, the course of history will be analysed and compared in order to clarify the theme of a general reformation in the Rosicrucian texts. In the first chapter, the manifestos will be compared with related medieval Catholic and early modern traditions and studied from the perspective of the (radical) Reformation.96 Chapter Two is devoted to Paracelsian themes. Although the Paracelsian inspiration of several of the manifestos' tenets has been investigated previously, here the Paracelsian impetus will be investigated specifically from the perspective of the notion of a general reformation and related apocalyptic expectations. The aim is to provide a fresh understanding of the Paracelsian influence on the manifestos. Likewise, not only genuine works of Paracelsus need to be reviewed but also early Paracelsian and pseudo-Paracelsian texts, which were published shortly before the manifestos were drafted and which are generally neglected in studies on Rosicrucianism.

Only after the origins of the contents of the manifestos have been sufficiently dealt with, is it appropriate to discuss the origins of the texts themselves and to return to the question of authorship. In Part Two (Chapter Three), we will first briefly review the question of authorship of the manifestos and, secondly, analyse the findings of Part One, and the key element of a general reformation in particular, in relation to the views expressed by the authors in other manuscript and printed texts. To what extent can the importance of the general reformation be observed in their other writings and what does this suggest about the manifestos' authorship and purpose?

Part Three (Chapters Four and Five) will in turn concentrate on the response to the manifestos. The aim of this part is not to trace the course of the Rosicrucian furore, but instead to analyse through several case studies specifically how the notion of a general reformation and related themes developed among the early readers of the manifestos. This approach will shed fresh light on the reasons for specific authors' support or dismissal of the Rosicrucian cause. To what extent was this theme appealing to Rosicrucian followers and controversial to those condemning the manifestos? Chapter Four will specifically concentrate on the early Rosicrucian furore, in order to describe in detail the role of the Rosicrucian call for reform in the early welcoming response. Chapter Five will then study debates between authors vehemently attacking the Rosicrucian movement and authors defending it, in order to

examine what was at stake in the views of both proponents and opponents of that movement. These texts will also be compared with formal reactions to Rosicrucianism within universities and courts, in which scholars were sometimes investigated and prosecuted for their Rosicrucian sympathies.

In the Conclusion, the findings of the previous chapters will be reviewed, analysed, and compared, and some thoughts on further research will be provided. <>

JUNGIAN PSYCHOLOGY IN THE EAST AND WEST: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES FROM JAPAN edited by Konoyu Nakamura and Stefano Carta [Routledge, 9780367766894]

It is well known that Jung's investigation of Eastern religions and cultures supplied him with an abundance of cross-cultural comparative material, useful to support his hypotheses of the existence of archetypes, the collective unconscious and other manifestations of psychic reality. However, the specific literature dealing with this aspect has previously been quite scarce. This unique edited collection brings together contributors writing on a range of topics that represent an introduction to the differences between Eastern and Western approaches to Jungian psychology.

Readers will discover that one interesting feature of this book is the realization of how much Western Jungians are implicitly or explicitly inspired by Eastern traditions – including Japanese – and, at the same time, how Jungian psychology – the product of a Western author – has been widely accepted and developed by Japanese scholars and clinicians.

Scholars and students of Jungian studies will find many new ideas, theories and practices gravitating around Jungian psychology, generated by the encounter between East and West. Another feature that will be appealing to many readers is that this book may represent an introduction to Japanese philosophy and clinical techniques related to Jungian psychology.

CONTENTS

This is a collection of papers presented by prominent analysts, analytical psychologists, and scholars from all over the world at the 2019 International Association for Jungian Studies (IAJS) Regional Conference, titled "Jungian Psychology: East and West, encountering differences", in Osaka, Japan, the first such meeting held by the International Association for Jungian Studies (IAJS) in Asia. This event was held at Otemon Gakuin University and was supported by the Japan Association of Jungian Psychology (JAJP). I had the honor of hosting the conference as chair.

Kiley Laughlin and I came up with the theme. As is well known, in the early 1920s C. G. Jung's interests drifted toward Eastern religion and culture (Jung 1936, 1939, 1944, 1948, 1953, 1954). This turning point in Jung's career serendipitously coincided with his study of Richard Wilhelm's Secret of the Golden Flower and Heinrich Zimmer's Artistic Form and Yoga in the Sacred Images of India. Jung's investigation of Eastern religion and culture supplied him with an abundance of cross-cultural material to compare with his hypotheses of archetypes, the collective unconscious, and other manifestations of psychic reality. There was something else in the East, however, that seemed to form the nucleus of his personal myth. In fact, this myth seems to have culminated with a figurative journey to the East, where the sun is continuously reborn, a motif that Jung referred to as a night sea journey, symbolizing an effort to adapt to the conditions of psychic life. The wisdom found in the East seems to have provided Jung with a sense of psychic orientation, and a partial road map, to navigate his own journey of individuation. Based on this, Jung further adapted his theories and practices and applied them to his psychology. His encounter with Eastern culture thus marked an attempt to synthesize a greater whole by showing what we can learn from differences.

Our conference, therefore, focused on what is created when differences are encountered, a difficult task indeed. In Japan alone there are various traditions, religions, social systems, and cultures, developed over a long history that has involved adapting science, religious, and cultural influences from abroad (Reischauer 1970). Jung noted:

> To us [in the West], consciousness is inconceivable without an ego.... If there is no ego there is nobody to be conscious of anything. The ego is therefore indispensable to conscious processes. The eastern mind, however, has no difficulty in conceiving of a consciousness without an ego. Consciousness is deemed capable of transcending its ego condition; indeed, in its "higher" forms, the ego disappears altogether. (1954, Para 774)

On the other hand, Kawai (1976) opined that Japan is a "maternal society" differing from the Western paternal one in that the Japanese ego is nearer unconsciousness. This theme aptly suited the first IAJS conference held in Japan.

A lot of excellent papers were presented, including four keynote presentations, by Iwao Akita, Stefano Carta, Andrew Samuels, and Megumi Yama, plus 25 speeches by Jungian analysts, psychotherapists, and scholars from places as diverse as America, United Kingdom, China, Italy, Japan, Latvia, and Taiwan. It was attended by more than a hundred participants from around the globe. It lasted only two days but led to sparkling discussions and sparked enduring friendships. It thus literally embodied meaningful bonds between East and West in the name of Jungian psychology.

This book includes some of the notable papers presented, divided into four sections:

Part I: East and West, Part II: Images, Part III: Clinical Issues, and Part N: Identity and Individuation. The separate chapters are introduced in detail by Professor Stefano Carta.

Readers will note how widespread and deeply rooted Jungian psychology is in Japan. At the same time, they will note how relevant this Eastern perspective is for scholars and clinicians around the world, especially those involved in psychotherapy and cross-cultural studies. Naturally, this group includes more than three thousand members in IAAP, the four hundred members in IAJS, and the six hundred members in JAJP, as well as trainees and university students in analytical psychology. It should also appeal to psychiatrists, sociologists, and medical anthropologists. We expect this book will be recommended reading in university courses in clinical and analytical psychology, both undergraduate and postgraduate, both in Japan and internationally. It will also surely draw the interest of the 30,000 certificated clinical psychologists in Japan, and I believe it will provide new horizons for the whole Jungian community.

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This book represents a further step in a dialogue between two quite complex subjects: the so-called East and the so-called West. The very fact that the contributions that follow this introduction may be seen as a dialogue is perfectly in line with the essence of Jungian thought. In fact, the Jungian paradigm is dialectic and dialogical all the way down: from the fundamental epistemological principle of the structural relationship between a pair of opposites, from which a third — a symbol — may arise (a symbol eventually incarnated in and yet transcending the "material" reality into a fourth), to the clinical setting seen by Jung as a dialectic process between two subjects.

Now, as in the title of this collection of chapters, the two subjects that will weave such a dialogue are the "East" and the "West." From this very first fact I would like to point out one of the essential

challenges of Jungian thought — the relationship between similarities (the archetypal level) and differences (the individual level). In fact, it may well be that neither of them may actually be found in the world — in the object — but only "in the eyes of the beholder." This becomes immediately apparent when we compare the main attitude of anthropology and of analytical psychology in reference to the symbolic world, as I doubt that any anthropologist would agree to recognize something as "East" and "West" as realistic autonomous, homogeneous, and comparable subjects.

This issue, which deeply regards Jung's thought, may be exemplified by a passage such as the following:

> Even a superficial acquaintance with Eastern thought is sufficient to show that a fundamental difference divides East and West. The East bases itself upon the psyche as the main and unique condition of existence. It seems as if the Eastern recognition were a psychological or temperamental fact rather than a result of philosophical reasoning. It is a typically introverted point of view contrasted with the typically extroverted point of view of the West

In my opinion, this dialectical movement between sameness and otherness through big or little differences is a key issue that we must always take into consideration when we deal with comparative issues such as the ones this collection of writings is dealing with. In fact, this is the fundamental starting point for this whole book — the recognition of fundamental differences between the Eastern and the Western psyche and similarities within them while keeping in mind that also what seems similar will eventually reveal specific "individual" differences that are as precious as the similarities. Seen this way, this is not a just good starting point, but it actually is a necessary one.

If we go back to the Jungian paradigm of the dialectic relationship between opposites, we may describe it in psychodynamic terms as the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious. The more the Eastern psyche seems "introverted" to the Westerner (or the other way around, extroverted for the Easterner), the more probable it is that the latter is actually coming into contact with his own introversion through his extroverted conscious attitude. In this regard, I find quite telling that the text that perhaps was the most revelatory for Jung, a protestant Swiss, was the Secret of the Golden Flower, a Chinese treatise that Richard Wilhelm brought to his attention in 1928.

In Memories, Dreams, Reflections (1989) Jung wrote:

> I devoured the manuscript at once, for the text gave me undreamed-of confirmation of my ideas about the mandala and the circumambulation of the center. That was the first event which broke through my isolation. I became aware of an affinity; I could establish ties with something and someone. (p. 197)

I think that through the Eastern psyche Jung could come into contact with his personal and his anthropological unconscious. Similarly, the most influential Japanese Jungian analyst and author, Hayao Kawai, could initiate his own dialogue with himself and his unconscious through a dream:

> In the dream, I picked up many Hungarian coins. These coins had the design of an old Taoist sage on them. Given my association to Hungary, the dream seemed to suggest that, to me, Hungary was a bridge to East and West. My analyst said that, to judge from this dream, I eventually might gain insights of great value for the relationship between East and West. When I reflect on the course of my life, I recognize that what my analyst surmised indeed has been realized. (1996, p. 17)

Here, the point is not only whether this interpretation about the "typical" introversion of the East or extroversion of the West actually adheres to reality (which would imply that there should be a definitely reduced minority of extroverted individuals in the East and of introverted ones in the West, therefore making of these anthropological worlds wholly disadaptive cultures and anti-symbolic milieus for those who do not fit the typological majority) but also how much, on a hermeneutic level, this reference to such "typical" characteristics - this way of looking at reality through similarities - instead of revealing actually conceals the complexities of our object of enquiry.

I think that a well-tempered attitude must keep the tension between the two opposite polarities of sameness and difference, for which something like "the East" or "the West" at the same time exists and does not exist. In fact, when we approach our subject from a unifying attitude, we decide to look at the forest from far away in order not only to search but actually see what

all its parts have in common. Yet, at the same time we must also accept to deconstruct this unity into its multiple differences and into the process of their historical unfolding. Therefore, my recommendation is to read this book with this double perspective in mind, for which what may be recognized as the "same" - in our case belonging to an "East; or to a "West" - may be recognized only through different individual vantage points, whose symbolic and historical specificity must be cherished and protected. After all, this may be one of the ways to describe what Jung called the individuation process itself.

For instance, in the first chapter of this book Megumi Yama writes:

> In this era of rapid globalization, it is sometimes heard that it may be doubtful that the concepts of "the West" and "the East" are as applicable as they were in the past. However, I would like to posit that however borderless our globe seems to be at a superficial level, if we go down deep to the roots, we can see a fundamental difference in the structure of each culture's psyche. This is perhaps because they were established on a basis of their own unique psychological histories and backgrounds that should not be ignored.

This issue regarding sameness, difference and identity is specifically discussed by Kazunori Kono in Chapter 5.

Discussing the Freudian concept of "narcissism of minor differences" in clinical and social situations, Kono revisits the concept of narcissism from the perspective of Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis and Jungian analytical psychology. For him, The concept of narcissism has been misunderstood and abused. Contrary to common belief, narcissism as well as sublimation is at the intersection of the individual and society. Encountering differences through others causes us to react in a variety of ways. Worrying about differences, we may fall into the pursuit of objects beyond our reach. Or, the pursuit of differences itself would lead to the denial and annihilation of others. In this regard, we can point out that the pursuit of difference is tied to fear of uniformity. Therefore, it is also important to be aware of that fear and accept the fact that you are, to some extent, the same as others. And yet, we continue to reconstruct our identity with minor differences.

I find this dream, and what it meant for Kawai, very moving and meaningful, as it represents a special form, very noticeable indeed, of Jung's "transcendent function" at work, for which the opposites — in this case Kawai's own Easterness and Westerness — were recognized and transcended.

From many of Kawai's invaluable contributions, another very important feature of the unfolding of this process is that, through his own West, Kawai found his own East in a deeper and highly personal (individual) form. Perhaps, the most interesting example is his reference to Buddhism as something that he did not wholly understand, something that he could not really be. Yet, through his pages one may appreciate how much of such Buddhism he had discovered and recognized in himself. This is to say that the dialogue between West and East may well bring a Westerner to be more conscious of his own Western nature through his own unconscious East and vice versa.

In the case of Jung, this relationship with the unconscious, seen as the relationship with one's other side of the world, has been described in Chapter 1 of this book by Megumi Yama as a descent into the world of the dead, that Jung commenced in his Gnostic diary Septem Sermones ad Mortuos (in Jung, 1989). Therefore, if from an Ego point of view we are dealing with an East—West relationship, for the point of view of the Self we are actually transiting between the world of the living and the world of the dead.

From my Westerner perspective, reading the chapters that I am trying to introduce I often felt to be in contact with a deep dialogue between differences which have been contaminating each other. In fact, while through these pages the authors were describing the specificities and peculiarities of the East and the West, I kept recognizing also many striking underpinning similarities. This may well be caused by the very nature of my training, profession, and, perhaps, individual inclination, but it may also be due to the very fabric of analytical psychology itself which, together with other psychodynamic currents of thought, such as those by Fromm, Bion, or Winnicott, are able to come closer to a core common to all humans, belonging to the West as to the East.

One example is the reference to the fact that in the Japanese psyche the boundary between consciousness and unconsciousness is much vaguer than in that of Westerners, and that it may actually lack a center at all. Megumi Yama describes this condition through some wonderful examples and images of gardens and art (Chapter 1), yet, while reading her contribution, I could recognize the "Western" trace of Hilman's position, for whom there is no need to posit any center of the psyche. In this situation we experience a fundamental shift of psychological perspectives — from an ego-centric monotheist one to a polycentric polytheist one. Once again, here Hilman and his archetypal approach develop Jung's idea of the plurality of souls/images that compose the psyche/world and idea that we will find again described in other terms in Chapters 6, 8, and 16.

Another essential difference, often discussed in these contributions between the East and the West, is the status and the position of the Ego. It seems that in the West and the East the Ego, as described and discussed in the pages that follow, is quite different. Yet, such differences may also produce projections and, therefore, faulty forms of dichotomic understanding: if in the East the Ego is different, the Westerner may think that there is no Ego in the East. Nevertheless, from the discussions that will follow, we will learn that this state of affairs is not at all true, as differences do not mean any yes/no, either/or approach.

In Chapter 2 Lynlee Lyckberg discusses this issue. She quotes Mokusen Miyuki, who suggested in Buddhism and Psychology, this is an erroneous assumption and common error in Western thinking. From an Eastern perspective, Buddhism does not require a dissolution of the ego; rather, "the ego is strengthened in meditation, and what gets dissolved is ego-centricity.

Now, when, in her discussion of the symbol of the mirror she writes:

> The underlying sensibility in Japan is simply that of impermanence, where the brief moment of existence framed by a unique and personal identity is conceptually nothing more than a mirage (mirror illusion) without substance, arising from the place of no-thing (emptiness) and returning to no-thing, symbolically represented by both the sacred mirror as a most auspicious symbol in Buddhism and by the Zen Enso circle.

I find a very similar trace of such a description of the Enso circle in Bion's concept of 0, and when Lyckberg writes about the two conditions of nothingness and no-thingness, I, once again, recognize Bion's reference to "nothing" and "nothing" as discussed in his Attention and Interpretation (1970). Also, Winnicott's concept of the true self as a potential, implicit, innate space from which reality (and the Ego) flows into the material, relational and historical world flow, seems to me something like a Western version of an Eastern image. Furthermore, in her comparison between Daoist qualitative numbers to the Western quantitative numbers, Lyckberg herself rightly mentions Jung's and M.L. von Franz's adherence to Eastern thought. To this I may add that throughout Western history, its deep counter current (fundamentally Gnostic and Alchemical) always maintained a qualitative understanding of numbers. The shift from the qualitative numbers to the purely quantitative ones was a product of a historical process, which culminated with the querelle between Kepler and Fludd in the seventeenth century. If, as we know, Kepler's position won and mathematics was since then thought more mathematice ("mathematically"), today it is hard not to see the qualitative aspect of numbers in quantum physics — for instance, the numbers associated with the spin of an elementary particle.

Once again, it seems that the East and the West are contaminating each other in a wonderfully fruitful way.

"Emptiness in Western and Eastern cultures" is the title of Tsuyoshi Inomata's Chapter 15, in which the author draws a history of nothingness, which, in the West wholly devoid of its symbolic pregnancy eventually turned into nihilism.

Quoting W. Giegerich, the author writes:

> Paradoxically, it is the Western way of the soul that — with its process of consecutive negations finally leading to what has been crudely and summarily condensed in the term "nihilism" — in fact produced an "emptiness consciousness: an "emptiness consciousness" as a real (i.e., inescapable) condition of the subject in real social reality and an objectively prevailing cultural mindset.

The connection of the emptiness of the modern Western psyche with the sacred, creative void of the Eastern one may transform Western nihilism into "a precondition for the creation of a rich animated world in which diversity is tolerated, if attitudes towards it change from pessimistic and rejective to empathic and receptive."

In order for this to occur, a change should also take place within the Eastern - in this case the Japanese - psyche, as its empty center (Kawai, 1996) lacks a subject "with its own will and freedom" This is something that, again quoting Giegerich, Inomata describes as "the Arctic vortex, a force of nature that swallows everything; which may be a concurrent cause of the spreading of autism (and perhaps, I might add, the hikikomori condition, now present also in the West?) within the Japanese psyche.

The image of the Enso is also discussed by Kojiro Miwa in Chapter 11.

Referring to the theories of Jung and of the Zen philosopher Shinichi Hisamatsu, Miwa discusses the encounter between the Western Jung and the Eastern Hismatsu. His contribution deals with the fundamental component of silence and nonverbal communication within psychotherapy, such as the use of the Tree Test, or, in more general terms, the use of nonverbal approaches, such as art therapy or sandplay. Equating the Self with the "Buddha nature; Miwa discusses the transformative, productive density of silence and of apparent void of nonverbal communication.

The clinical meaning of the tree and the use of the Tree Test is also discussed in Chapter 12 by Himeka Matsushita. In both these chapters, the theme of compassion emerges. A theme thoroughly discussed, in comparative terms, also by Shoichi Kato in Chapter 10.

Through two moving clinical cases, Kato highlights the fundamental importance of compassion. Once again referring to the transformative power of silence, Kato writes:

> in the depth of self-consuming emotions, a silent moment would arrive in which we could see the person so far recognized as the source of our misfortune in a new light, as a genuinely Other person. It is in this I — Thou relationship that Compassion would rise from our deep psyche to surround the two remotely separated individuals with silence.

In Buddhist scriptures, compassion (in Mahayana Buddhism: /karupa/) is often coupled with sadness and friendship. Reading Kato's chapter my mind went to Heinz Kohut's contributions on empathy and to the fundamental nature of the analytical relationship in analytical psychology, which is indeed based on a sort of friendship between two human beings - analyst and patient - who try to integrate the emotional meaning of life and its challenging, sad, mournful aspects (Carta, 2013).

Such a deep attitude of mutual understanding, the key to the Jungian psychological method, for which the analyst should "go where is the patient" and for which any real encounter implies a mutual transformation, is echoed in Ryutaro Nishi's Chapter 17 in which he discusses "Makoto Tsumori's philosophy of care and education in relation to Jungian psychology." For Nishi, both Jung and Tsumori "emphasised the need to understand children's inner world, without reducing it to the limited confines of past experiences." In fact, both demonstrated how children's expressions are always meaningful and should never be rejected or refused through a castrating form of education.

These considerations show some important common features of Tsumori's early childhood care and education (ECCE) method - based on play and imagination and a sustained relationship between children and practitioners - and play therapy, although the latter is conducted within the confines of a playroom.

In Chapter 14 Evija Volfa Vestergaard explores "leadership styles in Japan (East Asia) and Latvia (which is on the boundary between East and West) as an important element in creating a sustainable future for humanity."

Analyzing the apparent overlapping of the mythological images of the dragon in Latvian and Chinese cultures, she suggests that in general, both the Japanese and Latvian psyches are characterized by a greater permeability between their conscious and unconscious layers, expressed in a heightened sense of embeddedness with their surroundings, and the multiplicity of perspectives held by their leaders. Using the language of myths, these leaders find ways to dance with the dragons rather than slaying them.

They form a relationship with the surrounding natural environment and human-made worlds, rather than striving to separate and cut away one from the other. While, from a Western perspective, this permeability may be viewed as lacking a healthy ego, [she argues] that a sense of interconnectedness is beneficial in a world of expanding global interdependencies.

For Vestergaard, the mythological beneficial kinship with dragons is connected with a life well-balanced with nature in agrarian Latvia and with the Yin/Yang opposites in the East. It describes an Ego development that resembles that of both the Latvian and the Eastern Egos.

Quoting Akita Iwao (2017), Vestergaard describes the Ego's relationship with the unconscious as a "dancing with the shadows: instead of "integrating the shadow in the Ego: Quite a compelling image, indeed.

In Chapter 13, Hirofumi Kuroda also focuses her contribution on the peculiar nature of the relationship between subject and object and its representations in the East versus the West.

She writes:

> In the Western individualistic perspective, the focus is on subject and object, and the one-to-one interaction between subject and object. There is a center point where the image of self/I resides, which is the ego. However, in the Eastern collectivistic perspective, the focus is on the context, the circumference, and the many-to-many interactions in foreground and background.

In Chinese, the central field, in which the relationship between subject and object takes place, is expressed by the expression (heart, soul, and mind), which, in ancient times, was represented by the image" "fangcun," which literally means square inches.

Through a clinical case with a psychotic patient Kuroda describes the progressive reintegration of the psychotic patient's Ego, which took place along the development of recurrent images of the house imago:

> [From this case] we learn that the constellation of the house imago is an attempt for reintegration, which brings the individual back to /fangcun/ the heart and the Self. The creation of circumference provides a sense of being grounded without locating the center point. This is consistent with Jung's statement that "the Eastern mind, however, has no difficulty in conceiving of a consciousness without an ego." Because of this core difference, I would propose that the process and product of symbol formation (in Jungian's term, the "constellation") should be different between Western psyche and Eastern psyche.

In Chapter 3, David Fisher discusses the "Implications for Japan's maternal culture" of the meeting — indeed a clashing — of West and East. His starting point is Hayao Kawai's description of the Japanese psyche as essentially based on a strong maternal principle and of the discussions that have arisen out of such an interpretation.

He writes:

> If we take Kawai's assertion at face value, how does that square with Japan's very masculine Bushido and martial Imperial past? It seems that we have a very different thing, a radical restructuring of psychic energy that occurred rapidly, violently, and emerged from the extreme tension between two things of opposite polarity: in short, an enantiodromia.

A valuable aspect of Fisher's contribution is its historical perspective, which places the Japanese psyche within the flow of events that ultimately led Japan to the catastrophic defeat of World War II. Japan's "unconditional surrender; unbearably humiliating, caused an archetypal trauma which led to the enantiodromia of the Father principle into the Mother.

The issue of the relationship between the Father and the Mother principles is also discussed by Elly Lin in Chapter 4. In her contribution, the author gives two clinical examples of the very deep divide between a male American patient (from the United States of America) and a female patient living in the United States but of Asian origin.

She writes:

> In my experience, cultural differences, if ignored or interpreted in a narrow, personalistic frame, fall flat and meaningless at best; at worst, they are cause for misunderstandings and mishaps. The archetypal considerations, however, can expand the interpersonal dyad into a much larger and deeper context where differences become portals into a previously unknown psychic realm of richness and aliveness.

This becomes particularly true since

> While, according to Neumann, the image of the Mother remains relatively constant across cultures, the image of the Father tends to vary from culture to culture. (Neumann, 1970)

In the case of the Asian patient, the Father archetype and complex were structured along Confucian principles based on filial piety, family and social hierarchy, and shame. Using Edinger's model of the Ego-Self axis, Elly Lin shows us how such an overly dominant, in this case negative "Confucian Father complex," was hindering the patient's development and individuation process. This was the opposite for the American man, for whom the weakness, if not absence, of the Father image was equally blocking his individuation for the opposite reason.

In the case of this interesting contribution, as a Westerner my mind goes to such a pervasive issue of the historical evaporation of the Father that has taken place in the last 50 years. Yet, I also see that within the West there still exist quite many differences between, for instance, the Protestant and the Catholic ethics. This plural aspect of a shared phenomenon such as the crisis of the Father image (a crisis which today is slowly finding new avenues and potential symbolic solutions) shows us how important it is to place our psychology within a historical and (trans)cultural perspective.

Such a perspective is wholly assumed by Andrew Samuels, who, in Chapter 9, discusses another extremely complex and quickly evolving issue of the intimate relationship between genders, i.e., between differences.

He writes:

> The very idea of gender also has a hidden bridge-building function: it sits on a threshold half-way between the inner and outer worlds, and thus is already half-way out into the world of politics.

On the one hand, gender is a private, secret, sacred, mysterious story that we tell ourselves and are told by others about who we are. But it is also a set of experiences deeply implicated in and irradiated by the political and socioeconomic realities of the outer world. The notion of gender, therefore, not only marries the inner and outer worlds, but actually calls into dispute the validity of the division.

This perspective, which unites such apparently far realms of human life — gender intimacy and politics — has a truly invaluable epistemic significance, as it makes it possible to produce new metaphors to express the human complexity and therefore deal with fundamental questions such as those which Andrew Samuels discusses in his contribution: "Can men change? Are men powerful? Do men hate women?"

A number of the chapters of this book deal with images, as the affect-laden image is considered in analytical psychology the building block of the psyche.

The historical perspective on images is discussed by my colleague and coeditor Konoyu Nakamura, who, in Chapter 7, draws a short history of what today are known all over the world as manga. Mangas are symbolic manifestation of images that have often taken the form of monsters. Nakamura compares such images with Jung's contact with the "Others:' the inhabitants of his (our) unconscious — the complexes and archetypal images that form our psychological universe. The Shinto Japanese description is that of a universe full of spirits — kami — everywhere.

A very striking fact regarding these Japanese manga monsters is their enormous impact in the contemporary world, both in the East and in the West. Somehow, the Japanese and the Eastern psyche seems to be communicating something not just understandable but actually urgently needed by the Western psyche.

It seems as if, after the war lost by Japan, the psyche of the winners — that of the West and most of all the American psyche —has eventually been conquered by the Japanese manga, some of which actually represent the long and difficult elaboration of the post-traumatic effect of the defeat (for a thorough discussion, see also Allison, 2006).

The mythical-historical roots of such a universe full of soul is also described in Chapter 16 by Mayumi Furukawa, as she discusses the importance of the Ainu culture, which thrived for 10,000 years, for the Japanese psyche.

Furukama writes:

> the Ainu had a worldview that the very essence of all human beings, all animate beings, including animals, and all inanimate beings had an eternal and immortal soul that was part of their very essence. The word "Ainu: means human beings and "Kamuy: deities. The Ainu believed that human beings had their unique afterlife and so as Kamuy, as divine, had the ability to circulate back and forth between their respective present life and afterlife. Kamuy for the Ainu, however, is not equal to God or Gods, the higher deity of many faiths. Kamuy is not an overarching "master" of human beings but rather on an equal footing with human beings. Nakagawa (1997), a linguist, stated that Kamuy should be dose to "nature." In other words, sparrows do not have their own divine nature. Every sparrow is Kamuy and every tree is also Kamuy.

Furukama connects this "animistic" worldview with the dream phenomenon that Hayao Kawai (1995) called "interpenetration," in which Kawai noted that the distinction between oneself and others was ambiguous in medieval Japanese tales. In fact, as Furukama writes:

> these tales portrayed a state of mind where realities and dreams, and life and death, could freely communicate with each other. [Kawai] continued, "The remarkable synchronicity of events in dreams, this world, and the land of death was not considered unusual."

As I have already noted, this deep layer of an Eastern culture such as Japan not only is expressed through literature (for instance Murakami) or cinema (Miyazaki) but, along with the Mangas discussed in Chapter 6 by Konoyu Nakamura, seems to act as a powerful compensative symbolic force for the Western psyche, as the immense success of these Japanese forms of art have literally conquered the contemporary Western psyche.

The Shinto view of the world as a wholly animate reality is somehow similar to the Italian Saint Francis, whose story of conversion is discussed in Chapter 8 by Jun Kitayama. It is impossible to underestimate the stature of Francis of Assisi, who anticipated the second millennium after Christ to come (which marked the end of the Age of Aries and the beginning of the Age of Pisces). The dawn of the second millennium AD marked the inversion of the vertical orientation of the Spirit — for which God was far and alien to the material world and nature — therefore spiritualizing what is horizontal — this natural, physical world? As I wrote, it is of course impossible to summarize the complexity of the figure of Saint Francis, yet, within this book it is interesting to notice how much some of fundamental views of the Japanese Shinto religion, for which everything is alive and full of soul, was one of the key factors that, through St. Francis' re-sacralization of nature, radically transformed the Western psyche of the Middle Ages into the modem one. Today, it seems that this aeonic movement has exhausted its path and, while the Age of Pisces enters in the Age of Aquarius, the spirit that had to animate matter in the West seems to have wholly drowned into materialism?

In Chapter 7, Adelina Wei Kwan Wong formulates the hypothesis that Chinese hieroglyphs are a stylized form of archetypal pattern, similar to the archetypal themes of the myths and fairy tales. Following this interesting hypothesis, she carried out two clinical researches using clinical expressive materials, sand pictures and drawings, created by patients who are well versed in Chinese written characters. The therapeutic modes for the patients with early-life traumas often involve non-verbal expression and imagination like body movement, imagery painting, or Sand-play with 3D images on the sand (Manuhin 1992, Bradway 1997, Klaff 2003, Malchiodi 2014). All these are means for the patients to access the instinctual emotions of their "wounded inner child;' to create images embodying the emotions, and to be acknowledged by the consciousness.

In conclusion, I hope that these collections of writings, so rich in contents and comparisons, may interest and stimulate the readers as an incentive for further discussions on such fundamental issues that involve the potential totality of the psyche, embedded, as it is, within the symbolic, cultural world and its historical development. <>

Consciousness and the Unconscious: Lectures Delivered at ETH Zurich, Volume 2: 1934 by C.G. Jung, edited by Ernst Falzeder [Philemon Foundation Series, Princeton University Press, 9780691228570]

Jung's lectures on consciousness and the unconscious—in English for the first time

Between 1933 and 1941, C. G. Jung delivered a series of public lectures at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. Intended for a general audience, these lectures addressed a broad range of

topics, from dream analysis and yoga to the history of psychology. They are at the center of Jung's intellectual activity in this period and provide the basis of his later work. Here for the first time in English is Jung's introduction to his core psychological theories and methods, delivered in the summer of 1934.

With candor and wit, Jung shares with his audience the path he himself took to understanding the nature of consciousness and the unconscious. He describes their respective characteristics using examples from his clinical experience as well as from literature, his travels, and everyday life. For Jung, consciousness is like a small island in the ocean of the unconscious, while the unconscious is part of the primordial condition of humankind. Jung explains various methods for uncovering the contents of the unconscious, in particular talk therapy and dream analysis.

Complete with explanations of Jungian concepts and terminology, **CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS** painstakingly reconstructs and translates these talks from detailed shorthand notes by attendees, making a critical part of Jung's work available to today's readers.

Review

"Discovering these lectures, we begin to appreciate that the interplay Jung experiences between what he can and cannot know is how the psyche energizes him. We follow him in respecting our own amateur status, weighing what we will and will not accept in his assertions."—John Beebe, author of Energies and Patterns in Psychological Type: The Reservoir of Consciousness

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Between 1933 and 1941, C. G. Jung lectured at the Swiss Federal Institute for Technology (^^^). He was appointed a professor there in 1935. This represented a resumption of his university career after a long hiatus, as he had resigned his post as a lecturer in the medical faculty at the University of Zurich in 1914. In the intervening period, Jung's teaching activity had principally consisted in a series of seminars at the Psychology Club in Zurich, which were restricted to a membership consisting of his own students or followers. The lectures at ^^^ were open, and the audience for the lectures was made up of students at ^^^, the general public, and Jung's followers. The attendance at each lecture was in the hundreds: Josef Lang, in a letter to Hermann Hesse, spoke of six hundred participants at the end of 1933, Jung counted four hundred in October 1935. Kurt Binswanger, who attended the lectures, recalled that people often could not find a seat and that the listeners "were of all ages and of all social classes: students ... ; middle-aged people; also many older people; many ladies who were once in analysis with Jung." Jung himself attributed this success to the novelty of his lectures and expected a gradual decline in numbers: "Because of the huge crowd my lectures have to be held in the auditorium maximum. It is of course their sensational nature that enchants people to come. As soon as people will realize that these lectures are concerned with serious matters, the numbers will become more modest."

Because of this context, the language of the lectures is far more accessible than Jung's published works at this time. Binswanger also noted that "Jung prepared each of those lectures extremely carefully. After the lectures, a part of the audience always remained to ask questions, in a totally natural and relaxed situation. It was also pleasant that Jung never appeared at the last minute, as so many other lecturers did. He, on the contrary, was already present before the lecture, sat on one of the benches in the corridor; and people could go and sit with him. He was communicative and open."5

The lectures usually took place on Fridays between 6 and 7 p.m. The audience consisted of regular students of technical disciplines, who were expected to attend additional courses from a subject of the humanities. But as it was possible to register as a guest auditor, many of those who had come to Zurich to study with Jung or undertake therapy attended the lectures as an introduction to Analytical Psychology. In addition, Jung also held ^^^ seminars with limited numbers of participants, in which he would further elaborate on the topics of the lectures. During the eight years of his lectures—which were only interrupted in 1937, when Jung travelled to India—he covered a wide range of topics. These lectures are at the center of Jung's intellectual activity in the 1930s, and furthermore provide the basis of his work in the 1940s and 1950s. Thus, they form a critical part of Jung's oeuvre, one that has yet to be accorded the attention and study that it deserves. The subjects that Jung addressed in ^^^ lectures are probably even more significant to present-day scholars, psychologists, psychotherapists, and the general public than they were when they were first delivered. The passing years have seen a mushrooming of

interest in Eastern thought, Western hermeticism and mystical traditions, the rise of the psychological types industry and the dream work movement, and the emergence of a discipline of the history of psychology.

Volume 2: Consciousness and the Unconscious (Summer Semester 1934)

This volume presents twelve lectures from 20 April 1934 to 13 July 1934. Jung commenced with lectures on the problematic status of psychology, and attempted to give an account as to how the various views of psychology in its history, which he had presented in the first semester, had been generated. This led him to account for national differences in ideas and outlook, and to reflect on different characteristics and difficulties of the English, French, and German languages when it came to expressing psychological materials. Reflecting on the significance of linguistic ambiguity led Jung to give an account of the status of the concept of the unconscious, which he illustrated with several cases. Following these general reflections, he presented his conception of the psychological functions and types, illustrated by practical examples of their interaction. He then gave an account of his concept of the collective unconscious. Filling a lacuna in his earlier accounts, he gave a detailed map of the differentiation and stratification of its contents, in particular as regards cultural and "racial" differences. Jung then turned to describing methods for rendering accessible the contents of the unconscious: the association experiment, the psycho-galvanic method, and dream analysis. In his account of these methods, Jung revised his previous work in the light of his present understanding. In particular, he gave a detailed account of how the study of associations in families enabled the psychic structure of families and the functioning of the complexes to be studied. The semester concluded with an overview of the topic of dreams and the study of several dreams.

On the basis of his reconstruction of the history of psychology, Jung then devoted the rest of this and the following semesters to an account of his "complex psychology." As in the other semesters, Jung was confronted with a general audience, a context that gave him a unique opportunity to present a full and generally accessible account of his work, as he could not presuppose prior knowledge of psychology. Thus we find here the most detailed, and perhaps most accessible, introduction to his own theory. This is by no means just an introduction to previous work, however, but a fullscale reworking of his early work in terms of his current understanding, and it presents models of the personality that cannot be found anywhere else in his work. Thus, this volume is Jung's most up-to-date account of his theory of complexes, association experiments, understanding of dreams, the structure of the personality, and the nature of psychology...

"[T]he fundamental psychological truths can never be couched in delineated terms," because "the sharper a psychological term, the less it designates." Therefore we would have "to learn the art of coming up with terms that are quite general and indeterminate, and yet are still able to convey something." We always have to bear in mind that we are dealing with the totality of a person. It is no use "to isolate a psychic process" for the purpose of study, because then we will have "killed the psychic life in that process."

"There is nothing simple in the psyche." The psyche that reacts to something simple is never simple itself. Each of us perceives differently, so how do we construct a fact or evidence? And how do we faithfully convey the facts we experience? For example, "what do I mean when I assert: `I'm feeling fine'"? An external observer might register something we are unaware of. "The difficulties arising in this

connection were among the reasons," according to Jung, "that led to the recognition of the unconscious as an interfering factor." This gave Jung the opening to enter into a discussion of the concepts of consciousness and the unconscious, and their respective characteristics, which he illustrated with various examples, whether from everyday life, from his clinical experience, from his travels, from the literature, or, quite frequently, from what he still called "primitives."

He described the conscious and unconscious states alternately, stressing their difference but also their interdependence and interrelationship. Consciousness, for instance, "needs an effort, demands energy and work, and thus tires us." It is also "very limited" and "very narrow[,] and excludes a good many ideas." The unconscious, on the other hand, "is present at all times" and "the primordial condition of mankind." "The unconscious is always dreaming." It is also always "active at work, and I am completely dependent on this work." "[C]onsciousness swims on the unconscious world like a round disc, or is like a small island in the ocean. Consciousness can never be identical with the soul, it is only a part, perhaps a very small part, of the soul. The soul is the whole." "Consciousness is to all intents and purposes an organ, an eye or an ear of the soul." The unconscious, on the other hand, "has a fabulous memory. There are things we never knew, so to speak, but that existed nonetheless" and had a discernible effect on us.

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Perhaps also as a reaction to this feedback [about not addressing his own theories to the public], in the second semester Jung did talk much more about his own method and theory. He did this by sharing with his audience the path he himself had taken; nota bene, not by recounting his experiences of recording and assessing what he had encountered in his own inner world, but by dealing with experiments and concepts that had earned him scientific renown, beginning with his association experiments, and how he himself discovered "the" unconscious, eventually leading up to various methods of getting to know its contents, in particular, dream analysis.

What Jung did not do, for the time being, was to enter into a discussion of the theoretical and methodological differences between his own views and those of Freud (or Adler). Indeed, he did not even mention the name of Freud at all in this particular semester, which in itself seems to be a conspicuous omission, since without doubt Freud played a crucial role in the very development he was describing. With hindsight, however, we can see this as a strategy to prepare his audience for a detailed discussion of and comparison with those differences later on, which he did indeed undertake in the following terms. Now that we can see what he was leading up to, we can also appreciate how much an underlying, but still implicit, rivalry with Freud was behind this. As this will become much clearer in the third volume of this series (forthcoming), a commentary on their different approaches and Jung's way of presenting them will be reserved until we consider Jung's specific lectures on this issue. However, here I already want to point out the underlying rationale of Jung's strategy, in which—besides other motives—the long shadow that Freud still cast seems indeed to have played a major role.

Jung began his first lecture by saying, "In my experience, it was in general the basic terms which caused difficulty. I have therefore decided to discuss simpler matters this semester, namely basic terms and methods, with the help of which I hope to explain to you how the notions with which I work came into being."

The first question he addressed is a seemingly simple one: What is psychology? This leads to further questions: What is the present state of psychology? What is its subject? How subjective is it, and how objective can it be? Jung was a dedicated psychologist, and what he mentioned in the seventh lecture could be taken as a motto for his whole enterprise: "[^]he human being is the noblest task of science, towering above all its other tasks. It is the highest and most interesting task, in my unauthoritative opinion." This is reminiscent of Nietzsche, who had demanded "that psychology again be recognized as queen of the sciences, and that the rest of the sciences exist to serve and prepare for it" (1886 [2002], p. 24). It seemed to be more than a rhetorical question when Jung had asked, in 1930, will "Nietzsche be proved right in the end with his `scientia ancilla psychologise' [science is the handmaid of psychology]?" (Jung, 1930a, Introduction).

"Psychology is ... first of all about what is valid in general," he stated, notwithstanding one's own "psychology," but it is also subjective; it is about what occurs to us directly. Its subject is "what is called the soul," das was man Seele nennt. And not only is "everything we experience psychic" but "everything was once psychic, there is nothing that had not been psychic before, such as the fantasy of an artist or an engineer. Take a railway bridge, or a work of art—or indeed this lectern. Everything that we learn and experience is at first psychic. The only thing that is immediately given and perceptible is something psychic, that is, a psychic image. This is the first and only basis of experience. `I sense [emp finde]' is the first truth." Thus, psychology is both a general phenomenon and something subjective, an almost personal matter. Jung stressed, however, that it was not an arbitrary matter but rather "a phenomenology, a symptomatology."

This led him to the question of how the various views of psychology in its history, which he had presented in the first semester, had been generated, and later to account for national differences in ideas and outlook, in particular to reflect on the question of language, social and religious convictions, institutions, and geographical differences (soil, climate) in general, and on the different characteristics and difficulties of the English, French, and German languages when it came to expressing psychological materials in particular. "Psychology is ... dealing with a great number of facts," he noted. "But it is extremely difficult to accept these facts as they really are." Once we do accept these facts, there arises the next difficulty, that is, the representation of the material, which is a great difficulty indeed: "[^]t is almost impossible to faithfully convey the facts of the matter."

"[^]he fundamental psychological truths can never be couched in delineated terms," because "the sharper a psychological term, the less it designates." Therefore we would have "to learn the art of coming up with terms that are quite general and indeterminate, and yet are still able to convey something." We always have to bear in mind that we are dealing with the totality of a person. It is no use "to isolate a psychic process" for the purpose of study, because then we will have "killed the psychic life in that process."

"There is nothing simple in the psyche." The psyche that reacts to something simple is never simple itself. Each of us perceives differently, so how do we construct a fact or evidence? And how do we faithfully convey the facts we experience? For example, "what do I mean when I assert: `I'm feeling fine'"? An external observer might register something we are unaware of. "The difficulties arising in this connection were among the reasons," according to Jung, "that led to the recognition of the unconscious as an interfering factor." This gave Jung the opening to enter into a discussion of the concepts of consciousness and the unconscious, and their respective characteristics, which he illustrated with

various examples, whether from everyday life, from his clinical experience, from his travels, from the literature, or, quite frequently, from what he still called "primitives."

He described the conscious and unconscious states alternately, stressing their difference but also their interdependence and interrelationship. Consciousness, for instance, "needs an effort, demands energy and work, and thus tires us." It is also "very limited" and "very narrow[,] and excludes a good many ideas." The unconscious, on the other hand, "is present at all times" and "the primordial condition of mankind." "The unconscious is always dreaming." It is also always "active at work, and I am completely dependent on this work." "[C]onsciousness swims on the unconscious world like a round disc, or is like a small island in the ocean. Consciousness can never be identical with the soul, it is only a part, perhaps a very small part, of the soul. The soul is the whole." "Consciousness is to all intents and purposes an organ, an eye or an ear of the soul." The unconscious, on the other hand, "has a fabulous memory. There are things we never knew, so to speak, but that existed nonetheless" and had a discernible effect on us.

Having introduced this basic differentiation between consciousness and the unconscious, he then proceeded to discuss consciousness as a "perceptual" or "orientation organ," and "those functions of consciousness that serve our orientation toward the inside," or the "inner sphere." Leaving aside his distinction between introverted and extraverted types for the time being, he introduced the well-known four functions that, according to Jung, guide this orientation—sensation, thinking, feeling, and intuition—and, as always in these lectures, illustrated them and how they are "curiously interrelated" with the help of many examples. We also hear more about his distinctions between rational and irrational functions, and developed (superior) and underdeveloped (inferior) functions. Sensation tells us what a thing is, thinking what it means, feeling how we valuate it, and intuition gives us "the invisible aura that surrounds the thing," something best rendered as Ahnung (presentiment, premonition, inkling, hunch, foreboding). " In effect, the latter is an excellent term while `intuition' allows for many different meanings." It is a "function of perception by unconscious means." The intuitive "does not look at things, but sees," and simultaneously has "a truly remarkable capacity for non-observation." Foreshadowing his concept of synchronicity, Jung spoke about the "law of the series" and the "laws of coincidence." "Since intuitions are never completely conscious, intuition is a strange borderline function ... that is never really tangible, and we know as much of it as we do of the fourth dimension. Therefore, my definition of intuition is somewhat makeshift, and in fact a declaration of scientific bankruptcy." In fact, we find here probably the most detailed and simultaneously most accessible discussion of the intuitive function in Jung's work.

At the center of the functions there is the "I," and all functions relate to it. The I usually has a main thought and a large number of secondary thoughts that it keeps to itself, "for otherwise there would be no individuality." "These secondary thoughts make the I the keeper of the great seal of all secrets."

Although functions are subject to the will and can be directed, they can occur involuntarily in consciousness or can also proceed unconsciously. This unconscious course of our functions "is ... a very comforting fact. For it allows us to expect with some certainty that what we do not think, perceive, and intuit with our consciousness, will be done for us by the unconscious."

Jung stressed that these "functions were not discovered by myself, I only stumbled on this treasure trove, for the functions are an ancient fact." "In Lamaism, this theory of functions is developed to a significant extent. There, it is called 'mandala.'"

All of this is a reformulation of views he had already expounded elsewhere, most famously in Psychological Types (1921), but here in layman's terms and in an easily accessible form, and as such already a valuable addition to the Jungian oeuvre, or even, with only slight exaggeration, a Jung for Beginners by the man himself. In addition, however, we also find bits and pieces, snippets and asides, which may open up new perspectives. For instance, he introduced still another "function" that is particularly characteristic of consciousness and "a distinct cultural phenomenon": "the function of the volitional faculty [Funktion des Willensvermõgensj, in short, the will. If it were on a par with the other functions, we might call it a fifth function, but it is better to see it as a superordinate, central function of the I. It reflects the fact that a certain amount of energy is freely available in consciousness, like a mobile division or reserve unit. This psychically available energy stands at the disposal of consciousness."

Jung then turned to a more detailed discussion of the so-called unconscious, personal and collective. "Unconscious" simply means "that which we do not know." "It is not even possible to prove that these things exist when they are in the unconscious, for the essential character of the latter is that it is unknown." The unconscious is thus "a negative boundary term, one which indicates: it is dark there. We have no knowledge of what actually happens there. We postulate, however, that the things of which we are not conscious at this moment somehow nevertheless exist." As to his distinction between personal and collective unconscious, he stated that there is "nothing mythical about it, for it is really a very practical idea."

"The unconscious evidently comprises psychic processes that have either already become lost to consciousness and become forgotten, or ones that do not yet exist and have not yet been born." "What emerges from the personal unconscious is 'my business'; what emerges from the collective unconscious are matters related to humanity in general and therefore not my business in this sense." "[^]heir personal aspect is only a metaphor." Filling a lacuna in his earlier accounts, he gave a detailed map of the differentiation and stratification of its contents, in particular as regards cultural and so-called racial differences.

There follows an exposition of methods for rendering accessible the contents of the unconscious. From early on, Jung had looked for additional methods to do so, apart from the "only rule that psychoanalysis lays down in this respect is: let the patient talk about anything that comes into his head," because, apart from conscious resistances, the patient's "not talking to the point [danebenreden] does not prove that the patient is consciously concealing certain painful contents; it can also occur quite unconsciously." In these cases, "the analyst has to resort to other measures. One of these is the association experiment.... A second expedient is the analysis of dreams; this is the real instrument of psychoanalysis" (1913, §§ 531-533). And this is exactly what Jung did in these lectures, giving a detailed exposition of these measures.

Thus, he first turned to the association experiment and the psychogalvanic method, with many examples, including their use for Tatbestandsdiagnostik or diagnosis of evidence in forensics, or how a detailed account of the study of associations in families enables the psychic structure of families, the spiritus familiaris, to be revealed. All of this is further evidence, by the way, of how important these researches remained to him, and how useful he continued to find them for didactic purposes.

"The main finding" of these experiments was "the insight into the existence of complexes." "Complexes have to be taken seriously, they have dynamic energy, they live in our psyche, and they seem to be bad

things, yet it is these very complexes which lead us to our fate." Or: "Complexes are so to speak our family ghosts." And: "For the complex has the unpleasant characteristic that one forever does what tempts one, thereby inducing a kind of vicious circle." It is possible, however, that "complexes can be made to disappear by taking certain provisions ... through atonement or a confession, either by the patient resuming a reasonable life style, or through reintegration into the community." "There is still another way of ridding oneself of a complex, namely by getting into some kind of continuity that commits the same sin."

Gradually, however, Jung came to realize that a quasi-objective measure of complexes, with the stopwatch in hand, as it were, is not possible. The subject's response depends on what they think this is about and on who is asking. A sobering and embarrassing experience for Jung must have been his expert opinion in the trial of one Hans Näf in November 1934, §§ accused of murdering his wife, in which Jung concluded, on the basis of the Tatbestandsdiagnostik arrived at through the association experiment he had conducted with him, that "the subject's psychological situation, as revealed by the experiment, in no way corresponds to what one would empirically expect in an innocent person" (Jung, 1937 [1934], § 1388). Näf was found guilty and sentenced to lifelong imprisonment. Jung even used this case, in an interview with the Daily Mail in 1935, as evidence for the soundness of his method. A retrial in 1938 revealed, however, that Näf was in fact innocent of the charges and resulted in his acquittal. The fact that the experiment was not an objective measure surely contributed to Jung's turning away from it—although he continued, as here, to use it for didactic purposes—and instead to concentrate on psychological analysis.

The semester—and the book—concludes with an overview of the topic of dreams and the study of several of them. It "occurred to me early on that dreams are simply complexes." Both represent "an invasion of the unconscious." Dreams "are actually like association experiments turned inside out. In these experiments, we have stimulus words that strike the complex and elicit it to emerge, whereas dreams themselves produce the test words.... If you emphasize these words and certain motifs that often recur in dreams, it is really revealing when you ask: 'What comes to your mind about this?"

This is reminiscent of Freud's method of free association, but with one crucial difference. Whereas the Freudian analysand is asked to associate on and on, to "go off on a tangent," string-wise, as it were, from A to B, from B to C, from C to D, and so on, in the expectation that the associations will ultimately lead to the hidden meaning of the dream, a postulated X, which had been distorted and rendered unintelligible by the mechanisms of censorship and dream-work, Jung started out by using "controlled association." The dreamer is asked to approach the motifs and images of a dream in a circumambulatory manner, so to speak, and not to lose sight of them, because they are not distortions or "compromise formations" of opposed forces within the psyche. According to Jung, dreams are "spontaneous products of the unconscious soul. They are pure nature, and therefore convey an unadulterated, natural truth." They represent a "communication or message of the unconscious, of the all-one soul of humankind" (Jung, 1933b, §§ 317-318; my trans.). "But nature is not, in herself, a guide," as he noted elsewhere, "for she is not there for man's sake. Ships are not guided by the phenomenon of magnetism. We have to make the compass a guide." Thus, products of the unconscious, such as dreams, have to be used "with the necessary conscious correction that has to be applied to every natural phenomenon in order to make it serve our purpose" (1918, § 34).

The "compass" he gave to his listeners sounds simple enough: "A dream should always be written down at once, otherwise we inevitably lie to ourselves. It is best to note it down on a sheet of paper that one divides into three columns: The first column is for the text; the second is for the context, that is, comments on the keyword and associations we have to it, as if this were a complex word. In the third column we can note the interpretation. This is the way to work on a dream humbly, by oneself, when there is no accomplished analyst at hand to do it for one."

The deciphering of dreams, and reading and accepting the message from the unconscious, however, is not just a party game. The lectures break off with the analysis of one particular dream, the interpretation of which "did not enlighten the dreamer. He learned nothing from it and refused to accept my explanation of this dream. So, unfortunately, he went on following his ambitions and a disastrous situation followed." Obviously, there was more to be said on the topic, and so Jung started the following, third semester (forthcoming) by saying: "Those of you who attended last summer's lectures will remember that they dealt with methods for revealing the inside of the human psyche. We spoke of the word association method, combined with breathing, of the psycho-galvanic method, and finally of dream analysis. This semester we will proceed along the same path and study the psychology of dreams. The investigation of the inner psyche is a practical possibility for doctors; it is the investigation of the unknown motive. Just to know that a thing exists is not enough, one must know what it is and all about it. The human psyche is the most important object of all."

It is to this quest that Jung devoted his lifelong work—the sum total of which up to that point he was now ready to convey to a general audience of "educated people" in these lectures at a prestigious university. Welcome to what could be called his own Introductory Lectures to Analytical Psychology.
<>

Psychology of Yoga and Meditation: Lectures Delivered at ETH Zurich, Volume 6: 1938–1940 by C. G. Jung, edited by Martin Liebscher, translations by John Peck and Heather McCartney [Philemon Foundation Series, Princeton University Press, 9780691206585]

Jung's lectures on the psychology of Eastern spirituality—now available for the first time

Between 1933 and 1941, C. G. Jung delivered a series of public lectures at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. Intended for a general audience, these lectures addressed a broad range of topics, from dream analysis to the psychology of alchemy. Here for the first time are Jung's illuminating lectures on the psychology of yoga and meditation, delivered between 1938 and 1940.

In these lectures, Jung discusses the psychological technique of active imagination, seeking to find parallels with the meditative practices of different yogic and Buddhist traditions. He draws on three texts to introduce his audience to Eastern meditation: Patañjali's *Yoga Sûtra*, the *Amitâyur-dhyâna-sûtra* from Chinese Pure Land Buddhism, and the *Shrî-chakra-sambhâra Tantra*, a scripture related to tantric yoga. The lectures offer a unique opportunity to encounter Jung as he shares his ideas with the

general public, providing a rare window on the application of his comparative method while also shedding light on his personal history and psychological development.

Featuring an incisive introduction by Martin Liebscher as well as explanations of Jungian concepts and psychological terminology, **PSYCHOLOGY OF YOGA AND MEDITATION** provides invaluable insights into the evolution of Jung's thought and a vital key to understanding his later work.

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Carl Gustav Jung's university lectures, conducted in the winter semester of 1938/1939 (28 October-3 March) and the first half of the summer ester 1939 (28 April-9 June), and announced as "Introduction to the Psychology of the Unconscious," were dedicated to the topic of Eastern spirituality. Starting out with the psychological technique of active imagine, he sought to find parallels in Eastern meditative practices. His was on meditation as taught by different yogic traditions and in Buddhist practice. The final four lectures of the summer semester 1939 (16-7July) dealt with those meditative practices in Christianity that saw as equivalent to the aforementioned examples from the East. Jung was particularly interested in The Spiritual Exercises of Ignagious of Loyola, which formed the main topic of the following winter semester 1939/1940. Those four lectures will be published together with lectures of 1939/1940 as volume 7 of this series. After a break over summer of 1940, Jung restarted his lectures with a summary of the previous semesters. As Jung briefly returned to the topic of Eastern meditation as part of a summation, the first and second lectures of the winter semester 1940/f/1941 are published at the end of this volume.

Jung's engagement with Eastern spirituality and yoga can, at least, be iced back to the time of Transformations and Symbols of the Libido's (1912), which included a psychological reading of the Upanishads and Rigveda. His acquaintance with John Woodroffe's (aka Arthur alon) The Serpent Power—Jung owned a copy of the first edition of 1919—which was basically a commentary on the Sat Cakra Nirupana," gave Jung his initial knowledge of Kundalini Yoga. This interest in Kundalini and Tantric Yoga culminated in the seminar series by the Tubingen Sanskrit scholar Jakob Wilhelm Hauer in the Psychological Club Zurich in 1932. Hauer's lectures were accompanied by a psychological commentary from Jung. At the same time Olga Frobe-Kapteyn was organising the first Eranos conference which took place in her house near Ascona in the summer of 1933. The idea of dedicating this annual conference to the topic of the relationship between Eastern and Western philosophy and religion came from Jung himself. Consequently the first conference was on 'Yoga and Meditation' in the East and West. At Ascona in the 1930s Jung had the opportunity to discuss Indian thought and spirituality with scholars, colleagues, and friends such as the Indologist Heinrich Zimmer, the French Orientalists Paul Masson-Oursel, and the scholars of Buddhism Caroline Rhys Davids and Jean Przyluski — to on but a few. And, finally, Jung experienced India at first hand he was invited by the British government to take part in the celebrations of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Indian e Congress Association at the University of Calcutta. He left Zurich at the beginning of December 1937 together with Harold Fowler ormick and travelled through India for three months. Afterwards wrote two articles entitled "The Dreamlike World of India" and t India Can Teach Us" (1939)—the latter being a clear reference to Muller's 1883 article by the same title. Another text of Jung's, pubin Calcutta in 1936, was specifically dedicated to the topic of Yoga and the West."

In his lectures of 1938/1939, Jung chose three texts for introducing audience to the practice of Eastern meditation: Patanali's Yoga Sutra, Amitayur-Dhyana-Sutra from the Chinese Pure Land Buddhist tradition, and the Shri-chakra-sambhara Tantra, a scripture related to Tantric Yoga…

Lecture 1: 28 OCTOBER 1938

In earlier semesters, I spoke a lot about dreams and attempted to outline how dreams are structured and how we can get at their meaning. Now, in this semester I will follow up by describing the phenomenon of "active imagination."

You will recall the dream of the concert where, at the end, a glowing bauble emerged out of the Christmas tree. In particular, I said this:

> This bauble is not an ordinary object, but rather it is a symbol that reaches far back into the intellectual history of humanity. It is an example of how contents from the collective unconscious impose themselves upon consciousness until they become conscious. If we were to proceed anthropomorphically, it could be said that it is as if these contents of the collective unconscious have a certain volition of their own to become manifest. However, this is only a hypothesis, and I ask you not to take this literally. In any case, such contents appear first in dreams. These are phenomena that take place at the edge of consciousness, contents that emerge into consciousness. I was impressed by this fact very early on. You see this phenomenon extremely frequently in patients, as well as in the mentally ill. I asked myself if it might not be possible to make an impact upon that background where the unconscious originates so that it would give up its contents more clearly, or if it were possible to make these traces of the unconscious clearer so that one could discern them and understand them better?

I found that if one directs attention to these traces and concentrates upon them, a curious phenomenon of movement gets going, just as when one stares at a dark spot for a long time which then begins to become animated. We are then suddenly able to discern the forms of one's own internal background. "Gazing into the glass or bowl of water" opens onto the background to one's own soul, to the extent that one ultimately perceives the images— though of course not in the water. This is a technique used by the ancient Egyptian priests, for example, who stared into a bowl of water. There is nothing present in the water, but the intense gazing arouses the soul into seeing something. It has a hypnotic and fascinating effect. For this purpose, the ancient magicians used a glass button or jewel, or Egyptian priests a beautiful blue crystal, in order to impart unconscious perceptions to their clientele. It was not understood in this way back then but was employed for the purposes of prophecy, divination, and healing. The ancients were well aware that to heal the soul, or even the body, a certain assistance from psychic experiences was necessary.

We find similar ideas in the ancient Asclepius cult. That is why medical clinics in antiquity had incubation chambers in which the ancients would have a dream that proffered the correct diagnosis, or often even indicated the right cure for healing. Similar practices are still used today by Indians and medicine men of primitive tribes. If someone is troubled by an evil dream, the medicine man has them go through this process in order to bring them back into harmony with their psychic backdrop. For it is well known that someone who no longer has this connection has lost their soul. The loss of soul is typical for primitives. It is absolutely imperative that the soul be recaptured. This can be achieved by restoring the connection with the unconscious by capturing the psychic substratum. With children, for example, images sometimes even start to come alive: the locomotive begins to move or the people in the picture book begin to do something. It is thought these are only children's experiences, but some primitives have much more experience with the background than we who live orientated to the external world. We must get to know this. We live through our eyes. However, that is not characteristic for all peoples, but simply a peculiarity of the West.

If one concentrates on such a fragment, it is necessary to clearly retain the initial perception of it in the soul. This is where the Westerner has a tendency to inhibit the arousal of fantasy. He can shut off something from the environment, i.e., he so holds to one and the same standpoint that noting disturbs him. This differentiation is characteristic for Westerners, but not for people from the East. It is almost impossible to acquire precise information from them. They have no meditation on a specific area. If I bend down over a specific blade of grass and ask what it means, the Eastern person will give me the entire meadow. For them that's a demanding task that wears them out. This has also struck me about spiritually significant people from India or China. They cannot concentrate exclusively on one tiny detail.

But active imagination does not imply such singular concentration, which kills off anything happening. It must be possible that while the image stays firmly in mind unconscious fantasy can also join in. If this can be done, then something gets going. If one observes with the most relaxed attention possible, then one can perceive that some other material enters in that enlivens the situation. If one practices this, one can allow an entire system to unfold from any point of departure. In doing so, one always thinks that one does it oneself, one is inventing it, but in reality these are spontaneous thoughts. With such images one may not say that one created them oneself. If a roof tile falls on your head, you have not made it happen, nor have you done it yourself. These are "freely arising perceptions" as Herbart has already said. If one gives up tense expectancy and only gazes at the emerging possibility, then one perceives what the unconscious is creating from its perspective. In this way, an image is stimulated. When this occurs, a glimpse into the unconscious can be gained. People often dream in a very fragmentary way, or the dream breaks off in one place— then I ask the dreamer to imagine it further. I sort of ask for the continuation. In principle, this is nothing other than the usual technique of creating the dream's context. I elicit the entire texture in which the dream is embedded. As it appears to the dreamer. There are some simple ideas: we believe water is the same for everyone, but that's not the case. If I ask twelve people what they associate with water, one is amazed at what they say. So, if, instead of asking for the entire fabric of the dream, I were to ask how they would dream it onwards, then I would get as a reply material that would correlate exactly with the meaning of the dream. One can also sabotage such a quest. Someone already brought me a dream right out of the dictionary which I was supposed to be convinced by. Unfortunately for them I noticed this.

Active imagination is a making conscious of fantasy perceptions that are manifesting at the threshold of consciousness. We must imagine that our perceptions possess a certain energy through which they can become conscious at all. It is a great achievement to be conscious. For this reason, we are exhausted after a relatively long period of consciousness. Then we must sleep and recover. If primitives are asked quite simple questions, after a while they too become exhausted and want to sleep. If you leave them to their own devices, they think of nothing, sit around, don't sleep, but they also do not think. Something is happening that is not in the head, that is quite unconscious. Some are insulted if you ask what they are thinking. "Only crazy people hear something up there in the head," not them. You see from what night our consciousness in fact comes awake.

There are four different states of psychic content:

Consciousness	0—0—0—0	Conscious perceptions.
Threshold perception	0—0—0—0	Contents on the threshold of consciousness, below which darkness reigns (background perceptions).
Personal unconscious	0—0—0—0	Unknown or forgotten contents which however belong to the personal domain.
Collective unconscious	0—0—0—0	Thoughts which have already been thought in other epochs. The most interesting are these most profound contents which are not individually acquired but can be thought of as instinctive fundamental patterns, and thus as a type of category.

Each of these layers, even the uppermost, is influenced and modified if content from the collective unconscious arises. If the process of becoming conscious takes a natural course, not convulsively, then the whole of life proceeds according to the basic pattern of the collective unconscious, naturally shadowed individually, although the individual motifs are repeated in everyone. Hence, we find the motifs of the collective unconscious in the folklore of all peoples and in all times, in my theology, in the religions, etc.

Any concentration of attention in this technique is very difficult. This is something that can be achieved only through practice. The great majority of people lose themselves immediately in chains of associations, or they inhibit them and then absolutely nothing happens. Occidental man is not educated to use this technique, but rather to observe all external sense perceptions and one's own thoughts, although not to play host to the perception of the background processes. The East is way ahead of us in this respect. This is a meditation, i.e., an impregnation of the background, which becomes animated, fructified by our attention. By this means, objects of still- developing circumstances emerge clearly. The Latin word contemplatio comes from templum— a zone for living encounter is defined, a specific field of vision in which observation takes place. The augurs used to delineate a field, a templum for observing the flight of a bird. A protected domain from which one can observe the inner contents and can fertilize them with attention. And the word meditatio actually means to consider or ponder.

In antiquity, as far as I am aware, there were no detailed descriptions or instructions for this technique. It actually contradicted the classical spirit. By contrast, in the Middle Ages certain ideas were already emerging. The old alchemists—by which you must by no means imagine just any old crazy gold makers but rather natural philosophers— defined the term meditation as a dialogue with another who is invisible. This other may be God or oneself in another manifestation, or the good spirit, the guardian spirit of the person with whom they can be led into dialogue in meditation. St. Victor106 had such a conversation with his own soul. The Middle Ages thus already had the inner counterpart in contrast to the external counterpart; and that inner counterpart possesses a meaning in its own right, so that one can, in a sense, have a conversation with this other. So, in one word: this internal other replies. This

procedure is called imagination. I not only surrender myself to fantasy but I also concentrate my attention on what is to be contemplated and observe what happens in the process.

In the Middle Ages the philosophers used this term to describe the possible transformation of the elements. They can be transformed through meditation. By concentrating on the chemical matter, the image that is within us is imprinted upon matter. This image within us is the soul, and it is round. Roundness is perfection, therefore gold has a round form because it is a perfect body. One can imprint a model upon the image of one's own soul, and then it must be transformed into gold. One thinks that gold is meant. In truth, however, one is taught that it is not normal gold but the gold of the soul. It is difficult to understand these lines of thought, because things were not understood in our sense of the term, instead they took place in matter, thus in matter that one handles. It is as if the unconscious were located in chemical matter, in minerals.

But we must not forget that the chemical constitution of bodies was a great puzzle in the Middle Ages, a great dark puzzle. There was no knowledge about these things, hence their internal world was understandably projected onto them. The same is true for us. If we do not understand someone, we impute every sort of quality to him all the same, and assume a great deal about him, when in fact it is precisely what is within us. We can say nothing about him except what we see though our own lens, and we humans do this utterly without shame. We try to get in close with concepts, but we mystify our own mystery into matter. The same happened to the Middle Ages. Gradually people became a bit more conscious, but not enough. Then came the scientific age and interrupted this entire development. Not so in the East. There it was possible for these ideas and efforts, which had been preent from time immemorial, to develop analogously: they had not been interrupted by exclusive concentration on external things. Very early on, we find in Indian texts the concept of the tapas, i.e., heat, glow.107 It is used as an expression to represent the fructifying influence of attention, hence is translated as "creative heat." In the Rigveda it says: tapas is seen among the things that carry the earth.108 The earth is carried through truth, size, strength, through rita, i.e., the law of right action, tapas, brahman, and sacrifice. This idea is almost immutable in its form.

A hymn from the Rigveda says:

> What was hidden in the shell,
>
> Was born through the power of fiery torments.
>
> From this first arose love,
>
> As the Germ of knowledge,
>
> The wise found the roots of existence in non- existence,
>
> By investigating the heart's impulse.

Goethe said the same:

> You follow a false trail;
>
> Do not think that we are not serious;

Is not the kernel of nature

In the hearts of men?

These verses from the Rigveda propose that the existence of the world is in fact a psychic function. They would have us understand that these human qualities constantly generate heat, and that this glow begets the world. The world to our way of thinking is not begotten in this way, but to the Indian that's what the world is: namely, consciousness. That is why he can also say: the figures created internally are the world, an illusion— and in that sense the concept of mâyâ invites a similar understanding. Another passage where the concept of the tapas plays a role occurs in the myth of the creator of the world, Prajâpati. In the beginning, he was alone. Apart from him there was nothing:

Prajâpati had the desire of creating beings and multiplying himself. He underwent (consequently) austerities. Having finished them, he created these worlds, viz., earth, air and heaven. He heated them (with the lustre of his mind, pursuing a course of austerities); three lights were produced: Agni from the earth, Vayu from the air, and Aditya from heaven. He heated them again, in consequence of which the three Vedas were produced.

This means "he heated himself with his own heat," in commutatio. "He brooded, he hatched." He incubates himself. This is the word used for the technical concentration exercises out of which yoga developed.

The similarity between this technique, which we use in a psychological way, and Eastern Yoga should not be overlooked. The Western technique is a pitiful thing in comparison to what the East has to say about it. In any case, there exists a certain principal difference, not only because the East surpasses itself with a rich literature and an exceptional differentiation of methods. Yoga as it is practiced now and has been practiced for many hundreds of years is a system. The Western technique is not a system, but a simple process. In the East, it is a technical system. As a rule, the object of revaluation or meditation is prescribed there, which it is not in active imagination, where it arises quite naturally from a dream, from intimations that manifest in consciousness in a natural way. In the East, the guru, i.e., the leader, gives the tschela, i.e., the student, a particular instruction about the object he is to meditate upon. Guru and student are not outlandish peculiarities. Every moderately educated person in the East has his guru who instructs him in this technique. It has been this way since ancient times, a form of education practiced by one whose qualifications as a leader are not endorsed by any university.

This is the teaching of yoga in broad outline. The classic text offering an overview of yoga teaching is a work from the second century BCE: the Yoga Sûtra by the grammarian Patañjali. It is an exceptionally deep book containing a plenitude of profound ideas, incredibly difficult to translate because it presents the secrets of yoga in an exceptionally concise language: four texts for a total of 195 tenets.

The goal of the practice is the promotion of samâdhi, i.e., rapture, ecstasy, contemplation, also suppression. Hauer also translates it as enfolding in contrast to an unfolding.116 One could also translate this as introversion. After that, the practice of yoga intends a diminution of the kleshas. By this term one understands instinctive elements in the unconscious that actually should be repressed or at least diminished. The goal of yoga is to conquer these unconscious impulses, hence yoga, i.e., yoke; the yoking of uncontrollable powers of the human soul and in a different manner from how we do it. We simply suppress or repress certain emotions. The difference is this: when they repress, they know that

they are doing it. If we repress, the content disappears but then neurotic symptoms develop out of this repression. One turns his attention away from something unpleasurable. This is an hysterical mechanism that takes place not only in the life of the individual but everywhere, even in politics. The Yoga Sûtra says: egoism, ignorance, attachment, aversion, and fear of death weaken you. Ignorance (ávidyâ) is the ground for all other vices or kleshas. <>

COINCIDENCES: SYNCHRONICITY, VERISIMILITUDE, AND STORYTELLING by Michael Jackson [University of California Press, 9780520379954]

Most people have a story to tell about a remarkable coincidence that in some instances changed the course of their lives. These uncanny occurrences have been variously interpreted as evidence of divine influence, fate, or the collective unconscious. Less common are explanations that explore the social situations and personal preoccupations of the individuals who place the most weight on coincidences. Drawing on a variety of coincidence stories, renowned anthropologist Michael Jackson builds a case for seeing them as allegories of separation and loss—revealing the hope of repairing sundered lives, reconnecting estranged friends, reuniting distant kin, closing the gap between people and their gods, and achieving a sense of emotional and social connectedness with others in a fragmented world.

Review

COINCIDENCES, Michael Jackson has produced an impassioned and wonderfully written essay that weaves strands of narrative and philosophical reflection into a powerful and seamless tapestry that underscores a central theme of human being…its irrepressible ambiguity. —Paul Stoller, author of *Yaya's Story: The Quest for Well-Being in the World*

Excerpt: Our lives are, for the most part, made up of unremarkable events. Inevitably, however, the course of every life is punctuated by events that disturb and astonish in equal measure, and when we recount our lives as stories we often single out such events as turning points or moments of truth. This book is about such events. Its particular focus is on coincidences, the "remarkable concurrences of events or circumstances that have no discernible causal connection," and the notions of luck, fate, and providence to which these events give rise. Whether coincidences are construed as fortunate or unfortunate, tragic or transformative, they always evoke wonder and, as the saying goes, "make us think."

As I am writing, my faculty assistant, Andrea Davies, appears in the doorway of my office, and we fall into conversation. At one point, Andrea mentions that she wrote her MFA thesis on James Baldwin's nonfiction and his use of coincidence.' When I mention that I happen to be writing a book about coincidence and ask Andrea which of Baldwin's works I might refer to, she suggests I read the opening lines of Notes of a Native Son.

On the 29th of July, in 1943, my father died. On the same day, a few hours later, his last child was born. Over a month before this, while all our energies were concentrated in waiting for these events, there had been, in Detroit, one of the bloodiest race riots of the century. A few hours after my father's funeral, while he lay in state in the undertaker's chapel, a race riot broke out in Harlem. In the morning of the 3rd of August, we drove my father to the graveyard through a wilderness of smashed plate glass.

As we drove him to the graveyard, the spoils of injustice, anarchy, discontent, and hatred were all around us. It seemed to me that God himself had devised, to mark my father's end, the most sustained and brutally dissonant of codas. And it seemed to me, too, that the violence which rose all about us as my father left the world had been devised as a corrective for the pride of his eldest son.

This coincidence of a personal tragedy and a social calamity prompted Baldwin, "the eldest son," to ponder the connection between his father's generation and his own as well as the connection between the race riots in America and the biblical apocalypse.

Coincidences typically occasion quite different interpretations, and my ethnographic research in Aboriginal Australia and West Africa has taught me that while Western intellectuals tend to refer coincidences to that landscape of shadow that has been termed, directly or indirectly, "the unconscious," preliterate peoples tend to invoke unknown forces like witchcraft and sorcery, lying at the periphery of their social fields. As Michel Foucault observes, the unthought may be construed as deep within "like a shrivelled-up nature or a stratified history" or as something exterior to us, in the penumbra as it were, an "Other that is not only a brother but a twin, born, not of man, nor in man, but beside him and at the same time, in an identical newness, in an unavoidable duality." Although Foucault draws a distinction between the unconscious and the unknown, the former being "an abysmal region in man's nature" and the latter "an obscure space" inhabited by unknown others, he refuses to accord greater weight to either perspective. It could be argued, however, that the dominant episteme since the late nineteenth century has centered on the intrapsychic, not the intersubjective. For Sigmund Freud, as for Claude Levi-Strauss, delving into the depths of the unconscious mind was the royal road to understanding human thought and action, while Carl Jung interpreted synchronicity as the irruption of archetypal figures and mythological motifs into our conscious life.4 Although these thinkers evince an intellectual habit that Henri Ellenberger characterizes as "unmasking," it is practically impossible to sustain any hard and fast distinction between a mode of thought that focuses on the unconscious mind and a mode of thought that focuses on the dilemmas and difficulties of social relations. As Baldwin's compelling account of the coincidence of his father's death and the 1943 Detroit race riots indicates, theological, sociological, and psychological interpretations may all be inspired by the same event. Aboriginal people speak of the Dreaming as an ancestral yet timeless field of being that is occasionally and partially glimpsed by the living in their dreams. For many African people, the mysteries of the invisible can be penetrated by diviners gifted with second sight or assisted by spirit allies. In religions throughout the world, the invisible is a numinous realm to which one rarely gains direct access, though it can be reached by means of prayer, ordeal, and ritual. For scientists, the invisible consists in hidden laws of cause and effect that rational inquiry and sophisticated instruments can bring to light. For many anthropologists, the field of intersubjective life is the subject of their concern: the social matrices in which we are embedded and the dynamic forces that govern our interactions—love and hate, reciprocity and exchange, attachment and separation, certainty and uncertainty, power and powerlessness, war and peace.

What is common to all these interpretive traditions is the mysterious relationship between the visible and invisible dimensions of human existence, the "landscape of shadow" that lies between the known and the unknown and is at once exterior and interior to us. Whether one approaches the phenomenon of coincidence from an intrapsychic or intersubjective point of view, the same assumption is made—that the "obscure space" between the known and the unknown, or between thought and the unthought, can be illuminated, and that the world without and the world within can thereby be seen as one. Methodologically, one therefore needs a bifocal perspective that, in the words of D. W. Winnicott, does justice to the "intermediate area of experiencing to which inner reality and external life both

contribute." This dialectical approach is also suggested by Carl Jung's comment that synchronicity involves a "peculiar interdependence of objective events among themselves as well as with subjective (psychic) states of the observer or observers."8 But Jung's fascination with the collective unconscious leads him to downplay the dynamics of intersubjectivity—the passions that unite and divide us, coming together and moving apart in the course of our journeys through life. Historical and even prehistorical events shape our consciousness, to be sure, but we reshape those events in the multiple ways we respond to them after the fact, and any interpretation of a coincidence is inadequate unless it considers the lived experiences and immediate circumstances of those to whom the coincidence happens.'" Although I do not uncritically embrace either Jung's metaphysical interpretations of coincidence" or the Freudian view that our tendency to see meaning in coincidences is an expression of an infantile fantasy of omnipotence (a defense against our anxiety of not being in control of our world), psychoanalysis remains one of the most compelling approaches to understanding "clusters of unexplained facts," not by glib reiterations of the view that facts speak for themselves but by acknowledging that our evolutionary, genealogical, historical, mythological, and biographical pasts bequeath to us a constellation of elements that emerge in different permutations and combinations at different moments in life, and that our perception of reality reflects these ever-changing assemblages that are never the same for everyone, or for any one person in any given situation. This is why one cannot entirely explain a person in terms of any one variable, be it class, culture, gender, ethnic or religious affiliation, or even personality. This is also why it is imperative to deploy a double perspective that encompasses both the object of experience and the experiencing subject, allowing that human beings are shaped by external forces and conspire in their own fates, seeing the world through the lens of their own preoccupations and interests and creating gods in their own image. One is led, therefore, to broach the philosophical problem of verisimilitude: of speaking truth-to-life, of questioning every truth claim not in order to finally arrive at the truth for once and for all but in order to more deeply appreciate the complexity of what is at play for any person, in any moment of time, or in any one place.

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In **MINIMA MORALIA**, Theodor Adorno speaks of "the impossibility of a coincidence between the idea and what fulfills it?" There is always a surplus or excess of being over knowing. This is as true of the idea of coincidence as it is true of our concepts of personality, nationality, and ethnicity. It is not simply the lack of fit between a concept and the lived experience it supposedly covers that concerned Adorno, but the danger of becoming so infatuated by an idea that we forget the singular individuals whose lives call every abstraction into question. Avoiding the subordination of people to ideas or the sacrifice of human lives to the false gods of ideology might be less urgent if it were simply a matter of striking a balance in academic writing between the general understandings we seek and the individuals, including ourselves, whose particular experience is at once the means and end of that understanding. But ideology enforces and reinforces social and racial divisions between those who deem themselves worthy of life and those they turn their backs on as unworthy of care.

Consider the notions of duty, law, and faith. Although these notions are often espoused as ultimate values, they can readily absolve us from the burden of thought since the thinking has already been done for us by God, or the ancestors, or an authority figure in whom we place our trust.

Hence, Adolf Eichmann's repeated assertion at his trial in Jerusalem, that he upheld the law and was a conscientious servant of the state. "He did his duty, as he told the police and the court over and over again; he not only obeyed orders, he also obeyed the law."

I do not want to claim that dutifulness, obedience, or fidelity to a transcendent ideal is intrinsically incompatible with being a loving parent, a loyal friend, an ethical human being, or a good citizen. But swearing allegiance to a charismatic leader or a high ideal can, under certain circumstances, make one complicit in unspeakable deeds.

In Nuremberg in 1945, several high-ranking and well-educated members of the Nazi Einsatzgruppen (the mobile killing units on the eastern front) were tried for war crimes and sentenced to death. One of these men, Dr. Otto Ohlendorf, was found guilty of murdering ninety thousand Jews. In his defense, Ohlendorf argued that Hitler had good information that the Russians were planning to attack Germany. Since Hitler was better informed than he was, Ohlendorf was in no position to question this intelligence, and it was perfectly lawful for Germany to act in anticipatory self-defense. The chief prosecutor at this trial was a twenty-seven-year-old Jewish American lawyer, Benjamin Ferencz. Ferencz found Ohlendorf to be honest and rational, and in an interview some seventy years after the war he pointed out that the Pentagon would make the same argument today if it believed the United States was in danger of attack by a foreign power. By implication, history continues to repeat itself, and the ominous mantra that extraordinary situations call for extraordinary measures will be inevitably invoked to justify torture, mass incarceration of political enemies, the suppression of free speech, and the persecution of ethnic minorities.

In the same pessimistic vein, Ferencz observes that Ohlendorf was not incapable of humanity to his cats and dogs, his family, and the men under his command. The SS general did not believe in killing Jewish infants by bashing their heads against a tree. Instead, he told his men that an anguished mother should be allowed to hold her crying child against her breast. Then a single bullet would suffice to kill them both. This would spare his men from unnecessary distress and save bullets. It would also, presumably, lessen the possibility that the executioners should see their victims as human beings like themselves.

Perhaps because he did not want to be guilty of the same indifference as those whose crimes he was judging, Ferencz visited Ohlendorf in his cell shortly after his sentence had been handed down. The prosecutor hoped to better understand the mind of a mass murderer. Perhaps, too, he was worried that a desire for vengeance was affecting his professional commitment to due process. In any event, Ferencz soon experienced the same double bind that Hannah Arendt would experience sixteen years later after covering the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem. To devote time and energy to understanding a person whose actions are unequivocally "evil" might be seen as compromising the judgment by finding mitigating circumstances or simply showing the "human side" of an alleged monster. Ferencz quickly discovered that Ohlendorf felt no remorse. "You'll see that I was right," he told the prosecutor. "The Russians will take over the Jews. The Jews in America will suffer." He then reiterated the arguments he had made to the court. Ferencz saw that nothing could be gained by continuing the conversation, and he ended it.

Reason without emotion is dangerous enough. But when entrenched ideas preclude the possibility of seeing other human beings as though they were oneself in other circumstances, reason becomes split not only from feeling but also from intersubjective reality.

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For the idealist, whether religious or political, the idea to which he is attached is always transcendent. As such it cannot be questioned by a mere mortal, and its summons cannot be ignored. One has no choice in the matter. The idea carries its own necessity, whether this be the law of history, the law of nature, or the law of God. The idealist vows that he would give his life to the realization of the ideal. Ironically, he does not realize that he gave up his life the very minute he embraced the ideal as supreme or sublime.

When thinking becomes totally self-absorbed or fixated on an abstract idea, it becomes potentially as dangerous to self as to others. Although Hannah Arendt subscribes to Plato's idea that thinking is essentially talking to oneself (*eme emautõ*), this intrapsychic two-in-one is inseparable from the action of talking to others, in which interior monologue becomes a dialogue between people. This interplay between what goes on in the privacy of one's own mind and what transpires in the course of conversations and exchanges with others is suggested by her phrase, "the coincidence of thinking and thanking.

The question of whether and in what ways the life of the mind ever coincides with the life we lead with others has been central to this book. To explain a coincidence in terms of unconscious forces or archetypal forms is to assume that inchoate ideas generate events. By contrast, we might argue that events are more random than we like to think, and though we are continually ascribing meaning to events after they have occurred, life is continually outstripping our efforts to comprehend or control it. For Hannah Arendt, the very idea that we are the authors of our own fate is questionable. Although we recount our histories as we recount our lives—as narratives of good and bad choices—"the real story in which we are engaged as long as we live has no visible or invisible maker because it is not made." Although stories require agents, who make things happen and to whom things happen, in reality we act and speak without ever being arbiters of our destinies or lives, and history is "an endless new chain of happenings whose eventual outcome the actor is utterly incapable of knowing or controlling beforehand."

There appears to be a contradiction here between Arendt's view in Eichmann in Jerusalem that we can be called to account for our actions, and the argument she makes in The Human Condition that all human action reflects a plethora of often competing influences, interests, and persuasions that are the outcome of previous experience, and that have ramifications that go far beyond what any actor knows, desires, imagines, says or does. The "simple fact," she observes, is that "we don't know what we are doing when we are acting," and we can neither grasp, practically or intellectually, "the manifold influences that bear upon us or the future implications of what we do." This is not to reduce human existence to contingency, for our lives would be unthinkable without at least the ideas of agency and design. What Arendt wants to emphasize is the fact that human action always involves more than a singular subject; it occurs within fields of interaction that she calls the "subjective in-between?' Accordingly, whatever anyone does or says is immediately outstripped by what others do or say in return. Every action calls out a reaction that "strikes out on its own and affects others."

The resolution of this apparent contradiction between being responsible for our actions and being in thrall to circumstances beyond our comprehension and control lies in the recognition that both perspectives are entangled in any event. Thus, when a coincidence occurs, we are often undecided about

whether a meaning inheres in the event or we have ascribed meaning to it in retrospect. It is the same with history and biography. Every critical event is inherently ambiguous, and it is often impossible to decide whether we can be blamed for having made a bad choice or forgiven because we were victims of circumstance, our passions, or the baleful influence of someone else. This ambiguity accounts for why Hannah Arendt can hold Eichmann accountable for his crimes while dismissing him as a clown or a sociopath. Finally, however, we are called on neither to explain or exonerate but to find the means of recovering life in the face of loss. Of starting over. This, Arendt writes, is the meaning of forgiveness, which implies neither loving those that hate us, nor absolving them from their crime, nor even understanding them ("they know not what they do"). Rather, it is a form of redemption in which one reclaims one's own life, tearing it free from the oppressor's grasp, and releasing oneself from those thoughts of revenge and those memories of one's loss that might otherwise keep one in thrall to one's persecutor forever.

These strategies, she says, reflect the fact of natality—the power of action to bring the new into being. Thus, when we recount a story about any event that has befallen us, we play down the boundless field of influences and consequences that impinge on us, thereby creating the impression that our lives and histories are, at least to some extent, ours to have and to hold.

So it is with a coincidence. We are always in two minds about whether it holds a key with which we can unlock the secret of our lives or is random and devoid of any significance. As such, a coincidence encapsulates the ambiguity of human existence, for while life would be unbearable without meaning, we have no way of knowing for certain whether the meanings we invest in are true or false, harmful or harmless, and the relationship between ideas and life remains as indeterminate and mysterious as the relationship between two events happening to occur at the time in the same place. <>

Human Beings or Human Becomings? A Conversation with Confucianism on the Concept of Person edited by Peter D. Hershock & Roger T. Ames [SUNY series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture, SUNY, 9781438481838]

Argues that Confucianism and other East Asian philosophical traditions can be resources for understanding and addressing current global challenges such as climate change and hunger.

Great transformations are reshaping human life, social institutions, and the world around us, raising profound questions about our fundamental values. We now have the knowledge and the technical expertise, for instance, to realize a world in which no child needs to go to bed hungry—and yet, hunger persists. And although the causes of planetary climate disruption are well known, action of the scale and resolution needed to address it remain elusive.

In order to deepen our understanding of these transformations and the ethical responses they demand, considering how they are seen from different civilizational perspectives is imperative. Acknowledging the rise of China both geopolitically and culturally, the essays in this volume enter into critical and yet appreciative conversations with East Asian philosophical traditions—primarily Confucianism, but also

Buddhism and Daoism—drawing on their conceptual resources to understand what it means to be human as irreducibly relational. The opening chapters establish a framework for seeing the resolution of global predicaments, such as persistent hunger and climate disruption, as relational challenges that cannot be addressed from within the horizons of any ethics committed to taking the individual as the basic unit of moral analysis. Subsequent chapters turn to Confucian traditions as resources for addressing these challenges, reimagining personhood as a process of responsive, humane becoming and envisioning ethics as a necessarily historical and yet open-ended process of relational refinement and evolving values.

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CONTENTS

Humans, at least since the first uses of fire, have been technological animals. The inventions of the wheel, the compass, the printing press, the internal combustion engine, and the telephone each have dramatically changed humanity's relationship to the world, as well as our relationships with one another. Yet, the transformations of human experience being precipitated by technology today are unprecedented.

We now know that human activity is capable of affecting planetary processes like climate. Humanity is experimenting with cloning, gene editing, and other forms of bio-engineering, mapping the neuro-topography of thought with functional magnetic resonance imaging, and realizing new kinds of human—machine interactions. Most profoundly, perhaps, artificial intelligence and related technical developments like machine learning and big data are blurring boundaries between both the commercial and the political, and the technical and the ethical.

These latest products of human ingenuity have the potential to radically augment human capacities or to entirely supplant them. They are already a catalyst for the emergence of new societal infrastructures and will fundamentally transform work and employment in the coming decades, challenging in the process all extant understandings of decision making and agency. In the face of such transformations—a decentering of the human that will be at least as consequential as that which occurred through the so-called Copernican revolution—serious and sustained reflection is required on what it means to be (or to become) human, and on the ethical and social safety implications of our new technologies.

The changes being driven by contemporary science and technology raise profound questions about fundamental values. We can now realistically contemplate the colonization of the moon and the development of brain—computer interfaces that could bring about truly digital consciousness. We have built computational machines that by themselves can learn how to design racecars and that can process tens of thousands of research papers in a single afternoon to predict new discoveries. We now also have the knowledge and technical expertise to realize a world in which no child needs to go to bed sick or hungry. And yet, hunger persists.

This disparity of human potentials and human realities is not merely factual—it is moral. The conjunction of remarkable technical expertise and continued failure to provide adequate nutrition to all stands as a powerful indication that we have yet to determine with sufficiently broad consensus what would count as a "solution" to world hunger. We have not yet persuaded ourselves that whatever changes we would

need to make in our present ways of life to end hunger are worth the anticipated results. In short, the persistence of world hunger is not a technical problem. It is a moral predicament: evidence of unresolved conflicts among our own core values and interests. And hunger is just one of many such predicaments that we now face.

To address predicaments like the persistence of hunger in a world of excess food production or rising inequality in a world of historically unparalleled wealth production will require new kinds, scales, and scopes of ethical resolution. The global nature of these predicaments necessitates realizing new depths of ethical resolution, not only within communities and nations, but among them. Indeed, a guiding premise of this edited volume is that the interdependencies revealed by truly global predicaments compel questioning whether the resolve needed to address them can be realized within the horizons of any ethics committed to taking the individual—person, identity group, class, corporation, or nation—as the basic unit of moral analysis. The predicaments we now face make evident a new and profoundly unfamiliar and complex moral terrain.

Even at the personal level, the process of predicament resolution is always both contextual and reflexive. It involves us not only in changing how we live, but why we do so, and as whom. Global predicament resolution will require engaging in this reflexive process together, across both national and cultural boundaries. At the very least, it will require us to bracket imaginations of ourselves as singular agents acting in our own self-interest, and to deliberate together in full cognizance that either we win together or we lose together. At the heart of these deliberations will be questions about the meaning of personhood. What is it about who we take ourselves to be that allows global hunger to persist? Why are we falling so far short of doing what is needed to secure dignified lives for all? Who do we need to be present as to engage successfully in the boundary-crossing work of truly shared global predicament resolution?

Responding from an East-Asian Sinitic Perspective

The chapters in this book constitute an initial response to these questions from within Sinitic philosophical traditions. These traditions Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist—afford distinctive resources for conceiving of persons as relationally constituted and for developing a shared moral compass to guide our efforts to resolve global human predicaments in full recognition of our interdependence. In addition to their intrinsic merits as perspectives on the human experience, these traditions of thought and practice have the practical merit of being part of the cultural inheritance of roughly one-sixth of humanity. The sheer size of China's population and the fact that it will, in the coming decades, become home to the world's largest national economy mean, among other things, that Chinese perspectives must be integral to our shared efforts to resolve the global predicaments that humanity will be facing in this and coming generations.

In addition to this practical reason, there are both historical and philosophical rationales for turning to Sinitic traditions of thought. Although the roots of Confucianism and Daoism as elite traditions indigenous to what is now the Peoples Republic of China can be traced back to the Shang dynasty, they began to consolidate as canonical textual traditions during a time of great upheaval—the so-called Warring States period (475-221 BCE). Buddhist traditions began entering China during a comparable period of social, economic, and political transformation as the long-unified imperial China of the Han

dynasty (206 BCE to 220 CE) broke apart into shifting arrays of violently competing kingdoms and warlord alliances. There is thus historical precedent for regarding the resolutely relational character of Sinitic articulations of the human experience as, at least in part, the result of their dynamic attunement to the demands of responding practically to social, cultural, economic, and political disruption and transformation.

Moreover, the philosophical resources afforded by these traditions are arguably the result of what amounted to sustained and substantially intercultural deliberations. By the Song dynasty (1127-1279), the mantra had become "the three teachings as one (sanjiaoweiyi). Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism were being compared-by none other than the Song emperor Xiaozong (r. 1162-1189)—to the three legs of a ding ritual vessel symbolizing Chinese cultural and political authority. That is, they were understood to be distinct but complementary perspectives on the human experience. In fact, Buddhism had entered China from "the West"—Central and South Asia—as a manifestly "foreign" religion. And from the outset, Buddhist traditions both powerfully affected and evolved in sustained conversation with Confucian and Daoist interlocutors.

Thus, while Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist thinkers have all broadly agreed that human nature is irreducibly relational and dynamic and that personhood is irreducibly interpersonal, they have differed markedly in their recommendations of how best to actualize an ethically informed understanding of who we should be present as to realize our full human potential. The continued vitality of China's philosophical traditions owes a great deal to the internal pluralism in each that has been a significant result of their critical engagements with one another and, more recently, with traditions originating outside of Asia, especially in Europe and North America.

The Chapters

The scholars who have contributed to this collection were invited to respond from within their chosen philosophical tradition to the question, "Who do we need to be—personally, culturally, socially, economically, and politically—to navigate the great transformations of the human experience that are now under way?" They were tasked, more particularly, with reflecting on the social and political implications of "rethinking personhood" in the context of these transformations in ways that might be deemed valuable by others drawing upon very different sets of resources.

Of the ten chapters included here, eight were written by Confucian thinkers whose work has often been expressly comparative, placing the Confucian tradition in conversation with other global philosophies. These contributions are framed by essays that come from outside the Confucian tradition. While Daoism and Buddhism have remained vibrant as both philosophical and religious traditions, the cultural fabric of China is undeniably woven with predominantly Confucian thread. Moreover, Confucian resources today, with the collaboration of both the academy and political forces, are being actively incorporated in Chinese efforts to address the predicament laden transformations of the contemporary world. The Confucian perspectives offered here are thus justifiably granted centrality.

The two framing chapters—Buddhist and Daoist—serve a bordering function akin to that of the vocalists and dancers in a classical Greek khoros whose role was to create an expressive bridge between actors and audience members. That is, rather than being commentaries on the other contributions, these chapters are intended to establish a field of concerns about personhood that the remaining chapters bring into Confucian focus.

The volume opens with Peter Hershock's chapter, "Compassionate Presence in an Era of Global Predicaments: Toward an Ethics of Human Becoming in the Face of Algorithmic Experience," which sets out the predicament-laden nature of the intelligence revolution now taking place due to the confluence of big data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. After briefly exploring human experience as being structurally informed and transformed by powerful and emergent value-deploying systems of agentless agency, Hershock offers a Buddhist response to who we need to be present as to engage successfully in truly shared and global predicament resolution.

Building on this vocabulary of human beings and human becoming, Roger Ames engages in chapter 2 in an extended philosophical meditation on culture and human nature. In "Confucian Role Ethics and Personal Identity," Ames ranges freely among classical sources, the contemporary Confucian thought of Tang Junyi, and the American pragmatism of William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead to explore the embodied nature of what he terms "human becomings." What emerges is an understanding of personal presence based on the dynamic unfolding and consolidating of moral habits in the context of roles that stipulate the meaning of achieved excellence—a vision of relationally constituted persons in concert with others becoming not just human, but truly humane.

In chapter 3, "'Deference': On Sharing and Community in Confucian Ethics," Gan Chunsong begins with a detailed examination of the often-underappreciated Confucian concept of deference or yielding (rang). Following this, he embarks on a brief survey of the vicissitudes of Confucian thought and culture from the mid—nineteenth century through the final decades of the twentieth century, and its subsequent revitalization. He concludes with a visionary speculation on how the concept of deference might be pivotal in the articulation of a new approach to global governance that gradually decenters the nation-state in favor of modes of agency and communit^ based on the priority of shared interests.

The following two chapters, by Jin Li and Kwang-Kuo Hwang, take social scientific approaches to enunciating Confucian personhood. In "Confucian Self-Cultivation: A Developmental Perspective," Li first outlines in broad strokes the core commitments embodied in Confucian self-cultivation as a lifelong endeavor to craft oneself as a person in community with others. She then fleshes out this conceptual scheme by working through case studies of Chinese parenting and the distinctive ways in which it merges socialization and self-cultivation through the practices of exemplar modeling, combining verbal instruction with embodiment, and following emotional engagement with reasoning.

Hwang is also concerned with developmental issues, but at an historical scale rather than at that of the human lifecycle. His chapter, "Human Beings and Human Becomings: The Creative Transformation of Confucianism by Disengaged Reason," maps Confucianism responsive adaptation to the demands of modernity. Beginning with discussions of personhood as explored by Martin Heidegger and Charles Taylor, Hwang lays out the necessity and root conditions of an "indigenous" psychology that mediates between the lifeworlds realized by cultural groups over the long-term history of their development, and microworlds constructed by individual scientists—a Confucian naturalism on the basis of which to reframe the work of social science.

Taking as his historical point of reference the turbulent Republican period China, Tang Wenming uses mourning as springboard for reflecting on the nature of freedom. His chapter, "Understanding the Confucian Idea of Ethical Freedom through Chen Yinke's Works for Mourning Wang Guowei," draws out the implications of seeing suicide as an ethical expression of "spiritual independence and freedom of

thought." After setting the historical stage, Tang works through Axel Honneth's tripartite analysis of freedom realized in the objective system of social life, rather than in Kantian self-reflection or as a mere absence of constraints as in Hobbes. While stressing the immense influence of Hegel on modern Chinese philosophy, Tang argues on behalf of the need to qualify ethical freedom as a capacity for actualizing human relations in the context of an ongoing, normative reconstruction of the Confucian "five relations," grounded in the modern concept of personal freedom.

In chapter 7, "Life as Aesthetic Creativity and Appreciation: The Confucian Aim of Learning," Peimin Ni contests the received view that practices of self-cultivation in Confucianism have the aim of moral subjectivity, and that the Daoist ideal is to realize aesthetic subjectivity. Making use of classical textual materials, Ni links Confucian human-heartedness to tranquility, to virtue/virtuosity, but also ultimately to aesthetic enjoyment. That is, he argues that in Confucian self-cultivation through ritualized roles and relationships (li 4), the ultimate point is not moral virtue (de), but rather an achieved, aesthetic virtuosity—a capacity for transforming daily life into a field of artistic activity.

Stephen Angle is similarly revisionist in his reading of Confucian tradition in his chapter "Confucianism on Human Relations: Progressive or Conservative?" Angle's argument is twofold. First, he takes exception to the view that Confucian conservatism and roles-defined patterns of relationality can be reduced to maintaining or restoring traditional relations. He then argues more positively that the Confucian ethos of relational conservation is consistent with an evolutionary Confucian tradition that is capable of critically incorporating modern values. This "Progressive Confucianism," as Angle understands it, sustains traditional emphases on developing virtue, but embraces an extension of these emphases to social relations, accepting that these relations and their parameters must change in significant ways. His chapter concludes with a consideration of how contemporary spousal relations. might be given a progressive Confucian reading.

Concern for the evolution of social relations is central to Sor-hoon Tan's chapter, "From Women's Learning (fuxue) to Gender Education: Feminist Challenges to Modern Confucianism." Like Angle, Tan is critical of any nave traditionalism that would seek the revival of Confucianism as it was understood and practiced historically. Her chapter begins with an in-depth survey of how gendered education within Confucian tradition discriminated against women and entrenched their inferior social position, followed by an account of gender relations in China today. She then explores what Confucian education and self-cultivation for women should mean in the contemporary world, emphasizing the importance of diversity and flexibility in roles and relationships as aspects of a critical and responsive Confucian feminism.

The final chapter in the collection, David Wong's "Perspectives on Human Personhood and the Self from the Zhuangzi," offers a constructive critique of Confucian preoccupations with human social relations. Elaborating on the perspectives on human being and becoming in the Daoist text the Zhuangzi, Wong argues for the importance of pluralism with respect to both values and identity. But he also argues for the merit of a Daoist understanding of pluralism, contrasting it with the position forwarded by Joseph Raz, according to which recognizing the worth of the commitments and values of others undermines an engaged expression of one's own commitments and values. He then turns to address the core ethical question of the meaning of "the good life," making use of Daoist insights to advocate learning practices that encompass all the different parts of ourselves as our potential teachers, even those nonconscious parts of ourselves most intimately related to other aspects of the natural world.

Direction without Destiny

One of the distinctive features of East-Asian Sinitic philosophies is their refusal to valorize destiny. Although imperial dynasties in premodern China were understood to enjoy a "celestial mandate," this mandate was understood to be revocable. The Sinitic disposition, if we can be forgiven the generalization, has for millennia been nonteleological. That is, it has expressed a resistance to the idea that human nature is one thing or another, or that reality is this way only or perhaps that way. In keeping with their intrinsic pluralism, Sinitic philosophies have tended to sort themselves out through what the contemporary interpreters of Japanese thought, Thomas Kasulis and James Heisig, have characterized as carefully articulated practices of argument by relegation, not argument by refutation. This is a deceptively simple difference. The Sinitic disposition is not to attempt discovering the one and only true destiny of humanity—to specify who we should all seek to be. Rather, the attempt has been to recognize the diversity of what is truly human and also to establish which ways of being truly human are to be given primary.

To state this in perhaps more readily appreciated terms, the Sinitic disposition philosophically has not been to determine who has the truth or what the truth is once and for all, but rather to establish a hierarchy of approachesin this particular historical period—for truing how we are humanly present. In our view, this disposition is one well worth fostering. The "Intelligence Revolution" that is now under way will force humanity to consider—with a practical immediacy that is without historical precedent—what to valorize as freedom, as justice, and as truly humane. Among the merits of Sinitic traditions of thought and practice is their readiness to endorse transformation in the (nondestined) direction of enhancing relational diversity—that is, to provide conceptual and practical support for realizing how our differences from each other might be crafted into progressively evolving differences for one another.

In a single generation, we have witnessed the dramatic ascendency of Asia, and of China in particular, occurring at the apparent expense of Europe and America—a seismic shift that has transformed what was a familiar geopolitical order. Yet, more positively viewed, Asian development generally and China's growth more specifically have also brought into currency sets of cultural resources that have significant potential for reframing our engagements with the global predicaments that have beset us. The geopolitical order does not have to be structured in a way that is biased toward zero-sum, win-loss dynamics.

In seeking resources that will enhance human capabilities for resolving global predicaments like climate change, world hunger, or the algorithmic pairing of greater choice and control, primary among them are values and practices that will support replacing the familiar competitive pattern of single actors pursuing their own self-interest with collaborative patterns of players strengthening relations as a way of coordinating shared futures in which everyone is a winner. In our view, these are values and practices that will elicit appreciation of the possibility that freedom can be an expression of qualitatively deepening commitment and not just the enjoyment of numerically expanding experiential options.

As is now widely appreciated, the Sinitic traditions of Confucianism, Daosim, and Buddhism evince some persistent cultural assumptions and values: the holistic, ecological nature of the human experience; the high esteem accorded integration and inclusiveness; the yinyang interdependence of all things within their environing contexts; an aspiration toward deep diversity as the foundation of mutual contribution and achieved harmony; and the always provisional, emergent nature of natural, social, political, and

cosmic orders. Collectively, these traditions celebrate the relational values of deference and interdependence and foster a modality of self-understanding rooted in and nurtured by unique transactional patterns of relations.

The shared argument of the authors included in this volume is not that the Sinitic cultures provide wholesale answers to the pressing problems of our times. That would be an argument aimed at refutation. Instead, the recommendations found in this collection are forwarded in a spirit of accepting accommodation tempered with practical considerations of what must, in any given instance, be granted priority. In an era of intensifying global predicaments, there is considerable urgency in taking full advantage of all of our world's cultural resources. Plurality is an undeniable fact of the contemporary world. Pluralism is among its necessary core values. What is to be avoided at all costs is advocacy of any single perspective, a one truth/ one reality construction of human experience.

Who do we need to be present as to resolve the global predicaments of the twenty-first century? Our hope is that a chorus of offerings will be forwarded from within African, American, Asian, Australasian, European, Pacific Islander, and other indigenous perspectives. This volume is, we hope, but one of many contributing to the articulation of a diversity-enhancing vision of human and planetary flourishing in an era of unprecedented "creative destruction" that is at once technological, economic, social, cultural, political, and spiritual. <>

Studying Lacan's Seminar VI: Dream, Symptom, and the Collapse of Subjectivity by Olga Cox Cameron and Carol Owens [Studying Lacan's Seminars, Routledge, 9780367752835]

The second volume in the *Studying Lacan's Seminars* series, this book is the first comprehensive study of Lacan's Seminar VI: *Desire and its Interpretation*. A natural companion to Bruce Fink's recent translation of the seminar into English (2019), this book offers a genuine opportunity to delve deeply into the seminar, and a hospitable introduction to Lacan's teachings of the 1950s.

This important book brings together various aspects of Cox Cameron's teachings and systematic, careful, and critical readings of Seminar VI. Lacan's theorizing and conceptualizing of the object *a*, the fundamental fantasy, and aphanisis, as well as the ambiguous treatment of the phallus in his work at the time, are all introduced, contextualized, and explored in detail. The trajectories of his thinking are traced in terms of future developments and elaborations in the seminars that follow closely on the heels of Seminar VI – Seminars VII (*Ethics of Psychoanalysis*), VIII (*Transference*), IX (*Identification*), and X (*Anxiety*). Consideration is also given to how certain themes and motifs are recapitulated or reworked in his later teachings such as in Seminars XX (*Encore*), and XXIII (*The Sinthome*). Also included in this volume are two further essays by Cox Cameron, a most valuable critique of the concept of the phallus in Lacan's theories of the 1950s, and an overview of Seminar VI originally presented as a keynote address to the APW congress in Toronto 2014.

The book is of great interest to Lacanian scholars and students, as well as psychoanalytic therapists and analysts interested in Lacan's teachings of the 1950s and in how important concepts developed during this period are treated in his later work.

Review

"What a fantastic guide this book is, I was wishing Olga Cox Cameron could lead me through all of Lacan's seminars. This is a beautifully clear and funny and insightful reading of Seminar VI, showing us that there is no one Lacan, but many, and that self-critical attention to what is of dubious value in his work is the only way to discover what is so amazingly useful. At the same time the book is conceptually dense and enjoyable. I laughed out loud at points, especially the "Here is the News" example, and there is so much in here that I learnt and thought about." **Ian Parker**, *Fellow of the British Psychological Society, Emeritus Professor of Management at the University of Leicester, Co-Director of the Discourse Unit, and Managing Editor of* Annual Review of Critical Psychology

"Cox Cameron has written an elegant and clear study of Lacan's rich and complex *Seminar VI*. She skilfully walks the reader through the key tenets of one of Lacan's most important seminars and at the same time locates his teaching in the movement of his thought. A reflective and informed study that pairs beautifully with the original text." **Russell Grigg**

"In this book on *Lacan's Seminar VI*, Desire and Its Interpretation, Olga Cox Cameron provides extensive, lucid, and inspired commentary on some of Lacan's densest formulations, deftly elucidating such complex notions as being, the phallus, fantasy, and the object. As she contextualizes the work Lacan does here with respect to the Seminars that preceded it and the Seminars that followed it, she nicely outlines where Lacan remains Freudian and where he parts company with Freud—as regards dream interpretation and the interpretation of works of art, for example. The material is brought alive with references to mother-child experiences and myriad literary texts. The reader will thank her for providing us with such an eye-opening guide to a sometimes murky Seminar!" **Bruce Fink**, *Lacanian psychoanalyst, analytic supervisor, and Professor of Psychology at Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania*

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This book is arranged in three parts.

Part I consists of six chapters: these are the written up and expanded lectures Olga Cox Cameron delivered in various formats over the course of her teachings on Seminar VI, most recently to the Dublin Lacan study group.

Part II contains three chapters which consist of the transcripts of three out of the original four lectures Olga gave to the study group between 2016 and 2017; lecture 3 on Hamlet being lost.

Part III (Chapters 10 and 11) reprints two essays previously published by Olga in other publications

Together, all three parts assemble almost 25 years of teaching, essays, and other addresses on the theme of Lacan's Seminar VI: Desire and its Interpretation.

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While presenting as one of the longest, most unwieldy of Lacan's seminars, the seminar on desire is in fact quite tightly organized, falling as it does into four sections: the dream of the dead father, the Ella Sharpe dream. Hamlet, and lastly, summarizing these three sections, Lacan indicates how they might usefully illuminate the everyday symptomatology of the psychoanalytic clinic. So in three different configurations, as he points out himself in lesson three, Lacan presents a father, a son, death, and the relation to desire. While the sections echo each other thematically they also each represent, and in entirely different ways, unheralded points of entry into a more expanded exploration of Lacan's mantra "The unconscious is structured like a language" than the two rhetorical tropes, metaphor and metonymy, already well established in previous seminars.

This dimension is tragedy. Over the next two years and to a lesser extent in Seminar VIII this dimension will be deepened and made explicit to the point that the final section of Seminar VII will bear the title "The Tragic Dimension of Psychoanalytic Experience". In Seminar VI the opening up of this new dimension will be tightly, even impressively, corralled within the coordinates of Freudian doctrine. But by the end of Seminar VII when in the manner of all effective anamorphoses the hidden otherness begins to impose itself more insistently on the viewer, Lacan although still referencing this foregrounding of tragedy to Freud's appropriation of Oedipus Rex via the Oedipus complex, acknowledges its inadequacy. He in fact then radically modifies the classic Freudian position, suggesting that if tragedy is at the root of our experience this is so "[I]n an even more fundamental way than through the connection to the Oedipus complex" (Lacan, 1992, pp. 243—244).

Rather extraordinarily the harbingers of this new topic had appeared for the first time in lesson thirteen of Seminar V right after a kind of rock hard installation of certainty and confidence supposedly attendant on the successful outcome of the Oedipus complex, where the subject, with the title deeds to the penis stuffed tranquilly in his pocket goes on his merry way into grown-up life (Lacan, 2017, p. 189). Following on the heels of this inspiring pen-picture, the phrase "the pain of being" a pivotal concept in Seminar VI appears for the first time; "this pain of being that, for Freud, seems to be linked to the very existence of living beings" (ibid., p. 229). In point of fact, this is a very Lacanian reading of Freud's rather dry discussion of the interweave of Eros and Thanatos in "The Economic Problem of Masochism" (Freud,

1924c, pp. 159-173). Annihilation is spelt out in this lesson similarly to later in Seminar VI as "reducing his existence as desiring to nothing and reducing him to a state that aims to abolish him as a subject" (Lacan, 2017, p. 221), and the phrase "me phunai" "better not to be", taken from Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus,, attributed correctly in earlier seminars to the chorus now for the first time is (wrongly) cited as the final curse on existence of Oedipus himself, a misquote which will be hugely expanded on in Seminars VI, VII, and VIII. Also in this lesson, the Saint Augustine story which had featured in Lacan's work since the 194os reappears with a new tragic resonance. From the seminar on desire to that on anxiety it will be invoked as the specimen story for the founding catastrophe which marks the birth of the Imaginary. When one reads lesson thirteen of Seminar V from the vantage point of Seminar VI, it sounds like an overture. But as mentioned above, this is typical of the forward momentum of the seminars. Brush-strokes appear very briefly, vanish for extended periods, then reappear fully elaborated. While Lacan in Seminar VII can insist that as analysts, tragedy is at the forefront of our experience, this bias was much less visible in the early years of his seminar. It is true that already in Seminar II he quotes Oedipus, blind and crushed at Colonus: "Am I made man in the hour I cease to be?" (Lacan, 1988, p. 230), highlighting the bleakness of this essential drama of destiny. And already in Seminar II, for Lacan this ultimate suffering is captured in the phrase "me phunai", translated as "better not to be". But by Seminar VIII, Transference, this phrase will have undergone a number of metamorphoses and will now designate the true place of the subject as subject of the unconscious. By Seminar IX tragedy will have abruptly vanished from the seminar, giving way to topology.

That said, in certain respects Seminar VI, Desire and its Interpretation, stands clear of this Mahican structure. Gateway to the great middle seminars, it explicitly signals new directions. Unusually right from the start Lacan announces these departures. They are several, and they are significant. The earlier seminars had consistently relied on Freud's sexed distribution of "being" and "having" as specifying the outcome of the Oedipus complex. From Seminar VI onward, this fulcrum will be increasingly tipped by a new emphasis on "being" heralded by the recognition in lesson two that he may have irked his listeners with too much juggling between being and having (Lacan, 2019, p. 35). A number of other earlier accents are also explicitly re-calibrated. Speaking of a stage in the specular experience he tells his listeners that "[W]e shall use all of this in a context that will give it a very different resonance" (ibid., p. i9). And towards the end of the year he punctures the tranquil possessiveness of the successfully assumed paternal metaphor by pointing out its status as fiction, the fact that this metaphor is just a mask for the metonymy of castration (cf. Cox Cameron, 2019; also Part III of this volume). The entire seminar will also be a rewriting of "the object", now no longer metonymical (without quite ceasing to be so) but which by the end of Seminar VI is no longer an object at all in the strict sense of the word, but an index of impossibility. In lesson twenty-three he signals this re-write of the object which is he says "no longer simply a question of the function of the object as I tried to formulate it two years ago" (Lacan, ibid., p. 412). It is also in this seminar on desire that we can locate the inception of a new definition of the subject, a progressive re-write which will culminate in the gnomic statement three years later that it is the signifier which represents the subject for another signifier. The "big Other" too is rewritten. Without explicitly referring to his admirably clear definition of this big Other in his third seminar The Psychoses he effectively demolishes the status accorded it in the earlier seminar where the Other "is that before which you make yourself recognized. But you can make yourself recognized by it only because it is recognized first [...] It is through recognizing it that you institute it [...] as an irreducible absolute [..]" (Lacan, 1993, p. 51). By the end of Seminar VI this necessary reciprocity has been

bankrupted. On the 8th of April 1959 he clarifies that; "I have absolutely no guarantee that this Other, owing to what he has in his system, can give me back [...] what I gave him-namely his being and his essence as truth" (Lacan, 2019, p. 299).

Well aware that his critics decried Lacanian psychoanalysis as overly intellectualist, Lacan in the opening lessons of this seminar, mocks the poverty of so-called theories of affect and then goes on to situate this seminar right at its coalface.

The Lacanian vocabulary that has been the armature of his teaching, will continue to be used, but freighted now with these new meanings. The stated purpose of the five earlier seminars — a return to Freud — continues to be the banner under which Lacan advances, and one of the most remarkable features of the seminar on desire is a reading of Freud that is seemingly exact and faithful but also angled to reveal an altogether new dimension to psychoanalytic theory.

This, hopefully, is the book I would like to have had in hand myself when I first began to read Lacan's seminars more than 3o years ago. Many of the early seminars — between IV and X say — are hugely wordy, and the initial experience of reading is like standing under an avalanche, a hail of brilliant ideas, stunning one into either admiration or indignant befuddlement. It takes a while to see that these huge unwieldy masses are actually carefully structured, and that working through each lesson with this overall structure in mind permits one to step out from under the avalanche and engage critically with what is being said. Hence the rather plodding approach adopted here. Many of the previous books published on different seminars turn out to be a series of highly engaging riffs by different authors on topics germane to the seminar in question, rather than a step by step commentary. My own approach stems from a youthful attempt to read Finnegan Wake, and the useful footholds provided by writers such as Anthony Burgess and Roland McHugh who by shadowing Joyce's great work, illuminated it, releasing the baffled reader into the enjoyment of "laughters low".

As with all the other seminars Lacan's sixth seminar on desire confronts the reader with levels of complexity that are both exhilarating and daunting. What one must try to hold onto in this vertiginous venture is some exercise of one's own intelligence. There is a fine line to be drawn between close reading and swamping one's brain to the point of mere glazed iteration. In his delightful series of essays entitled The Consolations of Philosophy, Alain de Botton invokes Montaigne in the section on "Consolations for Intellectual Inadequacy" in order to put forward the view that boredom can sometimes be an indication of robustness of mind: "Though it can never be a sufficient judge (and in its more degenerate forms, slips into willful indifference and impatience), taking our levels of boredom into account can temper an otherwise excessive tolerance of balderdash" (2000, p. 158). As de Botton goes on to say, every difficult work presents us with the choice of judging the author inept for not being clearer, or ourselves stupid for not grasping what is being said. The challenge is to remain open to both possibilities.

One more warning before we start. Reading Lacanian theory as a series of successive stages in his thinking, elaborated over the course of z6 seminars, is on the one hand, standard teaching practice, and on the other, a fraught and foolish undertaking. Not that the stages aren't there, but inceptions, reversals, foreshadowings, and retrospective inclusions blur the outlines of definitive departure. In his tenth seminar L'Angoisse, Lacan describes an insect creeping along a Moebius strip. Starting on the inside, the insect, simply by crawling cussedly on, will pass without perceptible transition to the outer

surface and back again, the apparently radical distinction between inside and outside having been effaced by the loop which creates one continuous surface. A novice reader of the seminars will empathize with this insect. So for example, "the cut", a major feature of the topological seminars will appear without warning towards the end of this seminar on desire and without anything like the lengthy elaboration it will later receive in the ninth seminar dentification. <>

EARLY PSYCHOANALYTIC RELIGIOUS WRITINGS edited by H. Newton Malony and Edward P. Shafranske [Series: Contemporary Psychoanalytic Studies, Brill,

EARLY PSYCHOANALYTIC RELIGIOUS WRITINGS presents, in one edited volume, many of the foundational writings in the psychoanalytic study of religion. These translated works by Abraham, Fromm, Pfister, and others, complement Freud's seminal contributions and provide a unique window into the origins of psychoanalytic thinking. The volume includes the Freud-Pfister correspondence, with a brief introduction, which reveals the rich back story of friendship, mutual respect, and intellectual debate. These essays are anchored in Freud's early theory-building and prefigure and are linked to later developments in psychoanalytic thought. The issues raised in these essays are of relevance still today – how is religions thinking shaped by unconscious processes reflecting primary relationships and drives?

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The Psychoanalytic Study of Religion: Past, Present, Future by Edward P Shafranske

> [T] hose ideas — ideas which are religious in the widest sense — are prized as the most precious possession of civilization, as the most precious thing it has to offer its participants. It is far more highly prized than all the devices for winning treasures from the earth or providing men with sustenance or preventing their illnesses, and so forth. People feel that life would not be tolerable if they did not attach to these ideas the value that is claimed for them. And now the question arises: What are these ideas in the light of psychology? Whence do they derive the esteem in which they are held? And to take a further timid step, what is their real worth? (FREUD, 1927/1964, p. 20

We begin with Freud's words, with his acknowledgment of the value culture ascribes to religion and, in the same breath, his challenge to its merits. The questions that Freud posed have relevance not only for the psychology of individual religious experience but, as we will see, form the basis of his critique of culture and influenced early psychoanalytic exploration of religion.

The Psychoanalytic Impulse

Psychoanalysis aims to understand religious experience from the perspective of the complex dynamics of the mind. Its vantage examines religious beliefs and experiences as products of ever-present psychodynamics. These dynamics operate for the most part outside of conscious awareness and bear the imprint of countless human interactions. Freud's anthropology (and psychoanalysis, in toto) would be incomplete without considering the function of religion in the life of the individual (Vergote, 2002, p. 6) and in the transmission of cultural forms and ethics. Conversely, the study of religion or spirituality would be lacking without a means to examine the unconscious psychological and developmental vicissitudes that contribute to its potency. As an "initiator of discourse"

(Foucault, 1970) on society and culture, Freud employed "psychoanalytic perspectives to diagnose the psychological roots of cultural trends, unearthed archaic patterns in 'civilized' behavior and illuminated the relationship of the individual to society" (cf. Fischer, 1991, p. 108). Throughout this volume we see attempts to interrogate the manifest content found in Biblical and religious texts and to mine unconscious meaning by applying psychodynamic principles obtained in clinical psychoanalysis. These early works of Freud and others established applied psychoanalysis in which a critical analysis of individual and cultural experience could be undertaken which incorporated an appreciation of unconscious phantasy and psychodynamics.

Although incapable of authoring an objective opinion regarding the truth claims of religion or the veridical status of beliefs (Rizzuto & Shafranske, 2013), Freud's cultural texts initiated an approach to investigate the psychological means by which transcendent realities are apprehended or imaginatively created and to examine how culturally given religious forms influence individual and corporate subjectivities. In addition, the psychoanalytic perspective illuminates the possibility that human tensions, struggles, and compromises may be given expression through the cultural idiom of religion and other cultural texts. Contemporary psychoanalytic scholarship builds on this foundation, offering critique and extending Freud's theory of the genesis of personal religiousness as well as illustrating the pervasive influence of unconscious wishes and fantasies in human affairs. Such investigations necessarily fall into the temptation to reduce religious experience exclusively to the categories, methods, and models employed within the psychoanalytic paradigm. Such reductionism results in an emphasis on the intrapsychic functions religion performs outside of consciousness. Freud (1913b/1964), although confident in his discoveries, appears to have understood the inherent limitations in his approach and so concluded that, "There are no grounds for fearing that psycho-analysis ... will be tempted to trace the origin of anything so complicated as religion to a single source" (p. 100). The essential meaning of the findings derived from psychoanalytic inquiry ultimately rests on the fundamental faith perspective of the interpreter (cf. Wulff, 1997, p. 276) — for the theist such studies illuminate the psychological processes that shape one's relationship to transcendent realities, and for the atheist, religion is unclothed to be a cultural artifact, a delusion. No matter the resolution of this fundamental question, "Without psychoanalysis," as Robert Jay Lifton (200o) noted, "we don't have a psychology worthy of address to [individual] history and society or culture" (p. 222), of which religion holds a central position.

In this chapter Freud's seminal contributions to the psychoanalytic study of religion are discussed with multiple intents — to present a summary of his analysis and critique of religion, to consider his ideas in light of contemporary psychoanalytic scholarship, and to provide context to examine the contributions of his contemporary psychoanalytic colleagues.

Preliminary Considerations

Psychoanalysis takes as its primary method a clinical approach in which religious material obtained within the treatment setting is analyzed, paying particular attention to the patient's web of associations, which reveal wishes, defenses, and fantasy as well as the influences of internalized objects and cultural forms within the context of transference. Applied scholarship, such as Freud's contributions, involves the use of psychoanalysis as a hermeneutical method in which cultural texts are reinterpreted and meanings are reconstituted. Knowledge and theory, derived primarily from clinical experiences, are applied to cultural phenomena, in an attempt to "unfreeze" the symbolic potential embedded in language and ritual (Obeyesekere, 1990). In both clinical and applied contexts, the problem of meaning is "the central

disclosure of psychoanalysis" and involves apprehending the "multivocal relations within a symbolic sphere" (Kovel, 1988, p. 89). In these endeavors, analysts, beginning with Freud, have labored to understand the unconscious constituents of individual and cultural experience in which wish and illusion play dominant roles. For Freud, clinical experiences illuminated the ways in which psychological conflicts, originating in early development, come to be represented and repetitively expressed within the mind as unconscious fantasy and discharged through behavior, as exemplified in the cases of neuroses and in religious beliefs and rituals. This clinical discovery provides the foundation on which Freud constructed a psychoanalytic account of the psychological underpinnings of religion. Although Freud assumed that the origins of religion were found in prehistory and transmitted through phylogeny (Ritvo, 1990), his ideas today are better appreciated through an understanding of ontogeny and through the application of semiotics.

In light of its focus on non-material essences in the formation of conscious and unconscious meaning, psychoanalysis is best situated among the historical hermeneutic sciences rather than considered an empirical-analytic science (Habermas, 1971) as Freud had originally intended. Such an epistemological stance is advantageous for the psychoanalytic study of religion, which involves the analysis of the psychological function and appearance of religious forms within individual and cultural existence (DiCenso, 1999, p.1). Its purview does not permit investigation of the correspondence between such religious forms and objective reality or history; rather, it performs a study of symbolization and its motivation, inspecting the mental processes that mediate between the subject and the real. Its findings are therefore delimited and require the posit, as Ricoeur (cf. 1970, p. 242) suggested, of the double possibility of "faith" and "nonfaith" in which the question of the actuality of transcendent realities is suspended.

In addition, much of Freud's theory is conveyed through inventive literary expositions2 and speculative essays, which offer insights into unconscious psychological dynamics rather than establish historical truth. Ultimately, Freudian theory, itself, is embedded in and limited by the specific historical/cultural context in which it germinated. Freud's oeuvre reflects the assumptions of his time, i.e., materialism, Aristotelian faith in the ability to obtain knowledge of reality, and the valuation of reason over subjectivity, as well as a form of psychological essentialism based on his belief in the universality of the Oedipus complex. These works present a case for the coherence of psychic life, in which "unconscious wishes and fantasies are not constructed within particular cultural worlds, but are universal, a common ground of meaning that articulates or 'expresses' itself with some limited variations within different historical and cultural contexts" (cf. Toews, 1999, p. 99).

Freud's texts outline the central role religion plays in what Obeyesekere (1990) refers to as "the work of culture [whereby] symbolic forms existing on a cultural level get created and recreated through the minds of people" (p. xix). Beyond the sociological perspective of the social construction of reality, psychoanalysis amplifies the dynamic nature of these processes in which religion instills powerful moods and motivations. In a complementary fashion, culture reflects the mental contents of its citizens, which are then expressed and transmitted in the symbolic forms which culture supplies to be introjected by future generations. These dynamics involve the civilizing forces of moral systems in which desire becomes known within a specific cultural context and is expressed, sublimated, or repressed.

Commentary

Freud demonstrated through his cultural texts the utility of applying psychoanalytic theory and clinical method to investigations beyond the consulting room. These expositions on religion contributed not only to an examination of unconscious dynamics in religious observance and belief but also provided, in Freud's view, additional support for the tenets of psychoanalysis. First, the universality of the Oedipus complex could be demonstrated through the study of the religious beliefs and ceremonies of primitive peoples and their analogous ceremonies in contemporary religious observance. The parallels between the past and the present, the primitive and the contemporary, suggested to Freud the existence of a universal intrapsychic dynamic. The thread of the Oedipus complex, which he perceived as woven throughout the history of the individual and the culture, was clarified in his speculation concerning the origins of Judeo-Christian religion. As in neurosis, the cultures beliefs and practices were shaped by long repressed conflictual events; however, derivatives of the events could be discovered through an analysis of the symbolism contained within the rituals. Totem and Taboo and Moses and Monotheism, in particular, present the findings of such an analysis. Second, clinical experience furnished empirical evidence of the workings of unconscious mental processes which contributed to Freud's appraisal of religion as a disguised wish fulfillment and illusion. The latent content of religious ideas and practices could be inferred in keeping with the principles of psychoanalysis as practiced in the consulting room. These investigations served one hierarchical purpose: the demonstration of unconscious psychic determinism within human existence. Through these texts Freud could assert the workings of primeval history in the unconscious life of the individual. He could peer into the heart of the culture through his inspection and analysis of religious experience. His view that religion contains truth, but that this truth was of the veracity of a past event, and not the material truth of the existence of a deity, paralleled his understanding of neurosis and prepared the way for his radical critique of culture and "after education" (Freud).

In his critique, Freud placed religion at the nexus of cultural development. He viewed religion as contributing to an immature mode of instinctual renunciation that was established in the Oedipal complex and was in response to the repressed guilt and anxiety originating in prehistory. Freud (1927/1964) called for:

> a re-ordering of human relations ... which would remove the sources of dissatisfaction within civilization by renouncing coercion and the suppression of instincts, so that, undisturbed by internal discord, men might devote themselves to the acquisition of wealth and its enjoyment (p. 7).

For Freud, religion was the cultural expression of neurosis. The influence of the rational was overshadowed by the claims of the irrational. Civilization was held captive by the dynamics of oedipal conflict enshrined within religion. This examination concludes with a final question to which we now turn: "What is the value of Freud's critique of religion today?"

As we have seen, Freud's critique was established on the interplay between phylogeny and ontogeny. His acceptance of the phylogenetic hypothesis remained immutable throughout his life. Anna Freud remarked in a letter to Lucille Ritvo, "Personally, I remember very well how imperturbed my father was by everyone's criticism to his neo-Lamarkianism. He was quite sure that he was on safe ground" (Ritvo, 1990, frontispiece). The phylogenetic basis of Freud's understanding of religion is untenable. Although an appreciation of evolutionary biology in psychological functioning is developing [See Slavin & Kriegman,

1992], Freud's reliance upon specific Lamarkian principles of inherited characteristics is not supported. His view of religion as the cultural expression of an archaic event, as transmitted through biological inheritance, is unfounded. It was Freud's examination of ontogeny that has been the springboard for contemporary psychoanalytic study of religion. Ontogeny was conceived by Freud as psychosexual development culminating in the resolution of the Oedipus complex. In a footnote to Three Essays on Sexuality, Freud (1905/1964) asserted:

> It has been justly said that the Oedipus complex is the nuclear complex of the neuroses, and constitutes the essential part of their content ... Every new arrival on this planet is faced by the task of mastering the Oedipus complex ... With the progress of psycho-analytic studies the importance of the Oedipus complex has became more and more clearly evident; its recognition has become the shibboleth that distinguishes the adherents of psycho-analysis from its opponents (p. 226).

In keeping with this view, Freud's critique of religion rests firmly on the cornerstone of the Oedipus complex. Belief in god finds its origin in the child's desire for maternal protection and care. From this origin, religious belief evolves into the form of a father-god in keeping with the increased focus and conflict with the father within the Oedipal constellation. Is Freud correct in his reduction? In my view, Freud was both correct and limited in this assessment. He was correct in illustrating the dynamics of identification and projection in God-representational processes. He was also correct in placing emphasis on God-representational processes in the oedipal phase. Further, there are instances in clinical practice in which the leitmotif of the Oedipal, ambivalently held God the Father, articulates accurately an individual's God representation, its dynamic origin and the compromise formations that it serves. As salient as this model is, it is inadequate to describe the legion of self and object representations and the multiple dynamics which are contained in religious experience. Freud's view was limited by his unidimensional understanding of the Oedipus complex.

Freud brought both the method and theory of psychoanalysis to bear on Feuerbach's critique of religion as a human enterprise of projection. Psychoanalysis views these processes of identification and projection within the context of unconscious conflict. It is its approach to religion as a solution to an intrapsychic conflict as well as a response to humanity's ontological situation that marks a significant contribution. Freud's analysis leads to an appraisal of the function of God-representations and religion, in toto, along topographic, structural, economic, genetic and dynamic lines. This perspective posits religious experience to be a dynamic, multi-dimensional process. For example, within the structural approach, the influence of religion, vis-a-vis, processes of internalization and projection, may be seen to contribute significantly to super-ego functioning. Religious experience, seen in this light, is far more than theistic beliefs; rather, as an ingredient of the structure of the psychic apparatus it contributes to the psychological equilibrium of the human organism. Religion participates silently in the mental operations, which dictate behavior and consequence. Religious ideas and object relations serve a multiverse of functions. This view expands the horizon of inquiry into the nature of religious experience. In Freud's analysis, however, this horizon was contained within the Oedipus complex. This leads to a consideration of the Oedipus complex: its universality and comprehensiveness.

For Freud the Oedipus complex referred to specific libidinal and aggressive conflicts centered around the gradual triangulation of child's relationship with his or her parents. Anthropological studies for the most part have not substantiated Freud's thesis of the universality of the Oedipus complex; debate continues to ensue regarding the interpretation of such investigations [See Malinowski, 1927; Spiro,

1982]. The failure to support the universality of the Oedipus complex necessarily calls into question the claim that all religious experience bears the mark of Oedipus. This leads to a second concern regarding the comprehensiveness of the Oedipus complex as a template for understanding religious experience.

The Oedipus complex remains for many psychoanalysts today the cornerstone of psychoanalytic work and theory [See Panel, 1985; Feldman, 1990; Greenberg, 1991; Loewald: 1979; Wisdom: 1984]; however, for many theorists it refers to processes that go beyond the categories of drive theory. For example, Loewald (1983, p. 439) points to its function as "a watershed in individuation" in which drive conflict is seen within the context of the developing self. In his view emphasis is placed on object relations that become internalized as structures of the self within the oedipal phase. Chasseguet-Smirgel (1988), although not convinced of its phylogenetic nature, nervertheless views the Oedipus complex as an innate schema through which the capacity for establishing categories and classifying impressions leads to structure formation. Kohut (1977, 1984), although rejecting the psychobiology of drive theory, maintains the importance of the Oedipus complex in terms of the parents' attunement to the child's emerging Oedipal self. When we examine the validity of the Oedipus complex as a template for religious experience we must first establish which Oedipus complex do we mean?

Freud's understanding of the Oedipus complex is restrictive and inadequate to capture all of the facets of development and conflict. Toews (1999) finds that,

> Freud assumed a universality apparently incompatible with contemporary notions of cultural otherness, difference, heterogeneity, and pluralism. With the theory of the Oedipus complex (however variable and flexible, it might work itself out in individual cases) Freud affirmed the ultimately homologous character of processes of acculturation in all humsan cultural formations across space and time; the production of the human was presented as a single plot with variations (p. 111)

However limited, his theory does articulate important constituents of Godrepresentational processes as related to drive conflict and structural theory. He locates religious belief and experience within the intrapsychic realm of conflict and compromise and demonstrates the utility of God-representations in the economy of psychic operation and structure. Although Freud did not develop a comprehensive understanding of object relations, his inquiries into internalization and the processes leading to the formation of the super-ego anticipated a more complete explication of the internal world of objects.' Was Freud incorrect in positing that a God-representation is a displacement from the Oedipal father vis-a-vis processes of identification and projection? No, Freud was not wrong, however, he was limited by the metapsychology that he invented. His limitation lies in the narrowly conceived catalogue of meanings for religious experience posited by drive theory. In a more contemporary view of psychological functioning, considering multiple developmental lines within the realms of pre-Oedipal and Oedipal experience, religious experiences are seen to hold the potential to express a host of meanings and serve a number of functions. Rizzuto (1979), in her landmark study, The Birth of the Living God, proposed that the formation of the image of God is an object representational process that originates within the transitional space and that occurs, shaped by ever-present psychodynamics throughout the life of the individual. Although God-representations may derive in part from the processes which Freud described in terms of identification and projection of the father, her understanding goes beyond Freud's in asserting that "[God-representation] is more than the cornerstone upon which it was built. It is a new original representation which, because it is new, may have the varied components that serve to soothe and comfort, provide inspiration and courage — or dread and terror —far beyond that inspired by the

actual parents" (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 46). It may be concluded that Freud initiated an inquiry into the psychodynamics, which are involved in God-representations.

His view of wish fulfillment as the basis for religious illusions represents a partial understanding. If the notion of wish is construed beyond the parameters of drive, then Freud's thesis accounts for many aspects of religious motivation. Psychoanalysis does not have the ability to reduce all religious motivation and experience to the determinants of wish. Nor would a demonstration of such an occurrence establish or deny the veracity of religious beliefs or experience. Psychoanalysis provides a unique perspective and method, however, to examine a particular class of influences. This leads us to his critique of culture. Does religion serve the function of renunciation? A definitive answer cannot be found outside of an individual's psychodynamics. Freud's analysis of the function of religion as renunciation, and his comparison of religious practices to the obsessive actions of neurotics, in certain instances yields a valid appraisal. However, as Meissner (1991,1992,1996) and Vergote (1988) have convincingly argued, it is not religion per se but rather how an individual is religious that determines the function of religious belief and practice. It is within the consulting room that the nature of the influence of religion in the resolution of conflict and the formation of identity can be surmised.

Freud's contributions to the study of religion are significant in terms of the perspective that he offers; it is one which posits the crucial influence of unconscious processes in religious experience. Although Freud's reliance on phylogeny and his exclusive focus on the Oedipus complex is inadequate, in light of our current knowledge, these speculative texts, nevertheless, demonstrate the potential of applied psychoanalysis in which insights gleaned from clinical investigation may be employed in the study of culture. His contributions offer a perspective and a method of inquiry into the unconscious constituents of religious experience. His significance lies not in his definitive analysis of religion and culture but rather in commencing the psychoanalytic study of religion. <>

Fictional Practice: Magic, Narration, and the Power of Imagination edited by Bernd-Christian Otto and Dirk Johannsen [Series: Aries Book Series, Brill, 9789004465992]

To what extent were practitioners of magic inspired by fictional accounts of their art? In how far did the daunting narratives surrounding legendary magicians such as Theophilus of Adana, Cyprianus of Antioch, Johann Georg Faust or Agrippa of Nettesheim rely on real-world events or practices? Fourteen original case studies present material from late antiquity to the twenty-first century and explore these questions in a systematic manner. By coining the notion of 'fictional practice', the editors discuss the emergence of novel, imaginative types of magic from the nineteenth century onwards when fiction and practice came to be more and more intertwined or even fully amalgamated. This is the first comparative study that systematically relates fiction and practice in the history of magic.

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Excerpt: There is no such thing as magic — *Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone* 2001

Fiction, so we read in a contemporary etymological dictionary, is "that which is invented or imagined in the mind". The word goes back to old French *ficcion* ("dissimulation, ruse; invention, fabrication") and from there to the Latin *fictio* (which implies two distinct meanings: (1) "the act of modeling something, of giving it a form"; and (2) "acts of pretending, supposing, or hypothesizing":), with its verb *fingere* ("to shape, form, devise, feign") which also means "to form out of clay." Practice, in turn, goes back to old French *practiser* and Latin *practicare*, with its root meaning of "to do, to perform." From the fifteenth century onwards, it also acquired the meaning of "to perform repeatedly to acquire skill, to learn by repeated performance".

If we consider *fictional practice* to refer to a repeated performance which is based on, or strives towards, something that is invented or imagined in the mind, we might think of all sorts of things. Generally speaking, any fabrication of cultural symbols or artefacts may be interpreted as fictional practice in the sense that the symbols and artefacts originated in the human mind. For Ernst Cassirer, for instance, any type of cultural production was ultimately a fictional (or in his wording 'symbolic') enterprise (Cassirer 1944). Turning towards religion, 'new atheists' (who of course latch onto a much older debate) such as Richard Dawkins or Daniel Dennett consider basic religious tenets such as God/s, sin, karma, nirvana, or prophecy to be mere products of human fancy with no empirical correlate whatsoever (e.g., Dawkins

2006; Dennett 2006). From their perspective, many different types of religious behaviour might be interpreted as fictional practices, including prayer, sacrifice, baptism, funerals, the Eucharist, meditation, divination, or the carrying of religious cloth, symbols, amulets, or mojos. And then there is magic.

Magic has often been interpreted as one of the most stereotypical types of fictional practice, insofar as it seems to rely on weird combinations of essentially powerless ritual ingredients, actions, or principles, which purportedly cannot, either by themselves or in combination, produce any of the effects envisaged by its practitioners. In fact, one of the first basic connotations of the 'magician' in classical Greece (where the Western concept of 'magic' was originally shaped: Otto 2011, 143f) was that of a 'fraud': a private ritual entrepreneur who tricks and deludes naïve clients for the sake of his own enrichment. The notion of fraudulence is one of three basic anti-magical stereotypes present throughout Western cultural history, flanked on the one hand by blasphemy and on the other by immorality (see further Otto 2019a, 199–202). The idea that magical practices are inherently fraudulent gained particular impetus during the European Enlightenment, when magic gradually ceased to be interpreted as a crime against God and turned instead into a crime against reason. The assertion that believers in magic are prone to irrational and deluded (or ultimately delusive) thinking and behaviour had a lasting influence on the scholarly discourse from the nineteenth century onwards, and informed important early theorists such as Edward B. Tylor and James G. Frazer (see also Pasi 2006, 1134f.). Tylor, for instance, claimed that man, "having come to associate in thought those things which he found by experience to be connected in fact, proceeded erroneously to invert this action, and to conclude that association in thought must involve similar connexion in reality" (Tylor 1903, 112). Frazer followed in Tylor's footsteps by arguing that magic is based on a false "association of ideas" and thus depreciated it as "a false science as well as an abortive art" (Frazer 1922, 11).

Magic was thereby turned into 'fictional practice' *by definition*, and continued to function as a contrasting foil for the scholarly understanding of what may be considered true or false, modern or obsolete, what may count as accurate, trustworthy knowledge or what should rather belong to the realm of mere fancy (or fiction). The paradigmatic conviction of magic's fictionality built one of the normative foundations of academia as such in that it "served as a potent tool for the self-fashioning of modernity" (Styers 2004, 224). In fact, most twentieth-century scholars who participated in the exuberant debate on magic took its inherent fictionality for granted and focused almost exclusively on explaining its purported effects by positing socio-psychological or cognitive 'make-believe' processes. The only question that remained to be clarified was: why do practitioners of magic adhere to an apparently fictional enterprise?[1]

The present volume does not intend to follow along these argumentative paths. It moves beyond the question of whether magic is objectively or (only) subjectively real or efficacious, and approaches the matter instead from the perspective of cultural and discursive history, thus acknowledging magic as a complex, multifaceted, and powerful historical phenomenon that apparently had an enormous impact on Western history. Rather than engaging in the aforementioned debates on whether magic is factual or fictional, the volume instead poses a question that has occasionally been asked in the scholarly discourse but has never been explored in a systematic manner that encompasses a broad historical, geographical, and genealogical scope. We will pursue this goal by employing another meaning of *fiction* that is attested from the early nineteenth century onwards, namely that of "literature comprising novels and short stories based on imagined scenes or characters" (Harper 2020a; Schaffer 2012 speaks of 'fictional narrative'). We contrast this literary or narrative understanding of *fiction* with a notion of *practices* that

refers, first and foremost, to the performance of rituals by people who have labelled these practices as 'magic' and/or who have adopted the title 'magician' when referring to themselves (that is to say, we employ a discursive understanding of 'magic': see concisely Otto 2018b). One of the editors of this volume has suggested that such actors and their practices can be subsumed under the analytical notion of 'Western learned magic' and has analysed this textual-ritual tradition over the past years (see Otto 2016; Bellingradt/Otto 2017; Otto 2018a–c; Otto 2019b). Based on these premises, the present volume explores the inter-relationship between, on the one hand, fictional narratives on magic (as they appear in myth, poetry, and literature, as well as in theological or historical texts) and, on the other, the ritual performances of practitioners of learned magic (as they are preserved in ritual scripts, whether in manuscript or printed form, or ego-documents such as experience reports or ritual diaries). To what extent were practitioners of learned magic inspired by fictional accounts of their art, and to what extent were fictional accounts of magic inspired by real-world practice/s? Are there types of 'fictional practice' in which fiction and practice came to be intertwined or even fully amalgamated?

Western Learned Magic and the Entanglement of Fiction and Practice

The volume thus ties in with recent works on the literary dimensions of Western esotericism. In doing so, we also seize on the recent debate about 'hyper-real', 'invented', or 'fiction-based' religion and apply the research questions and perspectives of this debate to the study and history of learned magic. All chapters in this volume deal with sources that, in one way or the other, belong to the textual-ritual tradition of Western learned magic, whereas the main prerequisite for the authors was to include both fiction and practice on equal terms in their contributions. The volume thus adds to works in literary studies that have mainly dealt with magic in the sense of a narrative trope or plot device. By highlighting the practical—especially ritual—dimension of learned magic, it likewise expands upon research perspectives on Western esotericism that remain predominantly focused on 'knowledge', whether deemed 'higher' or 'rejected'. Essentially, the volume advocates a 'practical turn' in the study of both esotericism and literature.

The textual-ritual tradition of Western learned magic is eminently suited for this endeavour, as its theories and practices were highly heterogeneous, hybrid, and constantly in flux over the course of history (see Otto 2016, 189f), features that led to a tendency to appropriate a great quantity of fictional elements. In contrast to the debate on 'fiction-based' religion, which mostly focuses on developments of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (with Jedi and Tolkien spiritualities as prime examples: see Davidsen 2016, 2019), 'fiction-based' magic is significantly older: it goes back to the very roots of the concept. In fact, after 'magic' was detached from its Persian origins around 500 bce—where it had mainly referred to an Achaemenid priestly title (see Bremmer 2002)—the vast majority of sources that have discussed magic in the ancient Mediterranean world were authored by poets, lyricists, and satirists. Aesop, Sophocles, Euripides, Aischylos, Virgil, Horace, Ovid, or Lucian, to name only a select few, employed magical motifs in their works, thus significantly contributing to the concept's semantic—and especially polemic—foundations (see, exemplarily, Graf 1996; Dicki 2001; Ogden 2002; Stratton 2007; Otto 2011). It has also been argued that the world's very first 'novel' was Apuleius of Madaura's *The Golden Ass*, which, authored in the mid-second century ad (see Kenney 1998), is essentially a story about magic and a failed animal transformation spell.

The first fully-fledged corpus of texts written not from a philosophical, poetic, or literary perspective, but from the perspective of the practitioner—namely, the late ancient *Greek Magical Papyri*—emerged

almost a millennium after magic had begun to circulate as a largely polemical concept in ancient discourses (Otto 2013, 338; see also Frankfurter 2019). Unsurprisingly, we find numerous fictional patterns and narratives interwoven into its ritual scripts. These include the instrumentalisation of fictional practitioners as pseudepigraphs (such as Solomon [pgm iv, 850f], Democritus [pgm vii, 168f], or Moses [pgm xiii, 1f]), or the use of so-called 'historiolae'—a ritual technique that implies the re-narration of a short mythical tale during the ritual (see, for instance, the love spell in pgm iv, 1471f). Kyle Fraser, in the first contribution to this volume, further demonstrates that the authors of the *Greek Magical Papyri* engaged not only in what he calls 'stereotype appropriation', but also in a 'strategic response' to fictional tropes that circulated in the ancient Mediterranean—by creatively re-interpreting (or even reversing) these stereotypes and adapting them to their own needs and beliefs.

Fraser's finding is representative of the history of Western learned magic at large. Fictional stereotypes, tropes, clichés, and narratives have—to a greater or lesser degree—influenced or inspired real-world practitioners from late antiquity up to the twenty-first century. Yet, the appropriation of fictional elements by practitioners of learned magic was usually highly strategic, in the sense that it served their self-protection (e.g., through pseudepigraphy), self-traditionalisation (e.g., through positing fictitious lineages), or self-legitimisation (e.g., through appropriating rhetorics of religious legitimacy and authenticity; see, for example, the case of John of Morigny, discussed by Claire Fanger in this volume). Eventually, fictional tropes or narratives make their way into ritual scripts, with the intention of heightening the perceived efficacy of the rituals. For instance, the early modern legendary practitioner 'Dr Faustus'—who became the prototype of a misguided demon-conjuror from the late sixteenth century onwards—turned into a spirit to be invoked in a Scandinavian invulnerability spell of the eighteenth century (see Owen Davies' contribution in this volume for further details). Wiccans of the twentieth century drew upon an ancient narrative trope about 'Thessalian witches' when referring to one of their most pivotal rites as 'drawing down the moon' (see Ethan Doyle White's contribution in this volume). Some modern 'Chaos magick' groups read the supernatural horror fiction of Howard P. Lovecraft before and during their ritual procedures, thus intending to invoke and embody the 'Great Old Ones' (see Justin Woodman's contribution in this volume). Clearly, Western learned magic has always resonated with fiction, a tendency that seems to reflect its century-long shady underground existence, as well as its constant challenging of the limits and boundaries of the human condition.

The flipside to such types of 'fiction-based magic' is to be found in fictional narratives about magic that have been inspired by real-world practices or practitioners: 'practice-based fiction', as it were. Yet, whereas fictional elements are rather easy to identify in practice-oriented texts of learned magic, the question of whether real-world practices or practitioners have inspired fictional narratives is often much harder to elucidate. There are cases where the reference is explicit—Hugh Urban, for instance, in his contribution to this volume, discusses English novels of the 1920s and 1930 that are directly modelled on Pierre Bernard and Aleister Crowley. However, there are numerous fictional or legendary accounts of practitioners who may never have existed. Sometimes it is simply impossible to verify their historicity (as in the cases of Theophilus of Adana or Cyprianus of Antioch; on the latter see Ane Ohrvik's chapter in this volume); sometimes legendary practitioners are modelled after real-world persons (consider the early modern polemics surrounding Johann Georg Faust or Agrippa of Nettesheim), evidently not with the goal of providing a historically accurate account, but rather to promote fear- and fascination-driven stereotypes and clichés about magic (see Bernd-Christian Otto's chapter in this volume for further details). Finally, there is a vast corpus of legendary narratives about magical practices the historicity of

which remains unclear. Aðalheiður Guðmundsdóttir, for instance, in her contribution to this volume, discusses the degree to which Icelandic legendary (*fornaldarsögur*) literature, especially legends that revolve around the utterance of a spell (*álög*), function as a historical window onto medieval and early modern Icelandic conceptions—and practices—of spell-casting. It is worth pondering whether her critical questions and findings can be made relevant to the study of other legendary texts that display magical motifs.

The Rise of Fiction

While the premodern history of Western learned magic is already full of examples of 'fiction-based practice' and 'practice-based fiction' (as well as back-and-forth movements between the two), the relationship between fiction and magic has become ever more dynamic in the modern era. A crucial trigger for this development was the emergence of a large-scale international market for fictional literature in which the creation, promotion, and distribution of literary works was more and more professionalised. By the nineteenth century, the main product for this market had become genre fiction: works of fiction that were easy to promote because they catered to the expectations of audiences who were already familiar with similar works. In the realm of magic, it is, above all, the genre of the so-called Rosicrucian novel that attests to the increasingly complex web of fiction-practice relationships.

The foundational texts of the Rosicrucian movement—namely, the *Fama Fraternatis* (1614), the *Confessio Fraternatis* (1615), and the *Chymische Hochzeit* (1616), all authored, in all likelihood, by Johann Valentin Andrae (1586–1654)—combined legendary narrative about the life and deeds of Christianus Rosencreutz and his alleged fellowship with references to practical arts, such as alchemy, kabbalah, or natural magic (see van Dülmen 1973, 18f.; Otto 2011, 510f.). Even though these texts sparked an intense public debate throughout the seventeenth century, the existence of non-fictional Rosicrucian groupings at that time is disputed in present-day scholarship and considered to be a literary trope. Yet the Rosicrucian legend not only led to the foundation of Rosicrucian orders in the 18th and 19th centuries—the earliest and most prominent example being the *Orden der Gold- und Rosenkreuzer*, founded in 1757 in Frankfurt am Main—but also to novel literary representations.

One of the first representatives, or even the prototype, of the Rosicrucian novel was Pierre-Henri de Montfaucon de Villars' widely read *Comte de Gabalis*, first published (anonymously) in 1670. Connecting into the Rosicrucian excitement of the seventeenth century, *Comte de Gabalis* was composed as a conversation, spread across five dialogues, between a *Comte* and his student (the narrator) about the so-called 'secret sciences'. Curiously, the bulk of these dialogues are almost exclusively concerned with the Paracelsian concept of the four 'elemental spirits' (gnomes/earth; nymphs/air; sylphs/water; salamanders/fire). It was especially the idea of a spiritually beneficial marriage to elemental spirits, put forth in dialogue four, that left an enduring imprint on European literature, theatre, and art from the late seventeenth century onwards. As a method for receiving supreme wisdom or achieving spiritual rebirth, this type of 'marriage' was also put into practice. For instance, a detailed recipe of the practical necessities involved in attracting and marrying a sylph survives in a German manuscript that is today preserved in the Leipzig collection of 'codices magici' (Ms. Cod. Mag. 44; the recipe is outlined in detail in Bellingradt/Otto, 126–28). This text was written some time around 1700, that is, only a few decades after the first edition of *Comte de Gabalis*. From this first spark of 'fiction-based magic'—marriage with elementals—the Rosicrucian legend began to reveal further multi-layered interrelations between fiction and practice.

By the late 18th century, the burgeoning literary market had facilitated mass production and an increased access to formerly exclusive writings. Underpinned by changes in legal regulations with regard to blasphemy and censorship, the international book market now allowed for the wide distribution of material that had, until then, belonged to esoteric manuscript cultures. We see the effects of these developments in a new intertextuality created by new publication formats. Selective editions of esoteric writings, such as Francis Barrett's *The Magus or Celestial Intelligencer* (1801), suggested, already by way of compilation, occult connections between different textual traditions. The modern novel had likewise become a highly intertextual format, borrowing widely from disparate storytelling traditions and exploring their literary "reality effects" (Barthes 1969). At the interface of both developments, the Rosicrucian novel now became a standardised literary format with a growing popularity. Conceived of as a sub-genre of the gothic novel, works such as Shelley's *St. Irvyne the Rosicrucian* (1810), Ainsworth's *Auriol* (1814), or Bulwer-Lytton's *Zanoni* (1842) gained their fascination from firmly anchoring the storyworld of the Rosicrucian legend to the recent esoteric compilations, casually mentioning the names of authors and writings that Barrett and others had publicly promoted as part of a clandestine tradition.

The persuasiveness of this novel intertextual format became strikingly apparent in its impact on the constitution of a large number of self-proclaimed Rosicrucian societies from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, such as the *Fraternitas Rosae Crucis* (founded in 1858), the *Societas Rosicruciana in Anglia* (founded in 1865), the *Theosophical Society* (founded in 1875), the *Hermetic Brotherhood of Luxor* (founded around 1884), the *Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn* (founded in 1888), or the *Ordre Martiniste* (founded in 1891). Many of these newly founded orders drew on the Rosicrucian novels for their backstories, and began to translate fiction into practice. The *Hermetic Brotherhood of Luxor* and the *Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn*, for example, developed elaborate rituals for marrying elementals based on the *Comte de Gabalis* (see Godwin, Chanel, Deveney 1995, 107–120; Nagel 2007). In many strands of late nineteenth-century and twentieth-century occultism and learned magic, fiction became part of the curriculum (see, for example, Aleister Crowley's *A ∴ A ∴ Curriculum*, Crowley 1919, 22–26).[2] With fictional literature actively promoted as a source of occult knowledge and inspiration, we also see an increasing number of practitioners engaged in writing fiction (see Marco Frenschkowski's chapter on Helena Petrovna Blavatsky in this volume, and the overview of practitioner-novelists in Bernd-Christian Otto's concluding chapter).

The Power of Imagination

The enhanced entanglement of practice and fiction in learned magic from the nineteenth century onwards was, however, not only due to an increased access to esoteric sources and a growing market for occult fiction. Conceptual shifts happening in this period also allowed for a more theoretical alignment of magic and fiction. This alignment gave rise to what we, in this volume, identify as 'fictional practice' in a narrow sense, in which acts of engaging with or creating fiction, on the one hand, and magical practices, on the other, are in some form equated and coalesced. This somewhat counterintuitive blending of different cultural domains became possible through fundamental reconfigurations in the discourse on religion.

Conceptual historian Lucian Hölscher has shown how in the European political discourse of the transitional "Sattelzeit" between 1750 and 1870, the shift from the complementary "spiritual vs. temporal" dichotomy to a more conflicted "religious vs. secular" dichotomy gave the concept of religion

a "contradictory" character (Hölscher 2015, 73). With religion being criticised for being based on myth, notably by David Friedrich Strauss in his *The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined* (1844 [1835–36]), and theorised as a human phenomenon, notably by Ludwig Feuerbach's *The Essence of Christianity* (1841), its object was denied relevance for the public discourse. However, religious belief remained a political factor to be accounted for, and religion's allegedly 'invented' (or fictional) character did not necessarily detract from its cultural and social role. The field of inquiry where this conceptual development had its most striking repercussions was the study of myth, the "remote reality" of which (Hölscher 2015, 87) became palpable in the nation-building endeavours of the nineteenth century—with the creation of political myths that connected modern nations to ancient cultural traditions. The theories proposed to explain the origin of myths in human minds and societies just added to their political relevance. Things declared to be based on 'objectively false' premises—such as religion, myth, or magic—could now be argued to be nonetheless of utmost cultural, social, and psychological efficacy.

These conceptual developments had a major impact on the general notion of fiction as well. By the early nineteenth century, fiction still simply denoted "something feigned or invented" or "the act of feigning or inventing" (Johnson 1805, "Fiction"). Over the course of the century, however, it became the core term of the literary craft, denoting "one of the fine arts", even the most ancient one (Besant 1884, 3). Fiction "suggests as well as narrates", Walter Besant (the brother-in-law of theosophist Annie Besant) famously declared in 1884; it is as creative as it is descriptive (Besant 1884, 16). Even if understood as pretence and make-believe, the art of fiction was of intrinsic value and had an important cultural impact (James 1888).

The specific ingredient that allowed for this conceptual alignment of the notion of fiction with the contradictory understanding of religion—as false, but effective—was the demarcation of fantasy and imagination. These terms had previously been widely treated as synonymous, deriving from the Greek *phantasía* and the Latin *imaginatio* respectively. Denoting an "interior sense" with an ambivalent function as a source of knowledge as well as illusions, both fantasy and imagination had been key terms in philosophical and religious discourses since antiquity (Traut & Wilke 2015, 23–32). In esoteric discourse, in particular, they gained a "functional role in magical practice" through the Neoplatonic theory of attraction that first emerged in Arabic traditions of learned magic (Doel & Hanegraaf 2006, 608), for instance in al-Kindī's treatise *De radiis stellarum*, which was also one of the foundational texts of the early modern discourse on 'magia naturalis' (Otto 2011, 442f.). From the twelfth century onwards, scholastic theories of imagination led to a proliferation of religious practices based on imagination in medieval Catholicism ('kataphatic spiritual practices' in Egil Asprem's wording: see Asprem 2016b). These have, however, been gradually "separated out by disjunctive strategies rooted in the policing of orthopraxy" over the following centuries (ibid., 29). As a consequence, the much-debated use of imagination in the Renaissance (see, e.g., Yates 1964), that is, "key practices that we now associate with Western esotericism," stand in direct historical continuity to "the kataphatic trend that has been dominant in Catholic spirituality" ever since the late Middle Ages and should thus rather be considered as "leaves on a major branch of European intellectual and religious history". The association of the human faculty of *phantasia* / *imaginatio* with the creation of fictional literature, however, was mostly a later romanticist notion (Tarkka 2015, 19), and it was in the literary discourse of the nineteenth century that their demarcation came to take on a crucial importance. Suggested by Albertus Magnus (Asprem 2016b, 14) and later also by Paracelsus (Doel & Hanegraaf 2006, 612), the distinction between fantasy

and imagination as two separate mental faculties was installed as a lasting discursive demarcation by Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1817):

> Repeated meditations led me first to suspect,—(and a more intimate analysis of the human faculties, their appropriate marks, functions, and effects matured my conjecture into full conviction,)—that Fancy and Imagination were two distinct and widely different faculties, instead of being, according to the general belief, either two names with one meaning, or, at furthest, the lower and higher degree of one and the same power.

Coleridge disconnected fantasy from its etymology, stating that the "apposite translation of the Greek phantasia" needs to be the Latin *imaginatio* to allow for the differentiation between two distinct human faculties that produce formally similar results (notably: artistic expressions), but of fundamentally different quality. Whereas fantasy is merely associative, imagination is creative. The nature of this creation remained a subject of debate throughout the following decades, but the claim of an epistemological difference between fantasy and imagination remained a guiding principle. In the growing book market, assessing a literary trend as 'mere fancy' became a crushing blanket judgement. Claiming an 'imaginative' inspiration for a work of literary art, by contrast, valorised it. While still make-believe, 'imaginative fiction' could provide society with genuinely new ideas, tap into the soul of a nation, or express eternal truths.

The conceptual developments in various European countries of the time were not fully synchronised, which added additional layers of complexity to the theoretical blends of literature and religion that emerged in the nineteenth century. When Ludwig Feuerbach identified "die Phantasie" as "the original organ and essence of religion," he connected fantasy to Kant's "Einbildungskraft" and Hegel's "Vorstellung," all three of which, however, were translated as "imagination" in the first English edition of *The Essence of Christianity* (1854, 212). With religion thus being born from a romantically understood, genuinely creative and valuable notion of 'imagination', the prevalent critique of religion became religiously productive. By the end of the century, leading critics of religion such as Ernst Haeckel and leading evangelicals such as Henry Ward Beecher could agree, in a sense, that "the great schoolmaster of the soul, is the imagination, which the New Testament calls […] 'faith'" (Beecher 1904 [1873], 272), and that all faith was "a product of poetic imagination" (Haeckel 1905 [1899], 90). The imaginative artist had found a substantial theoretical foundation for claiming the status of a prophet, while the fanciful artist remained an entertainer, catering to the popular demand for distraction.

It is against the backdrop of such terminological repercussions that theories of imagination became core to the 'occult sciences' of the late nineteenth century as well. In the teachings of the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, Coleridge's literary theory transformed into an underlying principle of all magic: "Imagination must be distinguished from Fancy—from mere roving thoughts, or empty visions […]. Imagination is the Creative Faculty of the human mind, the plastic energy—the Formative Power" (W. W. Westcott, *Flying Roll* v: King 1997, 51). Practitioners of learned magic were now able to resolve the inherent contradiction inscribed in the modern notion of religion, myth, and magic by advocating the "remote reality" of the imagination, with fiction being its "most ancient" manifestation: "The uninitiated interpret Imagination as something 'imaginary' […]. But Imagination is a reality" (E.W. Berridge, *Flying Roll* v, King 1997, 47).

Fictional Practice

With imagination re-interpreted as the creative faculty of the human mind—whereby the outer world was reduced to its mere 'canvas' (to use the famous wording of Henry Thoreau [1849, 306])—, with the Euro-American book markets thriving, and with an ever larger number of occult societies and fraternities blossoming, the relationship between fiction and practice took on a new dimension. Whereas until the nineteenth century this relationship was mostly one of mutual inspiration (with cases of both 'fiction-based magic' and 'magic-based fiction', as well as back-and-forth movements in varying degrees), fiction and practice now intertwined in such a way that the two could become more or less indistinguishable. In order to designate and analyse this novel development in the history of Western learned magic, we suggest the use of the term 'fictional practice'.

Going through the case studies in this volume, it seems that different types of fictional practices have emerged since the nineteenth century. The most obvious type pertains to the idea that the writing of fiction now came to be interpreted as a magical act in and of itself. Unsurprisingly, it was a well-known poet and practicing magician who first advocated this idea, namely William Butler Yeats. Yeats not only implemented Golden Dawn symbolism in his poetry of the 1890s, he also crafted it with the explicit intention of invoking certain 'moods' in his readers, and thereby affecting and literally enchanting them, creating nothing less than 'talismanic poetry' (see Johannsen's chapter for further details). Similar approaches were advocated by several practitioners of the twentieth century, among them pivotal figures such as Dion Fortune, Kenneth Grant (on whom see Christian Giudice's chapter in this volume), or Alan Moore.

From the interpretation of the creation of fiction as a magical practice, it was only a small step to interpreting the reading of fiction in a similar way, thus tying to the (now) stereotypical notion of fiction as 'a place for wonder', as a possibly enchanting process that may transform its readers or miraculously take them into another world. The contributions of Katheryna Zorya and Justin Woodman in this volume show, with examples drawn from post-Soviet practitioner milieus as well as contemporary London-based 'Chaos magick', that perceiving writing *and* reading of fiction as magical practices has become a standard trope in modern practitioner discourses. Both contributions also demonstrate that fictional practices may go so far as to affect the perception of one's everyday surroundings, as in the case of the Lovecraftian group *The Haunters of the Dark*. Its members not only strive towards 'Cthulhu gnosis' through invocations taken verbatim from Lovecraft's works, but also projectively re-imagine Lovecraftian themes within the urban cityscapes of London (see Woodman's contribution for further details). In such cases, fictional practices are not merely immersive, but can be discussed as attempts to create an 'augmented reality' constituted by blends of imagined storyworlds and the external world.

Making a distinction between a mundane outer world and a hidden magical world has been a common strategy in the history of Western learned magic, but it was only during the late nineteenth century that the idea of blends or overlaps between the two worlds became a popular trope in fictional literature. During the late Victorian age, in particular, cross-world fantasy novels in which the protagonist discovers a portal to another realm or gains the ability to sense an alternative, underlying reality gained widespread popularity (in addition to the examples mentioned in Frenschkowski's contribution, see, for example, Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland* (1865), William Morris' *The Wood Beyond the World* (1894), George MacDonald's *Lilith* (1895), Edith Nesbit's *The Story of the Amulet* (1906), or Arthur Machen's *The Hill of Dreams* (1907)). In occult practitioner milieus, such novels were read—as well as produced—as a

form of instructive fiction that illustrated the imaginative practice of 'astral projection' (or 'astral vision') as a means of travelling on the 'astral plane'. It remains an open question as to whether the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn's 'tattwa' meditations, for example, in which painted symbols are used as portals to the respective element's 'astral plane', were partly inspired by fictional literature. The concepts of an 'astral plane' and 'astral projection' had become crucial elements within the practitioner discourse of the late nineteenth century, often with reference to the publications of Alphonse Louis Constant, alias Éliphas Lévi. In his widely read *Dogme et Rituel de la haute Magie* (first publ. in two volumes in 1854 and 1856), Lévi had popularised the notion of the 'astral light' ('lumière astrale') as the 'great magical agent' ('grand agent magique') which may be accessed and controlled by the magician's imagination. Indeed, the imagination was, for Lévi, an 'inherent property of our soul'. Even though the formulation 'astral plane' was a later and somewhat curious theosophical amalgamation (given that Lat. 'astrum' literally means 'star' or 'celestial body') of a range of different concepts—among them Lévi's 'astral light'; Neoplatonic and Paracelsian notions of 'natural magic'; the Mesmerist concept of the magnetic 'fluidum'; and the Hindu doctrine of the three bodies ('Sharira Traya')—it created a lasting connection between magical practice and fantasy literature. [*Browsing through digital archives of the nineteenth century, it is possible to trace the consolidation of the concept of an 'astral plane' on which it is possible to travel. This process appears to have taken place initially in the theosophical literature, starting from the early 1880s, with the first steps being taken in Anna B. Kingsford's and Edward Maitland's The Perfect Way (1882). The 'astral plane' was popularised in a fictional format shortly afterwards, notably in Alfred Percy Sinnett's novel Karma (1885). The term 'astral projection', denoting travels on this plane, also gained prominence in fiction during this time, e.g., in Perdicaris' Mohammed Benani (1887). It thus seems that both concepts were creative products of the theosophical discourse and from there inspired magical groupings of the time, such as the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn or the Ordre Martiniste.*] This is captured in the cover illustration of our volume, taken from one of the many publications of Gérard Encausse (Papus), who was an avid reader of Lévi and a former member of the Theosophical Society. The image, drawn by Louis Delfosse, displays a conjuration procedure in which the 'physical' and the 'astral' planes are portrayed as two complementary realms, making the magician a mediator between the worlds.

This is also mirrored in the most recent example covered in our volume, the *Grey School of Wizardry* (discussed by Carole Cusack), a case in which an amalgamation of Golden Dawn and Neopagan (Wiccan) practices is re-accessed through the lens of the *Harry Potter* novels and movies. The founder of the school, Oberon Zell-Ravenheart (born 1942), claimed in a vice interview in 2014 that the colourful energy-bursts that spout the wands of the protagonists of the *Harry Potter* movies reflect the imaginative reality of practicing magicians. There are surely contemporary practitioners who might consider the idea of energy-bursts spouting from their wands to be unrealistic and non-efficacious. For Zell-Ravenheart, however, it is nothing but a logical step towards resolving the boundaries between the 'fantasy' magic of the *Harry Potter* movies and the 'real' (that is, imaginative) magic of his kin, arguing that "we have always drawn from story to enhance our lives. […] Man's first magick was fire, but his second magick was story". The aesthetic of the Potter movies indeed mirror an aesthetic of magic that goes back to the aforementioned notion—and imaginative practice—of late nineteenth-century 'astral vision'. The foundation of the *Grey School of Wizardry* thus perfectly illustrates our understanding of fictional practice: here, magic, narration, and the power of imagination fully converge.

5 The Scope of the Volume

It goes without saying that the contributions to this anthology serve largely as examples. While the volume does include chapters from antiquity to the twenty-first century, there are huge gaps with regard to the premodern history of Western learned magic (e.g., with regard to Jewish or Islamicate discourses), but also pertaining to the potential—practical—roots of imaginaries of magic in modern fantasy literature (which could easily fill up several additional volumes). Nonetheless, the chosen case studies are telling insofar as they reveal basic types of magical tropes and fiction-practice relationships that have pervaded Western discourses of magic from antiquity to today. They also illustrate a specific development in the history of Western learned magic—and thus also of Western esotericism as its overarching category—that is tied to fundamental changes in the relationship between fiction and practice: namely the emergence of novel types of 'fictional practice' from the nineteenth century onwards through a re-interpretation of the human imagination. To further illustrate this significant shift, about half of the chapters deal with pre-modern material, whereas the other half deal with case studies from the nineteenth century onwards.

Instead of providing brief summaries of the contributions in this introduction, we have opted for a different strategy, namely to outline the general idea and rationale of the volume here while saving a more thorough survey and synthesis of all the chapters for Bernd-Christian Otto's concluding essay. This final chapter will attempt to weave red threads through the multifarious materials discussed in the individual chapters, to identify and trace specific developments in the history of Western learned magic in general, and to develop a synthetic narrative that transcends the individual chapters. Furthermore, all authors cross-reference other chapters in the volume, especially in cases where there are obvious historical connections or similarities, thus making visible hitherto unrecognised patterns in the history of Western learned magic. Fictional practices abound in modern magic(k) and esotericism, and we hope that the present volume provides a useful conceptual framework that may facilitate the future analysis of their many-faced manifestations. <>

A Partial Enlightenment: What Modern Literature and Buddhism Can Teach Us About Living Well Without Perfection by Avram Alpert [Columbia University Press, 9780231200035]

In many ways, Buddhism has become the global religion of the modern world. For its contemporary followers, the ideal of enlightenment promises inner peace and worldly harmony. And whereas other philosophies feel abstract and disembodied, Buddhism offers meditation as a means to realize this ideal. If we could all be as enlightened as Buddhists, some imagine, we could live in a much better world. For some time now, however, this beatific image of Buddhism has been under attack. Scholars and practitioners have criticized it as a Western fantasy that has nothing to do with the actual experiences of Buddhists.

Avram Alpert combines personal experience and readings of modern novels to offer another way to understand modern Buddhism. He argues that it represents a rich resource not for attaining perfection but rather for finding meaning and purpose in a chaotic world. Finding unexpected affinities across world literature—Rudyard Kipling in colonial India, Yukio Mishima in postwar Japan, Bessie Head escaping

apartheid South Africa—as well as in his own experiences living with Tibetan exiles, Alpert shows how these stories illuminate a world in which suffering is inevitable and total enlightenment is impossible. Yet they also give us access to partial enlightenments: powerful insights that become available when we come to terms with imperfection and stop looking for wholeness. A Partial Enlightenment reveals the moments of personal and social transformation that the inventions of modern Buddhism help make possible.

Reviews

Buddhist students and literature lovers will find much to ponder in Alpert's close textual readings. — **Publishers Weekly**

The stories about the Buddha, with their promise of awakening and liberation, are among the richest and most inspiring tales ever told. By focusing on the creation and complexities of a new, twentieth-century Buddhism, and the novels it has produced, Avram Alpert's *A Partial Enlightenment* delivers a brilliant work of literary history less concerned with the mythology of absolute perfection than the embedded, political, and existential realities that make modern Buddhism—an authentic way to 'fail better'—relevant for our lives today. — **Charles Johnson, author of *Middle Passage*, winner of the National Book Award**

A groundbreaking contribution to Buddhist literary studies, *A Partial Enlightenment* provides a new lens through which to examine the influence of modern Buddhist themes in twentieth-century world literature. In his role of scholar-seeker, or contemplative critic, Avi Alpert performs a complex, inclusive, and personal practice of literary exegesis, one that will enlighten academic and lay readers alike. — **Ruth Ozeki, *New York Times* best-selling author of *A Tale for the Time Being: A Novel***

In this stunningly sincere and groundbreaking work, Alpert takes the reader on a strange journey, often personal and always provocative, through a forest of literature to see how Buddhist thought and practice is embedded and intertwined with modern fiction. He shows the reader through novels as diverse as Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, Zadie Smith's *The Autograph Man*, J. M. Coetzee's *Elizabeth Costello*, Severo Sarduy's *Cobra*, Rudyard Kipling's *Kim*, Yukio Mishima's *Sea of Fertility*, among many others, that literature doesn't neatly present Buddhist truths, but complicates the very way Buddhism is received and taught. It is a story of disenchantment and tentative re-enchantment with Buddhist ideas and meditation practices with a healthy dose of Beckett's robust existential despair. It is a story of intellectual struggle and imperfect readings that enlightens, as well as forces the reader to simply lift her head, breathe deeply, and dive back in. No study of the modern encounter with Buddhism is complete without reading this truly refreshing and wonderful book. — **Justin Thomas McDaniel, author of *The Lovelorn Ghost and the Magical Monk: Practicing Buddhism in Modern Thailand***

Avi Alpert's timely book makes a significant contribution to re-evaluating Buddhism's role in engaging with the struggles and complexities of the postcolonial world. The book is at once a personal chronicle of disenchantment and discovery and a literary history that charts global Buddhism and the aesthetics of human fragmentation and connectivity. Alpert's compelling readings of modern novels uncover a simple truth of Buddhist ethics at their core: we may be limited in our understanding of the universe, but we have the power to act kindly towards living beings. An ethics of social relationality emerges as the book's most profound insight, making its innovative readings indispensable for students and scholars of

religion and literature. — **Gauri Viswanathan, author of *Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity, and Belief***

CONTENTS

Excerpt…I thought it surprising that Foucault was starting to sound a lot like Suzuki. And then I discovered that this was no coincidence: Foucault had been reading works on Zen—including one with an important introduction by Suzuki—while he was working on these lectures. It suddenly seemed as if my journey away from Suzuki had come full circle. And it made me begin to wonder: How much did it really matter if his Zen was not "authentic"? He had certainly made incorrect claims—and we owe a lot to Sharf and others for shaking up the hagiographic picture of him—but it was still the case that he, Foucault, and others were doing something very interesting with the archives that they were, in a sense, inventing. As the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins has written, maybe it's time we move beyond noting that traditions are invented and begin to think about "the inventiveness of tradition."" If we accept that modern Buddhism is an invention, then what can we learn from its inventiveness?

My return to Suzuki led me to ask questions about the general dismissal of modern Buddhism. Could it really be the case that so many people were wrong about Buddhism for so long? If meditation really worked, did it matter that none of the monks I met in Dharamsala did it? And what were we to make of all those modern writers from Asia—D. T. Suzuki, Anagarika Dharmapala, Taixu, the Dalai Lama, B. R. Ambedkar, and many others—who were arguing as vociferously for modern Buddhism as the Western Orientalists? And especially, how did it matter that some of them, like Nhat Hanh and Ambedkar, were so committed to equality and justice through Buddhism? Indeed, this has long been one of the main critical concerns about Orientalism: that in its fascination with what is wrong about Western knowledge of the East, it allowed very little room for how thinkers in other parts .of the world thought about themselves."

Why, then, is this not a book that explains the globalist, Buddhist worldview via the Asian philosophers who outlined it? Because, while I think such an account of modern, global Buddhist philosophy would be useful, the overwhelming focus on Buddhism as a philosophy was what got me—and most Orientalists—into trouble in the first place. Buddhism first appeared in the West in primarily two ways: as an exalted philosophy and as a degraded practice. Western writers upheld the marvelous philosophical insights of Buddhism at the same time that they excoriated its present condition in Asian countries. I learned in Dharamsala that this division was precisely what was occluding our understanding of Buddhist actuality. One cannot understand Buddhism as a pure philosophy or as a specific set of practices; one has to understand it, like most things, as part of an articulated and socially embedded web of relationships

among different actors, ideas, and historical facts. And one of the best ways to do this is and has always been through stories.

Donald Lopez, one of the main critics of our impoverished understanding of Buddhism, puts the point precisely in his The Story of Buddhism:

> Most Buddhists throughout history have not engaged in meditation. Many monks have not known the four noble truths. But everyone, monk and nun, layman and laywoman, knows stories about the Buddha, about the bodhisattvas, about famous monks and nuns. These stories, sometimes miraculous, sometimes humorous, sometimes both, have provided the most enduring means for the transmission of the dharma, more enduring even than grand images carved in stone. Each retelling of a story is slightly different from the one before, with embellishments and omissions, yet always able to be told again, its plot providing a coherence to the myriad constituents of experience, from which we may derive both instruction and delight.

What I have set out to do in this book is to show how modern novelists from around the world—from Botswana, Cuba, Japan, South Africa, Tibet, the United Kingdom, and the United States—have told the story of modern Buddhism. I have tried to understand and rearticulate the instruction they provide, the ways they have used Buddhism to make sense of the world around them and their place in it.

I argue that one of the most intriguing things we learn from this study of Buddhism in world literature is that no attempt to extract Buddhism from the complexity of its life-worlds is possible or even meaningful. It is not possible, as I have already mentioned, because every attempt to do so has inevitably found that even the most abstracted claims can only be based on and respondent to material frameworks. And even if it were possible, it would not be meaningful because to have a philosophy, as Foucault argued, is not to have a simple vision of the way the world works that may or may not be liveable. It is to think through how our ideas about the world succeed or fail to coincide with what we are able to make possible. It is thus equally about how we create the practices and institutions in which to effectively embed our ideals. My literary history of global Buddhism is the story of this ongoing dynamic between the promised ideals of Buddhism and their embedded histories.

Here's a story, for example. At the turn of the twentieth century, a powerful and well-connected Tibetan monk leaves his home on what appears to be a religious pilgrimage. The timing is somewhat suspicious, since there is no particularly good reason for him to be on pilgrimage now, especially since it is an extremely intense moment for his country. It is, after all, the height of the "Great Game" of empire, and Tibet is being threatened by both Russia to the north and Britain, via India, from the south. Tibet's fraught relationships with Mongolia and China—whose patronage powerful Tibetan religiopolitical figures have sought for centuries—also continues. Along the way, the monk has a surprising number of contacts with the British and their imperial agents, and an outside observer—at least one savvy enough to know that monks are political figures—might begin to wonder if his trip is indeed just a religious pilgrimage, or somehow a covert excursion related to geopolitics.

Readers of British literature may recognize the plot I've described as more or less that of Rudyard Kipling's Kim (1900/1901), and in a sense, it is. But it's also a description of a 1905 journey by the Panchen Lama (the second most powerful figure, after the Dalai Lama, in the Geluk sect of Tibetan Buddhism) who went to India on a pilgrimage to Buddhist holy sites. The trip was certainly in part a

genuine pilgrimage for the lama, who by all accounts found it profound and moving, but it also functioned as "'religious cover'" for covert political meetings with the British. That such a political context for the lama of Kim might underlie his trip to India has not, so far as I know, been broached by another literary critic, although, as I will argue in chapter 1, there is ample evidence for this within the text of Kim itself. Indeed, the lama figure in Kim is based on this very lama.

Such a critical lapse has occurred because we take the lama to represent only our own ideas about Buddhism. Because literary critics assume Buddhism to be otherworldly, they take it at face value that the sole purpose of his journey is to find a mystical "river of the Buddha's arrow," where he will find salvation. Because they assume that Buddhism and politics don't mix, they take it that the interesting political plot of the novel has to do with British imperialism in India, and ignore the obvious Tibetan context. If we change such assumptions, we learn something about both modern Buddhism and modern literature. We learn that modern Buddhism has never been otherworldly or removed from everyday concerns, but has always been embedded in the politics of its time. And we learn that literature, far from simply representing Orientalist fantasies, in fact often registers a complexity that the critics have tended to ignore. This is even the case, as we will see, with Edward Said's own writing on Kim.

This is the kind of reading I do throughout this book. I want to show how what we have taken for Buddhist abstraction is in fact embedded in modern life-worlds, and to discuss the lessons that begin to emerge once we pay attention to this. While I will primarily focus on the thematic lessons we may learn, I will also discuss what this teaches us about the formal aspects of these novels in greater detail in each of the chapters that follow. It includes, for example: the meaning of the frame story in Conrad's Heart of Darkness; the way literary language and characters are reincarnated in Jamyang Norbu's Mandala of Sherlock Holmes and J. M. Coetzee's Elizabeth Costello; the interpretation of seemingly nonsensical phrases or plot twists in Severo Sarduy's Cobra; and the structuring power of parables in Zadie Smith's The Autograph Man. In these and other instances, the application of vague ideas about what Buddhism is stops us from understanding how these novels formally operate. Once we know how Buddhism has informed these novels at a complex, formal level, we will see their composition in a new light.

Like all stories, my global literary history of global modern Buddhism has to begin and end somewhere. This is a literary history; not the literary history. Some of the choices I have made in telling this story may surprise readers. You will not find in what follows a discussion of Herman Hesse's Siddhartha, James Hilton's Lost Horizon, Jack Kerouac's Dharma Bums, the stories of Jorge Luis Borges, or any other fictions generally associated with modern forms of Buddhism. Part of the reason for this is precisely that they are expected, and I have tried to discuss Buddhism in authors and countries generally less associated with it. This includes Buddhism's often unremarked appearance in canonical works like Heart of Darkness and writers like Coetzee. And it also includes a greater diversity of writers than are often considered in studies of Buddhism and literature: novels like Bessie Head's A Question of Power—a novel about founding a new kind of Buddhism in the midst of insanity and domestic abuse—and Severy Sarduy's Cobra—a wild narrative about magic potions, sex changes, and drug dealers spending time with Tibetan monks in India.

The diversity of these selections matters a great deal for the literary history I am telling here. Too often, it is presumed that modern Buddhism is mostly for middle-class, bourgeois white people who have time to meditate and possessions to abandon. There is some truth to this. But focusing on it too heavily erases the many experiences with Buddhism that we find across lines of race, class, gender, and

sexuality." And factoring in these experiences presents us with a richer tapestry of modern Buddhist novels. It allows us to understand how seemingly abstract themes like authenticity, liberation, and enlightenment become embedded differently depending on the subject and their identity (or identities). At the same time, it helps us understand how such themes are shared in spite of the remarkable diversity of the authors. That's why I have grouped these novels by their shared themes. Across their diversity, they help to illustrate a singular history of global Buddhism: one in which we give up the hope for total salvation and instead focus on spectral illuminations that can help us work through the burdens of history and identity in our quests for liberation and authenticity.

In each chapter I will also relate the novels to chapters from my own story of learning, unlearning, and relearning global Buddhist history. While some academic readers may be less interested in my personal story, some general readers may find these sections more entertaining than the literary criticism. I have done my best to make the criticism as available and interesting as possible, within the conditions of scholarship, to readers coming from different backgrounds. I situate each novel's encounter with Buddhism at the nexus of authorial intentions, linguistic and narrative choices, and historical and philosophical contexts. I believe this methodological pluralism better explores the complexity of what Buddhism does in these novels than any particular school of interpretation. One tip to readers who do not frequently engage with literary criticism: it is much more enjoyable to read about novels that you have read, so I encourage you to read as many of these wonderful books as you can.

Whatever your background, I hope this book leads you to take critical Buddhist studies more seriously—not just for accuracy but also because factoring in Buddhism can give you a greater amplitude and understanding for dealing with suffering, liberation, history, oppression, and other themes pertinent to our lives today. It may at first be disappointing that in the story I tell about these themes, spectral illuminations of Buddhism cannot save the ruins of modernity, any more than the revelations of modernity could save the ruins of Buddhism. But perhaps the study of the global interactions of Buddhism, literature, and modernity may teach us something about how to appreciate the genuine values of existence in such a fraught and damaged world. And it may remind us of the immense joys and gifts that not only surround but also come through the damage. We may not find absolute enlightenment, the type of blazing revelation I wanted as a teenager, but the spectral illuminations may yet light a path to the world that the best aspects of Buddhism have always imagined. <>

GEORGE SANTAYANA'S POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS by Katarzyna Kremplewska [Series: Value Inquiry Book Series, Social Philosophy, Brill, 9789004506329]

Santayana's political ideas, as contained in **DOMINATIONS AND POWERS** and dispersed throughout his other works, have not been given the attention they deserve. This is the first comprehensive study of Santayana's political hermeneutics as embedded in his general philosophy and intimately connected to his cultural criticism. Managing necessity and harmonizing diversity, negative anthropology, an Apollonian individualism and naturalistic humanism, are only a few of the interpretative categories used to elucidate the dense, ambiguous and ironic ruminations of Santayana and reveal their timeliness. Discussion of other thinkers—from Plato to Ricoeur—brings to light the essentially dialogical character of his work.

CONTENTS

Foundations and Contours

The first chapter is devoted to the contours of Santayana's political hermeneutics. I attempt to curb systematically his ideas while preserving the structure of his own design, namely – **a.)** the dynamics between dominations, powers, and virtues as describing the relational position of a given life or lives in respect to their true interests and with vital liberty in view; **b.)** the three, intertwining orders present in the socio-political realm: generative, militant, and rational. An inquiry into the essentials of Santayana's conception of human nature, condition, and constitution allows me to illuminate the pre-political, anthropological and existential pillars of his political hermeneutics. I also introduce certain interpretive keys, such as *negative anthropology*, *managing necessity* (which I later develop into *managing necessity and harmonizing diversity*), and *governing life*, meant to illuminate the critical-hermeneutic potential of Santayana's political thinking. In the same chapter I discuss the twofold understanding of the very notion of "politics" held by Santayana, which, as I argue, is reflected in the dual nature of his endeavor in *Dominations and Powers*. Finally, I draw the reader's attention to the multitude of perspectives present in Santayana's political writings, which expresses his impartiality and adds to his work a dialogic dimension.

Liberty

In the second chapter, I analyze the evolution of Santayana's ideas about freedom and liberty, with focus on **a.)** the dilemmas and paradoxes involved in what the thinker calls "vacant freedom," and **b.)** the function of a moral horizon in politics performed by his idea of vital liberty. Of all themes central for Santayana's political philosophy, that of freedom allows to illuminate in the most articulate manner its extra-political premises, as well as to establish an intimate connection between his cultural criticism and socio-political reflection. Moreover, it brings to light the threads of continuity – existing regardless of change – in his early and late works. Finally, a look at Santayana's thoughts on anarchy leads me to the conclusion that his considerations of freedom sharply reveal the fact that every conception of freedom contains a seed of servitude and no conception of freedom is impartial.

Servitude

In the third chapter, in connection with Santayana's materialistic naturalism and his ideas of **a.)** the state and society as sources of multifaceted servitude, **b.)** government as managing necessity, **c.)** liberty as

constituted amidst limitations, I examine Santayana's vision of humans as thoroughly dependent beings and discuss basic forms of human servitude, including those of social and political origin. They embrace the whole range of phenomena – from the fact of having a body and hence, natural needs, through social commitments, military service, ideal allegiances such as patriotism, to a problematic relation of man to technology. I employ, useful in my view, Santayana's distinction among three kinds of servitude: necessary, voluntary, and involuntary yet accidental.

Militancy

The fourth chapter is devoted to the category of militancy – a generic term referring to the multitude of ways in which initiative, competition, and conflict manifest themselves in the human world. Forms of governmental oppression, the economization of all spheres of life, the power of ideologies and propaganda, as well as military conflicts are discussed. These phenomena have often been framed by Santayana in terms of re-barbarization, militarism, and tribalism, and judged from the perspective of their influence on the possibility of rational human government and self-government and, thus, the attainment of what Santayana calls the life of reason. In particular, I focus on Santayana's criticism of militarism with reference to Arnold J. Toynbee's theory of the decline of civilizations. In connection with the category of militancy, being a moral category indeed, I also argue that Santayana, who opposed a predatory kind of individualism aligned with egoism and power accumulation, proposed an alternative, gentle, "Apollonian" kind of individualism, not deprived of a certain subversive (critical) potential. Santayana's individualism is also unlike social atomism, criticized already by Tocqueville. Finally, this section features *a confrontation between a moralist and a cynic in politics* - a clash of attitudes, which I consider to be one of the most interesting and intriguing motives in Santayana's political thinking.

Arts as Powers and as Dominations

In this chapter I look at the problem, raised by Santayana, of the relation between the anthropological and cultural function of *arts*, as framed by the ancients, and the status of work as well as liberal arts in mass and consumerist society. Santayana was preoccupied, as I argue, with dehumanization and a phenomenon of a thoroughgoing alienation (to use Marx's term loosely) occurring between man and his activity. In this context, I also look at Santayana's criticism of the social status of the modern art and the artist, with reference to a parallel discussion of the condition of the modern art by Ortega y Gasset. A longer digression on Santayana's approach to secularization and his idea of "secularization without emancipation" completes the chapter.

The Fragility of Liberalism

This section is devoted exclusively to the reconsideration of Santayana's inquiry into the fragility of liberalism and its unfulfilled promises. I gather the dispersed in Santayana's *oeuvre* pieces of his criticism of liberalism and reflect upon them in a variety of contexts and with reference to other thinkers, John Gray most prominently. The failure of the liberal rule to wed negative liberty with equality of opportunity and the social and political consequences of this failure are among the major points made by Santayana and addressed by me. This is followed by the consideration of Santayana's changing opinion regarding the rise of the interventionist state, which he perceived as one of the ironies of liberalism. The Scylla of state interventionism has an alternative in the Charybdis of the particularism and the factionalism of civil society and both are subject to Santayana's incisive criticism. Finally, I inquire into the intimate connection between liberalism and culture, the very possibility of the former being dependent on the condition of the latter in a much greater degree than we may be habitually inclined to think.

Reflections on Self-Government, Democracy, and Justice

In this chapter, being one of the most important from the perspective of the contemporary reader, I review Santayana's ideas concerning governmental legitimacy, the paradoxes of representative democracy, the relation between the egalitarian and the aristocratic ideal (and what the latter may mean today), or, in other words, the ways democratic practice on the hand embodies and, on the other, betrays the ideal of human self-government. With the support of the idea of *managing necessity and harmonizing diversity*, I address the issue of Santayana's universalist and cosmopolitan sympathies and look at the possibility of socio-political arrangements that are alternative to a democratic nation-state and, as Santayana speculated, might become all the more realistic option in the globalizing world. Most importantly, I attempt to reconstruct and interpret Santayana's idea of justice by employing a double hermeneutic key: of harmony and charity. I argue that Santayana held a nuanced, sensitive, decisively modern, and potentially universalistic approach to justice.

Santayana on Communism

The main theme of this section are Santayana's changing views on communism, the evolution of which I trace by consulting both his philosophical writings as well as private correspondence. More specifically, I **a.)** try to understand the motivation and rationale behind the initial hopes Santayana might have attached to communism, **b.)** take a brief look at the incompatibility of his materialism with dialectical and/or historical materialism, **c.)** analyze Santayana's critical insights into the ways in which communist practice failed, which leads me to conjecture that his scattered comments, general and unsupported by sound knowledge of Marxist thought as they are, tend to be congenial with the conclusions of major critics of Marxism, such as Leszek Kołakowski or Andrzej Walicki.

Conclusions and Further Reflections on Why Culture Matters

In the final chapter, while summarizing major conclusions reached in the book, I explore broader contexts of the virtues Santayana extoled and the vices he reproached and ask whether they may be recognized as limits to his moral relativism. I also argue that one of a few overarching, though inexplicit, ideas that Santayana has conveyed in his writings on socio-political issues is that *culture is wiser than politics*. It seems to originate somewhere in the vortex of his philosophical commitments as well as personal preferences, which I frame in terms of: **a.)** a humble and self-critical humanism; **b.)** a modest and gentle individualism, which I call *Apollonian* and oppose both to social atomism and to a predatory individualism of power; **c.)** the primacy of culture over politics and the idea of not overestimating politics. Culture may constitute both a safeguard for humanity against the evils of politics and a source of betterment for the political sphere itself. Thus, upon my reading, one may find in Santayana an inexplicit incentive to depoliticize culture in order to save its liberality. This postulate, however, cannot be embraced uncritically and universally given the specificity of the contemporary context. An overarching conclusions is that a set of *principles of human benefit* be elicited from the body of Santayana's socio-political philosophy and cultural criticism. These include the principle of: **a.)** perfection, which involves respect for finite forms, virtues, arts, and a sustained, selective continuity; **b.)** rationality; **c.)** limited benefit from material progress (or: the principle of spiritual vindication); **d.)** *Nemesis*, by which I mean epistemic humility and the recognition of unintended consequences of human action, and **e.)** preserving disinterestedness, which involves the comprehension of autotelia, and an attitude of a sympathetic and supportive distance towards otherness (or: different forms of life), and - as such – may be a moral basis of pluralism.

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Why Culture Matters?

Santayana's political hermeneutics, as it has emerged from this study, is characterized, on the one hand, by syncretism and an intimidating breadth of thematic scope and, on the other, an integrity, which it owes to the naturalistic commitment as well as the humanistic and individualistic orientation of the author, expressed both in the initial assumption that "each man is by nature an end to himself"1 and the idea of vital liberty serving as an ultimate moral horizon for human government. While vital liberty is an individual attainment, it never occurs in a void, but in a society, in a medium of culture, and in specific political circumstances. The question posed by Santayana is this: under what conditions society and government are more of a benefit for its members than a burden. The relation of socio- political arrangements, then, to the attainability of vital liberty becomes both a target of criticism and the measure of judgment.

The life of reason, modus operandi of a good politeia, is, in fact, a naturalistic and pragmatic ideal of a pluralistic environment in which diverse individuals and groups may achieve completion and satisfaction, with regard to broadly understood circumstances, and while coexisting in a possibly peaceful manner with one another. As I have stressed repeatedly, human diversity, insofar as it reflects the natural variety of endowments and ideals possible, and plays a culture- forming function, being thus conducive to vital liberty, is assumed to be not only an ultimate social fact but also a good to be sought and protected. Now, in the light of the ideal of the life of reason, it is assumed that "[a] rt, which is action guided by knowledge, is the principle of benefit." The basic principle and virtue proper to the art of government and self- government is rationality, a higher- order human prerogative aiming at, first, reasonable satisfaction of needs and desires, and, second, reconciling or harmonizing often irrational and conflicted diversity. Wisdom, which except for rationality involves experience, far- sightedness, and the understanding of the conditions of human well- being, allows for setting major goals guiding action. By associating the art of government with the life of reason, Santayana makes politics – without denaturalizing it at any means – transcend a merely instrumental strategy of controlling animal impulses engaged in an eternal struggle. We are thus – to refer to Santayana's categories – at the level of politics in its "nobler" sense, one ascribed to it both by Plato and Aristotle. It requires of those engaged in governing to represent, except for professional competence, some politically significant virtue. Santayana, in general, is reticent towards the possibility of a beneficent and lasting government relying exclusively on procedural arrangements.

I have stressed throughout the book that the individualistic spiritus movens behind Santayana's political hermeneutics is the pursuit to increase the chances of individuals to live good lives in ways relatively compatible with their natural potential, non- interfering with analogous attempts of others, and, whenever possible, entering in a harmonious relation with them. In correspondence to these aims, my conclusion is that a set of principles of human benefit relevant for human communities may be elicited from Santayana's philosophy. These include the principle o^ 1) perfection, which involves respect for finite forms, virtues, arts, and a sustained, selective continuity; 2) rationality; 3) limited benefit from material progress (or: the principle of spiritual vindication); 4) nemesis, by which I mean epistemic humility and the recognition of unintended consequences of human action, and 5) preserving disinterestedness, which embraces the comprehension of autotelia and an attitude of a sympathetic and

supportive distance. These principles may also be seen as a response to what Santayana criticized as dehumanizing tendencies that characterize modern culture and the cynicism permeating politics.

While Santayana is convinced that there is more than one model of a socio- political organization conducive to human well- being, one may still point to what is obviously excluded from the array of acceptable options, namely – a totalitarian system as a radical negation of diversity and vital liberty, or, in Cassirer's words, a system based on "the principle of Gleichschaltung." Totalitarianism, de facto, makes culture as such redundant. To this I would also add any modern system that either by way of neglect or through unnecessary oppression, leads, through material and moral degradation of human life, to the exclusion of large groups of people from a proper participation in culture, thwarting their pursuit of vital liberty.4 One may think of oppressive autocracies, dictatorships in particular, oligarchies, and societies based on uncompromising, rigid, and exclusive hierarchies, based on dogmatic, superstitious or purely egoistic principles, privileging some individuals on the basis of, for example, wealth, heredity, or race.

This being said, one may have an impression that Santayana devoted not enough attention to the issue of justice and did not venture to develop an explicit and complete theory of it. Nevertheless, focusing on what he did say on justice, I have attempted my own interpretation with the support of two hermeneutic keys, namely- the notions of harmony and charity. What emerges from this reading is an eclectic, modern, and reflective approach, which seeks to explain justice in terms of three of its possible motivations – the pursuit of harmony by a disinterested reason, the admiration and recognition of multiform human excellence, and a universal incentive, reflected in different religious and philosophical traditions worldwide, to minimize suffering. While all of them are meant to express some shade of impartiality, the first one is a principle of the life of reason, the second and the third may be described as different facets of love – love as idealization or a premonition of perfection in the other, and love as a sense of sympathy with the suffering other, accompanied by a desire to relief them. The first of the two types of love reappears in Santayana's writing in different guises – for example in the form of the idea that eminence is universally representative, discussed in the section on the aristocratic ideal. The following passage is an articulate expression of the idea:

To worship mankind as it is would be to deprive it of what alone makes it akin to the divine – its aspiration. For this human dust lives; this misery and crime are dark in contrast to an imagined excellence; they are lighted up by a prospect of good. Man is not adorable, but he adores, and the object of his adoration may be discovered within him and elicited from his own soul. In this sense the religion of humanity is the only religion, all others being sparks and abstracts of the same.

One also reads that in order to approach "the Life of Reason nothing is needed but an analytic spirit and a judicious love of man, a love quick to distinguish success from failure in his great and confused experiment of living." The context of Paul Ricoeur's ruminations on love and justice helped me illuminate the fact that Santayana in his reflections on justice chooses metaphors from beyond the circle of retribution and vengeance, and from beyond the dominant utilitarian model. Other, practical aspects of just politics, such as equality of opportunity and elements of welfare state have also been given attention in this book.

All these dimensions of justice may be associated with the two levels of governance that according to my interpretation may be found in Santayana's thought – that of managing necessity (the level of necessity) and that of harmonizing diversity (the level of liberty). The two represent, as I have suggested, a specific formula of the separation of powers and competences. The art of harmonizing diversity must be founded in the art of managing necessity. As a naturalist, a materialist, and a critical philosopher, Santayana is careful to distinguish between human needs, interests, demands and preferences. Basic needs, as objective and common, part of the dimension of necessity, render themselves to an impartial, non- ideological interpretation in terms of interests and their "scientific" management. Yet, precisely this dimension of governing life or managing necessity forms a sphere of potential abuse, which I have discussed in this book with reference to what I call Santayana's negative anthropology. The thinker has no illusions about the pre- political principle according to which some lives thrive at the price of the belittlement of some other lives. In the absence of virtue, politics is reduced to its "meaner" sense, where government is an instrument of withholding war and distributing necessity and power. Dealing with a plurality of often conflicting units, it may well seek, cynically, to organize their existence according to a principle of enforced domination. Santayana's humanism and individualism stand behind his incisive criticism of the ways politics and society dominate rather than empower individuals.

I have emphasized in the book that, like Plato, who was a critic of the democracy of his own era, Santayana is sensitive to the anthropological placement of contemporary politics. He locates it at the fragile conjunction of material life with language and imagination, and observes that ideologies and fads, spreading like contagions, influence public opinion, and that socio- political phenomena are often co-fabricated by the language of propaganda, which is an equivalent of unprincipled ancient sophistry. During his lifetime, Santayana observed that the "exercise of autocratic power has become almost normal ... for party leaders ... and it is not in themselves or for what they do that they triumph: they triumph as demagogues" and may become "perpetual dictator[s]." Thus, Santayana's critique of the evolution of the existing democracies may be read as a warning against both totalitarian and autocratic forms of political organization, now transformed and reinforced by modern technology employed in the service of social control and invigilation. While some of the critical tools delivered by Santayana may still be helpful for understanding and judging reality, at least at a certain level of generality, some of his diagnoses have proved more timely than ever, prodigiously timely indeed.

The art of government, any intentional political reform indeed, is limited by the burden of past conflicts and inherited coercion. "People long coerce one another of their private initiative," writes the thinker, "or follow some tradition before they begin to do so through special military or legal agents. [In the generative order] [g] overnment concentrates domination in its own hands, and regulates it. It neither originates nor abolishes domination."8 Santayana repeatedly emphasizes that politics can never be emancipated fully from the ancient bond of necessary servitude, which is suffered by humans primarily in relation to nature and fate (or: contingency), and, then, to custom and law. I have tried to show that this servitude, however, which cannot be superseded fully as it is part and parcel of the human condition, is presented by Santayana as potentially complementary to the highest human good called vital liberty. It is through art (as a form of activity) and virtue that humans may aspire to an equilibrium between powers and dominations, and a harmony between liberty and necessity. The associated role of the government would be, in short, to mitigate the influence of natural necessity and introduce peace where there is conflict.

As John Lachs remarked, we still lack answers to some fundamental questions concerning the relation of individuals to communities. Perhaps no definitive answers exist, in which case, however, we are not exempted from asking the questions. Santayana offers his readers a broad, critical- hermeneutic reflection, which, while establishing a reflective distance from its subject, aims at enhancing self-understanding, illuminating human errors and limitations, revealing paradoxes involved in the practical application of theoretical constructs. As I have tried to show, his philosophy does provide some moral guidance, though without an underpinning of a naïve optimism. It conveys sensitivity to certain – usually overlooked or considered as "dated" – attitudes like criticism, patience, moderation, humility, disinterestedness, understanding of and sympathy with otherness. Meanwhile, the thinker is deliberate in not giving priority to any specific form of government or political doctrine. He sees a philosopher's task in terms of enlightening human will so that it "sees in the first instance how to attain its purpose without making or inflicting unnecessary sacrifices" and is able to "revise or rescind itself."9 These higher-order skills may be crucial given how demanding and fragile liberal and democratic ideals are. Embodying and preserving at least some of them to the common benefit would require a sustained effort and exercise in (self-) education and (self-) criticism.

Despite the fact that his primary definition of politics and government might suggest otherwise, Santayana explicitly opposes the Hobbesian idea that self- preservation and power accumulation is the highest aim of man and the source of his morality. It is not that these instincts are not real. Yet, there are other, equally real facts "competing" with the grim reality of strife, which is not to say that they ever annul the more "primordial" and violent dimension of human existence. One of them is the indissoluble bond between humans and the medium of culture in which they live. Culture may cultivate other impulses or channel the same impulses differently and assume unexpected forms. Culture may well idealize self- sacrifice rather than self- preservation. It is in the womb of culture that a political culture emerges. Among the sources of human morality culture happens to be one of the most prominent. It does not alleviate the relativity of morals as an essentialist conception of human rights or a universal and fixed human nature might do, but raises it beyond pure subjectivism, to a supra- individual level and makes it more resistant to momentary caprices and fashions.

Searching for the sources of morality and ideals beyond the individual and his direct circumstances is visible already in The Life of Reason. In it Santayana complains about an unfortunate separation of moral reflection from anthropological and existential one in contemporary philosophy. Rather than starting with asking: What is? Or: What ought to be? one asks an abstract question: "What ought I do?" as if there existed a separate sphere of morals, a self- standing "compartment." Some unfortunate conceptions of human morality, then, seem to Santayana to stem from abstractness, lack of deeper anthropological insight as well as "artificial views about the conditions of welfare; the basis is laid in authority rather than in human nature, and the goal in salvation rather than in happiness."10 Other than that, too often are morals derived primarily and directly from religion, which "unhappily long ago ceased to be wisdom expressed in fancy in order to become superstition overlaid with reasoning." Now, binding morality to the agent and their circumstances on the one hand may confirm relativism, on the other, however, may restrict it as long as this and other agents share a nature, belong to a specific type of natural beings, etc.

I have pointed to the fact that the thinker does not use the traditional notions of natural rights or laws; he preserves the notion of human nature, at least in a weak version, the human condition, and an idea of

human constitution - one of a concrete, mortal, psycho- spiritual being, endowed with potentialities, desires, and aspirations, and a propensity to find fulfillment in pursuing them. The said fulfillment does not ask for any additional justification, it is for its own sake and constitutes a sort of a borderline moral idea. This idea, which is one where constitution (or nature) is a source of ideal commitments, is central for Santayana's political thought and makes it at once naturalistic and idealistic, or, in other words, one where the ideal is inspired by nature, but, as I have stressed, not by facticity. What is more, this idea may help free Santayana's political ideas from an individualistic seclusion and the ghost of a radical kind of moral relativism which condemns any moral judgment to sheer arbitrariness as soon as it concerns anything beyond the narrow context of the speaker.

Throughout the book I discuss the way Santayana's moralism and humanism are, in a sense, grappling with his relativism. This is particularly the case in the context of social and political reflection, where certain technical subtleties of Santayana's metaethics, as contained, for example, in Realms of Being, for pragmatic reasons give way to more commonsensical assumptions concerning human agency, rationality, and the ability to form a trustworthy moral judgment concerning others, without which the ideas of moral representation, rational authority, responsibility, and justice would seem dangerously elusive and void. So, for example, an experienced and competent politician, when forming a moral judgment, has at his disposal and takes into account not only his personal, idiosyncratic, psychic impulses and personal preferences but also a rich experience, an insight into the objective needs of the people he represents and the goods that correspond to them, as well as a certain knowledge of the world and the realm of human affairs at large. Additionally, if he happens to be virtuous, his virtue gives him access to the understanding of the aforementioned principles of human benefit, the status of which is natural and aspires to some universality. Some of this knowledge may be conveyed through inherited traditional institutions, but politics, as a sphere of rationality and far- sightedness, cannot rely blindly on inheritance. Now, this heterogeneity of the sources of moral judgment, seems to suggest, tentatively, that there exist limits to Santayana's moral relativism, or, in other words, that his moral relativism tends to restrict itself, especially when regarded in a socio- political context. Such limits, if they exist, will be revealed in the process of examining human nature and the conditions of human well- being. Santayana appreciated the ancient thinkers for, among other things, their continuous effort to do so. More importantly, they will be revealed in and through moral imagination and virtue, which radically expand individual psychic resources turning them into a more reliable basis for moral judgment and authority, at least in a sociopolitical context. Now, to what extent these limits are universal and fixed for humans, and to what extent they are mutable and culture- specific, remains an open question.

The criticism of the individualism endorsed by Santayana as sterile from a perspective of community may contain a grain of truth but seems to overlook, first, the historical context, second, the significance of individual virtue and attainment to any human community, and, third, the naturalistic and humanistic paradigm to which it belongs. One should keep in mind that Santayana witnessed the rise of mass societies, accompanied by a propaganda of a thorough "socialization" of man, which in the context of the totalitarianisms of his time was, to say the least, ambiguous. George Orwell and Aldous Huxley were warning against anti- individualism. Questions arose about intellectual autonomy and morality when one is incapable of resisting the pull of the crowd or the impersonal mechanisms of the system. It seems important, then, to clarify the type of individualism endorsed by Santayana, a task which I have taken up in this book. I read it as connected to a prominent trait of humanism in his thought, which, next to his naturalism and the idea of spiritual life, constituted one of very few ideal allegiances of the philosopher.

While I do not intend to label Santayana "a humanist" in any doctrinaire sense – as a naturalist he enjoyed a belief that humanity is but a form of animal life – I think that it is correct to say that the main context (and rationale) for his well-known critiques of egotism, fanaticism, barbarism, militarism, and, even, capitalism, is humanistic. Actually, one may hardly find a better frame for the idea of wisdom in his thought than a humanistic (and a humane) one. This is illustrated by a beautiful passage from Dialogues in Limbo, where Socrates speaks of the human good: "Are all fashions equally good? Are all transitions equally happy? (...) Have you learned how to live? Do you know how to die? If you neglected these questions your self- government would not be an art, but a blind experiment."

These words encapsulate the meaning of the interconnected ideas of ars vivendi and wisdom. Both are part and parcel of Santayana's humanism and so is his individualism, remaining, as I have argued in this study, at a far remove from a Spencerian- type of egoistic individualism of power. Rather, in its eclecticism, it may be associated with Socratic self- knowledge, an Aristotelian, autotelic understanding of life, a humanistic articulation of individuality by the Stoics, the Spinozist ideal of intellectual autonomy and even, to some extent and despite Santayana's quarrel with romanticism, a post- romantic individualism of authenticity. Furthermore, when Santayana opposes what he calls the "brute humanity" and associates the coming of the brute humanity with the idea that "[c] ivilization is perhaps approaching one of those long winters that overtake it from time to time," he seems to be speaking on behalf and in defense of the virtues of a "polite humanity." Let me stress again, then, that the Apollonian individualism Santayana endorses, is very much unlike both the predatory, modern individualism associated with egoism and the social atomism, which involves depersonalization and in which individualism, especially in large societies, sometimes tends to result.

To connect a few points made by me so far in this chapter, let me evoke once again the issue of the limits of Santayana's moral relativism and say that if they exist, as I am inclined to believe, they originate in the implications of his naturalistic, pluralistic, and individualistic humanism. They reveal themselves, for example, when Santayana discerns within culture certain threads and tendencies that he calls emphatically "inhumane" and describes as "sins against humanity." Even though the thinker does not consider these judgments as "absolute" in any metaphysical sense, he thinks them true and valid from a humanistic (and a humane) perspective and in the light of the fact of human diversity, and hopes, perhaps even believes, that his readers share his moral intuitions, whereby they form a community of certain humane orientation. By calling something "inhuman" he does not mean that it is, in any sense, unnatural or metaphysically evil, but rather, that while being natural, it still conspires against the vital interests of a specific kind of natural being – a human being. Recall that for Santayana the dignity and specificity of a human being rests primarily in understanding, creation and appreciation of beautiful forms, and sympathy with otherness. When Santayana complains about certain aspects of modern culture, such as loss of chivalry, fear of discomfort, and subservience and conformity to majority option, calling them "a shocking degradation modern society has condemned the spirit," he speaks not on behalf of this or that ancient habit or a way of being but rather of human imagination that has been instrumentalized and enslaved by motivations, aspirations, and interests antagonistic towards human dignity thus understood.

To give a few more examples, in one of his texts, Santayana says "[n] othing will repay a man for becoming inhuman." The inhumanity here consists in egotism and xenophobia expressed in a "hatred of the rest of the world." Elsewhere one reads about "crime against humanity," being a kind of hubris that leads to sacrificing the human good in the name of egoistic and megalomaniac schemes. Faust – a

reappearing figure in Santayana's writings and an archetype of these inhuman tendencies – stands for a bearer of an infinite desire that he is keen on realizing without regard to the cost. Thus, he is bound to "grow feeble, vicious, and sad, like other sinners." In politics and society, an inflexibility, an excessive, militant integrity not founded in wisdom, a scary, "absolute singleness of will ... works havoc." Egotism, conceit, and unprincipled craving for power, being flows of character in a private person, turn into a fatal "sin" in a politician, a faction, or a government.

Now, given that "government [in the second, "meaner" sense] is essentially an army carrying on a perpetual campaign in its own territory," Santayana has good reasons for seeing the politicization of life, starting with the politicization of language, as a danger for culture. What sort of danger? The danger of becoming illiberal, inauthentic, and servile, which means losing the emancipatory, formative and dignifying potential that culture, and liberal arts in particular, represent to a human being. For similar reasons Santayana thinks personal virtues are needed for governing oneself and others. Virtues (integrated by individuals but conveyed by culture), as trans- political "powers," may be the only chance to withstand the otherwise irresistible thrust of different forms of competition, conflict, manipulation, and struggle for domination. An inherent idea in Santayana's political thinking, then, is not overestimating politics. To put it in other words, into the relation between an autotelic human life striving for some form of fulfillment, and government, an intermediary or a third party, namely – culture, is introduced.A Santayana's intention is to make this third party an ally of individuals. That is why, as I claim, his political thought is inseparable from his reflection on and criticism of culture. To divorce the two or simply ignore the latter is to deprive the former of some of its most precious insights.

What is more, the individualism and the humanism – both mildly rebellious given their critical potential – endorsed by Santayana are relevant for politics in that they constitute a safe guard against totalitarian tendencies. The quality of human environment is not insignificant for the emergence and success of a totalitarian regime, as authors such as Hannah Arendt or Ernst Cassirer pointed out. It seems that the threat of totalitarianism, the essence of which is anti- individualism, uniformity, and a total politicization of the common world, can hardly be countered without recourse to human individuality. It is an individual who is the bearer of virtues, the primary seat of suffering, judgment, and, when necessary, the source of the spark of multifaceted resistance. Though a single individual, when isolated, may be powerless, a number of similar individuals may constitute a community, a minority of like- minded persons who perhaps may start a movement. But this actual community needs to be founded in and nourished by a virtual human "community," not limited by time and space – in other words, human culture. Humans may and should be able to benefit from the fact that broadly understood culture has deeper roots and longer influence than politics. It remains in their best interest, then, to preserve at least partial autonomy of culture as well as individual, intellectual, and moral independence from the ever- expanding power of politics in its "meaner" sense. In other words, humans may seek in culture protection against the evils of politics.

Now, to counter my own conclusions, I admit that a contrary situation is perfectly possible too! People may and often do seek protection against prejudice or irrational and cruel customs sanctioned by their specific, traditional cultures in the legal and political sphere. This, however, I would reply, is an expression of their longing for justice and a socio- political order which is, at least, an approximation of the life of reason. Thus, we are at the level of politics in its "nobler" sense, where both politics and culture work towards the empowerment of people rather than their enslavement.

Santayana was too well aware of the role of culture as a supra- individual and trans- political medium in forming individuals and communities, to overestimate politics, especially politics of the day. Besides, aware of the significance of unintended consequences of human action, he attaches more hopes to the long- term effects of the development of philosophy and liberal arts for the condition of society, culture, or civilization than about the immediate consequences of current politics. Politics is but one dimension of the world of human affairs, and it sadly happens to be one of the least disinterested ones. Reading Santayana in- between the lines, one may conclude that culture tends to be wiser than politics and less contaminated by the actually competing forces and their interests. However, while culture penetrates social and political life, a reverse process seems to be more potent in the contemporary world. The appearance and global spread of internet made culture more fragile, more forgetful and more sensitive to diffused and unpredictable influences than it has ever been before. This fact prompts one to reconsider both the issue of the autonomy of culture and that of the sources of individual autonomy as even more pressing.

Without intending to cloth Santayana as an idiosyncratic liberal, I have pointed to the fact that, in some respects, such as his endorsement of individualism, tolerance, and pluralism, Santayana is close to the original liberal perspective. In some others, such as his focus on the share of tradition, continuity, and virtue, or, in fact, a set of specific virtues preferred by him, he draws on the heritage of the ancients. I also tried to show that Santayana's criticism of modernity does not make him necessarily an anti-modern thinker. Despite the presence of some conservative traits in his thought and what may seem as a nostalgic sympathy for older, organic forms of socio- political organization, Santayana's anti-dogmatism, his futurist speculations, the hermeneutic- critical form of his reflections, as well as the ambiguity and provocativeness it is permeated by, reveal a modern, if not post- modern dimension of it. Santayana's thinking is always ready to recognize and trespass its own prejudice, even though his very materialism and his views on truth make him an unlikely candidate for a post- modern thinker. As beautifully phrased by Morris Grossman, a "remarkable duplicity" and "controlled ambiguity" are "at the heart of the smiling sadness of the entire Santayanian corpus." As for the ambiguity on Santayana's part, besides being intriguing in itself, it may be considered as a dialogic expression of authentic dilemmas in front of some problems of the human world that – in their intricacy – resist an exhaustive rational analysis and a definitive solution.

Let me conclude by evoking Wilfred M. McClay's humorous remark that "[i] t may seem mildly self-subverting to invoke such a spirit of Gelassenheit [as represented by Santayana] as a form of cultural improvement; and to be sure, one does not want perversely, to turn Santayana into the new guru of moral uplift and self- help." Santayana's astonishingly rich legacy nevertheless remains and one does well to appreciate it "for what it is and what it could mean to us ... and appropriate it on whatever terms make sense to us." My modest aim when writing this book has been to breath into Santayana's political hermeneia some of the vitality it deserves, a philosophical kind of vitality, which arises from and through dialogue and interpretation. Far from hoping to exhaust the interpretive possibilities of his political reflection – which, I am convinced, opens before an inquisitive reader an enormous variety of paths as well as many opportunities for criticism – I seek to provoke further questions and research. <>

A Critique of Western Buddhism: Ruins of the Buddhist Real by Glenn Wallis [Bloomsbury Academic, 9781474283557]

What are we to make of Western Buddhism? Glenn Wallis argues that in aligning their tradition with the contemporary wellness industry, Western Buddhists evade the consequences of Buddhist thought. This book shows that with concepts such as vanishing, nihility, extinction, contingency, and no-self, Buddhism, like all potent systems of thought, articulates a notion of the "real." Raw, unflinching acceptance of this real is held by Buddhism to be at the very core of human "awakening." Yet these preeminent human truths are universally shored up against in contemporary Buddhist practice, contravening the very heart of Buddhism.

The author's critique of Western Buddhism is threefold. It is immanent, in emerging out of Buddhist thought but taking it beyond what it itself publicly concedes; negative, in employing the "democratizing" deconstructive methods of François Laruelle's non-philosophy; and re-descriptive, in applying Laruelle's concept of philofiction. Through applying resources of Continental philosophy to Western Buddhism, *A Critique of Western Buddhism* suggests a possible practice for our time, an "anthropotechnic", or religion transposed from its seductive, but misguiding, idealist haven.

Review

"Having read through the book a second time I can say without hesitation that *A Critique of Western Buddhism* is one of the most important books ever written on the subject of Buddhism—certainly the most important in the decades since Buddhism has established itself as an ideological resident here in the West." - *The Failed Buddhist*

"The single most important book of contemporary Buddhist philosophic reflection. Wallis' critique masterfully addresses the twinned questions central to contemporary Buddhism: 'What use is being made of Buddhism today?' and 'What use is Buddhism today?'" *—Richard K. Payne, Yehan Numata Professor of Japanese Buddhist Studies, Institute of Buddhist Studies, USA*

"It is a very rare and precious thing to find a book such as this, which engages as deeply with religious materials as it does with the philosophical. Glenn Wallis brings together resources from Continental philosophy, namely François Laruelle's non-philosophy, and concepts and ideas from Buddhism to carry out a fecund project that grows in the ruins of our philosophical and religious pretensions and arrogance."" *—Anthony Paul Smith, Associate Professor of Philosophical Theology, La Salle University, USA*

"Glenn Wallis' Critique of Western Budism is one of the rare examples of non-philosophy applied on a specific subject area, next to Anthony Paul Smith's non-philosophical environmental studies, John O'Maoilearca's animal studies as well non-Marxism. It proves that non-philosophy is praxis grounded rather than being self-sufficient system of philosophical diagnostics. Wallis' brilliant analysis demonstrates that radicalized Buddhism establishes a perfect homology with non-philosophy, both in form and in substance." *—Katerina Kolozova, Professor of Philosophy and Gender Studies, University American College, Macedonia*

"Wallis' Critique is a bold commentary and analysis of Western Buddhism that runs against the mainstream. His central arguments are convincing and should certainly enter into discussions of "mindfulness" practices and adaptions of Buddhism in Western societies. This book will challenge the thinking and practice of many readers, make some uncomfortable, but will be a life preserver for others." —*Stuart W Smithers, Chair of the Department of Religious Studies, University of Puget Sound, USA*

CONTENTS

A ruin is a curious thing. Imagine the Acropolis or Borobudur, Ephesus or the Great Wall of China. Magnificent structures erected on the foundation of a society's most advanced technologies and its most sophisticated sciences. Constructed from raw materials— wood, metals, stone, lime mortar, marble, glass, turf, and soil— quarried, excavated, transported, and formed by the labor— the debilitating, depleting sweat and toil— of flesh and blood men, women, and children. But a ruin is more than the material out of which it is fashioned. It in infused with the longing of a people; longing for meaning and order; longing for fellowship and community; longing for the reign of beauty on earth. More than mere material, a ruin is saturated with culture. It is a culture's loftiest aesthetic imagination manifest in the light of day in all of its sensuousness. But a ruin is more than the designs and desires of a people. A ruin is nature. Its very matter is fired in the furnace of the elements. And once in place, the edifice is eternally embraced by earth, fire, wind, and water. As Georg Simmel wrote in 1907, "a ruin is fused into the surrounding landscape and, like tree and stone, grows into and is integrated in that landscape." As much as it tries, a thriving cathedral or a bustling office building cannot achieve this integration: its relationship to its natural surroundings is one of artificiality at best, domination at worst. Its atmosphere is charged by an ordering of its own making. By contrast, "an atmosphere of peace emanates from the ruin; for, in the ruin the contrary aspirations of both world potencies [the energies of nature and the conceptions of society] appears as a calm image of purely natural being." What has wrought this change in the charge of the structure's atmosphere is time. A ruin, finally, is time. It is transhistorical time, "ruin time," the steady chroniclers of past glory and decay, present cause and effect, and future promise and peril. "Ruin time unites," says Florence Hetzler. It suffuses the "biological time of birds and moss" with

the immemorial "synergy" of all of living beings— human, animal, bacterial, microbial— whose bodies have touched, however fleetingly, however gently, the ruin.

Western Buddhism is not a ruin. It is a sprawling estate, operating daily at peak capacity. Western Buddhism is a prodigious ancillary of an ancient edifice that, as Simmel says of palaces, villas, and farmhouses, "even where it would be best to fuse with the atmosphere of its surroundings, always originates another order of things, and unites with the order of nature only in retrospect." Why should it "be best" to do so? Western Buddhism itself provides the answer: because there is no real division between culture, society, person, and "nature." The Buddha has taught us that it is nature all the way through. He also taught us that the very nature of nature inexorably impels our— the world's— very ruination. Ruin is ruin because our desires and actions, however exalted, cannot withstand the nonnegotiable consequences of impermanence, dissolution, and emptiness. And yet, somehow, the edifice that is Western Buddhism does not merely remain in place: it stands fortified against the consequences of its own self- acknowledged insights into our "natural" condition. In doing so, it originates an order, both for itself and for its practitioner, that is at odds with these very insights. For, "to fuse with the order of nature only in retrospect" is to create the illusion that it does not fuse with nature at all. It creates the illusion that the object of Western Buddhism's fusion— the object of its most abiding desire— is of an altogether different order from nature's ruin. It is, rather, of a higher order that somehow enables escape from the raw contingencies of nature— the very ones that Buddhism itself articulates— leaving the subject ultimately unscathed.

The term for "nature" that I use in the subtitle and throughout the book is "the Real." Like Western Buddhism's "emptiness" or "no- self," in the history of Western thought, "the Real" names some profoundly productive a priori, awareness of which is a sine qua non of human awakening and of the liberation that such awakening is said to entail (however variously those consequences might be understood). Paradoxically, the Real is as evasive as it is productive, eluding capture by our strategies of linguistic and symbolic communication. Of course, it is we creaturely humans who enable this evasion by constructing obfuscating, at best, symbolization around the nonetheless fecund Real. In his twentieth-century masterpiece of literary criticism, The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, Walter Benjamin wrote that "in the ruins of great buildings the idea of the plan speaks more impressively than in lesser buildings, no matter how well preserved they are." For Benjamin, it is precisely the ruin's proximity to "creaturely nature" that infuses it with its "uncontrollable productivity." Of what, then, does the well-preserved building speak? Of what is it productive if not of the very idea that saw it rise from the dust in the first place? In proximity to what would this construction be, if not to the passion and pain coursing through the veins of earthly creatures? Such questions merely postpone my conclusion: Western Buddhism must be ruined.

This, at least, is the belief animating this book. I have come to this belief after forty- some years of actively surveying the Western Buddhist landscape. At turns figuratively and literally, my exploration has taken me from the tropical forests of the achans to the austere rusticality of the roshis to the stark mountainous terrain of the rinpoches. It has taken me from the temple to the practice center to the university classroom. It has enveloped me in the exertion of several practices, each of which is deeply contemplative in the degree of steady concentration involved: still, silent meditation; laborious reading of Pali, Sanskrit, and Tibetan texts; and the most difficult of all, sustained and unflinching critical thinking. Why is critique so difficult? Well, it is not only philosophers who fall in love with their subject. That love

will ensure that the critique that follows does not obliterate, does not grind back to dust, the finely wrought edifice of Western Buddhism. And if I do succeed in my plan, it is only to view the ensuing ruin in the glow of a stranger, more creaturely, light.

I have learned a lot about ruin from the people I mentioned earlier. Another teacher not mentioned is the Persian Muslim poet Jalāl ad-Din Muhammad Rümi (1207– 1273). Rümi employed the conceit of ruin as an image of the catalyzing loss required to come in possession of our most potent human quality: love. He doesn't mean love as a commonplace affection. He means love as a ferocious force of ruination: "What care I though ruin be wrought?/ Under the ruin there is royal treasure." One collection of his poetry is titled The Ruins of the Heart. I have also learned a great deal about ruin from Canadian poet, novelist, and singer- songwriter Leonard Cohen (1934– 2016). A line from his 1992 song "Anthem" has become a kind of cultural cliché, like the Vincent van Gogh painting Starry Night that can be had on a teeshirt or coffee mug, but it nonetheless captures his notion of ruin: "There is a crack in everything/ that's how the light gets in." For Cohen as for Rumi, ruin is a question of igniting the "furnace of the spirit," whose ardent issue, always, is love.

I first heard Leonard Cohen in 1975 while in the room of my friend, Thomas Adams, who had then borrowed the album Songs of Love and Hate from a local library. At that point in our lives, Thomas and I were drinking from the trough of Alice Cooper, the New York Dolls, and Black Sabbath. Yet, we sat in rapt silence as the black vinyl turned, slowly secreting the passionate, melancholy ambience that is Leonard Cohen— his voice, his guitar, his verse. One of those verses, from the first song on the record, "Avalanche," could be the Universal Beloved inciting Rümi to ecstatic embrace. Or is it Shams, the mysterious dervish perpetually wandering in search of a beloved friend, someone with whom he could speak of secret things? It's impossible to say. Both masters wield double entendre as a weapon of ruination. After admonishing his wavering lover not to feign such passion in the face of doubt, the singer intones (or cautions?): "It is your turn, beloved/ It is your flesh that I wear." It is a disturbing, almost ghastly, line. But can you conceive of a more direct and unadorned image of union born of annihilation? Imagining that ruined building once again, I picture it obliterated as an edifice for narrow worldly concerns (commerce, service, bureaucracy) because it has become clothed in the flesh of nature.

Thomas and I intravenously ingested Leonard Cohen's intoxicant. At the same time, together with my brother Damon, we began imbibing the violent metallic hootch of the Stooges' Vietnam War– contaminated Raw Power: "I am the world's forgotten boy/ The one who searches and destroys."8 The three of us began imperceptibly to mix the dark elixir of Leonard Cohen and the volatile firewater of the Stooges with a form of music that would come to define our lives: punk rock. Like so many young people in search of an expression for their still nascent superpowers, we formed a band. Joined by like-minded insurgents of the moribund American middle class, we unleashed our Dionysian energy, power, passion, and heat on the Philadelphia (and beyond) underground from 1981 to 1987. The name of our band is Ruin. (Present tense: like an alcoholic, you are never cured of your band.)

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Introduction: Raise the Curtain on the Theater of Western Buddhism!

What are we to make of Western Buddhism? It presents itself as the treasure house of ideas and practices that were formulated by an enlightened teacher who lived in India 2,500 years ago. Followers of Western Buddhism tell us that this man's teachings accurately identify the real conditions of human

existence. If true, that is quite a remarkable achievement. It would mean that an ancient diagnosis of human experience still pertains in our hyper- accelerated, ultra- technological modern society. Is such a correspondence possible? Western Buddhism might, conversely, be made out to be less of an unchanging universal account of human reality and more of a contemporary ideology. In its basic sense, an ideology is a strategy that "represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence." To recognize Western Buddhism as an ideology is not to view it as an instance of false consciousness or nefarious deception. It is rather to acknowledge it as being uniquely productive of a quite particular subject, one that imagines his or her relation to the world in quite particular ways. If we view Western Buddhism as an ideology, as, that is, a form of life, an apparently natural way of being within any given social formation, we could certainly better explain the incredible diversity among its forms throughout time and place. For, unlike an idealist timeless teaching, "ideology has a material existence." Its dictates are always enacted within the presently existing social arena and realized as a practice by real people therein. Invoking the prospect of an imaginary relation to one's world suggests a third, altogether different, possibility. Western Buddhism might be understood as a strategy for engaging with the dominant ideology of a society. In this case, it would be a practice of critiquing and possibly even improving the social formation in which its practitioners find themselves currently embedded.

My observation of Western Buddhism leads me to the conclusion that it itself is unsure which of these three characterizations best describes it. By "it," I mean, of course, the combined effect of the people— the formulators, teachers, and practitioners— who act in the name of "Western Buddhism," or really of "Buddhism" in the West today. Their accumulated record is an expression of adamant faith in the universal veracity of their teachings. Somewhat paradoxically, they are equally willing to perform operations on those same teachings, to adjust and alter them, in ways that suggest that they are aware of the time- and place-dependent ideological nature of the teachings. More puzzling, these same people regularly invoke concepts that caution, watch your head! radical critique of self and society underway!

One contention driving this book is that Western Buddhism functions in all three of these modes, but to varying degrees of explicitness. I see Western Buddhism as a critique subsumed within an ideology subsumed within a faith. I am almost tempted to apply to Western Buddhism, along with a grain of salt, Freud's famous topography. Faith is Western Buddhism's superego. It internalizes and echoes back society's sense of morality, righteousness, and goodness. It aims to produce the ideal subject, one who spontaneously conforms to the social law. The superego- faith of this subject compels him or her to eschew expression of aggressions that are forbidden by decorum. The faithful Western Buddhist subject is thus adept at channeling aggression into affirmation. Critique is Western Buddhism's id. The critical drive bound up in certain Western Buddhist postulates (e.g., emptiness, no- self, impermanence) are primitive and instinctual. This drive impels the subject's visceral desire to be unbeholden to subjugating norms, to be free of society's (and of faith's) self-serving moralistic constraints. It thus tends to produce a subject who takes up conceptual arms against the deceptively polite policing of those norms and thrusts them into a controverting chaos. The critical Western Buddhist subject is adept at flushing out repressive sleeper cells within the doctrinal and communal compound. Ideology is Western Buddhism's ego. It is the "I" of the subject, the "we" of the community. It is motivated by the demands of society (and of faith) and is thus acutely sensitive and responsive to "reality," to, that is to say, society's status quo. The ideological Western Buddhist subject seeks, above all, some form of wellbeing. Happiness would be optimal; but, short of that eternally elusive goal, certainly the reduction of stress and tension isn't too much to ask for. After all, Western Buddhist ideology, as Freud says of the ego, "serves three

severe masters and does what it can to bring their claims and demands into harmony with one another." Ideology- ego's "tyrannical masters" are, of course, reality, faith, and critique. Western Buddhist ideology thus paradoxically produces an anxious Western Buddhist subject, one who is able to minimize conflicts with the pious demands of faith only by repressing and shoring up against the primal aggressive force circulating within the concepts of that very faith.

As the title suggests, one aim of this book is to give voice to the critical unconscious, to stay with our psychoanalytic metaphor, of Western Buddhist discourse. I will give the details of my approach later. Here, just a brief word about the general purpose of critique. Marjorie Gracieuse sums up this purpose when she speaks of "wresting vital potentialities of humans from the artificial forms and static norms that subjugate them." That is a generous definition of the task. It allows at the outset that the object of critique has something of value to offer us. At the same time it suspects that this value comes embedded in a system of thought and practice that has superfluous, and problematic, elements. These elements constitute a symbolic surplus value that functions to capture the desire of the practitioner. It is reasonable to think that it is in this surplus that we discover features that limit and coerce the subject's agency. Advertising gives us the most obvious examples of the value/ surplus differential. It pitches item after item that relates to the fulfilment of some basic human need— food, clothing, hygiene, mating, transportation, security, relaxation, and so on. Yet it should not be difficult to discern how an ad for, say, a Prius SUV or a pair of Aéropostale ripped skinny jeans elicits desires that far exceed fulfillment of basic transportation and clothing needs. In addition, advertisement is produced by, and further reproduces, quite particular social relations (economic, gender, racial, political). Symbolic surplus value is easily discernible when it comes to such goods as a pair of pants that, beyond the basic need of covering the flesh in cold weather, inscribe their young female wearer into "consumer society's colonization of youth and sexuality through [selling her] 'freedom' . . . to do whatever she wants with her body." It becomes more difficult to discern in the cases of the "vital potentialities" that Gracieuse alludes to. At what point, for example, does education cross over from being the practice of developing the human potential for thinking and knowing into a means of social inculcation? Paulo Freire, for instance, holds that all people possess the potential to become aware of the forces (social, political, cultural, linguistic, psychological, etc.) that constitute "the logic of the present."6 An educational program can facilitate that end, he says, by training students in "the practice of freedom," whereby they learn to discern the operations of these forces on their own sense of identity, as well as on the ways in which these forces serve to replicate and perpetuate "the logic of the present." An educational program can just as likely be put in the service of a political agenda that precisely wants to hinder such awareness of that logic. To do so, it does not deny "the vital potentiality of the human" that is the capacity for creative critical inquiry. Rather, it perversely directs this potential into a stultifying framework (forms and norms) of preordained outcomes. Another example, one familiar to readers of the present book, is meditation. Let's assume for a moment that sitting still, silently, and attentively serves, like education, the vital potentiality of the human for a certain type of creative critical self-inquiry. At what point does this ostensibly neutral, natural inquiry become a node in an ideological system? Is it not curious that meditators virtually always happen to discover in their meditation the very claims of their community's doctrine? What does such "validation" tell us about the relationship between the vital human potential affixed (possibly) to silent sitting and the apparently overdetermining forms and norms that frame such a practice?

I leave those questions hanging for now. The point here is that critique is a practice that attempts to "wrest" vital value from subjugating surplus. It is a practice that allows us to make explicit the operations

of a system of thought and practice that the system itself, in order to remain whole, keeps implicit— its unstated assumptions; its unspoken values; its relationship to existing social, economic, and political formations; and, perhaps most importantly, its tacit formation of individual actors in the world. Without a practice of critique, we cannot distinguish a catalyst for a vital human potentiality from a self- serving prescription of a covertly ideological program, however well- meaning that program may be. The wager of this book is that, in distinguishing between the two types of practice, we are dealing with a difference that makes a world of difference. But what might that difference be? I will deal with this question in depth later. For now, just to give the reader some initial orientation, we can consider the purpose of the "wresting" that Gracieuse recommends. In brief, it has to do with something that will sound familiar to readers of Buddhism, namely, a certain unbinding from violence, delusion, and fugitive desire. We might call this unbinding freedom, liberation, or even nirvana. If these terms sound grandiose in the present context, they may nonetheless name a genuine vital potentiality of human beings. If so, this unbinding will require, like the Buddha besieged beneath the bodhi tree, a ferocious struggle against "the world under the sway of death." For, in naming coercive structures, in speaking of subjugation, stasis, and dissemblance, Gracieuse is giving voice to nothing if not the necessity of a kind of human insurrection against the existing world. I believe that Western Buddhism understands this struggle. The crucial question is whether it provides arms in solidarity with the struggling human or whether it performs a kind of spiritualized Dolchstoß in the very heat of battle. Or perhaps we will discover another potent image to characterize Western Buddhism in our time. First, however, we must explore many criticisms and refutations and propose many new ideas, concepts, and claims.

Why Western Buddhism?

Why Western Buddhism? The title of this book surely suggests that I am treating a quite specific variety of Buddhism: that which exists in the West. It would follow that this western variety has something— texts, doctrines, teachers, practices, beliefs, communities— that differs significantly from its eastern relatives. Otherwise, why would it be necessary to add the modifier? At the same time, though, the reader will notice that I often use "Buddhism" interchangeably with the modified form "Western Buddhism" and, indeed, rarely differentiate between the two usages. I will have more to say about this matter later. Here, I would like to highlight what I mean by the term "Western Buddhism."

Western Buddhism originated in the East, in Asia. I am not referring to the obvious fact that Asia, specifically India, is the wellspring of all subsequent international forms of Buddhism. Rather, from its core values to its high aspirations, Western Buddhism is the result of an articulation and self-understanding that initially took shape in Asia. According to the German Indologist Heinz Bechert, the lineaments of what we now think of as Western Buddhism were first drawn in Sri Lanka. This origin should not be surprising. As Bechert points out, since 1517 the coastal areas of the island had been occupied by, first Portuguese, then Dutch, and finally British, forces of merchants, militaries, and missionaries. At that time, too, the Buddhist Kingdom of Kandy (1521–1818) was rising in the land's interior, preserving the ancient domination of Buddhism in daily affairs. This hotbed of East– West proximity led to encounters such as the spirited public debates between Buddhist monks and Christian missionaries, where opposing worldviews could be aired, evaluated, critiqued, and defended. It is thus also not surprising that Asian Buddhists were subjected to a long and ultimately far- reaching exposure to "European ways of thinking."8 The movement of the arrow, though, was turning in the other direction as well: the colonizing Westerners were showing a sustained interest in Buddhism. However scheming and skeptical this newfound interest may have been on the side of the colonizers, it created, in

turn, an equally new self- consciousness among Buddhists concerning their own tradition. "Thus," writes Bechert, "an essential presupposition for the development" of what would become Western Buddhism was this "intensive encounter between western and Buddhist thinking."

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Theaters comforting, theaters cruel

With that description in mind, it will be useful to revisit the question: what are we to make of Western Buddhism? Is it the serious form of thought and practice that its adherents would have us believe? It certainly speaks in the idiom of seriousness. Buddhist teachings invite us to entertain possibilities that should make even the most impulsive of the proverbial rushing fools balk: emptiness, selflessness, freedom, rebirth, the multiverse, enlightenment, abiding happiness. Topics like these, of course, have occupied some of the brightest minds that humanity has produced since the dawn of recorded human thought, thinkers from Parmenides and Plato to David Hume, Hannah Arendt, and Stephen Hawking, to just barely get the list going. Now, we're hearing about Buddhism's ability to address the most vexing issues confronting the twenty- first century, issues such as the domination of technology, environmental degradation, the intricacies of trauma and addiction, and the mysteries of the human brain. Western Buddhist teachers suffer no loss for words when it comes to any of these topics. Academics, too— principally in Buddhist studies, but also in fields like neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy— laud Buddhism's contributions to interminable debates on epistemology, ontology, logic, language, perception, and consciousness. The accumulated result is that Buddhism enjoys a blue- ribbon reputation in the West as a profound all- encompassing system of thought, or at least, to those less inclined toward intractable conundrums, as a self- help remedy par excellence.

Is this reputation deserved? Perhaps the most obvious approach to investigating the viability of Buddhists' claims for their ostensibly pansophic teaching would be to systematically present and analyze these teachings. Such an approach, however, would be tedious beyond belief and ultimately unproductive. Why do I say this? It would be tedious because "Buddhism" is the name of a two- and- a-half millennia amassing of ideas, beliefs, rituals, worldviews, texts, theories, art, architecture, music, fashion, practices, universities, monasteries, lay communities, virtually ad infinitum. And all of this in the cauldron of cultures spanning Beijing and Boston. Although this baroque assortment bears the shared name of "Buddhism," the commonalities across time and space are mostly of the family resemblance variety, wherein the self-identity of each lies in its difference from the others. Like the proud factions of a venerable and extremely large clan, Buddhists seem to be particularly sensitive to this matter of difference. This sensitivity, furthermore, informs the reason that a doctrinal analysis of Buddhism would be as unproductive as it would be tedious. Contemporary Western Buddhists commonly respond to criticism with an appeal to exception. This tendency parallels what I call a detail fetish among Western Buddhists, a kind of exemplification reflex. Providing a particular example in order to make a finely calibrated point is, indeed, not unusual in complex systems of thought. Heidegger has his hammer; Wittgenstein, his slabs. Spinoza has his hatchet, and Descartes, his wax. If you have ever read even the first page of a book on classical Buddhist philosophy, you will almost certainly have come across "the pot." Buddhists, in the written word and in dialogue, have always been quick at the draw with their own mechanism of ideological damage control: the hyper-specific doctrinal detail. Apparently, there is no criticism of a given Buddhist concept that cannot be decisively dismissed with an added detail, an overlooked facet, an ever- so- slight shifting of the dharmic goalpost. The detail is taken from this

teacher's meticulous interpretation, from that pinpointed textual passage; or, failing its intended effect, from the hidden sphere of wisdom known as personal experience. The detail corrects, alters, refines, and reshapes. And along the way, it inevitably derails any criticism, rendering it irrelevant.

If Buddhism is in equal measure elusive and unassailable, how is an evaluation of it possible? If the term "Buddhism," or for that matter "Western Buddhism," is a catchall for such a wide diversity of phenomena, what is it exactly that is being critiqued? And even if we can say, if every particular instance that is offered up for critical analysis is countered by a supposedly more salient yet resistant instance, on what foundation can a critique be raised? To indicate more about my approach to these matters in A Critique of Western Buddhism, and to convey a sense of the book's spirit, I would like momentarily to band together the Buddha and the bearer of such ad rem wisdom as "Where there is a stink of shit/ there is a smell of being."

The Buddha did not write books, but if he had, I can imagine him thinking, along with his scatological comrade, Antonin Artaud: "I would like to write a Book that would drive people mad, that would be like an open door leading them where they would never have consented to go; in short, a door that opens to reality."34 In the terms that I introduce in Chapter 2, what Artaud calls "reality" is better understood as "the Real." In one of its uses, the concept of the Real gives us a way to talk about disavowed features of reality that threaten to sunder our constructions of order, sense, and meaning. In another usage, the Real names a facet of existence presupposed, yet unaffected, by human symbolic systems, such as language and ideology. So, I will accordingly adjust Artaud's terminology here. The Real, in Artaud's charged and idiosyncratic idiom, is marked by "cruelty." It is, in fact, the definitive cruelty. The very purpose of theater, Artaud believed, is to refract this cruelty: theater should be coextensive with the Real. It should ensue from the Real, thus operate alongside it. And yet the theater of his day aspired to be little more than a melodramatic retreat from the threats of modern life. It sought to protect its audience from the cruel. Artaud had a different vision. He saw in theater a practice that "inspires us with the fiery magnetism of its images and acts upon us like a spiritual therapeutics whose touch can never be forgotten." With this aspiration, he was up against no less than a popular institution that served, like the church and the police, the creation of a public submissive to an oppressive status quo. Artaud thus made it his mission to transmute this theater of complacency into an "immediate and violent" maelstrom, one that exposed its viewers to the primal truths of their lives. Only a theater that wakes up its audience's "nerves and heart," he believed, is worthy of the name. Such a theater must be built on the cruelty that is the Real, on those eschewed features of reality that, to evoke Artaud's wise words from above, stink. Such a theater must not shrink from the possibility that "extreme action, pushed beyond all limits" must ensue from its feral process. For, if not pushed with such intentional zeal, the machinations of delusion and self- satisfaction will overwhelm the vitality that is catalyzed by the lucid acknowledgment of the cruel Real.

What do the fiery dreams of a bona fide madman like Artaud have to do with the cool and eminently sane Buddha? To suggest a parallel, let's turn to the primal scene of their respective spheres of action. We see demented revels of the Dionysian maenad dancing and drinking themselves into orgiastic frenzy, shredding, with their phallic thyrsoi, then ecstatically devouring, the raw flesh of the sacrificial beast. Out of this appetite, the theater is born. Buddhism's myth of origin is hardly less dramatic. Revisiting the locus of its founding scene, the seat of the Buddha's awakening, we are in the presence of overwhelming elemental power: trees, water, sky, fire, earth, bodies beautiful and decaying, lust, passion, storms, death,

swirling cosmos, occult powers, animals, sprites, spirits, gods. Sitting against the trunk of a massive ficus, the Buddha, as Gilles Deleuze says of writers, uses all the resources of his athleticism to "dip into a chaos, into a movement that goes to the infinite." By engaging in extreme contemplative experimentation, the Buddha enters into a "Dionysian space of undoing" within which he enacts "not a system of demonstration, but an ordeal in which the mind is given new eyes."

Each of these spheres represents a literal theater, a theatron, a space of violent, if perhaps cathartic, seeing. And yet from a catalyst for the crushing ordeal of human awakening, the Theater of Buddhism, like that of Artaud's France, lapses into a refuge of comfort, into an institution of sleepy, complacent social conformity, into thought so sluggish as to mope its way into the desert of the Western New Age. That, at least, is one of two major premises of this book. What creates this breach is that the progenitors of Buddhism and of the Theater of Cruelty presuppose a "Real" of which their particular forms are crucial recoveries. This fact, the positing of a relationship to the Real— indeed, the very evocation of the notion— permits a corollary to the premise. In the case of Buddhism, this corollary is that its conceptual materials may, despite its lapses, offer valuable resources for radical reformations of thought and practice and of self and society in the contemporary West. But now a shadow of this first premise appears; namely, the noun "Buddhism" indexes an historical failure to unleash the force of its very own thought. "Buddhism," that is, names an obstinate containment of potentially vital human goods. The end result is that Buddhism everywhere functions as a conservative protector of the social status quo, however toxic, and as an ideological fortress spawning subjects whose treasured goal certainly appears to be to remain unscathed— in some sense or another— by life's vicissitudes. Paradoxically, therefore, we cannot look to Buddhism— to its teachers and defenders, to its commentaries and explications, to its communities and organizations— to assist us in removing its auto- erected bulwark of resistance.

The second major premise of this book derives from this paradox. It holds that certain critical procedures must be performed on and with the Buddhist material if Buddhism is to avoid complete absorption into the Western self-help industry. The question twice posed in this introduction— What are we to make of Buddhism?— is thus intended in the most literal of senses. What, if anything, might we do with Buddhism, with Buddhist materials, in our present circumstances? Committed Western Buddhists will be perplexed by the very question. It entails an assumption that, I doubt, would ever occur to them, much less be acceptable. For, to its adherents, Buddhism is nothing if not an exemplary inventory of what we should do in our present circumstances. This inventory is, furthermore, nothing if not wholly sufficient. It encompasses the entire cosmos, in fact, including, for instance, what we should do with our minds, our bodies, our speech, and in comportment to others and to the environment. It makes pronouncements on the workings of causality, past, present, and future. It holds the codes to the cosmic vault of meaning and value. So, first, perhaps, among a host of other difficulties that I discuss in this book is that a critique will have to avoid the snares of the principle of sufficient Buddhism. Echoing Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason (all things, according to reason, have a reason) as well as François Laruelle's critical principle of sufficient philosophy (all things, according to philosophy, are philosophizable), this principle holds that Buddhism can be universally applied to its object. Given that Buddhism's overt object is reality, or indeed, the Real, Buddhism's sufficiency knows virtually no bounds. That being the case, any critique of Buddhism that uses Buddhist materials is setting itself up to be absorbed back into the fold as yet one more iteration of Buddhism. A critique will thus have to be nimble and will have to hit hard.

Here, I would like to mention four basic features informing my critique. The details will be found in the chapters that follow. First, I am borrowing elements from the prodigious theoretical apparatus of the contemporary French thinker François Laruelle. The most succinct definition of the aim of Laruelle's critique is that it is "the simplification of transcendence." Laruelle holds that philosophy— the topic of his own critique, which he terms "non-philosophy" or "non-standard philosophy"— suffers a condition whereby it is "intended by necessity to remain empty but which necessarily evades this void with objects and foreign goals provided by experience, culture, history, language, etc." Philosophy must remain empty because of its "intention" of filling the role of an explicator of immanent reality or indeed of a kind of science of the Real. That means that philosophy identifies itself as an organon, as an unmediated instrument of knowledge, rather than as co-author of the reality it explicates. Instead, what we find is that philosophy habitually affixes its own postulates concerning reality and the Real onto the very instrument of its ostensible science, thereby inevitably mixing these with the object to be known. Through this mixture, philosophy "evades" the immanent Real that it endeavors to think and know, and instead erects a transcendental mirror reflecting philosophy's mixture back onto the world, and into the Real. This circularity entails the failure of philosophy to function as the rigorous organon it so aspires to be. It thus becomes instead a "rumor . . . which is transmitted by hearsay, imitation, specularity, and repetition." As I will show, Laruelle's recognition of philosophy's identity transfers uncannily well to that of Buddhism. In part, this shows the protean nature of his theory. Indeed, he holds that " 'nonphilosophy' is the generic term for the enterprise which takes on other names locally according to the materials to which it relates." It is a theory that is simultaneously a practice, whereby the practitioner uses it to do something with the local material. I will say more about this facet in Part 3. In any case, I know of no theory more capable of resisting the reappropriating sufficiency that marks totalizing systems such as Buddhism than Laruelle's non-philosophy.

Second, it should be clear by now that a conviction running throughout my critique will be that an orientation toward immanence is a vital human value. I would hope to convince my readers that thinkers of immanence— whether in the sciences, medicine, economics, psychology, philosophy, even the arts— offer the most promising models for social and personal clarification and, where desired, transformation. This is because, like Heidegger's "hardness of fate" premise, their promise is rooted precisely in a transcendentally minimized assessment of human experience, one that moreover opens up the possibility for "authentic action" in our world. This conviction has a corollary: systems of transcendence, namely, those that posit autonomous yet immanently absent orders of truth and reality, must be forcefully countered. If for no other reason, they must be countered because they are alienating to human beings. Buddhism is a fascinating and rare instance of a system of thought that adamantly posits a version of radical, non- alienating immanence yet aggressively staves off the consequences of its own productive insights via transcendental mixtures of its own making. My critique thus takes seriously those insights of Buddhism (e.g., subjective destitution, phenomenal dissolution, contingency, nihility, etc.) concerning reality in relation to the Real. My hypothesis is that Buddhist materials might contribute to serious, immanental models of human transformation, but only in ways that would be unrecognizable to Buddhists. Put in apt if somewhat dramatic terms: we might, after all is said and done, discern the afterglow of liberating human thought in the ruins of "Buddhism's" destruction.

Third, this critique serves as both a theory and a performance. I don't mean only that a text like this one is "performative," that it does, or at least aims to effect, something. I am more interested in the performance associated with the reading of the text. I hope to stimulate a reading, thinking, living

subject, one who regards the Buddhist conceptual material alongside of, hence profoundly affected by, what Laruelle calls "radical immanence." Theory-practice therefore seems like a fitting term here. Theory, like its etymological relative, theater, positions us to gaze on the spectacle of Western Buddhism. As Sruti Bala writes, the two closely related terms "deal with orders of perception and meaning-making of reality." Performance, however, in contrast to theory, "foregrounds action as opposed to perception." It is thus "connected to the legal act of executing a will or promise, as opposed to the emphasis in the terms 'theater' and 'theory,' on considering and speculating." So, one implicit claim made for A Critique of Western Buddhism is that it at least endeavors to execute the promise of Buddhist emancipatory materials within some register of thought and action. "Placed together," to paraphrase Bala, theory and performance "span a range of investments, from aesthetic and formal to the political and social."

Finally, I want to reiterate that I am not critiquing Western Buddhism as a flawed deviation from a pure "original" Buddhism or as a corruption of traditional eastern forms of Buddhism. Neither am I putting Buddhism on trial and conducting an inquest into the truthfulness of its claims. The fact is that it is impossible to evaluate "Buddhism's claims" because, as I have already mentioned, "Buddhism" is too slippery a term. Its very fluidity, however, is a richly instructive fact, one that provides a clue to its identity and thus to how to construct a consequential critique. In brief, I am employing a method that bears no resemblance to approaches such as the history of ideas, the philosophy of religion, or doxography. While readers might excuse me from following either of the first two methods, I can imagine they will be disappointed if I don't base my critique on the evaluation of actual doctrines. I am following Laruelle here. He writes, "There is a frivolity of doxography from which 'the history of philosophy' does not always escape. It is not a matter here of objects, authors, themes, positions or texts; it is solely the matter of a problematic and of the reconstruction of this problematic." I will work out later what I think this problematic is for Western Buddhism. The point that I wish to make here— and it is a crucial point overall— is that whatever Western Buddhist "objects, authors, themes, positions or texts" I could name would amount to little more than indices. That is, names of specific texts, doctrines, teachers, etc., are but "indications of problems that we are striving to demonstrate and analyze in their coherence and functioning; guiding threads for penetrating into a [buddhistic] environment that exceeds them, but the extent, the possibilities and also the limitations of which they have made perceptible." I am interested in the "environment" that both exceeds and precedes any Buddhist text, figure, and so on, that we might name. This environment constitutes the problematic because it, and not specific doctrinal details, is the incubator of the countless phenomena that comprise "Western Buddhism." The general, Laruellen, term for this problematic is "decision." Very briefly, decision involves cutting knowledge off from its immanent- material-empirical given in order to ground that knowledge in a transcendent- ideal-hallucinated supplement. Such a move is, of course, not a problem for avowedly transcendental forms of thought, such as theistic religion. Decision is, however, a problem for self-declared phenomenologically verifiable systems like biology and Buddhism. I argue that, given its specific practice of decision, Western Buddhism exposes itself as a visionary form of knowledge. In any case, this is not to say that you will not encounter named examples in this critique. Rather, it means that these instances will only be viewed— to use a famous Buddhist trope— as fingers pointing to the moon of buddhistic decision. The purpose of this approach, indeed of this entire critique, is, once again, not to annihilate the finely wrought edifice of Western Buddhism, but to view that edifice in the glow of a stranger, more creaturely, light. <>

Utpaladeva on the Power of Action: A First Edition, Annotated Translation, and Study of Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti, Chapter 2.1 by Utpaladeva by edited and commentary by Isabelle Ratié [Harvard Oriental Series, Harvard University Department of South Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 9780674270817]

The Recognition of the Lord (Īśvarapratyabhijñā) by the Kashmirian Utpaladeva (c. 925–975) is a landmark in the history of nondual Śaivism, and one of the masterpieces of Indian philosophy. The detailed commentary (*Vivṛti*) on it by the author himself was so far considered almost entirely lost, but three chapters of this major work were recently recovered from marginal annotations in manuscripts of other commentaries on Utpaladeva's treatise.

The book provides the first critical edition, annotated translation, and study of one of these chapters, which endeavors to justify a fundamental paradox of the system—namely, the idea that Śiva (understood as an infinite, omniscient, and omnipotent consciousness) has a dynamic essence since the core of consciousness is a subtle form of action, and yet is by no means limited by the temporal and spatial sequence that affects all ordinary acts and agents.

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Excerpt: The importance of the fragments for the assessment of Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's philosophical contributions

Several factors might be invoked to explain this temptation, perceptible in the alterations undergone by these IPVV marginal quotations, to let Utpaladeva's most important work sink into oblivion. As pointed out by K.C. Pandey, Abhinavagupta's detailed, elegant and synthetic ^PV might have been deemed clearer than Utpaladeva's highly inventive but elliptical work—in Terentianus' famous words, *pro captu lectoris habent sua fata libelli*. [The pamphlet has its own fate.] Besides, with the exception of Utpaladeva's devotional hymns, the latter's works are confined to the genre of philosophical treatises and commentaries, whereas Abhinavagupta has authored important works on various topics (the aesthetics of theatre, the aesthetics of poetry, the interpretation of Saiva scriptures, the practice and meaning of Saiva rituals...), so that his fame may have surpassed Utpaladeva's early on—and this may have greatly influenced the choices that were made as to which works should be copied preferably to others within the Pratyabhijna corpus.

Whatever the reasons for these choices may have been, however, such decisions have profoundly affected our perception of the roles respectively played by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta in building the Pratyabhijna system. Thus as pointed out above, before the publication of Raffaele Torella's pioneering studies on Utpaladeva's Vivrti, historians of Indian philosophy had simply assumed that Abhinavagupta's commentaries were the most innovative works in this tradition, and they tended to ascribe to Abhinavagupta some ideas that they could find in the latter's works, but not in Utpaladeva's stanzas or Vrtti. In his first article devoted to the Vi^rti, Raffaele Torella already questioned as follows Pandey's statement to the effect that the Pratyabhijna system "owes" its "importance" to Abhinavagupta's commentaries:

> A close examination of the IPVV is already sufficient in itself to limit the validity of this statement. Despite the inevitable difficulty in reading a text like the IPVV, which is an extensive and diffuse commentary on a work that has not come down to us, it seems clear that the majority of the themes and subjects that Abhinavagupta touches on find their direct correspondence—or at least their starting point—in Utpaladeva's tika. In fact the IPV itself, which according to Abhinavagupta is intended to be a commentary on what the kariktas are in themselves, accomplishes its task through a carefully gauged and considered systematization of a rich speculative material whose early origin is to be glimpsed in the tika. Only a direct reading of the tika would allow one to define the central role that Utpaladeva undoubtedly played in the elaboration of Pratyabhijna philosophy.

As more and more Vivrti fragments are coming to light, we are now able to compare all the texts belonging to the Pratyabhijna corpus; and is it is becoming ever more obvious that indeed, Abhinavagupta was a brilliant commentator, but also a very faithful one, and that Utpaladeva's Vivrti was the truly innovative work.

An interesting example of such a distortion in our vision of the history of the Pratyabhijna system is the issue of the famous "doctrine of reflections" (pratibimba^ada): in many of his works, Abhinavagupta claims that the phenomena constituting the universe as we perceive it are similar to reflections in a mirror, because the variegated reflections that we may see in a mirror are perfectly real inasmuch as they really occur on the surface of the mirror, yet they are nothing over and above the surface of the mirror that makes them manifest by assuming their forms. In the same way, argues Abhinavagupta, all

phenomena, which are perfectly real, are not to be discarded as mere illusions (contrary to what the representatives of Advaitavedanta contend), yet they are nothing over and above the unique, all-encompassing and all-powerful universal consciousness that makes them manifest by assuming their forms. So far this analogy was ascribed to Abhinavagupta, or at least most scholars credited him with being the first to make a full metaphysical use of it. Utpaladeva himself; however, mentions in his commentary on another Saiva work (Somananda's Sivadrsti) that he has explained at length in his detailed commentary. <>

DEFENDING GOD IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY INDIA: THE ŠAIVA OEUVRE OF APPAYA DĪKSITA by Jonathan Duquette [Oxford Oriental Monographs, Oxford University Press, 9780198870616]

This book is the first in-depth study of the Śaiva oeuvre of the celebrated polymath Appaya Dīkṣita (1520-1593). Jonathan Duquette documents the rise to prominence and scholarly reception of Śivādvaita Vedānta, a Sanskrit-language school of philosophical theology which Appaya single-handedly established, thus securing his reputation as a legendary advocate of Śaiva religion in early modern India. Based to a large extent on hitherto unstudied primary sources in Sanskrit, Duquette offers new insights on Appaya's early polemical works and main source of Śivādvaita exegesis, Śrīkaṇṭha's Brahmamīmāmsābhāṣya; identifies Appaya's key intellectual influences and opponents in his reconstruction of Śrīkaṇṭha's theology; and highlights some of the key arguments and strategies he used to make his ambitious project a success. Centred on his magnum opus of Śivādvaita Vedānta, the Śivārkamanidīpikā, this book demonstrates that Appaya's Śaiva oeuvre was mainly directed against Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, the dominant Vaiṣṇava school of philosophical theology in his time and place. A far-reaching study of the challenges of Indian theism, this book opens up new possibilities for our understanding of religious debates and polemics in early modern India as seen through the lenses of one of its most important intellectuals.

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The Rise of Śivādvaita Vedānta

Once upon a time...
The illustrious Ra:ngarājamakhin had a famous son, Appaya Dīksita,
devoted to the moon-crested [Śiva].
Thanks to him, the fame of the illustrious king Cinnabomma,
breaker of armies, was unobstructed.
He raised up the commentary of Śrīka:n:tha to support
the doctrine of the supreme Śiva.

These words were inscribed in 1582 on the Kãlaka:n:thešvara temple situated in A:daiyapãlam, a small village in the Tamil region and the birthplace of the celebrated scholar at the centre of this book—Appaya Dïksita (c.1520–1593). Appaya was undoubtedly one of India's most influential Sanskrit intellectuals in the sixteenth century. A scholar of polymathic erudition, he wrote profusely in a range of Sanskrit disciplines prominent in his day—especially poetic theory (ala:mkãrašãstra), scriptural hermeneutics (mïmã :msã), and theology (vedãnta)— and with an idiosyncratic boldness that generated both praise and blame in the centuries to follow. While he is mostly remembered in India today for his writings on the non-dualist school of Advaita Vedãnta—most notably for his subcommentary on Šankara's famous Brahmasütrabhãsya, the Parimala, which continues to be part of the curriculum in some institutions of learning in India—Appaya also devoted a large share of his long and prolific career to writing about Šaivism, a major religious tradition centred on the god Šiva and to which Appaya belonged by birth and remained devoted throughout his entire life. It is this key dimension of Appaya's career and scholarly persona, highlighted in the Kãlaka:n:thešvara inscription, that forms the central scope of this book.

Appaya wrote all his Šaiva works over the course of three decades (1549–1578), while serving at the court of Cinnabomma—the 'breaker of armies' hailed in the inscription and whose fame Appaya contributed to spreading. Cinnabomma was an independent Šaiva ruler based in Vellore, a town in the Tamil country, located a few hundred kilometres from Vijayanagara, the capital of the empire of the same name. Vijayanagara was a powerful polity in South India founded in the fourteenth century and arguably one of the greatest empires in the history of South Asia.4 Appaya's Šaiva works include a number of hymns in praise of Šiva (often with a self-authored commentary), a ritual manual on the daily worship of Šiva and a series of polemical treatises and works of Šaiva Vedãnta theology which, as this book will show, impacted on the intellectual and religious landscape of early modern India in significant ways. Aside from highlighting Appaya's association with Cinnabomma and his construction of the temple in A:daiyapãlam, the Kãlaka:n:thešvara inscription also hails Appaya as the author of the Šivãrkama:nidïpikã, a monumental sub-commentary on the Brahmamïmã :msãbhãsya, a Šaiva commentary on the Brahmasütras (a foundational text of the Vedãnta tradition) composed by Šrïka:n:tha Šivãcãrya around the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries. We are told that Appaya wrote this work thanks to the generous support of his Šaiva patron. He himself says at the beginning of the Šivãrkama:nidïpikã that he was commanded to write this work twice: in a dream by Šiva in His androgynous form as Ardhanãrïšvara and, in waking life, in the form of Cinnabomma, whom Appaya here implicitly identifies with Šiva. Upon completion of the Šivãrkama:nidïpikã, continues the inscription, Appaya was literally covered with gold by his patron and an endowment was established for 500 scholars to study Appaya's magnum opus both in A:daiyapãlam and Vellore.

The composition of the Šivãrkama:nidïpikã marked a new beginning in Appaya's Šaiva career. Prior to this work, Appaya had only written polemical works claiming Šiva's supremacy over Vis:nu-Nãrãya:na based on a creative exegesis of passages taken from sm:rti literature and Upanisads. With the Šivãrkama:nidïpikã, Appaya begins a new, more extensive exegetical project in which he articulates the view that the canonical Brahmasütras centre on Šiva as the conceptual and semantic equivalent of Brahman, the absolute reality eulogized in the Upanisads. From here on, Appaya shifts his focus from plain polemics to establishing a new theological position (siddhãnta) combining Šaiva doctrine with the orthodox theology of non-dual Vedãnta—a position he refers to as Šivãdvaita Vedãnta. Although he relies on Šrïka:n:tha's commentary as his main textual source in this endeavour, Appaya approaches the

latter with an unusual degree of freedom, substantially reinterpreting its core teachings along the lines of Advaita Vedānta, the school of Vedānta he cherishes the most. In this sense, Appaya truly positions himself as the founder of a new school. Before him, virtually no scholar had paid attention to Śrīka:n:tha and his Śaiva commentary; with Appaya's commentarial work, the figure of Śrīka:n:tha achieved wider recognition among early modern scholars of Vedānta. Appaya was not only the first scholar to present Śrīka:n:tha's Vedānta as a legitimate participant in intra-Vedānta debates of his time, but also the first to actively promote and defend the positions of Śrīka:n:tha vis-à-vis other Vedānta schools, notably Viśis:tādvaita Vedānta, as I shall demonstrate in this book.

His work on Śivādvaita Vedānta not only earned Appaya a formidable reputation as a scholar, but also established him as a legendary advocate of Śaiva religion in South India. Already during his lifetime, he was held as the representative of this school par excellence: a Sanskrit copper-plate inscription, dated to 1580 and ascribed to Sevappa Nāyaka of Tañjāvūr, praises him as the 'sole emperor of Śaiva Advaita' (śaivādvaitaikasāmrājya). For his pioneering work on Śrīka:n:tha's commentary, Appaya continued to be praised as an emblematic figure of Śaiva religion in later hagiographies, and even as Śiva incarnate: his grand-nephew Nīlaka:n:tha Dīksita (seventeenth century), a great scholar in his own right, says in the opening of his Nīlaka:n:thavijayacampū that Śiva (śrīka:n:tha) took on the body of Appaya, the teacher of Śrīka:n:tha's doctrine (śrīka:n:thavidyāguru), in this Dark Age, just as Vis:nu will one day appear as Kalkin, His last incarnation (avatāra). But Appaya's Śivādvaita work did not attract only praise. Right from its inception, it was met with fierce criticism from several quarters, including from Śaiva scholars who did not agree with the non-realist implications of this new form of Śaiva non-dualism. This criticism continued throughout the early modern period and to some extent into the modern period.

Appaya was not the first Śaiva scholar to undertake a major exegetical project backed by a Śaiva ruler. Two centuries earlier and in the same imperial setting— the Vijayanagara empire—Sāya:na had authored no fewer than eighteen commentaries on different Vedic texts under the patronage of the early Vijayanagara ruler Bukka I (1356–1377) and his successor Harihara II (Galewicz 2009: 34), both from the Sangama dynasty. It has been shown that Sāya:na's commentarial work was unprecedented in scope and that the 'image of grandeur' attached to his exegetical project was closely tied to the dynastical ambitions of the first Vijayanagara rulers (ibid.: 22). There are significant parallels between Appaya's and Sāya:na's grand projects. Aside from the fact that they both authored multiple works that were commissioned, and possibly encouraged, by a Śaiva ruler, both wrote commentaries that could be characterized as both canonical and scholarly. As Galewicz explains, Sāya:na wrote commentaries on canonical Vedic texts with the clear intention that his own commentaries themselves be considered 'canonical' or authoritative. Furthermore, Sāya:na did so in ways that reached beyond the 'traditional idea of exegesis', making skilful use of poetic literary devices and manipulating the discourse of philosophical polemics with an imagined opponent to convey his own personal views (ibid.: 20–1). Likewise, Appaya's Śivārkama:nidīpikā styles itself the first sub-commentary written from a Śaiva perspective on a canonical text of the Vedānta tradition, the Brahmasūtras. As we shall see, Appaya too made use of various literary devices and textual strategies to reinterpret Śrīka:n:tha's commentary in a way to convey his own idiosyncratic views on hermeneutics, grammar, and theology, and make his own sub-commentary— and, by extension, the school he sought to firmly establish—authoritative.

Like Sāya:na, Appaya also sought to make an impact on his immediate social milieu with his commentarial project. The last decades of the Vijayanagara empire witnessed dramatic changes in its social, political,

and religious life. In the second half of the sixteenth century, the Araviː:dus, the last dynasty of the empire (which came to an end in 1565), abandoned the diverse patronage of Šaiva, Vais:nava, Jaina, and Muslim institutions that had been practised earlier, and started to aggressively commission Vais:nava scholars and institutions. By the time of Cinnabomma's death in 1578, the Araviː:du rulers had effectively taken control of the capital, and replaced Virüpãksa (a local form of Šiva that had been the ensign of the first Vijayanagara rulers) with Viː:t:thala (a form of Vis:nu) as the empire's tutelary deity (Rao 2016: 45). This shift in state policy in an empire that used to be predominantly Šaiva arguably changed how Šaiva and Vais:nava scholars interacted with one another. Not only did it dramatically enhance competition for royal patronage, influence, and prestige, but it also led to increasing polemicism and intellectual rivalry, particularly among theologians espousing different interpretations of Vedãnta. At the time when Appaya started his career under Cinnabomma, theologians of Vedãnta included primarily: smãrta brahmins, typically adherents of pure non-dualism (Advaita Vedãnta) who had managed the court temple of Virüpãksa since the empire's founding in the fourteenth century; Šrïvais:nava theologians, who advocated a non-dualism of the qualified (Višis:tãdvaita Vedãnta) and whose influence on Vijayanagara royal agents had been on the rise since the end of the Sangama dynasty in the late fifteenth century (Rao 2011: 30); and Mãdhva theologians, also of Vais:nava affiliation, who defended a realist and dualist view of reality (Dvaita Vedãnta), and who achieved wider prominence at the beginning of the sixteenth century under the leadership of the scholar and religious leader Vyãsatïrtha. It is in this context of increasing sectarian tensions between Šaivas and Vais:navas and of polemical debates between Vedãnta theologians that Appaya composed his Šaiva oeuvre. One key difference between Appaya and Sãya:na, however, is that the former's intellectual production was not so much a 'project of empire' as a project on the verge of it. Patronized by a self-declared Šaiva ruler rather than by a patron of imperial calibre, Appaya did not get involved with the Vijayanagara court. Nonetheless, it is likely that his militant defence of Šaiva religion was tied to the rise of Vais:nava religion in the imperial capital.

Likewise, Appaya was not the first Šaiva scholar to try and reconcile Šaiva doctrine with Vedãntic ideas. Before Šrïka:n:tha, both Bha:t:ta Bhãskarãcãrya (second half of the tenth century?) and Haradatta Šivãcãrya (twelfth to thirteenth centuries) had argued for the identity between Šiva and Brahman. These two Šaiva scholars most probably inspired Šrïka:n:tha's own views. Appaya himself draws attention to affinities between Šrïka:n:tha's and Bha:t:ta's Šaiva theologies in the Šivãrkama:nidïpikã, and several textual and conceptual parallels have been noted between Šrïka:n:tha's theology and Haradatta's understanding of the relation between Šiva/Brahman and the world (Sastri 1930). A number of premodern Virašaiva works written in Sanskrit also show a clear imprint of Vedãnta terminology and ideas, and share the same intention of establishing Šiva as the nondual Brahman of the Vedãntic tradition. What sets Appaya apart from these scholars, however, is that he is the first Šaiva scholar to develop a fully fledged Šaiva Vedãnta position (siddhãnta) and elevate it to the status of a school (mata) on a firm footing with the other prominent Vedãnta schools of his time. The boldness and ingenuity with which he accomplished this scholarly feat as well as the scope of his commentarial project are unprecedented in the history of Šaivism in South India, and therefore fully deserve our attention. What drove the talented Appaya to 'support the doctrine of the supreme Šiva'? What were his message and rationale? How was his Šivãdvaita work received among Sanskrit intellectuals in early modern India? What does this tell us about Appaya as a scholar and social agent, and the complex world in which he lived and wrote?

This study puts the Šaiva oeuvre of Appaya and its reception in early modern India into context for the first time. In Chapter 1, I offer new insights on Appaya's main source of exegesis, Šrïka:n:tha's

Brahmamïmã :msãbhãsya, and reassess the current evidence about Šrïka:n:tha's lineage, influences, and date of activity. Attention has recently been paid to the relationship between his Šaiva Vedãnta theology and the theology deployed in the work of Vïrašaiva scholars writing in Sanskrit. Although there are significant linkages between these Šaiva scholars, the extent to which they influenced each other's theologies is not yet fully understood. Among other things, my analysis will complicate the relationship between Šrïka:n:tha and Nïlaka:n:tha, a figure central to the Vïrašaiva Vedãnta tradition. In Chapter 2, I focus on Appaya's 'early' Šaiva works. In these polemical works, which I surmise to have been composed before the Šivãrkama:nidïpikã, Appaya emphasizes the greatness of Šiva and His superiority over Vis:nuNãrãya:na, based principally on the exegesis of passages taken from the Purã:nas, Upanisads and epics. An overall understanding of Appaya's early Šaiva works is key to understanding his Šivãdvaita Vedãnta oeuvre. Aside from the fact that they feature core theological concepts that prefigure the fully fledged theology of Šivãdvaita Vedãnta, they also reveal that Appaya was engaged with Vais:nava opponents early on. In these works, we begin to see Appaya's aversion for those 'heretics' and 'evil-minded' scholars who denigrate Šiva's worship. I will argue that these scholars were principally Šrïvais:nava adherents of Višis:tãdvaita Vedãnta, the dominant Vais:nava school of Vedãnta theology in Appaya's time and place.

One of the core arguments developed in this book is that Appaya's Šivãdvaita project pursued the same ambition of defending Šaivism as in the early polemical works, yet in a more systematic manner, that is, by shifting the debate to the interpretation of the canonical Brahmasütras. Prior to the sixteenth century, Vedãnta theology had essentially been the bastion of Vais:nava scholars. In the aftermath of Šankara's Brahmasütrabhãsya, four major Vais:nava-leaning commentaries on the Brahmasütras were written, namely by Rãmãnuja, Madhva, Nimbarka, and Vallabhãcãrya, the first two of which led to the formation of long-standing and systematic schools of thought—namely Višis:tãdvaita Vedãnta and Dvaita Vedãnta—and generated an important amount of commentarial literature. In comparison, the production of Vedãnta material by the other prominent religious group in medieval India, the Šaivas, had been rather limited. In Appaya's time, the Višis:tãdvaita Vedãnta school dominated the theological landscape in South India. Scholars still read and commented on the works of Rãmãnuja, Sudaršanasüri, and Venka:tanãtha while continuing to actively write new independent works in this tradition. The flowering of Šrïvais:nava scholarship on Vedãnta in this period was increasingly stimulated as Šrïvais:nava scholars were gaining the support of Vijayanagara rulers. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, several preceptors and advisors to the king belonged to the prestigious Šrïvais:nava Tãtãcãrya family. In Appaya's time, both K:rs:nadevarãya (ruled c.1509–30) and Rãmarãya (c.1542–1565) were advised by Tãtãcãrya preceptors (rãjaguru): the first by Venka:ta Tãtãcãrya, and the second by Pañcamatabhañjana Tãtãcãrya, a scholar whom later hagiographical sources describe as an important rival of Appaya. It is my view that Višis:tãdvaita Vedãnta had gained enough significance by Appaya's time to inspire, for the first time, a parallel Šaiva attempt—Šivãdvaita Vedãnta.

In Chapter 3, I turn to Appaya's Šivãdvaita Vedãnta works per se. While these works, composed later in Appaya's Šaiva career, are also polemical to some degree, they differ from the earlier Šaiva works in that their central concern is now the correct interpretation of the Brahmasütras in light of Šrïka:n:tha's commentary. It is in these works that Appaya develops and promotes a fully consistent Šaiva Vedãnta position (siddhãnta) in opposition to Višis:tãdvaita Vedãnta. For this purpose, he relies on various textual and hermeneutical strategies, ranging from including Šrïka:n:tha's position alongside other schools of Vedãnta in an unprecedented doxography of Vedãnta schools, to reinterpreting some of Šrïka:n:tha's key

doctrines in line with the doctrine of pure non-dualism advocated in the Advaita Vedãnta tradition, a position that Šrïka:n:tha did not himself fully acknowledge. Appaya's lifelong endorsement of Advaita Vedãnta is well known. Not only did he write substantial works in this tradition, but he also remained a great admirer of Šankara (the bhagavatpãda, as he often refers to him) and of his Brahmasütrabhãsya throughout his entire career. We shall see that this commitment not only influenced his reading of Šrïka:n:tha's commentary, but also—in stark contrast with his Šaiva co-religionists in South India—how he interpreted Šaiva scriptures and their validity vis-à-vis the Vedas.

In Chapter 4, I pursue my analysis of Appaya's Šivãdvaita works with a special focus on the modalities of his engagement with the Šrïvais:nava tradition of Vedãnta. I examine a number of arguments Appaya employs to criticize Rãmãnuja's theology and his reading of the Brahmasütras, and thereby establish Šrïka:n:tha's theology as the superior system. One of the core doctrines against which Appaya argues—developed to a large extent by Sudaršanasüri, a late-tirteenth-century scholar who may well have been Appaya's nemesis—is that the two Mïmã :msãs, namely Pürvamïmã :msã and Vedãnta, form a single unified corpus. I also pay attention in this chapter to a little-studied work of Šivãdvaita Vedãnta, the Ratnatrayaparïksã, a short devotional hymn with self-authored commentary in which Appaya encapsulates his original vision of Šrïka:n:tha's 'esoteric' theology. I conclude this chapter with an examination of Appaya's critical take on Pãñcarãtra, a key source of Šrïvais:nava theology.

The book concludes (Chapter 5) with an analysis of the reception of Appaya's Šaiva work in early modern India. Vais:nava theologians of Vedãnta from various schools were quick to respond to Appaya's bold theses; we will pay attention to critical responses by Vijayïndra (Dvaita Vedãnta), Purusottama (Šuddhãdvaita Vedãnta) and Šrïvais:nava theologians such as Mahãcãrya, Rangarãmãnuja and Varadãcãrya. If the Šaiva response was generally more favourable, some Šaiva scholars also took a critical stance on Appaya's work and developed their own position on Vedãnta. This is most notably the case of Vïrašaiva scholars of Vedãnta, who promulgated their own distinctive position on Vedãnta in the wake of Appaya—Šaktivišis:tãdvaita Vedãnta.

By uncovering this intellectual history, I wish to demonstrate that Appaya Dïksita played a key role in the history of Šaivism in South India in being the first Šaiva scholar to ever take up the challenge posed by Šrïvais:nava theologians of Vedãnta in the medieval period. His comprehensive work based on Šrïka:n:tha's commentary was not meant as a mere contribution to Vedãnta scholarship; it was a grand exegetical project designed to respond in particular to the Šrïvais:navas' interpretation of Vedãnta material. Thus this study aims to provide a more nuanced portrait of Appaya Dïksita, the scholar and the religious figure. It will present him not only as the prolific and bold intellectual we already know him to be, but also as a social agent sensitive to the polemical conflicts that set Šaivas and Vais:navas apart in his time and place. In doing so, I hope that this book will open up new possibilities for our understanding of the challenges of Indian theism, and also shed light on the religious landscape of early modern India as seen through the lenses of the most important scholar of the sixteenth century. <>

THE VEDA IN KASHMIR, VOLUMES I AND II: HISTORY AND PRESENT STATE OF VEDIC TRADITION IN THE WESTERN HIMALAYAS by Michael Witzel, [The Department Of South Asian Studies Harvard University, Harvard University Press, Harvard Oriental Series; v. 94, 95, This two-volume work includes a DVD that contains additional texts, rituals, sound recordings, and films taken in 1973 and 1979, Harvard University Press, 9780674258273; Volume 1: Harvard Oriental Series; v. 94, Harvard University Press, 9780674984370 I; Volume II: Harvard Oriental Series; v. 95, Harvard University Press, 9780674257771]

The Veda in Kashmir presents a detailed history and the current state of Veda tradition in Kashmir. It traces the vicissitudes of Vedic texts and rituals and their survival during some 400 years of Muslim rule. The peculiarities of the Śākalya Ṛgveda, Kaṭha Yajurveda, and Paippalāda Atharvaveda texts are discussed in great detail. The rituals from birth to death of the Pandits, the Kashmiri Brahmins, are depicted and explained, including current interpretation.

CONTENTS

The Veda in Kashmir, vol. II [Harvard Oriental Series; v. 95 ISBN 9780674257771]

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When, after a short visit to Kashmir in August 1973, I started to write down my observations on the present state of Veda tradition in the Valley, they soon turned out into a longer article (which, at one time, we wanted to publish in the Himalayan journal Kailash). Then, the original typed manuscript of this article was stolen from my car, along with a small bag of other Vedic materials, at Kathmandu.

In my last years in Nepal (1975-1977) I became very occupied with administration and other projects (such as filming the coronation of the late King Birendra and other Vedic rituals, notably the curious Tantric Agnihotra of Patan). That required me to put the work aside, except for collecting the materials for Ch. 4 during a bad bout of influenza. After having moved to Leiden in 1978, I made a new start, visited the Valley again for a month, in the summer of 1979 and subsequently went through my materials. But again, other work took precedence, notably the Paippalāda Samhitā, for which D. Bhattacharya came to Leiden in 1981-1982. After 1983 persistent work in Holland was made impossible due to the 'reforms' (read: budget cuts) of the then Education minister Deetman and the machinations and intrigues that this provoked. Disgusted, I left for Harvard in 1986. During a year of Sabbatical leave in 1989-1990, and due to the generous support of the Institute for research in Humanities Studies of Kyoto University and the Japanese Ministry for Education I found time to pursue this project again. I organized substantial materials from my field notes and from further reading, and tried to bring it to a conclusion. However, again this was not to be. The book has been in my drawer since 1990.

As some colleagues have asked (or teased) me about it, I now endeavor to present it in whatever incomplete and imperfect form I can achieve at this time. Necessarily, some questions have remained open and in some cases only initial data could be presented, with suggestions of how to proceed in the future.

For example, this book would have been delayed even further by: detailed philological study of the remaining doubtful variants in the Kashmir Rgveda ms., or the study of all accented passages in the Kashmiri PS, not to speak of a detailed investigation of all available ritual handbooks (cakas) in public or private possessio Habent sua fata libelli. Though no longer a libellum, this book has existed for a long time, to quote Kalhapa, like the Šāhi kingdom, only in name.

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Thus, although the book has been advertised in Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik in 1975, nothing much could be done after 1976, when I collected the Nyãyamañjarï quotations, and after adding my field research notes of 1979. Even until now, I still did not find time enough to go through much of the voluminous medieval literature of Kashmir, — though not a prerequisite, at least a desirable requirement for writing a better history of the Kashmiri Veda tradition and its schools. That remains a desideratum, though not too many data can be expected in the increasingly Shaiva-oriented texts of the late 1st and early 2nd millennia.

Nevertheless, it is hoped that even the present long, but still fragmentary account will provide an idea of Veda tradition in the Valley. This account is especially important because copper plate inscriptions that provide such a large body of evidence in other parts of the subcontinent largely fail us regarding Kashmir.

It is with all these imperfections and reservations that I finally present this book for scrutiny to my friends, colleagues and the interested public. As the medieval Japanese monk Kenkõ said in his Tsurezuregusa:

“It is typical of the unintelligent man to insist assembling complete sets of everything. Imperfect sets are better. ... Leaving something incomplete makes it interesting and gives the feeling that there is room for growth.”

In this spirit, there is much room for the work of current and future generations...

About this book: a map for reading

The first two chapters set the stage with a brief description of Kashmir and its history (Ch. I), while Chapter II provides a more specific history of the Kashmiri Pandits a people and of their typical religious

rituals. (Some of them, the Samskãras from birth to death, are treated in more detail, according to current interpretation, in Appendix II).

Chapter III includes a detailed investigation of the four Vedas and their attestation during all of Kashmir history. Special attention is paid to the oral transmission and the increasing disappearance of Vedic texts. Then, the four Vedas are discussed individually, listing and analyzing the texts belonging to the prominent recensions (šãkhãs) of Kashmir. Chapter IV provides additional, detailed evidence from a late 9th century source for Kashmiri Vedic tradition at that time (Jayanta Bhatta's Nyãyamañjarï).

The next few chapters (IV sqq.) deal with the main Vedic tradition of Kashmir, the Ka^ha school of the Black Yajurveda that is prominent in all rituals of Kashmir.

Chapter V presents an analysis of the Vedavratas, that is the observances a young student has to undergo when beginning and continuing to study the Veda, while including all its successive portions and text layers. It provides a good idea of what was supposed to be the normative curriculum during the many years of learning the Veda by heart. This evidence is reinforced by Chapter VI that is tied to the Vedavratas as it deals with specific rules for studying (dangerous) portions of the school curriculum, covered by the Vedic doksa and avãntaraḍïktã. As additional information, in Chapter VII the two late Vedic indexes of Mantras of the Katha Samhitã are edited and dealt with; and as an appendix parts of the little known Tarpamakãnta are extracted and discussed as it contains the names of prominent teachers and texts.

Chapter VIII sums up and enlarges on this information about the Katha school: it presents a very detailed account of all known texts of this long-isolated and now heavily endangered šãkhã, its available commentaries and ancillary texts. Chapter IX is the first attempt at drawing up a detailed history of this recension of the Black Yajurveda. As an excursus, the brief Chapter X deals with the explanation of the name, Katha, of this šãkhã and its supposed promulgator, the Rsi Katha.

Chapters XI-XIII deal with the other, formerly prominent šãkhã of Kashmir, the Paippalãda Atharvaveda. It had survived only in Kashmir and Orissa, where it still is found, precariously. To evaluate the garbled text of the only Kashmir manuscript of this school, written in 1419 CE under the famous Sultan Zayn ul Abidin (Zain al-'Ãbiḍïn), some preliminary studies are necessary. First one must investigate modern and medieval Kashmiri pronunciation, notably that of Vedic texts (Ch. XI) that has generally been neglected by scholars. Secondly, a study is necessary of the Šãradã script and the typical copying mistakes in Kashmir manuscripts (Ch. XII).

This prepares the ground for an evaluation of the history of text transmission of this rare Veda and its Paippalãda Šãkhã. The history and reconstruction of the original Paippalãda text is given in Ch. XIII, based on my earlier papers of the Seventies and Eighties. Added now is an evaluation of D. Bhattacharya's edition of PS as it still lacks in philological rigor and execution. These sections will help in the ongoing effort, by several scholars, of editing this important text in a more scholarly manner than heretofore. This effort is important as PS contains so much new information, including on everyday life some 3000 years ago.

The final chapter (XIV) is an epilogue on the past and present situation, and about the persistence of the Veda in Kashmir. It includes an evaluation of the reimport of Vedic tradition under Zain al-'Ãbiḍïn

(1418/20-1470 CE) and it ends with a plea to preserve what can still be salvaged, both in written form as well as in ritual practice.

The Appendixes provide more detailed information on some topics that were not included in Ch.s I-XIV as they would have bloated certain chapters too much.

Appendix I presents the mss. of Kashmiri Samskãra rituals that have to undertaken from birth to death – and beyond.

Appendix II presents the current (traditional) interpretation of the Samskãra rites. Both Sütra theory and actual practice (of 1979) are described. More data are added about the religious life in the Kashmir Valley: it is a list of festivals, similar though often less extensive, to that given in the Nïlamata(-Purãna) more than a thousand years ago.

Appendix III discusses Kashmiri manuscripts and Šãradã script the knowledge of which is necessary for any study of Kashmir texts. It includes a list of past and (now regrettably lost) libraries of Pandits at Srinagar between 1875 and 1990, before their unfortunate exodus from the Valley. The question remains how much of them have been preserved, for which a detailed survey needs to be undertaken at Srinagar.

Appendixes IV and V build on this bibliographic material with a provisional list of typical Kashmir names and typical colophons used at the end of the Pandits' manuscripts. They may be useful for a desirable, future prosopography of authors and texts.

Appendix VI contains a detailed list of the Pandits' ritual handbooks, the Rcakas, as far as they are known now, both in manuscript as well as in printed form, and of their varied contents. Appendix VII is the unfinished Habilitationsschrift (D.Litt.) of the late Hertha Krick (1979). It sheds considerable light on the Vedic and medieval bimonthly Pãkayajña rituals. <>

Early Buddhist Transmission and Trade Networks: Mobility and Exchange within and beyond the Northwestern Borderlands of South Asia by Jason Neelis [Dynamics in the History of Religion, Brill, 9789004181595]

This exploration of early paths for Buddhist transmission within and beyond South Asia retraces the footsteps of monks, merchants, and other agents of cross-cultural exchange. A reassessment of literary, epigraphic, and archaeological sources reveals hisorical contexts for the growth of the Buddhist saṅgha from approximately the 5th century BCE to the end of the first millennium CE. Patterns of dynamic Buddhist mobility were closely linked to transregional trade networks extending to the northwestern borderlands and joined to Central Asian silk routes by capillary routes through transit zones in the upper Indus and Tarim Basin. By examining material conditions for Buddhist establishments at nodes along these routes, this book challenges models of gradual diffusion and develops alternative explanations for successful Buddhist movement.

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The concepts for this book emerged from field research in northern Pakistan leading to a Ph.D. dissertation.1 As a graduate student focusing on the study of graffiti written on rocks by ancient visitors to Hunza-Haldeikish, I was interested in what these inscriptions could reveal about the history of Buddhism in this local setting and regional environment. In the dissertation, I aimed to place the data from Buddhist inscriptions and petroglyphs at other sites in northern Pakistan within economic and historical contexts of Buddhist transmission. This book is centrally concerned with these broader contexts for the transregional establishment and expansion of Buddhist institutions throughout and beyond South Asia.

While the geographical focus on the region of the Northern Areas of Pakistan is restricted to a single chapter (Chapter 5: Capillary Routes of the Upper Indus), I have expanded the treatment of other networks for early Buddhist mobility between South Asia and Central Asia. Inevitably, it has not been possible to cover all aspects of this rich topic, but significant attention is given to formative phases and routes for Buddhist expansion in the Indian subcontinent in the earlier chapters (especially 2–3), and the later chapters (4–6) emphasize the northwestern borderlands as contact zones for Buddhist transmission between South Asia and Central Asia.

As discussed in greater depth in the first chapter, I have utilized a variety of relevant sources for this synthesis, but my methodological preference for material sources (such as inscriptions, manuscripts and archaeological remains) does not mean that literary sources have been neglected. A comprehensive survey of doctrinal developments is not attempted, nor has it been possible to retrace complex lines of textual transmission. I have extrapolated from available sources to connect patterns of early Buddhist transmission with trade networks and other economic, social and political catalysts, but limitations of these sources often constrain against reconstructing links with intellectual and philosophical movements. However, I hope that this work will provide useful background for braver and better equipped scholars to more adequately contextualize Buddhist ideological developments as well as art and imagery associated with particular ordination lineages, scholastic traditions, and the Mahãyãna and Vajrayãna in specific chronological and regional frameworks. ***

Road Map for Travelers

This exploration follows in the footsteps of travelers who left traces of their journeys in a wide range of literary and epigraphic records, devotional images, and archaeological artifacts with the goal of understanding how and why various Buddhist traditions flourished outside of the original homeland of the historical Buddha in ancient India. Interpretation of these sources helps to discern internal and external factors, along with historical contexts and socio-economic catalysts, which set this religion in motion throughout and beyond South Asia. The injunction purportedly spoken by the Buddha (and preserved in monastic codes, or vinayas) to "wander the path for the benefit and satisfaction of many people and out of compassion for the world" in order to "teach the dharma" gave canonical warrant for Buddhist mobility, although his instruction that "two must not go by a single (way)" was not strictly followed.1 Investigation of the religious agendas and practical details of their journeys helps to develop a fuller picture of the monks and nuns and other travelers who set out across the world's highest mountain ranges, deep river valleys, and formidable deserts.

Rather than restricting themselves to a single Buddhist superhighway, Buddhist missionaries followed various itineraries, including major arteries, minor capillary routes, and "middle paths" to travel back and forth between destinations. Their roads frequently overlapped and intertwined with those of merchants and traders in pursuit of both religious and economic goals. Since both itinerant monks and cenobitic communities inhabiting residential monasteries depended upon donations for material support, the dynamic growth of Buddhist institutions was directly linked with the generation of surplus resources. Thus, Buddhist transmission, which necessarily involved the transformation of basic ideas and common practices through interactions with local host cultures and other religious traditions, was symbiotically related to parallel processes of commercial and cultural exchanges. This book demarcates networks for the transmission of Buddhism and cross-cultural exchanges with the goal of explaining the ultimate success of the multidirectional movement of this panAsian religious tradition.

This introductory chapter provides a "road map" to theoretical models of religious mobility, critical issues in the study of religion and economics, and methodologies for analyzing primary sources. In the first section (Models for the Movement of Buddhism), a brief treatment of different metaphors and paradigms for understanding patterns of Buddhist movement widens the range of perspectives by exploring possible alternatives to the typical view of the spread of Buddhism by gradual diffusion. The following section (Merit, Merchants, and the Buddhist San^gha) highlights linkages between Buddhist networks and trade exchanges after engaging with debates over relationships between economics and religions. The third section (Sources and Methods for the Study of Buddhist Transmission) is an overview of relevant literary, epigraphic and archaeological sources and a guide to methods of interpretation, which is intended to familiarize readers with recent discoveries of manuscripts, inscriptions, and other materials. A synopsis of the other chapters (Outline of Destinations) at the end of this chapter is the starting point for an investigation of historical and economic contexts for networks of Buddhist transmission, commercial exchanges, and cross-cultural contact between South Asia and Central Asia.

Models for the Movement of Buddhism

Themes of mobility pervade Buddhist imagery, beginning with the religious biography of 8ākyamuni Buddha, who relinquished his destiny of becoming a "wheel-turning" ruler (cakravartin) when he "set out" (Sanskrit: pravrajita) as a renouncer rather than fulfilling his duties as a settled householder in Kapilavastu. After a period of ascetic wandering and his subsequent awakening at Bodh Gaya, 8ākyamuni set the "wheel of dharma" (dharmacakra) in motion with his first teaching at Sarnath. The wheel symbolizes this hagiographic event, which is also recalled by the Buddha's gesture of "turning the wheel of dharma" in recurring iconographic patterns. Dynamic turning of a wheel has polyvalent meanings in Buddhist art and literature, including the widespread metaphor of the "wheel of becoming" (bhavacakra) to depict the cycle of rebirth in medieval Buddhist art from India, Central Asia, China, and Tibet. In addition to the wheel, motifs of roads, ways, and paths are employed as analogies for the teachings of the Buddha, who is characterized as the re-discoverer of an ancient road. A basic feature of Buddhist rhetoric is the "Middle Way" between extreme practices of ascetic self-mortification and luxurious self-indulgence and between philosophical extremes of nihilism and eternalism. Another prominent example is the "Noble Eightfold Path" elaborated by the Buddha during his first teaching at Sarnath, which is glossed as the "Way leading to the end of suffering" (dukhanirodhagāmanï pratipad) in commentaries. Buddhist texts with titles such as the Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), and the Lamp for the Path to Awakening (Bodhipathapradïpa) demonstrate that Buddhaghosa, Atiša, and other Buddhist scholars from

very different traditions framed methods of reaching religious goals in terms of "paths" (mãrga). Many of these Buddhist texts schematically 'map' doctrinal complexities and meditation techniques for reaching Nirvãn^a, fulfilling Bodhisattva vows, and realizing Buddhahood. On the basis of the variety of "mãrga schemes" for reaching Buddhist goals, Robert Buswell and Robert Gimello argue that "the concept of 'path' has been given an explication more sustained, comprehensive, critical, and sophisticated than that provided by any other single religious tradition". The project of finding pathways of practice and thought to escape from suffering is not exclusively Buddhist, but the repeated emphasis and continuous elaboration of mãrga-type imagery shows that metaphors and motifs related to journeying are particularly apt. Epithets of the Buddha as a "caravan leader" (sãrthavãha) and narratives of Bodhisattva merchants discussed later in this chapter suggest that literary and visual allusions to wheels, pathways, and vehicles to express abstract goals of release may have had considerable basis in the experiences of everyday Buddhist monks and merchants who traveled on ordinary roads to reach conventional destinations. ***

Sources and Methods for the study of Buddhist Transmission

A synthesis of texts, inscriptions, and archaeological materials reveals patterns of Buddhist transmission which stand out in sharper relief when multiple sources are utilized for interpretation. Such an approach requires consideration of fundamental questions about how the primary sources related to the social and economic history of Buddhism:

1) What is the basis for situating these sources in chronological and geographical contexts? Addressing issues of time and place is necessary to discern the viewpoints of authors and producers of textual and material artifacts, as well as their audiences.
2) How does source analysis shed light on issues of institutional expansion, trade networks, and mobility? Is it possible to use evidence from religious sources to address questions about cultural, social, and economic contexts without reductionist oversimiplification?
3) How can internal Buddhist discourses illuminate historical processes of cross-cultural exchange, inter- and intra-religious dialogues, and shifting practices? While scholarly skepticism requires further questioning of emic claims of conversion narratives, for example, examination of underlying motives and assumptions can help to understand the practical and ideological concerns of Buddhist communities.
4) Can external sources be correlated with Buddhist sources to provide more comprehensive viewpoints on religious, historical, and economic contexts? 'Outside' sources include travel itineraries, coins and seals, and other written and visual materials that are not directly connected with monastic production.
5) Which etic perspectives in the academic study of Buddhism help to clarify relationships between sources, and which scholarly biases have clouded their interpretation? While the field of Buddhist Studies has inherited a tendency to privilege literary texts from the so-called Oriental Renaissance in the nineteenth century when scholars such as Eugène Burnouf initially identified common features in accounts of the Buddha's life, teachings, and community in Sanskrit, Pãli, and Tibetan texts, many recent scholars have challenged uncritical acceptance of this basic bias (which is certainly not unique to the study of Buddhism). Gregory Schopen characterizes this longstanding bias as a "Protestant Presupposition" in that Protestant reformers located religion in scripture rather than 'vulgar' external works and elevated doctrinal ideas over manifestations of devotion. Such methodological critiques are not intended to dismiss the importance of textual

sources for illuminating key doctrines, but to seek answers to questions about material culture, religious practices, and socio-economic concerns by broadening inquiries to include a wider variety of literary discourses, epigraphic sources, and archaeological remains. While striving to avoid "the bugaboo of binary oppositions" between literary and material sources, élite scholasticism and popular practice, and the abstract thought and concrete practices, the goal here is to synthesize different genres of textual sources, epigraphic evidence, and archaeological materials, while acknowledging limits to their interpretation. The following outline of sources aims to introduce methodologies for approaching these valuable sources. ***

Outline of Destinations

Having outlined some of the sources, methods, and theories at the outset of the journey, where do paths of Buddhist transmission lead? Before embarking, it is necessary to identify a starting point and destinations, both in terms of chronological time and geographical space.

Chapter 2: Historical Contexts for the Emergence and Transmission of Buddhism within South Asia

The second chapter establishes a diachronic foundation for the study of trade and transmission beginning with the emergence of Buddhism in northern India during the time of the historical Buddha around the fifth century BCE and continuing through the first millennium CE. Issues related to the emergence and growth of renouncer movements in very competitive social, economic, and religious environments are addressed in this re-examination of the initial phases of Buddhist formation in northeastern India from approximately the fifth century BCE to the Mauryan period. The focus of the historical overview shifts to contacts between India, Iran, and Central Asia in the early centuries CE, since various groups migrated to South Asia along routes that were also used in the transmission of Buddhism in the opposite direction to their former homelands. Although it will not be possible to completely fill every gap in the history of Indian and Central Asian Buddhism, historical contexts for the patronage of Buddhist monastic institutions in later periods during the first millennium CE receive particular emphasis.

Chapter 3: Trade Networks in Ancient South Asia

Roads for the expansion of Buddhist communities throughout ancient India known as the 'Northern Route' (uttarãpatha) and 'Southern Route' (daks^in^ãpatha) are explored in the third chapter. These terms generally designate geographical / cultural regions of northern and southern India, often in relation to the location of the author of a text, the original homelands of travelers, or the domain of rulers whose exploits are eulogized in inscriptions. These arteries of commercial and cultural exchange, which were linked to much larger overland and maritime networks, served as paths of Buddhist transmission. Literary references as well as epigraphic and archeological evidence associated with particular nodes demarcate paths and patterns for the transmission of Buddhism in the Indian subcontinent.

Chapter 4: Old Roads in the Northwestern Borderlands

An extension of the Northern Route beyond the northwestern frontier of South Asia is a particularly significant part of the itinerary and is detailed in the fourth chapter. This chapter focuses on the domestication of Buddhist narratives, art and architecture, literary culture, and monastic institutions in ancient Gandhara, a pivotal border region for cross-cultural contact between Indian, Iranian, Hellenistic, and Central Asian spheres located in northwestern Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan. Archaeological

remains of stüpas and monasteries, distinctive artistic traditions which had a wide impact beyond South Asia as well as donative inscriptions and several collections of early Buddhist manuscripts written in the Gãndhãrï regional language amply demonstrate that Buddhist institutions flourished in many impressive centers of cultural production in the Gandhãran region. Buddhist cultures in the Swat valley (ancient Updpiyãna) and Bajaur in northwestern Pakistan and in Kashmir were closely linked with Gandhãra, but developed their own artistic and literary traditions and localized shrines and narratives, as attested in the accounts of Chinese pilgrims.

Chapter 5: Capillary Routes and Buddhist Manifestations in the Upper Indus

Inscriptions and rock drawings in the Upper Indus, Gilgit, and Hunza valleys of northern Pakistan demarcate a network of capillary routes and long-distance trade routes across topographical, linguistic, and cultural boundaries enabled Buddhist missionaries to "spread the dharma" at élite and sub-élite levels. Manifestations of the presence of the Buddha in the form of reliquary stüpas, inscriptions, and images show that the process of transmission involved more than adoption of philosophical ideas and religious ideals. As flexible religious systems rather than monolithic unchanging entities with fixed doctrines and rigid orthodox rules, Buddhist traditions were able to adapt to different environments. The ability to change with shifting conditions of economic support and to appeal to a wide audience of potential patrons differentiates the lasting success of Buddhist missions outside of the Indian subcontinent from other religions originating in South Asia. This reassessment of sources, methods, and models illuminates paths and processes of Buddhist transmission across Asia in order to answer longstanding questions about why the sangha was able to successfully transmit the dharma in its various manifestations beyond the homeland of Šãkyamuni Buddha. <>

Bringing Buddhism to Tibet: History and Narrative in the DBA' BZHED Manuscript edited by Lewis Doney [Series: Beyond Boundaries, Co-published with the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland with support from the European Research Council, De Gruyter, 9783110715224] Open Source

- Full text of the Dba'bzhed, a key work for the early history of Buddhism in Tibet
- Tibetan text and English translation in facing layout for the first time
- Expert analysis and contextualization of the Dba'bzhed

Bringing Buddhism to Tibet is a landmark study of the *Dba' bzhed*, a text recounting the introduction of Buddhism to Tibet. The narrative of Buddhism's arrival in Tibet is known from a number of versions, but the *Dba' bzhed* preserved in a single manuscript'is the oldest complete copy. Although the *Dba' bzhed* stands at the head of a long tradition of history writing in the Tibetan language, and has been known for more than two decades, this book provides a full transcription of the Tibetan for the first time, together with a new translation.

The book also introduces Tibetan history and the *Dba' bzhed* with several introductory chapters on various aspects of the text by experienced scholars in the field of Tibetan philology. These detailed studies provide analysis of the text's narrative context, its position within traditional and current historiography, and the organisation and structure of the text itself and its antecedents.

BRINGING BUDDHISM TO TIBET is essential reading for anyone interested in Tibetan history and kingship, the nature of Tibetan historical narrative or the traditions of text transmission and codicology. The book will also be of general interest to students of Buddhism and the spread of Buddhism across Asia.

CONTENTS

Tibet has never been as closed off to the rest of the world as it exists in some westerners' imaginations. During the seventh century, Chinese ambassadors passed through a Central Tibet ruled by the Tibetan empire. In the eighth century, artisans from Nepal and China were present at court and helped establish Tibetan Buddhist material culture. In the south, the trade routes across the Himalayas continued to provide access to the Indian subcontinent after the fall of the empire and, in the western Himalayas, the Mnga' ris Kingdom traced its heritage back to central Tibet but also maintained strong ties to South Asia. With the second dissemination of Buddhism, more Tibetans travelled to Kashmir, Nepal, Bengal and the Gangetic Plain in search of Buddhist teachings and texts, writing of their peregrinations and advising future travelers of the dangers that they would face. The journeys of Indic masters to Tibet are also recorded, though more usually in the third person.

Yet, the question still remains, what is Tibet? The geographical extent of what constituted 'Tibet' (Bod/Bautai/ Baitai/Tubbat/Fa/Tufan) during the imperial period (c. 600–850 CE) varied considerably as the Tibetan empire expanded and contracted at its various borders over time. Yet, through the prism of especially Buddhist historiography, a 'Tibet' emerged that was increasingly identified with the values of

Indic Buddhism rather than military expansion. Works of historiography reflecting the influence of Buddhist literature and the cultural memory of the post-imperial Tibetans transformed the cosmopolitan Tibetan imperial world into a wild borderland contrasted with the Buddhist Indian subcontinent of the first millennium, through the biographies of its emperors who brought queens and religious masters to court from throughout their realms and beyond and thereby civilized the "land of snows." When the Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) ruled over Tibet, the latter then gradually took on a new role as guru to the region's new imperial power. This rise in the status of Tibet on the world stage influenced even later accounts. For example, the lists of countries whose Buddhist masters played roles in converting imperial Tibet became longer, reflecting an expansion in certain Tibetans' geographical awareness in the interim. These histories raise certain questions: To what extent did such accounts draw on first-hand experiences of the places described, either as people saw them at the time of these works' compilation and/or during the imperial period itself? Is there anything in the depiction of the flow of people between South Asia and Tibet that links the self-representation of the emperors to the later 'national' self-image of the Tibetans?

As Buddhism spread through Asia during the first millennium, its encounter with the lands and societies it entered was represented in a variety of unique ways. Narrations of "the coming of the dharma" (chos 'byung) had profound effects on each country's literature and, together with the influx of foreign narratives about South Asia itself into these countries, formed an integral part of their assimilation of Buddhism. The myths surrounding the Tibetan empire and its place in the spread of Buddhism in Asia steadily grew in length, variety, and influence from the post-imperial "time of fragments" (sil bu'i dus) through the politically charged fourteenth century to the more philologically critical milieu of the fifth Dalai Lama (1617–1682). However, Buddhist historians during this entire period rarely made explicit statements about their work. They seldom provided criteria defining different genres of historical text or any of the rules governing their choice of sources. It is therefore of central importance to analyse the adaptation and redaction of their narratives, if we ever hope to reveal Buddhist approaches to historiography in practice. This will also help us answer wider cultural questions of attributed authorship, literary genres, and the creation of traditionally authoritative Buddhist historical narratives. This book intends to do just this, and so contribute to ongoing debates about the religio-politically motivated reconstruction of history and narrative in Buddhist Asia, and its lasting effects on the national identities of those countries.

This edited volume brings together six scholars of Tibetan studies to examine one such history, the Dba' bzhed.1 The principal narrative of the Dba' bzhed reflects an eleventh or twelfth-century view of the Tibetan imperial period and especially the acts on behalf of Buddhism that the eighth-century emperor (btsan po) Khri Srong lde btsan (as his name is spelled there), his subjects and invited religious masters performed in Tibet, China and India. The Dba' bzhed's full title is: "Dba' bzhed, the royal narrative (bka' mchid) concerning how the Buddha's dharma arose in Tibet." This description encapsulates the main account given in the text, and perhaps indicates the antiquity of its core depiction of this period. The Dba' bzhed first surveys the reigns of four major Tibetan Buddhist emperors: the prehistoric Lha tho do re snyan btsan, during whose reign Buddhism is said to have appeared in Tibet; Srong btsan sgam po (d. 649), during whose reign the practice of the doctrine was introduced; Khri Srong lde btsan (742–c. 800), during whose reign the doctrine spread and prospered; and Khri Gtsug lde btsan (Ral pa can; d. 841), during whose reign the doctrine was thoroughly systematised. The biographies of these emperors divide the narrative into four parts, with Khri Srong lde btsan taking the lion's share.

When the thirteen-year-old Khri Srong lde btsan takes over the governance of the empire (on folio 4r:6), the narrative shifts from the emperor to a small group of Tibetan ministers and their conspiracies against the dharma. The Dba' bzhed's principal protagonist is the Buddhist minister Dba' Gsas snang (known to later tradition as Gsal snang), with a lesser but still important role played by Dba'/'Ba' Sang shi. Despite the rival ministers' destruction of all that previous Buddhist kings had achieved and their interdiction against its future practice, Dba' Gsas snang goes in search of the dharma to India and Nepal where he worships at Buddhist pilgrimage and monastic sites (5v:1–2).

Dba' Gsas gnang convinces the emperor to invite the Indian abbot Šãntarak^ita to Tibet. Šãntarak^ita in turn recommends the tantric master Padmasambhava to tame the land in order to build Bsam yas Monastery (gtsug lag khang). However, Khri Srong lde btsan grows suspicious of the siddha's power and asks Padmasambhava to leave Tibet half-way through the narrative. The emperor instead appoints Dba' Gsas snang to "the highest religious authority (chos kyi bla) as head [at his] right side (sa g.yas kyi tshugs dpon)." For a while thereafter, though, Šãntarak^ita continues to play a more prominent role than Dba' Gsas snang, for instance in debate with the followers of the indigenous Bon religion of Tibet or digging out the site of Bsam yas with Khri Srong lde btsan (14v:1–15v:3).

When the abbot dies, Dba' Gsas snang is ordained as Ye shes dbang po and becomes the main moral goad of Khri Srong lde btsan. Ye shes dbang po recommends inviting the disciple of the now deceased Šãntarak^ita,

Kamalašïla, to take the gradualist side in the famous Bsam yas Debate against proponents of the instantaneous path to enlightenment (19v:3). Khri Srong lde btsan finally chooses the gradual approach as the victor and spreads it throughout Tibet (24v:2–3). Towards the end of the Dba' bzhed, it states that his reign marked a high-point in the rise of Buddhism in Tibet:

> Where the dharma did not get established during the reign of the five previous kings, Lha sras Khri Srong lde btsan, Ãcãrya Bodhisatva, Dba' Ye shes dbang po and 'Ba' Sang shi, these four, established the shrines of the triple gem.

These protagonists are actively responsible for bringing Buddhism to Tibet, despite the manuscript's title and opening lines framing the narrative as an arising of the dharma in a way that de-emphasises (human) agency. This should alert us to the multiple depictions existing with the same text. Providing the core narrative of this text in precis here gives the misleading impression that it is perhaps the homogenous work of a single author. However, the Dba' bzhed represents a collage of narratives that probably took on its recognisable shape around the eleventh century. Some Tibetans over the centuries may have read this text as a single work (just as it is translated as a single piece into English), but it was surely created through a process of compilation and annotation over a number of centuries. The text therefore contains numerous strata of narrative, which give differing impressions of the central protagonists of the narrative, the organisation of the court and religion's role in Tibet (both Buddhist and non-Buddhist). In this way, the Dba' bzhed offers us a number of different snapshots of a vital evolving corpus of texts and quotations within Tibetan historiography focused on the eighth century, that shall be referred to in this volume as the Testimony of Ba tradition.

Contributors to this book describe the earliest sources preceding the Dba' bzhed history and the process of recension that created it and then altered it down the centuries. This process gave birth to the Testimony of Ba tradition on Khri Srong lde btsan and the spread of Buddhism in Tibet during his

reign, the Testimony of Ba. The Dba' bzhed is the oldest available full version of the tradition, and its core narrative probably dates to the eleventh or twelfth century. Yet, it contains earlier narratives perhaps dating back to the ninth century, as well as later additional elements and interlinear notes. A longer, redacted version of the same narrative first published in 1980 most likely dates to the twelfth century, but a condensed version of the same narrative published in 1961 represents a thirteenth or fourteenth-century redaction.

In Chapter 1, I describe how the modern study of the Testimony of Ba began in 1961 when a late version of the narrative was published by Rolf A. Stein (1911–1999). As more exemplars appeared, they influenced scholarly debates (in Tibetan and other languages) over Tibetan history and historiography, its language, society and religion. Chapter 1 then sketches out the relation between a few of the key witnesses to the Testimony of Ba tradition. This investigation helps to show the high place that the text holds in the Tibetan historical tradition, as well as some of the ways in which the narrative was perceived and used over time.

In Chapter 2, Michael Willis and the late Tsering Gonkatsang examine the codicology, palaeography and internal history of the Dba' bzhed manuscript. Close study of the organisational structure and scribal peculiarities of the manuscript bring us closer to establishing the date of its compilation and the earliest history of the narrative. This is followed by copious notes on philologically intriguing aspects of the manuscript, its main text and annotations.

In Chapter 3, Sam van Schaik investigates the first evidence of the narrative, which comes from a fragment found in one of the Mogao caves near Dunhuang, Northwest China.7 This fragment dates between c. 800 to 900 CE, during or shortly after the time when the Tibetan empire controlled this area. The fragment may represent the narrative in its formative state and a close examination of its palaeography, codicology and content deepens our understanding of how the Testimony of Ba evolved between the ninth and eleventh century.

In Chapter 4, Brandon Dotson engages in a close reading of lexical details within the Testimony of Ba. He shows the relationship between the title and the Dba's clan's relation with the Tibetan emperor. Chapter 4 also discusses deliberately archaic phrases and terminology from the dynastic period, contained in the Dba' bzhed. The identification of these archaisms reveals much about the sources of the narrative and the cultural context of those who compiled and edited it over the centuries.

In Chapter 5, Serena Biondo focuses in on the Bsam yas Debate between followers of the gradualist and instantaneous paths to enlightenment. The historical veracity of the account, its sources and influence on later religious and philosophical debates in Tibet has long been a topic of intense interest among scholars of Buddhist Studies. Chapter 5 uncovers some important quotations of other Buddhist works within the Dba' bzhed, reinterprets its ending and reconsiders the identity of some of the major protagonists of the Bsam yas Debate.

In Chapter 6, I conclude Part One with a look at the depiction of Khri Srong lde btsan as a Buddhist king in the Dba' bzhed. Earlier narratives present a glorified, divine image of this emperor and describe his reign as a 'golden age' of Buddhist practice, from which Tibetan ritual has since declined. In contrast, the Dba' bzhed places the period of decline in the eighth century. Tantric masters such as Padmasambhava attempt to prevent its destruction. The emperor then hastens its demise by banishing Padmasambhava

and causing a division in the Buddhist community. This depiction causes tensions in the portrayal of Buddhist kingship that later editors of the Testimony of Ba had to deal with if they wanted to keep representing the imperial period as a 'golden age.'

Finally, the book provides a facing-page transcription and translation of the Dba' bzhed undertaken by Tsering Gonkatsang and Michael Willis and a very useful index to the text compiled by Serena Biondo. The manuscript presented here has 31 folios. The translated text runs to 16,670 words. Gonkatsang and Willis' transcription improves on a number of recent attempts in the sophistication of its philology and the clarity of the type-setting. Their translation also builds on that of Pasang Wangdu and Hildegard Diemberger in 2000, more thoroughly emphasising the main text and adding depth to the meaning based on our two scholars' long experience in Tibetology and Indology respectively. Having recourse to Pasang Wangdu and Diemberger's facsimile of the text and copious notes is still advised. I hope that this volume will prove of use to students and scholars of Tibetan Studies, and also those in the wider academic world interested in the redaction of historiography and the place of literature in the Buddhicisation of empire.

As readers make their way through this book, it will become clear that, at points, its contributors present different translations or interpretations of Dba' bzhed narratives. I have neither sought to reduce these tensions, nor 'solve' these contradictions, since one of the main aims of this volume is to problematise the monolithic presentation of the Dba' bzhed as a single work of some genius author that can be mined for their 'intent' in writing it at a single moment in history. Instead, these different readings show the Dba' bzhed to be a rich and complex source of the wider Testimony of Ba tradition. The strata within both should be distinguished, as in an archaeological dig, to highlight the different layers of historiography, identity politics and religious perspective deposited by the various redactors over time. In the future, I hope that this will lead

to a relative chronology of the narratives surrounding the Dba' bzhed history of the coming of the dharma or bringing of Buddhism to Tibet, and shed light on the changing cultural dynamics of the early second millennium that fed the soil of our extant exemplars of the Testimony of Ba and sowed the seed of its enduring popularity. In closing, I would like to heartily thank the contributors for their hard work, patience and many forms of help over the years beyond writing their individual contributions, and to Aaron Sanborn-Overby and Sabina Dabrowski at De Gruyter for seeing the book through the press. Most of the writing, editing and publication of this book was generously funded by the European Research Council and the Royal Asiatic Society as part of the project "Beyond Boundaries: Religion, Region, Language and the State" (ERC Synergy Project 609823 ASIA). Finally, this volume is dedicated to the memory of Tsering Dhundup Gonkatsang, who patiently guided the work at every step and gave keen attention to transcription and translation of the text, and whom we shall all miss.

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In Memoriam: Tsering Dhundup Gonkatsang (1951–2018) by John Bray

In the course of his life Tsering Dhundup Gonkatsang played many roles, but he found his vocation—above all else—as a teacher and a translator. Confident in his own skills, he never sought any particular academic prestige. Rather he found fulfillment in using his expertise to help others. This involved him in a wide variety of tasks, from deciphering complex historical texts to organising community events, making films, and translating human rights documents into Tibetan. His formal career culminated in his

appointment as the first Instructor in Tibetan at the University of Oxford. Beyond his family, his greatest delight was in the success of his students.

Tsering was born in Da nga, Sharkhog, eastern Tibet in 1951, shortly after the Chinese Communist takeover of the region. His family were relatively prosperous, the kind of people who might be classified as class enemies. In the mid-1950s, fearing that their son might be at risk, his parents took him on what became an extended journey first to Ngawa, then to Dartsedo (Kanding), and eventually to Lhasa. At that point, his father got into trouble with the Chinese authorities, and was imprisoned. Together with his mother, uncle and aunt, Tsering travelled on to Kalimpong in north-east India where he went to his first school. They did not see or hear from his father for more than 20 years.

In India, Tsering and his relatives at first lived precariously, and in that respect their fortunes mirror those of many others in the Tibetan refugee community. From Kalimpong they moved to Simla. During the colder winter months, the adults earnt a supplementary income selling sweaters in Calcutta (now Kolkata), and Tsering helped out during the school holidays. Later, his uncle and aunt were allocated a small plot of land in Bylakuppe, a Tibetan settlement in southern India, where they lived from the sale of maize and other crops, as well as wood gathered from the nearby forest.

Despite these hardships, Tsering was fortunate in being able to gain a good education as a boarder at the Central School for Tibetans at Happy Valley in Mussoorie, where he excelled both academically and at sport. Everything that he achieved subsequently was grounded on this early training.

Tsering went on from Mussoorie to study English at Chandigarh University. After graduation, he was recruited into the Special Frontier Force, a Tibetan military unit within the Indian Army, based in Chakrata (now part of Uttarakhand). He completed his training, but there was a delay in the confirmation of his appointment as an officer following an Indian government policy review after the 1977 national elections. Rather than hang around waiting, Tsering decided to change course and become a teacher. He therefore studied for a B.Ed degree at the Central Institute of Education in Delhi. In 1979, he joined the SOS Tibetan Children's Village (TCV) school in Dharamsala, the north Indian town that serves as the headquarters of the Tibetan government-in-exile, and in due course rose to become headmaster.

Early in the 1980s, during the period when there was a brief hope of political liberalization in Tibet, Tsering's father was able to travel via Nepal to India. Despite not knowing either Hindi or English, he found his way to Calcutta and, having met a Tibetan monk at Howrah station, contacted the Tibetan community in search of his family. Tsering once told a moving story of how his father was reunited with his aunt. Thinking that a sudden unannounced meeting might be too much of a shock, his father waited outside her home while her relatives prepared her with a gradual build-up of hope and expectation. Their conversation started with the thought that it would be good to hear from Tsering's father after so many years. Then they discussed how wonderful it would be if he could come to India. And it would be even better if he could come to see her. The climax came when they announced that he was waiting just outside.

Tsering's father had hoped that his family might accompany him back to Tibet. His uncle went so far as to obtain the necessary identity papers from the Chinese embassy in Delhi, but they ultimately decided

that they would return only when the Dalai Lama himself was able to do so. Meanwhile, Tsering continued his teaching career in Dharamsala.

It was in Dharamsala that Tsering first became interested in the challenges of translation. The immediate spur was a guidance document issued in Tibetan by Samdhong Rinpoche, who was then at the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Varanasi. Until then, exile Tibetan schools had focused on the teaching of English as a core survival skill, often at the expense of the mother tongue. Samdhong Rinpoche now called on them to redress the balance in favour of Tibetan. Evidently, his concerns were justified because Tsering had to translate this guidance for his Tibetan colleagues who were, themselves, products of an English-language education. He sent his translation to Samdhong Rinpoche, whose warm endorsement encouraged him to take his own Tibetan language skills a step further.

In 1987 Tsering moved to the University of Glasgow in Scotland to study for a postgraduate degree in education, with a particular focus on mother-tongue teaching. He then moved to north London and set up a home there with his wife Dolker and their three children, Lhayum, Choeyang, and Tashi, who all joined him from Dharamsala. Dolker's constant support and their happy family life served as the foundation for everything else that Tsering did. He was immensely proud of his children, their partners, and two grandchildren, all of whom survive him.

From 1991 until 2001, Tsering worked at the International Community School in London, eventually becoming Head Teacher. Meanwhile, he was involved in a wide range of other activities. Already an accomplished teacher of English to non-native speakers, he now began to apply the same skills to the teaching of his own language. I was myself among a select group of friends who regularly visited his house in north London for private lessons. He also served as the General Secretary of the Tibetan Community in Britain (TCB) from 1994 to 1996, and for many years taught Tibetan to the TCB children. At the same time, he provided translation to and from Tibetan for a number of organisations, including Amnesty International, the Tibet Information Network (TIN), and the Trace Foundation in New York.

Once he had settled in London, Tsering was able to revisit Tibet. In 1997, he travelled to his home in Amdo, together with Dolker and Choeyang. In 2004, he and Dolker visited her home in Tinkye, southern Tibet. Finally, he was again able visit Amdo in 2007, a year before his father passed away.

In 2001, Tsering took up a position as Instructor in Tibetan at the University of Oxford; this was a new post, created in memory of the Tibetan scholar Michael Aris (1946–1999). Tsering's now well-honed talents as a teacher and a linguist meant that he was the perfect candidate. During his years in Oxford he was able to put all his varied skills and experience to the best possible use.

Tsering taught beginner and intermediate Tibetan, as well as working intensively with advanced students on the reading of specific texts. He typically spent two days a week in Oxford. Driving up from his home in London, he would start early in the morning and stay late, surviving on orange juice when there was no time for meals. For his teaching materials Tsering drew on an eclectic range of sources including the adventures of Tintin, his own translation of the Twelve Days of Christmas (an English carol), as well as Tibetan-language Internet blogs and historical texts. He presented papers on Tibetan teaching materials at successive triennial conferences of the International Association for Tibetan Studies (IATS). The panel that he planned on this topic at the 15th IATS conference in Paris in 2019 will be dedicated to his memory.

Tsering's students remember him for his warmth, encouragement and sense of humour, often telling jokes that set the class into fits of laughter. At the same time, they marvelled at his linguistic versatility, whether they needed help with dharma texts, poetry, folk tales or historical records. Always unassuming, he was at the heart of the Oxford Tibetan studies community.

Tsering was equally generous in his collaboration with researchers beyond Oxford, and I was myself a beneficiary. Together we wrote three historical papers on Ladakh, and a fourth was in preparation at the time of his death. Other close colleagues included Michael Willis of the British Museum with whom he wrote three joint essays; they were working on a project on the advent of Buddhism into Tibet according to the Chronicles of Dba' at the time of his death. It is a great pleasure to see this book finished and in the hands of readers.

Tsering's other personal projects included the translation of an illustrated biography of the 14th Dalai Lama on behalf of the Domey (Amdo) Association in Dharamsala, and a book on the protector deity of Kirti monastery (in Ngawa, Eastern Tibet). At the same time, he was still fully involved in Tibetan community activities, serving as a trustee of the Tibet Foundation from 2009 to 2017, as well as Tibet Watch, a UK-based NGO monitoring Tibetan affairs, from 2008 to 2016. He provided translations for, among others, the US-based Radio Free Asia, and collaborated on the production of films and documentaries related to Tibet. In all of these activities, he rarely showed signs of fatigue. Tsering's daughter Choeyang shares part of the secret. For her father, there was no boundary between his formal work and the wide range of Tibet-related activities that brought him satisfaction and joy.

In April of this year I met Tsering at the British Library in London, and we chatted for two hours in the canteen. This would in any case have been a memorable occasion, since I now live in Singapore and we rarely had an opportunity to meet in person. Now the meeting has taken on an extra significance. Our conversation turned to his birthplace in eastern Tibet. Tsering then ran through the key events of his life, retelling old stories, and sharing new ones, including some of the anecdotes related here. He had one more year to go before retirement from Oxford, and then he would have had plenty of other projects. The overwhelming impression was a sense of fulfilment and contentment.

Less than three weeks later, Tsering died after a car crash on his way to Oxford, having started early on a Friday morning to offer extra help to students before the start of his formal lessons. It was and remains hard to take in this news. He still had so much to contribute and—on a personal note—there was still so much that I and others had wanted to ask him.

Tsering's legacy includes a range of articles and translations in print and scattered across the Internet. More than that, he will remain a continuing presence in the lives of the many people who knew him as a friend, colleague, and mentor. Between us, we will build on what we learnt from him, take it a step further, and share it with others. There can be no better way of honouring the best of friends and the most beloved of teachers. <>

Chan Buddhism in Dünhua'ng and beyond: a study of manuscripts, texts, and contexts in memory of John R. McRae edited by Christoph Anderl, Christian Wittern [Series: Numen book series: studies in the history of religions, Brill, 9789004431911]

Chán Buddhism in Dūnhuáng and Beyond: A Study of Manuscripts, Texts, and Contexts in Memory of John R. McRae is dedicated to the memory of the eminent Chán scholar John McRae and investigates the spread of early Chán in a historical, multi-lingual, and interreligious context. Combining the expertise of scholars of Chinese, Tibetan, Uighur, and Tangut Buddhism, the edited volume is based on a thorough study of manuscripts from Dūnhuáng, Turfan, and Karakhoto, tracing the particular features of Chán in the Northwestern and Northern regions of late medieval China.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: John R. McRae (1947–2011) was a leading scholar in the field of Chán Buddhist studies, one who left his mark on the field from the late 1970s and until the moment of his untimely passing. After studying at Stanford University (BA 1969), John completed his master degree (1971) at Yale University,

where he also commenced his PhD research under the guidance of Prof. Stanley Weinstein. During the work on his PhD thesis he spent an extended period of time in Japan, studying with the two leading Chán scholars of that time, Yanagida Seizan f ffIRd! (1922–2006) and Iriya Yoshitaka ^^^^ (1910–1998). After the completion of his PhD at Yale University (1983, "The Northern School of Chinese Ch'an Buddhism"), he taught and conducted research at several universities in the USA, including Cornell and Indiana Universities, before becoming a lecturer at Komazawa University, Japan. In the course of his life, he conducted research and taught at numerous academic institutions, including the Universities of Santa Barbara, Los Angeles, Princeton, Harvard, Hawaii, Stanford, Tokyo, Bangkok, Chengchi (Taiwan), and St. Petersburg State University.

As one of the most promising students of Yanagida Seizan, John is especially recognized for his contributions to what is commonly referred to as "Early Chán," i.e., early sectarian formations of Chán Buddhism, including the Northern School the Niútóu School and Shénhuì's Mkt Southern School, and as such has left us several monographs and numerous illuminating articles on various related topics (for a list of John's publications, please consult the bibliography at the end of this volume). His meticulous study of the primary sources has set a model for younger scholars to follow, and it is fair to say that Chán studies would not be what they are today without his sustained input.

John was a pioneer of Chán studies in the West and before the publication of the Northern School (1986) there was little available on Early Chán in a Western language. As such, before its publication, it was difficult for young scholars to find academic materials in English and French on the earliest texts of Chán Buddhism, and they had to rely primarily on Japanese materials, the majority of them provided by Yanagida Seizan. One of the contributors to this volume, John Jorgensen, recalls, when he went to Japan in 1974 in order to attend seminars conducted by Yanagida and Iriya Yoshitaka, John McRae and Bernard Faure were already there. At that time, training in mainland China was not an option due to the Cultural Revolution and an anti-Buddhist atmosphere, and even Chinese scholars in Taiwan like Yìnshùn WE, (1906–2005) relied heavily on the works of Japanese scholars.

Around 1983 there was a sudden flourishing of work on Chán in English and French, with Jeffrey Broughton editing Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yen (University of Hawai'i Press, 1983), in which John had a chapter on Niútóu, and David Chappell, editing Early Ch'an in China and Tibet (Asian Humanities Press, Jain Publishing Company, 1983), in which John translated an article by Yanagida ("The 'Recorded Sayings' Texts of Chinese Ch'an Buddhism"). In 1984, Bernard Faure finished his thesis in French ("La volonté d'orthodoxie: Généalogie et doctrine du bouddhisme Ch'an de l'école du Nord"), concentrating on the Lèngqié shïzijì and Northern Chán. Another scholarly work, on a much later period, Robert Buswell's Korean Approach to Zen: The Collected Works of Chinul, also was published in 1983 (University of Hawai'i Press). John's Northern Ch'an book of 1986 then significantly added to the impetus that was growing in Chán studies and made much available to those scholars who did not read French.

Thus, it was in the period between 1983 and 1986 that there was enough scholarly material available on early Chán to allow this field to flourish. The training and fostering of a younger generation of scholars by Yampolsky, McRae and Faure, among others, led to a surge on new works on Chán/Zen and a deepening of critical approaches, with more studies on Dünhuáng materials and monographs on later periods.

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The papers collected in this volume aim to address various aspects of Chán studies that have previously received insufficient scholarly attention. The focus is on Chán developments in peripheral regions (from the perspective of the center of the Chinese Empire), and on the Buddhist centers in these areas' role in preserving, defining, and spreading Chán texts and ideas. To illuminate these issues, the publication introduces and analyzes manuscript material from Dūnhuáng, Turfan, and Karakhoto. It also presents high-quality reproductions of hitherto unpublished material (see, for example, Kirill Solonin's paper), critical editions, and translations. Through these case studies and the thorough investigation of extant manuscript material, we hope to enhance understanding of the complex interactions among Buddhists of different ethnic origins from different areas, and the transformations that took place in the Northwestern regions during the medieval era.

Focus on Dūnhuáng

As the book's title indicates, the region of Dūnhuáng is central to this project. This is not merely because of the tens of thousands of manuscripts that have been found in the "Library Cave" (Mògāo Cave 16/17)—one of the main sources for the study of medieval Chinese culture and religion over the past century—but also because it is located on the western border of the Héxī 河西 Corridor, and as such was a major hub on the eastern section of the Silk Roads. Originally the home of nomads, the region came under Chinese control for the first time during the Hàn 漢 Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). At the end of the Eastern Hàn 東漢 Dynasty (25–220 CE), many families from Central China migrated to this relatively peaceful area, bringing with them the culture of the Chinese heartland., Dūnhuáng fell under the control of various Northern Dynasties. However, from the eighth century onward, when the early Chán movement started expanding, Dūnhuáng was again a city with a strong military garrison. Indeed, the third-largest army of the Táng 唐 Dynasty (618–907) was stationed there, and the city's economy and population gradually expanded. The location of Shāzhōu 沙洲 (as Dūnhuáng was known during the medieval period) enabled it to develop into a key hub for trade between China and the Western regions, and into a vibrant meeting point for various ethnicities, cultures, religions, and philosophies. Consequently, in addition to being an important strategic stronghold, a transit city frequented by traveling merchants, and a temporary dwelling place for itinerant pilgrims and monks, it developed into a religious center that not only passively received ideas from other regions but also molded its own distinctive Buddhist practices and produced a variety of ground-breaking Buddhist scriptures. Most importantly, it became a key player in the dissemination of specific Buddhist ideas and practices throughout the Northwest and North, while simultaneously receiving innovative concepts from the Central regions, the Twin Capitals, and the western sectors of the Silk Roads.

The discovery of the Dūnhuáng manuscripts around 1900 CE and the subsequent research into these documents have played a pivotal role in increasing our understanding of medieval Chinese literature, language, religion, and culture. Throughout the twentieth century and especially over the last few decades, "Dūnhuáng studies" (*Dūnhuángxué* 敦煌學) has developed into a major field of research. Moreover, because of the vast array of genres, texts, and topics covered by the manuscripts, this umbrella term now encompasses a growing number of increasingly specialized sub-fields.

The Dūnhuáng hoard—including a particularly rich trove of "non-canonical" sources that were not transmitted in any other form after the Táng, Five Dynasties, and Early Sòng periods—has provided a glimpse into myriad forms of Táng Chinese Buddhism in terms of doctrines, practices, and popular

rituals (although it can be difficult to determine whether some of these forms of Buddhism were specific to the Northwestern region or rather were over-regional developments). Regarding the various Buddhist sectarian and doctrinal formations that flourished during the Táng Dynasty, the Dūnhuáng corpus is an especially rich source of texts representing the various "schools" (or rather factions) of the early Chán movement. Systematic study of these documents commenced more than fifty years ago, first in Japan, then in the United States (often among scholars who had trained in Japan) and (to a lesser degree) France. Subsequently, John McRae and others introduced these early Chán texts to a wider Western readership. Scholarly research into the formative period of Chán peaked during the 1980s and 1990s; thereafter, attention shifted to the formation of the institutionalized Chán schools during the Sòng Dynasty and—more recently—to developments during the Míng and Qīng.

Although the studies of the early Chán texts have challenged and corrected numerous stereotypes, misconceptions, and historical projections (many of which were based on the historiographical material of the Sòng Chán schools themselves, coupled with Japanese authors' accounts of the origins of Chán/Zen when introducing Western audiences to the subject), many questions remain, and many aspects of Chán during the Táng demand more thorough and contextualized studies in the future.

Challenges in the Study of Early Chán

Although our understanding of the development of Chán Buddhism during the Táng, Five Dynasties, and Sòng periods has improved dramatically over recent decades, a number of issues remain. Rather than trying to construct the notion of a historically *coherent* movement, we should focus on the actual circumstances under which Chán was practiced during its early phase of development, with an emphasis on specific locations and periods. Recent studies that have followed this approach have yielded some important results, identifying significant regional differences in doctrinal frameworks, lineage systems, and practice.

Buddhism in China should be seen not as a uniform structure, but as an amalgamation of a multitude of local traditions following their own specific courses of development. These local traditions could have preserved elements of Chinese Buddhist doctrinal and textual heritage not available, or otherwise neglected, in Song-era China.

Indeed, many of the most distinctive and local features of Táng Buddhism seem to have been preserved (or even developed) *outside* the core areas of China proper (for instance, in terms of Chán Buddhism, the Northwestern areas, Sìchuān, Fùzhōu, Hángzhōu, Jiāngxī, etc.). By contrast, in the Central regions, such features often fell victim to fragmentation or destruction due to rebellions and political unrest that targeted the heart of government, or—as happened at the beginning of the Sòng Dynasty—to standardization and "text sanitation" processes that either neglected or actively erased "non-orthodox" features in official historiographies and transmission records. As such, the local forms of Buddhism that developed in the Northwest, Sìchuān, and various other regions have come into sharper focus over recent decades.

Isolation from the Central Regions

The material found at various cave sites in the Dūnhuáng area (Shāzhōu 沙洲 in historical records) testifies that Buddhism had an increasing influence on the lives of the elite and the general populace in the region, especially during periods of relative isolation from the Central regions. Thus, the religion

helped to define the area's local identity and contributed to the establishment of regional alliances. The Ān Lùshān 安祿山 Rebellion (beginning in 755), which had a devastating impact on the population and culture of the Táng state, also affected Dūnhuáng, since troops left the area to fight the rebels in the Central regions. The Tibetans seized this opportunity to occupy Dūnhuáng, retaining control of the city and the surrounding area until 848. It was under their auspices that Buddhism started to flourish in the region, as Rong Xinjiang (2013: 40) observes:

At the beginning of the Tibetan rule, Shāzhōu [i.e., the Dūnhuáng area] had nine monasteries and four nunneries, with the number of clergy amounting to three hundred and ten. In contrast with this, at the end of the Tibetan rule, there were a total of seventeen monasteries and the number of clergy had escalated to several thousand, even though the entire population of Shāzhōu was only about twenty five thousand.

It is also important to note that the Huìchāng 會昌 persecution of Buddhism—which peaked in 845, with devastating consequences for Buddhist institutions in regions controlled by the central government—had relatively little impact on the Dūnhuáng area.

Chán Buddhism in the Dūnhuáng Area

The caves in the Mògāo complex, Dūnhuáng, were first inhabited by monastic immigrants to the area. The northernmost section of Mògāo is characterized by the absence of wall paintings or Buddhist icons in in the caves (with the exception of those in the "Tantric cave," D-MG 465). The many caves in this sector would have housed monks engaged in Buddhist practice, as well as a few burial sites.

The Dūnhuáng communities' fascination with Chán is demonstrated not only by dozens of manuscripts that present a wide variety of early Chán doctrines and lineages but also by numerous extant appraisals and Chán songs. In addition, the corpus features several Tibetan translations and Chán texts that were produced in the area itself, for example by the famous monk Mahāyāna (Móhēyǎn 摩诃衍), who was active there during the late eighth century. Furthermore, stele inscriptions and captions dating from the Late Táng and Five Dynasties periods are important sources of information on Chán activities. It was during this period that interest in Chán peaked in the area. As some recent studies have shown, Chán was frequently referred to as the "Great Vehicle of Sudden Enlightenment" (*dùnwù dàshèng* 頓悟大乘), and adherents could be found among both the general population and the elite. Captions in several Mògāo caves also associate Chán monks and their meditation practice with specific caves.

The Structure of the Book

This collection of papers is divided into three parts. Part One, "Early Chán History Revisited," comprises two chapters. In Chapter 1, John Jorgensen sets the stage for the rest of the book with an extensive study and reevaluation of the historical sources relating to early Chán. Chapter 2 then focuses on a genre that has received insufficient scholarly attention: early Chán songs and appraisals. This material is of great historical value as it provides ample evidence of the enduring appeal of many early Chán concepts and practices until the tenth century (in the Dūnhuáng area, at least).

Part Two, "The Spread of Chán in the Northwestern Region," focuses on the transmission of Chán from an interregional, intercultural, and cross-lingual perspective. In Chapter 3, the *Siddhaṃ Song* studied in Chapter 2 is analyzed in its Uighur translation. Chapter 4 then reevaluates certain aspects of Tibetan

Chán on the basis of a study of the cultural and multilingual context of Dūnhuáng in the final centuries of the first millennium. Finally, Chapter 5 presents a detailed study of Liáo and Tangut Buddhism through meticulous analysis of Karakhoto manuscripts.

The two chapters in Part Three, "Chán in an Interreligious Perspective," focus on Táng (Chán) Buddhism from an intersectarian and interreligious perspective by studying relevant Dūnhuáng manuscripts and other textual material. Specifically, Chapter 6 investigates the interactions between Chán and Esoteric Buddhism, while Chapter 7 explores the connections between Táng Buddhism and Daoism.

Part One: Early Chán History Revisited

The volume opens with a thorough account of early Chán from a historian's perspective. It is important to reassess many early sources on Chán with a critical eye in order to arrive at a more detailed understanding of its early history. In his paper, Jorgensen reexamines the historical material on Bodhidharma and Huìkě, asserting that a critical reading of the historical sources can reveal information that goes "beyond the myths and hagiographical patterns." This is of great significance since many of the later developments in Chán were based on parameters established during the early historical phase of the formulation of Chán thought. Studying a variety of early Chán texts, Jorgensen attempts to reconcile several historical sources in order to clarify the stages of Bodhidharma's life and the origins of the texts that are attributed to him. Likewise, when turning his attention to Bodhidharma's disciple Huìkě, Jorgensen presents a close reading of the available sources to explain that biographical descriptions should not be automatically dismissed as "hagiographies." Indeed, he demonstrates that, if critically assessed, they may provide a wealth of important historical information. He also observes that early Chán figures are frequently linked to specific scriptures, such as the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*, which remained a highly influential text over the course of many generations, as a number of tenth-century manuscript copies in Dūnhuáng testify. (Other chapters in this collection also discuss the significance of this *sūtra* within early Chán.)

In Chapter 2, Anderl and Sørensen explore a genre that has previously received relatively little scholarly attention in the West—so-called "Chán songs" (*Chán-gē* 禪歌)—in order to demonstrate that early Chán doctrines and practices, including those traditionally associated with the "Northern School," enjoyed unbroken popularity (at least on a regional level) until approximately the tenth century (see also Chapter 4, this volume). One particular text, the *Siddhaṃ Song*, is critically edited through collation of a number of extant manuscripts, and an annotated English translation is provided. Close analysis of this text reveals that many of the motifs that appear in the ninth- and tenth-century Dūnhuáng manuscript copies—including key terminology reminiscent of the Northern School—can be traced back to the earliest phase of the Chán movement. Moreover, the relatively large number of copies of the text that remained in circulation until the tenth century confirm the enduring appeal of early Chán concepts. Interestingly, the text was written in verse form, using a highly complex pattern of rhymes. In addition to brief doctrinal statements and words of encouragement for Chán practitioners, it features a host of phonetic characters. The majority of these seem to be attempts to imitate foreign sounds that were thought to have powers of salvation similar to those of *dhāraṇī*s, rather than transliterations of actual Sanskrit words. In addition, the preface connects the text to Bodhidharma and the *Laṅkavatāra* tradition, while the Siddhaṃ alphabet is reminiscent of Kumārajīva's *Tōngyùn* 通韻. Overall, the text reflects Chán

adherents' multifaceted attitude to Buddhist teaching, and their willingness to employ a variety of genres depending on the target audience. As such, it is just one of many contemporaneous texts to display not only an acute awareness of the sectarianism within Chán Buddhism *but also a conscious decision to adopt a pragmatic, conciliatory approach toward rival factions*. This attitude is similarly evident in other Chán songs and eulogies, some of which were written by monks who were active in the Dūnhuáng area.

Part Two: The Spread of Chán in the Northwestern Region

Uighur Chán Buddhism

The extant sources provide only limited evidence of Buddhist activities during the First (552–612) and Second (692–742) Turkic Khaganates, and indeed during the Uighur Steppe Khaganate (744–840), when Manichaeism became the state religion. Closer contact with Buddhism probably did not emerge before the collapse of the last empire, followed by the Uighurs' expansion to the Gānsù Corridor and the Tarim Basin. Most of the extant Buddhist literature was produced in the West Uighur Kingdom between the ninth and the fourteenth centuries. Hundreds of these manuscripts lay undisturbed in Turfan and the Mògāo Library Cave for several centuries before a series of Western and Japanese expeditions discovered them in the early 1900s. This corpus consists of a wide variety of Buddhist texts, translated from a number of languages, including Sanskrit, Chinese, Tocharian, and Sogdian, with the Chán Uighur texts comprising only a small portion of the total. The translations include Chán poems and songs, the apocryphal *Yuánjué jīng* 圓覺經, which was popular among early Chán practitioners, and the Northern Chán School text *Guānxīn lùn* 觀心論 (*Treatise of Contemplating the Mind*). Peter Zieme (2012) has explored the relationship between Dūnhuáng and Turfan through detailed analysis of Berlin's collection of Turfan manuscripts. His research has revealed that Dūnhuáng Buddhism was the driving force behind Chinese-to-Uighur translation activities during the tenth and eleventh centuries (a period which witnessed a significant shift from Manichaeism to Buddhism in Uighur society).

In Chapter 3 of this volume, Zieme presents an annotated English translation of an Uighur translation of the *Siddhaṃ Song* (the subject of Chapter 2), comparing it with the original Chinese text and highlighting any variations and reinterpretations that were introduced during the translation process. His conclusion is that, notwithstanding several inconsistencies between the two versions, the Uighur translation helps to clarify several of the Chinese source text's more enigmatic passages.

Tibetan Buddhism in Dūnhuáng

The era that followed the Tibetan occupation of the Dūnhuáng area is usually known as the "Return of Righteousness Army" (*guīyì jūn* 歸義軍). Although the Tibetan rulers had been ousted, Tibetan language and culture remained defining features of the period, and researchers believe that a large proportion of the populace were bilingual (see Takata 2000). As there are only a few native sources on the period of Tibetan rule, several Dūnhuáng manuscripts—such as the *Old Tibetan Annals* (P.t.1288; Or.8212.187) and the *Old Tibetan Chronicle* (P.t.1286, 1287)—have key roles to play in shedding light on the occupiers' impact on the region. In addition, many manuscripts provide details on the local administration of Dūnhuáng during the occupation. These are of great significance because they allow researchers to reconstruct events that occurred during that period. By contrast, official Táng Dynasty historiographical sources on China's peripheral regions are very scarce. In addition to these administrative and historiographical texts, manuscripts written in Tibetan are especially rich sources of material on Chán Buddhism. Recent research into these Tibetan Chán manuscripts has challenged the traditional narrative

(which was mostly based on later Tibetan sources) concerning the so-called "Debate of Lhasa" between Indian and Chinese monks on the nature of enlightenment. These studies have demonstrated that many of Dūnhuáng's Tibetan manuscripts date from *after* the Tibetan occupation, indicating that Tibetan influence persisted in the region for much longer than was previously thought. Moreover, as Sam van Schaik and Jakob Dalton point out, Chinese Buddhism continued to have a parallel impact on Tibetan Buddhists long after the period of Tibetan control of Dūnhuáng had come to an end:

> With no controlling religious authority, Tibetans were able to develop their own Buddhist traditions, drawing upon those of their neighbours in China and India, as well as their own cultural concerns. Tibetans living in Dunhuang after it was regained by China loyalists were particularly well situated to absorb these various influences.

This "cross-fertilization" was especially dynamic during the tenth century, when Chinese Chán traditions merged with Tibetan Tantric Buddhist traditions. In this context, the role of multi-religious, multi-ethnic Dūnhuáng was crucial, resulting in "syncretism on a level one might expect in a vibrant and multicultural religious centre like Dūnhuáng." In the texts studied by van Schaik and Dalton, Mahāyoga practices are described using Chán Buddhist terminology, such as *kàn xīn* (Ch. 看心; Tib. *sems la lta*). Such techniques are usually associated with Northern Chán practice, providing further evidence that Northern Chán beliefs and methods continued to circulate in the Dūnhuáng region long into the tenth century. The Tibetan Chán manuscripts include translations of texts by two highly influential masters—the Indian monk Móhēyǎn 摩呵衍 (Skr. Mahāyāna) and Shénxiù from Central China—as well as doctrines that are characteristic of another early Chán school, the Bǎotáng School of Sìchuān (as represented by the work of Wúxiàng 無相; 684–762).

In Chapter 4 of this volume, Sam van Schaik presents a reconsideration of Tibetan Chán. First, he critically examines the accounts on the monk Móhēyǎn 摩訶衍 as well as the ongoing debates over simultaneous and gradual enlightenment. Next, he demonstrates that most of the Tibetan manuscripts recovered from Dūnhuáng date from *after* the Tibetan occupation, that Tibetan Buddhists retained a strong interest in Chinese Chán texts, and consequently that the copying and translation of these texts continued for many years. As such, he concludes that Chán thinking probably exerted a powerful influence over Tibetan Buddhism until the eleventh century, when attention started to shift to new concepts from India. He also investigates key manuscripts associated with Tibetan Chán and highlights their focus on the *Diamond Sūtra*, as used in precept rituals in the context of ordination platforms. Finally, he presents a thorough reevaluation of the lineage system associated with Tibetan Chán.

Liáo and Tangut Buddhism

Kirill Solonin (2013: 93) has suggested that "Tangut Buddhism emerged under substantial Liao influences, so that one can even suggest that Buddhist traditions in Xixia [Xīxià 西夏] which were traditionally believed to originate from China had, in fact, penetrated from Liao." As such, the expansion of Buddhism in the Northwestern regions after the tenth century should be seen as a highly complex phenomenon that was driven by multiple intersecting influences. Solonin observes the tendency to "unify" diverse traditions and practices and wonders whether this was a distinctive feature of Buddhism in the "border regions" on account of those regions' complex contact patterns and waves of imported ideas. Presented with a wealth of choice, the inhabitants may have selected the most compatible elements from each of the rival systems of thought. Or perhaps their distance from the sectarian contexts in which the

competing ideologies originated enabled them to focus on the elements they shared, rather than their more divisive aspects. Alternatively, the local Buddhist communities may simply have chosen whichever doctrines and practices best suited their specific needs and expectations. More research into Buddhism in the border regions is needed before a definitive conclusion may be reached.

As Solonin points out in his contribution, Chán Buddhism cannot be understood as an independent entity in the context of the Liáo. Liáo Buddhism was based on a version of Huáyán 華嚴 Buddhism intermingled with elements of Esoteric Buddhism (this combination is sometimes referred to as "perfect teaching," *yuánjiào* 圓教) and certain doctrinal features of Chán Buddhism. This approach by the Liáo was adopted by Tangut Buddhists, who eventually incorporated some Tibetan Tantric practices into the system. Consequently, another fascinating transformation of Chán Buddhist thought is evident in the emergence of several forms of Tangut Buddhism, each of which conflated indigenous, Chinese, and Tibetan elements. A reconciliation with Huáyán Buddhism was achieved through selective translations and reinterpretations, providing evidence of alternative forms of Chán Buddhism that coexisted alongside those documented in Northern Sòng texts. Our main sources for the specific forms of Tangut Buddhism are manuscripts found inside a *stūpa* in Khara-Khoto in 1908–1909.

In Chapter 5, Solonin provides a detailed study of the Khitan (Liáo) influence on Tangut Buddhism, focusing specifically on the Khitan Buddhist master Héngcè Tōnglǐ. This monk does not appear in any of the standard Buddhist history works, but he surely exerted considerable influence during his lifetime and played a key role in the sūtra carving project of the Liáo Buddhist canon. Solonin concludes that Tōnglǐ was an adherent of a particular Liáo Dynasty form of Chán Buddhism that he promoted within the Tangut state. As such, he and several other important Tangut monks, such as Dàochēn, helped to formulate and disseminate their unique interpretation of Chán (sometimes labeled "Huáyán-Chán" 華嚴禪) in the Northern region.

Solonin presents translations of two previously untranslated texts (one based on a Chinese source and the other on a Tangut manuscript) as well as high-quality reproductions of material from the St. Petersburg collection. He concludes that the exchanges between the various forms of Buddhism in the Northern and Northwestern regions were highly complex, and admits that they can be difficult to trace in geographical and temporal terms. That said, the extant manuscript texts indicate that Liáo Buddhist texts were disseminated throughout these regions, reaching at least as far as Dūnhuáng and even influencing the Uighurs' understanding of Buddhism. Moreover, they suggest that, in return, Uighur monks were highly active in the establishment of Tangut Buddhism.

Part Three: Chán in an Interreligious Perspective

The final part of the book explores the fact that early Chán evolved in an environment where multiple Buddhist and non-Buddhist factions competed for resources and attention from China's political and cultural elites. From at least the mid-eighth century onward, many Chán masters engaged with a wider Buddhist audience, frequently at mass congregations where they administered the precepts during platform ceremonies (*tánjiè* 壇戒). As the Dūnhuáng manuscripts testify, Chán also actively engaged with Esoteric Buddhism, which was imported to China during the eighth century and quickly gained great popularity.

Henrik H. Sørensen investigates this conflation of Chán and Esoteric Buddhism in Chapter 6. Contrary to Sòng Dynasty accounts of the evolution of Chán, Táng Dynasty Chán was a highly complex amalgamation of multiple lineages and local transformations over which other Buddhist and even non-Buddhist schools exerted considerable influence. Based on a study of Dūnhuáng sources, Sørensen attempts to reconstruct the first contact between early Chán and Esoteric Buddhism, which occurred with the arrival of Indian masters such as Śubhākarasiṁha and Vajrabodhi in the early eighth century. His suggestion is that Chán's subsequent preoccupation with ceremonies connected with the ordination platform and the bestowal of Bodhisattva precepts (a topic that is analyzed from a variety of angles elsewhere in this volume) might have been prompted by these monks' promotion of Esoteric Buddhist rituals. Sørensen then turns his attention to the genre of *Siddhaṃ songs* (see also Chapter 2) as well as the spells and mantras that were chanted during meditation, which leads to his conclusion that a number of esoteric texts must have circulated among Chán practitioners in the Dūnhuáng area.

In the second part of his paper, Sørensen demonstrates that Esoteric Buddhism had a significant impact on both Northern and Southern Chán. He also discusses the *Tánfǎ yízé* 壇法儀則—a text that synthesizes the Chán patriarchal lineage and Buddhist Esoteric thought (and features several of the deities who are associated with it)—which enjoyed great popularity in the Dūnhuáng area. This analysis includes the caveat that it is often difficult to classify the Dūnhuáng texts, because many of them are products of rearranging preexisting material and inserting it within new contexts (known as the "cut-and-paste" technique).

Although direct references to Daoism are relatively scarce in early Chán material, there is historical evidence that the former religion was flourishing when Chán adherents formulated key concepts and practices in a series of late seventh- and eighth-century treatises. Indeed, some scholars (e.g., Sharf 2002) have argued that several key scriptures, such as the *Bǎozàng lùn* 寶藏論 (*Treasure Store Treatise*), were direct results of interactions between Daoism and Buddhism. In addition, the Dūnhuáng manuscripts include a handful of early Chán texts that make explicit references to Daoism, longevity, and alchemical practices (which are usually presented as inferior to Buddhist practices).

In Chapter 7, Friederike Assandri investigates the complex interactions and "confluences" between Buddhists and Daoists in medieval China. She points out that there were frequent public debates between the two groups from the late Six Dynasties period to the Mid-Táng, so neither religion should be regarded as a hermetically sealed theology. Rather, their respective adherents engaged in a continual process of exchange during which each side appropriated concepts, terms, and scriptures from the other. In her paper, Assandri explores this process through a study of the development of the Twofold Mystery teaching and its impact on the development of early Chán Buddhism. This form of teaching employed an epistemological system based on Mādhyamaka teaching that was utilized during analysis of the *Dàodé jīng* 道德經. After analyzing various sources, Assandri concludes that interactions between Daoists and Buddhists in the sixth and seventh centuries were not only frequent but enthusiastic, and that proponents of the Twofold Mystery teaching made full use of all the relevant terms, concepts, and soteriological schemes that were available to them, regardless of whether they were Daoist or Buddhist in origin. Meanwhile, many of the ideas developed in the context of the Twofold Mystery teaching found their way into the emerging Táng schools of Buddhism, including "proto-Chán," and scriptures such as the *Treasure Store Treatise*. <>

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Japan was the first Asian nation to face the full impact of modernity. Like the rest of Japanese society, Buddhist institutions, individuals, and thought were drawn into the dynamics of confronting the modern age. Japanese Buddhism had to face multiple challenges, but it also contributed to modern Japanese society in numerous ways. Buddhism and Modernity: Sources from Nineteenth-Century Japan makes accessible the voices of Japanese Buddhists during the early phase of high modernity.

The volume offers original translations of key texts—many available for the first time in English—by central actors in Japan's transition to the modern era, including the works of Inoue Enryō, Gesshō, Hara Tanzan, Shimaji Mokurai, Kiyozawa Manshi, Murakami Senshō, Tanaka Chigaku, and Shaku Sōen. All of these writers are well recognized by Buddhist studies scholars and Japanese historians but have drawn little attention elsewhere; this stands in marked contrast to the reception of Japanese Buddhism since D. T. Suzuki, the towering figure of Japanese Zen in the first half of the twentieth century. The present book fills the chronological gap between the premodern era and the twentieth century by focusing on the crucial transition period of the nineteenth century.

Issues central to the interaction of Japanese Buddhism with modernity inform the five major parts of the work: sectarian reform, the nation, science and philosophy, social reform, and Japan and Asia. Throughout the chapters, the globally entangled dimension—both in relation to the West, especially the direct and indirect impact of Christianity, and to Buddhist Asia—is of great importance. The Introduction emphasizes not only how Japanese Buddhism was part of a broader, globally shared reaction of religions to the specific challenges of modernity, but also goes into great detail in laying out the specifics of the Japanese case.

CONTENTS

Buddhism and Modernity in Japan, An Introduction by Orion Klautau and Hans Martin Krämer

The challenges faced by Japanese Buddhists since the middle of the nineteenth century were in many respects homegrown. The iconoclastic movement to "abolish the Buddha and smash Sakyamuni" (haibutsu kishaku) was certainly a local phenomenon, as was the particular configuration of state and religion during the early Meiji period, when the new government still grappled with a religious policy for the young nation-state. Yet, Japanese Buddhism also shared many of the difficulties modernity brought to religions worldwide. Perhaps the most fundamental of these was the new type of secularism that went along with Enlightenment. This was not necessarily an objective process of secularization, but certainly brought with it a change in attitudes toward and expectations from religion(s), primarily from the modern natural sciences and philosophical materialism. None of the major religious traditions around the world remained unaffected by this new challenge. The type of reaction that took place in each religion—internal reform, conservative reassertion, creation of eclectic new religions, or religious universalism—varied, as did its timing.

While this new secularism may be seen as an indirect effect of the ascent of industrial capitalism, another of its consequences, the imperialist encroachment upon the rest of the world by the West, made possible a new solution to the threat felt by Christianity at home: reaching out globally through missionary efforts. It was through this—mainly Protestant—mission that Asian countries including Japan first met religious modernity head-on. Asian religions such as Japanese Buddhism had to react to the competition posed by Protestant Christianity, which came with the market advantage of representing modernity. Debates about the reconfiguration of the relations between state and religion were heavily tinged by the question of what to do with Christianity.

Japanese Buddhists—or at least some of them—were acutely aware of the changes around them. Since the 1850s, Buddhist authors had addressed the new threat posed by Christianity, and some sects even introduced "enemy studies" into the curricula of their academies. Buddhist authors were among the first in Japan to write about evolutionary theory and the particular problems this new scientific theory implied for revealed religion. Buddhist authors also introduced modern historiographic methods into the writing of religious history. Although different sects adjusted in different ways, there was a general mood of readiness for reform almost unparalleled in other major religious traditions around the world, where conservative attempts at reassertion usually played a much larger role—be it in South Asian Hinduism and Islam, Southeast Asian Islam, European Christianity, or Middle Eastern and North African Islam—where reform attempts frequently entailed a split from the mainstream religious institutions and the creation of new religious movements. In contrast to these cases, Japanese Buddhists enthusiastically embraced the changes necessitated by the modern age, which they interpreted as new possibilities.

Japanese Buddhism as we know it today was formed in this era of tremendous change. The modern period, largely the decades between the middle of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, has nonetheless received scant attention in historical research on Japanese Buddhism. In Japan, it has been dwarfed by doctrinally oriented sectarian studies and the towering attention devoted to the late ancient and medieval periods, supposedly the time when Buddhism in Japan flourished and engendered its most original innovations under the great reformers of the Heian (Saichõ and Kükai, the founders of the Tendai and Shingon, sects, respectively) and Kamakura periods (Hõnen, Shinran, Dõgen, and Nichiren the founders of the Jõdo, Jõdo Shinshü, Sõtõ Zen, and Nichiren sects, respectively). Together with the niche subjects of early modern Buddhism (i.e., that of the Tokugawa period) and contemporary Buddhism (since 1945), modern Buddhism has only slowly taken ground as an accepted field within Buddhist Studies since Yoshida Kyüichi Ámat^ (1915–2005) pioneered work on the Meiji period, emphasizing its "modernity," in the late 1950s. In Western-language scholarship on Japan, the transformative era of the nineteenth century has taken even longer to catch on, despite the importance of the Meiji period more generally in European and North American scholarship on Japan since the early postwar period. In the following sections, we will first trace the major transformations Buddhism underwent at an institutional level in nineteenth-century Japan, especially in connection with the broader religious policy of the Meiji state. With those factors in mind, we will move to an overview of how scholarship on the topic developed in both the West and in Japan, before identifying the major issues that Japanese Buddhists faced in the nineteenth century, which will also inform the makeup of this volume.

Buddhism in Nineteenth-Century Japan: An Overview

Before we enter into the history of scholarship on modern Japanese Buddhism proper, it will be useful to gain a general insight into the main institutional changes experienced by the Japanese schools of Buddhism after the Meiji restoration of 1868. Historian of religion Hayashi Makoto (b. 1953) has recently proposed, in response to an earlier division by Yoshida Kyüichi, a new periodization for the history of modern Buddhism in Japan. Diverging from the more Marxist-influenced classification of Yoshida, Hayashi asserts the need to understand the history of nineteenth-century Japanese Buddhism not only as the making of something new—or in other words, of the "modern" itself—but also as the gradual process of dismantling a centuries-old religious system with its own intrinsic rationale.3 That is, we can only begin to comprehend the "modernization" of Buddhism in Japan if we take into consideration the adaptational struggles that came with the sudden abolishment of Tokugawa institutions, then indissociable from the Buddhist establishment itself. From that perspective Hayashi divides the history of post-Restoration Buddhism into three periods, which will function as a guide for the brief historical overview below.

The Age of Negotiation (1868–1872)

In 1868, after over a decade of complicated internal debates among the political elites and a few years of actual military conflict, the young Mutsuhito ^^ (1852–1912) was crowned emperor of Japan. Although fighting against Tokugawa forces would continue in northern Japan well into the following year, in areas already under Imperial authority the process of "restoring" institutions of the ancient ritsuryõ state—or rather, idealized versions thereof—had begun. This meant, of course, the abolition of social and legal structures then considered by different factions within the new government as being both impediments to the "restoration" of Imperial power and "former evil practices" associated with the Tokugawa regime. The Buddhist institution was, unmistakably, one such structure, and for Meiji ideologues it had to be dealt with accordingly. The government thus issued the many individual directives that became known in later historiography as the shinbutsu bunri {edicts). These, as John Breen explains, were aimed at putting "an end to all state privileges" enjoyed by Buddhism and transferring those social functions to "Shinto." While their most immediate objective seems to have been to prompt all involved parties to "clarify" (hanzen, i.e., distinguish between the worship of bud-dhas and kami at a mostly material and ritual level), they eventually led to the sometimes violent outbursts known as the haibutsu kishaku move-ment.6 However, the foremost preoccupation of Buddhists was that the Meiji state, seeking friendly relations with Western countries, would now allow the free practice of Christianity in Japan. The social role of keeping Japan a "Jesus-free" land was perceived by many late-Edo Buddhists as the main raison d'être of their institution, a trend readers can verify in several texts included in this sourcebook.

The way Buddhists reacted to these policies was, however, not as one would at first expect: although some of the government actions could be read as unmistakably anti-Buddhist, the most representative part of the clergy did not act with contempt nor did it engage in direct protest. Rather, they proceeded to acknowledge their "past mistakes" and proposed a renewed relationship with their new secular leaders. During the early months of 1869, clerics representing different Buddhist schools— a number of them included in this volume—came together and founded the League of United Buddhist Sects (Shoshü dõtoku kaimei), the first supra-sectarian Buddhist association of modern Japan.

They drafted a joint document in which they declared the "inseparability of secular law and Buddhist law," the "critique and proscription of heresies" and, most significantly, the "sweeping away of the past evils of each sect," among other items.

The proposal set forth by the League of United Buddhist Sects was not to set themselves against the new government, but to assert that the Buddhist institution, despite its numerous problems, could still be useful in the years to come—for instance in keeping away the "heresy" of Christianity, still forbidden in Japan at the time. Between 1869 and 1872, however, state policies aimed at disestablishing the Tokugawa regime would continue to shake the very foundations of Buddhist institutions: in early 1871, in preparation for the abolition of the domain system that would take place a few months later, the Meiji state confiscated all land that had been granted to both Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines by the shogun and daimyo. Although this remains an understudied topic, the confiscation had a far larger material impact on the Buddhist institution than any of the isolated haibutsu kishaku events. By mid-1871 the government had also issued a new state-centered family registration system. This led, a few months later, to the official abolition of the Buddhist-controlled religious census that had formed the basis of the danka system, a feature characteristic of Tokugawa Japan. In 1872, a law was issued decriminalizing clerical marriage and meat eating, both of which had been considered illegal in the Tokugawa context. Later that year members of the clergy were also made to take surnames, and were now, in essence, no different from commoners (heimin).

By the end of 1872, Buddhism had been stripped of both its main sources of income and of its social status. It was also on the verge of seeing the decriminalization of Christianity, perceived as its great enemy. Indeed, in the beginning of 1873, the Meiji state decided to withdraw the centuries-long prohibition against the "heretic teaching." Although by this point many a cleric was convinced that the government was truly setting out to "eradicate" Buddhism, others continued to seek state approval, emphasizing the myriad ways the dharma could contribute to the national goal of enriching the country and strengthening the army (fukoku kyōhei) and, as we will see below, to the emperor-centered national promulgation campaign.

The Age of Kyōdōshoku (1872–1884)

In order to eliminate Buddhism from the public sphere and transfer its social functions to Shinto, the government had promulgated, in early 1870, the Imperial decree on the Great Promulgation Campaign (Taikyō senpu no mikotonori). This edict asserted the unity of ritual and government (saisei itchi), and established the office of senkyōshi (propagandists), who were supposed to elucidate to the nation the "Great Way of obedience to the gods." Nativist and Confucian scholars were recruited for the position, while Buddhist priests were deliberately excluded from participating. However, for a number of reasons, which included lack of consensus regarding what these officials should in fact "propagate," by mid-1872 the senkyōshi had been abolished; now under a different ministry, the Kyōbushō their role was reformulated and incorporated into the newly created office of doctrinal instructor (kyōdōshoku). The latter now included not only Nativist and Confucian scholars, but also Buddhist priests and whoever else was considered to have experience with audiences, such as haiku poets and rakugo storytellers.

The main role of the kyōdōshoku was to preach to the population based on the "Three Standards of Instruction" (sanjō kyōsoku) which were as follows: "To embody reverence for the deities and love of the country," "To clarify the principles of heaven and the way of humanity," and last, "To revere and assist the emperor and obey the will of the court." These aimed at inculcating into the population the

ideal of a new tennõ-centered Japan. With a few notable exceptions, most of the Buddhist world revealed a rather positive attitude toward these standards, even contributing to the formation of an entire exegetical genre surrounding them. This national proselytization plan focused on the Three Standards was further expanded in the following year, with the opening of the Great Teaching Institute (Daikyõin), set up on the grounds of Zõjõji temple in Tokyo. One should note that 1872 was also the year of the promulgation of Japan's first Code of Education (gakusei). At this early stage, there was not yet a clear differentiation between kyõka ^^, which would be a duty of the Kyõbushõ, and kyõiku, which would be the responsibility of the Monbushõ (Ministry of Education).

Nevertheless, this relationship did become an issue after 1873, when Monbushõ officials returned from Europe at least partly convinced of the ideal of separating religion and education.13 From around this time, Monbushõ bureaucrats began advocating a clear distinction between the roles of proselytizers and schoolteachers, which eventually led to the exclusion of Buddhist priests from public education. This ban was later relaxed, and then ultimately lifted in 1879, when it became clear that the Buddhist clergy was essential in terms of persAonnel for the Monbushõ enterprise. Note that although the Daikyõin had been dissolved in 1875 (and the Kyõbushõ itself abolished in 1877), the kyõdõshoku system itself continued well into the following decade. This meant that the time between the late 1870s and early 1880s was one of accommodation for Buddhists, who now had to find their role amid this new division between "education" and "religion." In fact, while kyõdõshoku members of the Buddhist clergy still had a public role, the office also increasingly lost importance, making it clear that it was just a matter of time until it was abolished altogether. In the "enlightened" environment of Meiji Japan, asserting themselves vis-à-vis the old "enemy" of Christianity as a positive force for the state became the highest commitment for most Buddhists.

From the early 1880s, as Japan embarked on the journey to become a constitutional state, Buddhists strove at the intellectual level to adapt to the myriad new discourses required by current times. Besides the abovementioned concept of "education," the concepts of "science" and "religion" also posed their challenges, as did those of "individual" and "faith." Another important development at this time was the rise of lay Buddhist movements. Whereas until the early Meiji years nonclerical persons in positions of leadership in Buddhist institutions were virtually unheard of, laypeople began playing a major role around this time, as we can observe in the work of individuals such as Õuchi Seiran (1845–1918) and Nakanishi Ushirõ (1859–1930). Their less directly engaged position—or in other words, the fact that they were not as committed to institutional demands—was also important in overcoming, when necessary, the sectarianism so characteristic of Japanese Buddhist schools. This in turn became an essential tool for reframing Buddhism as a "religion."

Establishing the Modern Buddhist Institution (1884–1900)

Between the late 1870s and early 1880s, as the Freedom and People's Rights Movement (Jiyü minken undõ) gained strength, so did the demand for a constitution. The idea of a constitutional environment—and the possibility of Japan adopting a state religion— provided Buddhists with a new type of awareness, which can be observed, for instance, in the work of Shaku Unshõ (1827–1909) included in this sourcebook. At the same time, the realm of religious policy also experienced its own crisis. With the demise of the Daikyõin in 1875— due mainly to the lack of cooperation by Jõdo Shin priests prompted by Shimaji Mokurai (1838–1911)—a new Shinto-centered bureau took over much of its role. A dispute arose between the chief priest of the Ise Shrines, who had been appointed the head of this new Office of

Shinto Affairs (Shintõ jimukyoku), and the chief priest of Izumo Shrine over which deities to enshrine in the office. As a consequence of this "Pantheon Dispute" (saijin ronsõ), which could only be solved by the arbitration of the Imperial court, in 1882 the government forbade priests working in national and Imperial shrines (kankoku heisha) from serving as kyõdõshoku. They were also forbidden to perform funerals. The dissatisfied factions went on to establish their own institutions, giving rise to the distinction between "Shrine Shinto" and "Sect Shinto."

This internal dispute, intrinsically related to the very issue of Imperial authority, constituted the final blow to the already moribund kyõdõshoku system. Between March and April 1884, Inoue Kowashi (1844–1895), one of the architects of the Meiji Constitution, proposed the elimination of the office. He emphasized the ideal of religious freedom alongside a legal framework for regulating religious corporations. Indeed, a few months later in August 1884, the Council of State promulgated a directive abolishing the position of kyõdõshoku, an event of utmost importance for Buddhism. The proclamation not only ended the twelveyear existence of the office, but also reformulated the sectarian administrator system (kanchõ seido), giving religious institutions the autonomy to appoint and dismiss their own clergy. Furthermore, it also stipulated that Buddhist schools had to prepare, according to the principles of their own foundational doctrines (rikkyõ kaishü no shugi), a sectarian constitution (shüsei), laws for governing temples (jihõ), and rules for appointing clerics for various positions. These would be submitted to the minister of home affairs (naimukyõ), who would then authorize the sects' provisions.

This right to self-determination affected Buddhist sects in very different ways. Some sects had to come up with solutions for long-term internal rivalries, such as the centuries-old friction between the Sõjiji and Eiheiji temples in Sõtõ Zen, or even give consideration to what would, in essence, be their "foundational doctrine." Others had relatively little trouble developing a centralized administration based on the tenets of modern bureaucracy. This newly gained autonomy, albeit limited by the boundaries set by the home minister, introduced yet another sense of crisis for Buddhists—they needed a clear "doctrine," which, as per contemporary requirements, had to accord with ideals such as "science" and "rationality." That is, in a context in which the influence of Christianity grew each day, Buddhists emphasized that their "religion," despite its many flaws, was still in harmony with the moral goals of the Japanese nation and could, therefore, contribute to uniting people's spirits. Buddhism, they held, was a better aid than Christianity for the national enterprise not only because it had been in Japan for longer, but because "rationally," it made sense.

The 1890s, however, brought yet new developments. The Meiji Constitution of 1889 and Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890 both settled the idea of religious freedom alongside the understanding of emperor worship as civic duty. The 1891 lèse-majesté incident involving Uchimura Kanzõ (1861–1930), who as a Christian had hesitated to fully bow during a ritual reading of the Rescript, provided the Buddhist world with further ammunition to question the role of their old enemy in the new constitutional framework. Could Christians uphold their beliefs without compromising their duties as subjects? The Buddhist answer was obviously "no." This became a still more pressing issue in 1894, when the government signed, just before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (Nichiei tsüshõ kõkai jõyaku). By the terms of the agreement, scheduled to come into force five years later in July 1899, British nationals in Japan would be subject to local laws, which implied an end to the system of extraterritoriality and the enactment of what the Japanese referred to as "mixed residence" (naichi zakkyo). At a time when Japan was becoming more

aggressive in its colonial enterprises, the new system meant that foreigners were no longer limited to inhabiting specific settlements such as Kobe or Yokohama, but could now live anywhere in Japanese territory as long as they complied with the law. The idea of Christians roaming around as they wished felt like a threat to many, which prompted the government to begin considering a law of religions.

Into the Twentieth Century

Such a law of religions was proposed in 1899, the same year in which the mixed-residence system was scheduled to begin. It established somewhat equal regulations for Sect Shinto, Buddhism, and Christianity, but as scholars have pointed out, failed to satisfy any of the representatives of the different groups. While it did find some advocates among Buddhists, most schools united against the law,20 claiming that Buddhism, as the religion of the majority of the Japanese, should be granted a special legal status, akin to what Catholic and Protestant churches experienced in France and Germany, respectively. They were successful in their lobbying efforts, as in early 1900 the law, which had been approved by the (lower) House of Representatives, was rejected by the (upper) House of Peers. This caused the government to revise its plans and establish, in April 1900, two new offices within the Home Ministry: the Shrine and Religion Bureaus. The latter was supposed to oversee all "religions" (including Sect Shinto), whereas the former would be in charge of official "Shrine Shinto" (jinja shintō) affairs. This division, which in a sense formalized the influential discourse of Shrine Shinto as "non-religious," is considered by scholars as a major turning point in the establishment of what we now refer to as "State Shinto" (kokka shintō).

The late nineteenth century was, as seen above, a time of rapid change not only for Buddhism, but for the entire Japanese religious landscape. For Buddhist schools, in particular, it was a time of adaptation and negotiation, a time of finding new justifications for their existence vis-à-vis the state and in relation to each other. Indeed, although Hayashi Makoto mentions the years between 1900 and 1945 as the last stage of his periodization, he does imply that the impact of the above challenges continued to influence the way Buddhists acted and thought well into the twentieth century, a point readers can confirm in several of the texts included here. In the following section, we will provide a brief history of how scholarship has dealt with this complicated period, after which we will provide an overview of how this volume relates to some of these questions.

The History of Research on Modern Japanese Buddhism in Western Languages

Although the question of modernity was in a way one of the defining issues in postwar Western-language scholarship on Japan, religion was conspicuously absent from research in modern Japanese history long after 1945. The paradigm of modernization theory that dominated the field well into the 1970s implied that secularization had rendered religion more or less obsolete in the modern age. The Japanese case seemed to bear out this assumption particularly well, given the aggressively secularist stance of Japanese elites.

The role of religious institutions or religious thought within modern Japanese history was not entirely absent in Western scholarship, but it did not become a main focus of studies until around 1980. The first important monographic study, Kathleen Staggs's 1979 dissertation In Defense of Japanese Buddhism remains unpublished, yet it is still often cited. It was not until 1990 that a landmark study of Meiji Buddhism with a legitimate claim to present a comprehensive picture introduced the importance of this subject into English-language scholarship with force. James Ketelaar's Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji

Japan to this day remains the point of departure for anyone dealing with Meiji Buddhism in the English language, given that it effectively covers central aspects including Tokugawa-period preconditions, the haibutsu kishaku narrative central to the book's title, attempts of intra-Buddhist reform in response to the crisis of the first years of the Meiji period, and the early years of the global spread of Japanese Buddhism.

This groundbreaking work has since then been complemented by more specialized studies in a number of important subfields. One of these has been the introduction of individuals important to the story of modern Buddhism. In 2002, Peter Kleinen contributed to this genre with a study on the bakumatsu priest Gesshõ (1817–1858), including a full German translation of his Buppõ gokoku. The same author had already penned a monograph on Tanaka Chigaku earlier, although this was written more within the context of the Japanese ultranationalism and fascism of the 1930s. More recently, Hans Martin Krämer has produced a study of the early Shimaji Mokurai, a pioneer of many modernist innovations, particularly in the field of the relationship of religion and the state. Mokurai's contributions were to characterize modern Buddhism, and especially the modern Jõdo Shinshü institutions, throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century.

Even before Ketelaar's study, interest in the history of Christianity in modern Japan had led to the publication of Notto Thelle's Buddhism and Christianity in Japan in 1987. For the bakumatsu and the late Meiji period, Thelle offers a comprehensive account of the changing character of the relationship between the two religions, introducing a plethora of historical actors and texts from both sides. A work of similar character was written by Monika Schrimpf in German, extending the time frame somewhat up to the end of the Meiji period. More recently, Michel Mohr has complicated the picture of Buddhist-Christian relations by looking beyond the mainline denominations and focusing on the cooperation between Unitarians and Japanese Buddhists toward the end of the Meiji period.

Another focus of Western-language studies has been the internal institutional changes of Buddhist sects in the Meiji period. Two dramatic changes stand out, especially when viewed in comparison to the preceding Tokugawa period. One concerned the way of dealing with death. While Buddhism had had a virtual monopoly on entombing the dead and conducting funeral rites up to 1868, this was now challenged by competition from Shinto shrines. The challenge was more than symbolic, as the livelihood of priests largely depended on the funerary business. In his 2006 Modern Passings, Andrew Bernstein has looked into how Buddhism weathered these difficulties in the early Meiji period. Richard Jaffe has researched the other great change imposed upon Buddhist priests by the new government in 1868, namely the rescission of the prohibition of marriage that had been upheld by the state until then. This is also one of the few works in English that has taken up the question of monastic rules, the future of which was a hotly contested issue in Buddhist circles in the last decades of the nineteenth century.

One of the major topics pioneered by Ketelaar's Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan was the beginnings of the propagation of Japanese Buddhism in Europe and North America, especially through the participation of Japanese priests in the 1893 World Parliament of Religions in Chicago. The Japanese activities at the Parliament have been the subject of two monographic studies, Presenting Japanese Buddhism to the West by Judith Snodgrass and Mahayana Phoenix by John Harding. In contrast, the introduction of Japanese Buddhism to Europe has not been a central object of scholarship so far and has mostly been treated either marginally within the framework of the introduction of Buddhism overall or

within Japanese religions more broadly, such as in the case of Frédéric Girard's book on Émile Guimet and Japanese religions.

Surprisingly, despite the groundwork laid by Kathleen Staggs, the vicissitudes Buddhist thought underwent in modern Japan have not been the central subject of monographic studies, although they do play some role in many of the studies mentioned already. Galen Amstutz's diachronic study of Pure Land thought in Japan includes a substantial chapter on the modern period. Similarly, Clinton Godart's recent study of evolutionary theory in modern Japan includes an in-depth consideration of how Buddhists situated themselves vis-à-vis this specific challenge of the modern natural sciences.

Another subject that until very recently was marginal is the connection that emerged, since the 1890s, between Buddhism and progressive politics. While some scholarship on the later twentieth-century movement of Engaged Buddhism had been available for some time, two recent English-language monographs have now advanced our understanding of this movement's Meiji-period precedents. While Melissa Curley's Pure Land, Real World focuses on the Jõdo Shinshü, James Mark Shields's Against Harmony casts a slightly wider net to include Zen as well as Nichiren Buddhism. Both works only partially deal with the Meiji period and include events up to 1945 and even the early postwar period. Equally marginal, but perhaps even more important, is the subject of Japanese Buddhism in relation to "Asia." Although, as we will see in the section below, a number of volumes on that subject have been published in Japanese in recent years, there is still very little work on it in other languages. Notable exceptions are Micah L. Auerback's unpublished PhD dissertation and Hwansoo I. Kim's Empire of the Dharma, both focusing on the role of Japanese Buddhism in colonial Korea. Although Richard Jaffe's recent Seeking Šãkyamuni addresses the issue of Japanese connections with South and Southeast Asia, there is, other than in Japanese, still no monograph-length study in English (or any other European language) of the position of Japanese Buddhist schools in either continental China or colonial Taiwan, for instance.

Lastly, a number of recent studies are already beginning to have great impact on the field of the history of modern Japanese Buddhism, despite being of a more synthetic character. The most important to mention in this context is Jason Ã. Josephson's 2012 monograph The Invention of Religion in Japan, the first work to take up the question of how the concept of religion was "invented" in modern Japan and what consequences its appropriation yielded, including its effects on modernizing Buddhism. A similar work with a greater focus on the relationship between religious groups and the state is Trent Maxey's 2014 monograph The "Greatest Problem." Finally, there is Isomae Jun'ichi's Religious Discourse in Modern Japan of the same year, which also sets its main focus on the complicated consequences of the introduction of the modern concept of "religion" into Japan, but this time with a focus on its effects within the academy, especially the emerging field of religious studies in Japan.

Almost all of the studies mentioned above stand in close relationship to Japanese scholarship on the same subject, in that they were prompted by or developed in close cooperation with Japanese scholars of modern Buddhism. In fact, although relatively marginal within Japan, Japanese scholarship on the history of modern Buddhism predates that in Western languages by several decades and may be thought crucial for the agenda setting of the latter.

History of Research of Modern Japanese Buddhism in Japanese

Domestic considerations of the post-Restoration development of Buddhist history began during the 1890s and became both more frequent and robust around 1930. For instance, in 1894 the journal Bukkyõ (Buddhism) published a call for papers on historical sources of "Meiji Buddhism," which was followed, from the next issue, with contemporary accounts by important figures such as Nanjõ Bun'yü (1849–1927) and Maeda Eun (1855–1930). Ten years after this early attempt, Õuchi Seiran would publish, in the pages of the journal Shin Bukkyõ (New Buddhism), an article titled "Lectures on the History of Meiji Buddhism," which in a vein similar to the papers mentioned above, relied on the contemporary eyewitness character of its author.46 The establishment of the journal Bukkyõ shigaku (Studies in Buddhist history) in 1911 meant yet another important step in the historical study of Buddhism, and served as a catalyst to the gathering of sources that would, in the following decade, culminate in the Meiji ishin shinbutsu bunri shiryõ (Historical sources on the separation of Shinto and Buddhism during the Meiji Restoration), a true tour de force in five volumes published between 1926 and 1929.

Although important works on the Restoration's impact on Buddhism were published from the mid-1920s, the following decade saw far more important developments in terms of monographic studies on the topic. For instance in 1933, Tomomatsu Entai (1895–1973), encouraged by French orientalist Sylvain Lévi (1863–1935), established in Tokyo the Historiographical Institute for Meiji Buddhism (Meiji bukkyõshi hensanjo, which, despite being only a minor influence at the time, did help pave the way for a whole generation of scholars focusing on the modern history of Buddhism, and revealed the then increasing preoccupation to save as many primary sources from the Meiji period as possible.

After 1945, the postwar generation would build upon this documentary groundwork and, based on a new interpretation of the meaning of "modernity," turn the study of "Meiji Buddhism" on its head. The generation of scholars represented by Yoshida Kyüichi and Kashiwahara Yüsen (1916–2003), who had lived through the Pacific War as male adults in their late twenties and were influenced by Marxism, presented a narrative of modern Japanese Buddhism critical to the role of religious institutions in the formation of the so-called Emperor System (tennõsei). This group of scholars, active mostly between the 1950s and 1980s, understood the collaborationist attitude of Buddhist schools in the modern war efforts as marks of a "feudal character" that somehow survived into the Meiji period. They saw an exception to this affirmative position only in the few instances when Buddhists openly defied the state or, rather and more frequently, proposed alternatives to what these postwar scholars perceived as a totalitarian system.

In this sense, to the point that they served to affirm state ideology, the majority of Buddhist activities was criticized as "feudal," whereas innovative and sometimes "anti-establishment" movements such as Kiyozawa Manshi's (1863–1903) Seishinshugi (Spiritualism) or Sakaino Kõyõ's (1871–1933) Shin Bukkyõ (New Buddhism) were deemed worthy of the rubric "modern," or kindaiteki. These early postwar scholars followed the mainstream of non-Marxist social science and historiography in Japan. Associated with names such as Maruyama Masao (1914–1996) or Õtsuka Hisao (1907–1996), the concern with Japan's modernity—or rather its lack thereof—dominated those disciplines well into the 1970s and even 1980s.

Despite this modernist view of history, scholars such as Yoshida and Kashiwahara, alongside their junior Ikeda Eishun (1929–2004), produced important works that remain authoritative in the field to this day,

and were responsible for encouraging a new generation of younger students of modern Buddhism. Indeed, while these earlier scholars saw the history of modern Japanese Buddhism as the process of the realization of their own postwar ideal of modernism—and criticized everything that was not part thereof as "feudal"—the following generation, represented by Okada Masahiko (b. 1962), Fukushima Eiju (b. 1965), Moriya Tomoe b. 1968), and Õtani Eiichi (b. 1968), would take yet a different stance. Influenced by the discursive approach that had a decisive impact upon the Japanese humanities from the 1990s onward, this generation of scholars was less interested in the issue of war responsibility and more focused on understanding the strategic self-styling of the historical actors—that is: what did it mean, in the context of modern Japan, to be a "Buddhist"?

The research results presented by those younger scholars need to be understood in connection with the handful of studies on the establishment of the modern concept of "religion" (shükyõ) published after the mid-1990s. Despite some earlier works on the topic, monographs such as those by Haga Shõji, Yamaguchi Teruomi, and Isomae Jun'ichi, as well as the edited volume Reconsidering "Religion" by Shimazono Susumu and Tsuruoka Yoshio, showed that issues of self-identification were as much at the core of the so-called modernization process as were institutional changes. The attention to identity formation included a new focus on how Japanese national identity was shaped vis-à-vis Asia, and this translated into new studies focusing on cultural aspects of Buddhist proselytization in China and Korea. Moreover, research into the activities of Japanese Buddhists on the mainland, and other aspects of accommodation of sectarian institutions with the wartime state, now aimed less at facile criticism of these instances of "collaboration," but rather at identifying the inner logic behind it.

By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, enough works had been published that the first critiques of the field itself started to appear. Spearheaded by the abovementioned Hayashi Makoto—who also served for several years as president of the Society for the Study of Modern Japanese Buddhist History (Nihon Kindai Bukkyõshi Kenkyükai the main hub for scholars in the field)—these critiques sometimes pointed to how the field had changed in terms of self-identification, in the course of the 1950s and 1960s, from Meiji Buddhism to Modern Buddhism, and how the actual contents of these studies had shifted along with our very understanding of "modernity." He alluded, for instance, to the lack of studies on the transition between the Edo and Meiji periods, on the early Shõwa period, and on the transition into the postwar period.

Consciously or not, more recent scholars have produced studies that, in many ways, fill in at least some of the gaps pointed out by Hayashi. Having experienced graduate education in an environment where the dialogue with non-Japanese scholarship was already the norm, studies by Tanigawa Yutaka (b. 1973), Hoshino Seiji (b. 1973), Õsawa Kõji (b. 1975), Iwata Mami (b. 1980), Shigeta Shinji (b. 1980), Kondõ Shuntarõ (b. 1980), and Õmi Toshihiro (b. 1981) have more explicitly connected Buddhism and its institutions with other areas of social activities, thus expanding the narrower traditional "History of Buddhism" into broader historiographical inquiries. For instance, what was the role of Buddhism in the development of modern education or the modern disciplinary institutions? How did the idea of "Buddhism" function in the establishment of "religion" or "art" as modern discourses? What was the ideological and practical role of Buddhism in the formation of panAsianism? How did Buddhism connect with the reception of Marxist theory in modern Japan? How did Japanese Buddhism negotiate the role of women within the emerging modern gender relations? These are, obviously, not simple questions to be

answered in a single monograph; nonetheless, they show us that in terms of both perspective and scope, the field is now thriving as never before.

Major Issues of Modern Japanese Buddhism

As already emphasized, during the nineteenth century Japanese Buddhists faced a number of challenges, ranging from their identity as Buddhists (i.e., the very reconception of Buddhism as a "religion") to their role as subjects of an increasingly larger empire. With that in mind, and for the purposes of this volume, we have divided the voices of nineteenth-century Japanese Buddhists, represented by the twenty-two chapters of this book, into five sections. These sections reflect major issues they faced, as identified in the scholarship summarized above, namely: 1) sectarian reform; 2) the nation; 3) science and philosophy; 4) social reform; and 5) Japan and Asia. The bulk of non-doctrinal writing by Japanese Buddhist authors was in one way or the other devoted to one or several of these themes, which also came to inform their identity, be it primarily sectarian or more integrally Buddhist. Furthermore, none of these issues can be analyzed in a national vacuum; the role of Western precedent, competition, or cooperation is prominent throughout.

Sectarian Reform

The role of comparisons to the West is clear even with regard to the most inward of the five themes, that of sectarian reform. Undoubtedly, the most important trigger of inner reform was the severe criticism Japanese Buddhism faced from a variety of quarters. Confucian-inspired critique had been a mainstay of Tokugawa-period elite discourses since the early seventeenth century. Confucianists attacked the clergy as corrupt and the Buddhist teaching as otherworldly, a distraction from the paramount concerns of real life, that is, ethics. From the eighteenth century onward, the Nativist school of Kokugaku added to the mix with its vitriolic emphasis on the foreignness of Buddhism, supposedly unsuited for Japan. There was not much that was substantially new in the movements of the Late Mito School and Restoration Shinto, which sprang up in the first half of the nineteenth century. They were, however, important conduits for transporting and amplifying older critiques of Buddhism and translating them into action, such as the anti-Buddhist policies of the late Edo period.

A number of these points of criticism were grudgingly accepted by members of the Buddhist clergy, and a precept revival movement, aimed at rooting out the most widespread degenerations that had become the target of criticism, emerged from the mid-eighteenth century, associated with the names of Jiun Onkō (1718–1804) and Fujaku (1707–1781), among others. This movement was prominently continued in the Meiji era by the Pure Land priest Fukuda Gyōkai (1809–1888). Indeed, the concern with monastic rules and the interference of the government into priestly life is the main concern of the first text introduced in this volume, Gyōkai's 1876 "Questions and Answers from Beneath a Snowy Window" (part I, chapter 1), which includes a pointed critique of the contemporary focus of Buddhist priests on conducting funerals for securing their livelihood, a very appropriate object for reform in his eyes.

Institutional reforms were spurred on by the haibutsu kishaku policies and the disestablishment of Buddhism immediately following the Meiji Revolution of 1868. An early example was the establishment of a new regional school for priests by a reform group of the Jōdo Shinshū in Yamaguchi in 1866. The older academies also slowly took up the cause of reform, such as the Takakura Gakuryō of the Ōtani branch of the same sect, which established a Department for the Protection of the Dharma (gohōjō) in 1868, where for the first time texts from other religions, especially Christianity, were studied.

These early reform initiatives, however, were dwarfed by the inner changes the sects underwent during the course of the Meiji period, which some observers have called a "Protestantization" of Japanese Buddhism. Among the observable transformations were standardizations and unifications (such as of the Zen rituals for school founders or of koan phrasebooks) and simplifications and abridgements (such as those rituals in the esoteric schools now deemed too superstitious, or making Shugendõ into a distinct institution). Many of these concrete reforms were notionally based on a new understanding of Buddhism as a "religion," that is, a social system of action fairly clearly delimited, no longer encompassing all walks of life, but restricted to the spiritual dimension. It was by living up to its full potential as an "ideal religion" that Japanese Buddhism might also prove its superiority to the rival Christianity, as Nakanishi Ushirõ argued in his 1889 On Religious Revolution (part I, chapter 2). While this rethinking of the nature of Buddhism by Buddhists themselves began in the early Meiji period, it gained considerable momentum with the formation of the The Fraternity of Puritan Buddhists (Bukkyõ Seito Dõshikai) in 1899 and establishment of its journal Shin Bukkyõ in the following year. As the editorial from the inaugural issue of that journal introduced in this volume (part I, chapter 3) shows, the "New Buddhists" literally derided the "Old Buddhism" as superstitious, while calling for the "improvement of inner character through religious faith."

A genuinely new element of anti-Buddhism had come into play when Christian missionaries began proselytizing and publishing in Japan. They mainly took aim at Buddhist cosmology, rituals, and elements of faith that they viewed as superstitions. A potent weapon they employed in doing so was the historicization of what used to be elements of revelatory religion, following recent trends of liberal theology in Europe and North America. It took Japanese Buddhists until the 1890s to come to grips with this challenge, and only then did a historical approach to scriptural commentary and interpretation begin to take hold. As the authors—it is attributed to Kiyozawa Manshi—of an 1897 editorial for the journal Kyõkai jigen argued (introduced in this volume as part I, chapter 4), the independent study of scripture, unmediated by traditional commentaries, actually aided in understanding the core meaning of sacred texts.

In this way, Japanese Buddhist reform in the Meiji period pervaded both form and content. Institutional reform, educational reform, and the reform of the idea of and scholarship on Buddhism were intimately intertwined. Reform also had from the very beginning an eminently political dimension, which will be explored in the next section.

The Nation

The early modern period in Japan has been characterized as an era of budding nationalism. First articulated as the call for emancipation from Japan's "unforgettable other," China, the incursions by Russia and other Western powers into Japanese territory from the late eighteenth century onward markedly accelerated articulations of proto-nationalism. From the 1830s onward, tracts on national defense appeared, and religion also became a prominent topic in writings on national independence, as a Christian infiltration was seen as a first step toward conquest by the Western nations. Japanese Buddhists were not part of this discourse until the 1850s, when some of them began portraying Buddhism as the ideal bulwark against the spiritual onslaught of Christianity. More than anyone else, it is the Jõdo Shinshü priest Gesshõ who is associated with this movement that sought to protect both the dharma (gohõ) and the nation (gokoku). In his On Protecting the Nation through Buddhism, posthumously published in 1858 and introduced in this volume (part II, chapter 1), Gesshõ explained

how Buddhism, and the Jõdo Shinshü in particular, was the best means to provide spiritual guidance in order to repel the Westerners whose strategy it was to weaken Japan spiritually through the introduction of Christianity.

Efforts at proving the utility of Buddhism in the face of national crisis were prominent in, but not limited to, the Jõdo Shinshü. Given its historically strong rhetorical emphasis on saving the nation, it is no wonder that similar positions could be found in the Nichiren sect in the years immediately preceding the Meiji Revolution. A good example of this is the tract "Upholding Faith in the Buddhadharma and Repaying the Nation" penned by the layman Ogawa Taidõ (1814–1878) in 1863 (part II, chapter 2). He traced the origins of the contemporary political crisis in Japan, its existence threatened by foreign powers, to a "neglect of the Buddhadharma." Tellingly, the way to protect the nation for Ogawa lay in correct practice, which first meant internal reform. This was necessary given the dismal situation Ogawa thought much of current Buddhism to be in.

However, as we have seen above, much to the chagrin of the Japanese Buddhist establishment it was to Shinto that the young government turned as the main building block of post-Restoration religious policy. The separation of the Tokugawa-era link between state and temples and the turmoil in religious policy in the first few years of the Meiji period prompted some of the more perceptive among the clergy to fundamentally rethink the relationship between religion and state, or indeed, to think through this relationship in those terms for the very first time, given that the conceptual framework to do so was just emerging in the Japanese language. It was in particular the Three Articles of Instruction that prompted debate and invited criticism by Buddhists who felt that it was time that Buddhism was recognized as a vital force by the new Meiji state. An already very senior scholar priest joining the debate over the Three Articles of Instruction was Higuchi Ryüon. (1800–1885) of the Jõdo Shinshü. In his 1873 "Lectures on the Three Articles of Instruction" (part II, chapter 3), he argues that the hearts of the people need to unite in order to form a strong nation. Just as the Western nations were built on Christianity, the Japanese nation needed a religious foundation. Concurrently with Higuchi, the idea that Shinto is unsuitable for this task was spelled out most aggressively and most prominently by his fellow Jõdo Shinshü cleric Shimaji Mokurai. This mostly intra-Buddhist discussion coincided in the early 1870s with the debates among the secular intellectuals of the Meiji Six Society (Meirokusha). Although these intellectuals agreed in principle that religion might be useful for uniting the nation, they also saw that a situation of religious plurality might best be dealt with by establishing the separation of religion and state and the freedom of religion. Given the tendency of the early Meiji state to prefer Shinto, this position was attractive to Buddhists, since it promised the protection of their creed, if not as a state cult, then at least as a private religion. This status came to be enshrined in the Meiji Constitution of 1889.

Throughout these early years of the Meiji period, the other predominant political issue that religious groups in Japan were faced with was the question of Christianity. Pressure by the Western imperialist nations to lift the ban against Christianity had grown since the first unequal treaties had been signed beginning in 1854. Finally, its practice was permitted generally since 1873. For most Buddhists, the question was not whether to repel Christianity or not, but how to do so most effectively. A prominent representative of Buddhist intellectuals devoted to the antichristian cause was Ugai Tetsujõ (1814–1891), who (under the pseudonym Kiyü Dõjin) published his textbook for Buddhist priests Laughing at Christianity in 1869 (part II, chapter 4). Ugai largely relies on the old Sino-Japanese tradition of anti-Christian pamphlets dating back to the seventeenth century, which is visible both in the items of

Christian doctrine he singles out for attack as well as in his positive advocacy of a cooperation between Buddhism, Shinto, and Confucianism, which would soon be replaced by a more self-confident stance arguing on the basis of the strength of Buddhism alone.

Refutations of Christianity remained acute for Buddhist scholars well into the Meiji period. They were frequently articulated within a political argument for the predominance of Buddhism, especially before the compromise of the Meiji Constitution. The Shingon priest Shaku Unshõ (1827–1909), for instance, argued that Buddhism had always been the main religion of the Imperial house and was thus fit to be the national doctrine of Japan. In his 1882 work "On the National Doctrine of Greater Japan" (part II, chapter 5), Unshõ, like many of his contemporaries, stressed the need for moral reform of Buddhists themselves before Buddhism could serve as the religion of the nation.

The emphasis on the need for inner reform receded somewhat after the 1880s and was replaced by a more openly articulated support of the new nation-state. A further self-confident Buddhism also began to engage in social reform of society at large. The most pressing concern of Buddhist intellectuals in the 1880s, however, was the commensurability of Buddhism with modern forms of thought, especially modern academic philosophy. This ushered in a debate that was to dominate Buddhist writing in Japan in the 1880s and 1890s, which will be taken up in the next section.

Science and Philosophy

No scholar of religion is a stranger to the old adage that "Buddhism" is a religion compatible with "Science." As Donald S. Lopez Jr. has repeatedly pointed out, the history of this relationship overlaps, in many ways, with the very story of how we came to understand ourselves as "modern."68 In Japan, in particular, this is certainly the case, as both concepts of "science" and "philosophy" were only established in the archipelago through the mediation of a type of "Buddhism" that was, more than a mere "religion," also both "scientific" and "philosophic."

As explained in the previous section, the nineteenth-century (re-) encounter with Christianity functioned for Buddhists everywhere in Japan as a call to arms of sorts. Although earlier critiques such as those by Ugai Tetsujõ had been based on late medieval anti-Christian tracts, and even later works by the likes of Shaku Unshõ still grounded themselves on a highly idealized primeval relationship between Buddhism and the Imperial court, several Buddhists began dabbling in what they regarded as far more sophisticated methods for criticizing Christianity, which in the mid-Meiji context now "threatened" Japan in yet a different way.

With the establishment of European-inspired political institutions in the 1870s and into the 1880s, the question was always present as to which religion Japan should adopt as a nation—or whether it should do so at all. Japanese Christians emphasized that if Japan were to follow in the footsteps of Euro-American nations, it needed Christianity, which was the very ethical cornerstone of those regions. Buddhists, on the other hand, naturally rejected this idea, but the gist of their argument now was no longer Christianity's belligerent character, but its philosophical unsoundness in terms of "science." Sada Kaiseki (1818–1882) (in part III, chapter 1), argued for a uniquely Japanese idea of progress that did not rely on things Western, which led him to dispute the very core of Christian cosmology, suggesting it presented a demiurgical idea of God. Although in some respects disparate even for contemporary eyes, Sada's text does pose questions related to theodicy that, in essence, are meant to convince the reader of the usefulness of Buddhist science as an alternative to the Christian paradigm of modernization.

Although not yet explicitly present in Sada, the recurrent issue of whether Buddhism is a "religion" or "philosophy" was considered in depth by one of his contemporaries, fellow cleric and University of Tokyo instructor Hara Tanzan (1819–1892) (see part III, chapter 2). In the late 1880s this author would claim that, to the extent it cares little about the existence of "ghostly realms" and rather focuses on the elimination of affliction and sickness, Buddhism is not a "religion" but a "philosophy." Influenced by the Japanese translation of Henry S. Olcott's Buddhist Catechism (orig. 1881), Tanzan's statement was a clear reaction against the type of faith-centered concept of "religion" that was starting to take root at the time. That is, in the sense that it is essentially a scientific endeavor, Buddhism was not supposed to be even considered in the same framework as Christianity, a system based entirely on what he regarded as blind belief.

Having attended Tanzan's classes at the University of Tokyo, Inoue Enryõ (1858–1919) (see part III, chapter 3), would take the above discussion one step further and claim that Buddhism was indeed a "religion," albeit a "philosophical" one. In a context in which it was common knowledge that a constitution was in the works—and it was still unknown whether a political system with a state religion would be adopted—attempts to assert Buddhism as superior to Christianity became all the more frequent. The latter was but a "religion" based on emotion, whereas Buddhism, in turn, did share that aspect but went beyond, also constituting what Enryõ dubbed an "intellectual religion" (chiryokuteki shükyõ). He did acknowledge, however, that the Buddhism present in his time was not Buddhism as it should be, and for it to actually function as the true religion of Japan, it needed to be appropriately "revived." What Enryõ argued for, then, was the (re)construction of a Buddhism rooted in reason, which unlike Christianity could guide the nation on the path of modernity.

The issue of constructing Buddhism as a sound "religion" was, therefore, one of the most pressing of Meiji Japan. However, the question also arose of what was, precisely, the scope of this religion: while Christianity was, in the late nineteenth century, presented to the Japanese as a more or less well-defined system, Buddhists still struggled in that regard. Amid the myriad schools and sects of Buddhism, there was no historical consensus as to what should be the core of their teachings, a fact that prompted Meiji Buddhists to distill their canon(s) and produce textual compilations reminiscent of the Christian Bible.

This contemporary demand to present Buddhism as a single religion was, however, not a struggle solely devoted to finding common doctrinal grounds, but also in terms of convincingly presenting the internal consistency of these teachings. It is precisely this issue that Murakami Senshõ (1851–1929), professor of Buddhist Studies at the then Tokyo Imperial University, attempted to address in the intended five volumes of his Discourse on Buddhist Unity, published from 1901. Murakami's work is also, in many senses, a response to contemporary European Buddhologists who presented as most authoritative a version of Buddhism centered on the Pali Canon, dismissing Mahãyãna developments as latter-day corruptions. Murakami, therefore, not only endeavored to produce a synthesis of Buddhist thought, explicating the connection between contemporary Japanese forms and their purported Indian past, but also, as the text translated in this volume (part III, chapter 4) reveals, strove to show the meaning of this unified doctrine in terms of a sound "faith."

From the turn of the century, as Christianity settled in Japan, discussions over the legal status of religion moved toward a consensus. Moreover, European scholars became more receptive to the Mahãyãna as a form of Buddhism worthy of respect, and thus the need to present (Japanese) Buddhism as a philosophical religion in accordance with the principles of science decreased. The new idea of a

reformed, "unified" Buddhism was connected, as seen in the previous section, not only to the rise of harsh critiques of sectarian identity, but also led, ultimately, to the ways in which Buddhists related to society as a whole.

Social Reform

As explained above, internal sectarian reform was a crucial element in the modernization of Japanese Buddhism. Even statements challenging Christianity or Shinto were frequently accompanied by the caveat that only a reformed, modern Buddhism would be able to wield a superiority over other religions. This reformist zeal, however, also affected Buddhist attitudes toward the broader society. Although endeavors in social reform can be seen as reactions to conventional critiques of Buddhism as of a purely otherworldly orientation, they were certainly also driven by genuine religious convictions.

Social engagement by Meiji-period Buddhists took many shapes. One of the earliest, and somewhat less explicit, was their involvement in the movement now referred to as "civilization and enlightenment" (bunmei kaika). The Meiji Six Society included in its ranks important sectarian leaders such as Ishikawa Shuntai (1842–1931) and Shimaji Mokurai, the latter of whom established, with Õuchi Seiran, the journal Hõshi sõdan, one of the first dedicated Buddhist periodicals of modern Japan. Seiran was also the editor of important publications such as the Kyõzon zasshi and the Meikyõ shinshi, as well as an active performer of the enzetsu type of public lecture characteristic of the bunmei kaika era. The translation in part IV, chapter 1 is an example of one such speech by Seiran, in which he emphasizes, from the perspective of a Buddhist, the "spiritual" values of "Eastern Civilization" vis-à-vis its then overestimated "Western" counterpart.

Another early form of social engagement was the establishment of schools. Building on both the early modern heritage of running temple schools and experiences with institutions of priest training, individual Buddhist clerics as well as sects started establishing general schools, as opposed to schools geared toward training the clergy, from as early as the 1870s. As in so many other instances in Meiji-period Buddhist history, the Christian challenge again looms large in the background: Christian missionaries in Japan had founded general purpose non-theological schools since the 1870s. Many of these were schools for instruction in English at first (such as Channing Moore Williams's [1829–1910] English School in Osaka [1870] and Niijima Jõ's [1843–1890] Dõshisha English School in Kyoto [Dõshisha eigakkõ, 1875]), but the net was soon cast wider. Women's education, perceived as lacking by Christian missionaries and converts, was targeted especially. Schools such as Meiji jogakkõ (1885) were set up with Protestant backing, albeit without Christian ceremonies on campus or even overtly Christian educational content.

Given the experience of Buddhist institutions in the field of education, it did not take long before similar institutions with a Buddhist background appeared, such as in the field of women's higher schools. An early example of the latter was Joshi bungei gakusha, founded in 1888 by Shimaji Mokurai. The former Buddhist academies were gradually transformed into modern universities, many of which are still in existence today. Their role for training the future clergy diminished while an increasing majority of students enrolled in general degree programs.

Another Jõdo Shinshü school, the Futsü kyõkõ had opened in 1885 and would be, through new media in general, the breeding ground for several other influential Buddhist social reform organizations in the realms of temperance and outreach to society. Indeed, the proliferation of Buddhist journals—in the 1890s, over a hundred of them existed—points toward the trend of Buddhism interacting with society

in this era. Created by Futsü kyõkõ members, one of these journals, the Hanseikai zasshi (see part IV, chapter 2), made temperance, but also a more general humanism, its goal. Avoiding alcohol was just one step toward moral improvement, this time not aimed at priests, but rather as a movement aimed at society broadly defined.

The conceptual—and practical—jump from reforms of the clergy, to those of laypeople, and eventually those of society at large had to include a reconsideration of the role of women within Buddhism. In a time when universal education became the norm, a number of Buddhists felt the need to address the issue of (in)equality between the sexes, a phenomenon of which the 1888 text by Shimaji Mokurai included in this volume is a clear example (see part IV, chapter 3). Also intended as a critique of the idea that the type of equality between men and women observed in the West was a result of Christian values, Shimaji's text asserted that for Buddhism (and Confucianism) true equality lay in accepting the different roles of both genders. The question of women was also addressed by Tanaka Chigaku, himself a lay follower of Nichiren Buddhism who developed his own organization after having broken with orthodoxy. Tanaka's 1894 On Buddhist Marriage (part IV, chapter 4) not only argues for the marriage of clerics, but more broadly aimed at "correcting the image of Buddhism as unworldly, emphasizing its connectedness to life, society, and the modern state."

By the turn of the century, Buddhist social outreach had multiplied. In theoretical terms, Buddhist thinkers began to grapple seriously with the profound social change wrought by industrialization and with the major political schools already developed in reaction to this in Europe, such as social democracy or state socialism. The Western-educated Shinshü priest Chikazumi Jõkan (1870–1941) situated Buddhism within these trends in his 1904 text The Problem of Faith (part IV, chapter 5). He argued that the historical Buddha had been a social reformer, preaching the equality of people regardless of caste. Among the Buddhists of contemporary Japan, Chikazumi continued, social justice should not remain theoretical but translate into social activism, and he clearly enumerated "workers' education, illness insurance, family assistance, and so on" as fields of action.

Indeed, by the turn of the century, Buddhists had reached out to society in numerous ways. They had founded hospitals and other welfare institutions, employed prison chaplains, sent out military chaplains (see also part V, chapter 2), and engaged heavily in mission work in (mostly) other Asian countries, especially China and Korea. This was part of a more general turn toward Asia, as will be taken up in the next section.

Japan and Asia

Since the Heian period (794–1185), people on the main islands of the Japanese archipelago understood the world as being constituted of three "nations" or "realms." This cosmology is obviously connected to a narrative of how Buddhism reached Japan and can be traced back at least as far as to the works of Saichõ (767–822). This idea was, for the inhabitants of the Japanese archipelago, an essential element in the ingraining of traditional Buddhist cosmology that placed Mt. Sumeru (Shumisen) at the center of the universe. Humankind would reside on a continent located in the southern part of this mountain, of which Tenjiku (which included, but was not necessarily limited to, the Indian subcontinent) occupied the center. Neighboring Tenjiku was Shintan (that is, China) and far in the periphery, almost falling off the edge of the world, was the realm of Japan, or Honchõ *fl. The story of Buddhism, which had its origins in Tenjiku, spread through Shintan, and was then propagated into Honchõ, was itself, in this sense, a narrative of global history.

Although the arrival of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century— and consequently of modern European cartographic knowledge—did bring new developments to this cosmology, the essential narrative of Buddhist history remained. That is, far before the Western idea of "Asia" spread throughout Japan in the course of the Edo period, the story of how Buddhism came to the Japanese islands was already intrinsically connected to imagined versions of the continental mainland. The bakufu's isolationist policy meant, however, that Buddhists in Japan were not allowed more than the imagining of India and China, save perhaps for sporadic contact with visitors from the continent in limited quarters of cities such as Nagasaki. With the "reopening" of the country in the 1850s, along with the easier access to transoceanic transportation, however, Buddhists could now experience the mainland themselves, without the textual filter imposed thus far. That is, besides the encounter with "religion" and a new sense of their role within society, Japan's relationship with "Asia" was one of the issues that would (re)define the character of Buddhism in modern Japan.

The first case of a Japanese Buddhist priest visiting China was that of Ogurusu Kōchō (1831–1905), who traveled not long after the ratification of the Sino-Japanese Amity Treaty in June 1873. However, contrary to the vigorous practice he might have expected, he found Chinese Buddhism to be decadent, a reality that prompted him to draft the text partially translated here (part V, chapter 1), meant to revive Chinese Buddhism on his terms. Calling for cooperation against the common Western enemy, On Protecting the Dharma in Beijing is an essential text that represents the transformation of a theretofore subservient relationship: Japan is no longer the student, but now the teacher, who can save the Chinese dharma from its downfall.

This self-representation as the leader of East Asia was ideologically fundamental for the colonial enterprise, in which Buddhists were to play an important role. With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, Buddhist priests were sent to the continent in order to serve as chaplains, an activity they would continue to perform over the course of all Japan's modern wars. Yamagata Genjō (1866–1903), whose The Iron Scepter is partly translated here (part V, chapter 2), was one such chaplain. A scholar-priest within the Shingon tradition, Yamagata recorded his accounts of the battlefield in diary form, which reveal cooperation with Chinese Buddhists in what he then regarded as "new Japanese territory." A clearer picture of how Buddhist rhetoric was used in order to justify Japan's colonial enterprise can be seen in Shaku Soen's (1860–1919) "The Japanese People's Spirit," a talk given in Manchuria but two years after Japan's 1910 annexation of Korea (see part V, chapter 3). The lecture, obviously aimed at a Japanese audience, presents Japanese superiority in racial overtones that would become all the more frequent over the course of the following decade, alongside discourses on the nation's kokutai.

Yet, the Asian experience was also important in a doctrinal sense. The appropriation of European buddhological knowledge during the late nineteenth century helped to conclusively establish in Japan the idea that Chinese was not the "original" language of Buddhism, and that Sakyamuni's "golden words" were to be found elsewhere. This led Rinzai priest Kawaguchi Ekai (1866–1945) to leave Kobe in 1897 in search of these authentic texts, becoming the first Japanese to enter the "hermit nation" of Tibet in 1901. He recorded his impressions in A Travelogue in Tibet, partly translated in part V, chapter 4. A widely popular text at the time, it shows that, besides his will to garner the "sacred texts" of his tradition, Kawaguchi also saw Tibet as a somewhat inferior nation in terms of civilization, which could again be "illuminated" by the wisdom of his native Japan.

The increasing contact with the Asian reality ultimately changed the way Japanese clergymen and laypeople alike understood their own selves as "Buddhists," in terms not only of their role as leaders of an imagined Asian coalition, but also in the sense of refashioning "Buddhism" as the most essential Pan-Asian construct.

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Many of the chapters below actually concern several of the five dimensions that we have presented and which inform the structure of the book. Anxiety about the nation could fuel sectarian reform; social reform measures were taken up within the framework of the mission in mainland Asia; through educational efforts, the pursuit of new trends in science and philosophy were thought to contribute to sectarian reform. Moreover, the challenge posed by the encounter with the (Christian) West was a contributing factor in all of the instances discussed here, so it will be treated as present within and throughout the five chapters instead of dealing with it separately. We hope that the diversity of the challenges of modernity and of Japanese Buddhists' answers to these challenges becomes palpable in the volume, thus leading to a better understanding of where Japanese Buddhism stands today and how it arrived there. <>

Drifting through Samsara: Tacit Conversion and Disengagement in Goenka's Vipassana Movement by Masoumeh Rahmani. [AAR Academy Series, Oxford University Press, 9780197579961]

In **Drifting Through Samsara**, Masoumeh Rahmani provides a fieldwork-based study of Goenka's Vipassana meditation movement in New Zealand. This group is distinguished by its refusal to identify as Buddhist and by a rich rhetorical repertoire for repackaging Theravada Buddhist teachings in pseudo-scientific and secular language. Drawing from qualitative research, the book examines the way the movement's discourse shapes unique processes and narratives of conversion and disengagement. Rahmani argues that conversion to this movement is tacit and paradoxically results in the members' rejection of religious labels and categories including conversion. Tracing the linguistic changes associated with the process of conversion and increased commitment, she outlines three main disengagement pathways: (1) pragmatic leaving, (2) disaffiliation, and (3) deconversion. Pragmatic leavers are individuals who were disengaged prior to developing a commitment. Rahmani argues that the language of these leavers is characterised by pragmatisms, dualistic discourse, and ambivalence, and their post-disengagement involves an active gravitation towards practices with easily accomplished goals. Disaffiliates and deconverts are individuals who disengaged after years of intense commitment to the movement. One of the distinguishing features of disaffiliation narratives is self-doubt resulting from the movement's ambiguous discourse regarding progress. For these people post-disengagement often involves the retrospective adoption of Buddhist identity.

Rahmani finds that as a consequence of its linguistic strategies, deconversion is a rare exit pattern from this movement. In general, however, the themes and characteristics of both disaffiliation and deconversion fit the contours of exit from other traditions, even though conversion was tacit in

the first place. The book thus questions the normative participant recruitment approach in conversion studies and argues that a simple reliance on the informants' identification with or rejection of religious labels fails to encompass the tonalities of conversion in the contemporary spiritual landscape.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: Vipassana meditation as taught by S. N. Goenka inhabits a niche in the life of many individuals who desire fulfilment through self- transformation, yet who also wish to keep religious traditions at arm's length. Goenka has achieved global popularity by divorcing his teachings of Vipassana meditation from its foundations in Theravada Buddhism and refashioning them in a scientific and world- affirming language. People from various walks of life find themselves in the unique environment of ten- day silent meditation courses where they are asked to disconnect from the external world, commit to a strict code of conduct, and meditate for ten hours per day. While some people are content to experience this novelty once and move on, others become committed meditators, advance to longer courses, and shape a life around this practice. However, regardless of their level of commitment, Vipassana practitioners in New Zealand commonly reject religious labels and conceptualise their commitment in non- religious terms. In fact, the more they are socialised into this movement, the more likely they are to conceive of it as a secular institution; the more they are converted to this movement and its Buddhist worldview, the more likely they are to deny the category of conversion.

This book explores religious disengagement in a context where the concept of conversion is ignored and taken for granted in the first place. A great deal of scholarship on conversion has been limited by taking the informants' rejection of certain categories (for instance, religion, conversion, and Buddhism) at face value. Despite the growing call to view conversion as culturally constituted phenomenon that varies across traditions, the field heavily relies on a person's self- identification as a convert to the point that for decades the etiquette for participant recruitment in conversion studies has (more or less) boiled down to one question: 'Are you a convert?'. One of the aims of this book is to disturb this etiquette in participant recruitment and the normative view of conversion as whatever 'a group or a person says it is'. I argue that this approach fails to encompass the tonalities of conversion in light of an increasing aversion to religious labels and in contexts where people exhibit a certain anxiety about being perceived as religious.

In this book, I introduce the term tacit conversion to describe a peculiar form of conversion that is unacknowledged. The term describes a process whereby increased socialisation into a movement and the adoption of its language paradoxically conceals conversion to the member. Tacit conversion is the

product of a complex interplay of historical, social, cultural, institutional, linguistic, ideological, and biographical structures— all of which I explore in this book. It explains circumstances where there is a disconnect between language and the lived experience, a disconnect between non-religious self-identification and representation of selves that are constructed and interpreted within a particular religious language. Tacit conversion occurs in movements with rich rhetorical repretiore for rejecting associations with religion. Goenka's Vipassana organisation is a case in point; instead of teaching Buddhist meditation, the movement claims to teach a 'scientific', 'non- sectarian', self- development 'tool' based on the 'core teachings of the Buddha' or 'pure Dhamma', which are 'universal' and do not involve religious conversion. Indeed, other studies on this movement have confirmed that almost all Vipassana practitioners reject religious (Buddhist) identities and often self- identify as nones, secular, and even atheists. By introducing the term tacit conversion, I expand the category of conversion in ways that encompass new religious movements (NRMs) with ostensibly blurred religious/ secular boundaries.

In the field of religious disengagement, this book makes two contributions. First and foremost, it explores whether the contours of disengagement from the Vipassana movement are coterminous with other existing models of religious disaffiliation. Second, empirical studies on religious disengagement are primarily built on the experience of individuals who exit a religious tradition after years of participation and commitment. This book explores the characteristics of disengagement narratives, particularly as they occur at early stages of conversion, before the meditator has developed a commitment to the movement. In this regard, this book aims to advance the field of meditation studies by examining what prompts practitioners to stop and effectively disengage from Vipassana meditation. Understanding how disengagement occurs from meditative movements, such as Goenka's Vipassana, has significant implications for expanding our knowledge of the kinds of needs that promote individuals to seek meditation in the first place, as well as assessing the efficacy (or inefficacy) of meditation groups in meeting those needs.

This chapter begins with an introduction to Goenka's Vipassana movement, a description of a standard ten-day Vipassana course and the field site at which ethnographic research for this book was conducted. Next, the chapter briefly introduces the participants involved in this research and provides an overview of some of their shared perspectives including their conception of categories such as religion and spirituality. Finally, the chapter reflects on the recent developments in conversion studies and situates this book within this field. Most notably, it includes my conception of conversion as a process of personal transformation reflected in the adoption of a new universe of discourse and outlines the linguistic approach I have adopted to achieve the objectives of this book.

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Research Design and Personal Orientations

This research engages in a bricolage to create a methodological garment tailored to the context of inquiry: it is an interpretive research informed by reflexive ethnography, in- depth interviews, and a dynamic combination of thematic and structural narrative analysis. This approach responds to the collage of perspectives and theories about conversion and disengagement that influenced this research.

In- depth interviews constitute a substantial portion of the material collected for this research. Between June 2014 and February 2016, I conducted interviews with twenty- six individuals: six old students, four new students, and sixteen individuals who have departed from the movement, all of which were digitally

recorded. Moreover, I conducted follow- up interviews with three individuals who accepted the invitation to be interviewed roughly a year after the initial interview took place. Thus, a total of twenty-nine formal interviews were collected. These culminated in detailed longitudinal reports on two new students (initial interviews were conducted two weeks after their first course and the follow- up interview took place a year later) and a disaffiliate (Damian, the key informant in chapter 4). In addition to formal interviews, I had informal follow- up meetings and conversations with six participants, which also informed the process of this research and substantiated some of my ideas.

Since the participants in this research fall into three main categories (new student, old student, and disengagers), recruitment strategies varied depending on the level of accessibility of each group. For instance, new students could only be accessed at the centre, and therefore recruitment was in person, whereas old students were recruited with the help and promotion of my gatekeeper— the movement's administration— who kindly introduced me to a group of volunteers during the work period.

Facebook constitutes another arena from which a number of participants were recruited. There are several Vipassana public groups on Facebook with over 45,000 members in total. Memberships to these groups are free but require the approval of the page administrator (usually an active member of the community). As a member of these groups, the search graph on Facebook allowed me to identify individuals with reference to their location. Therefore, it was relatively easy to identify New Zealanders affiliated to one of these groups or have simply 'liked' Goenka's Vipassana Facebook page. Additionally, there is a specific group called Vipassana (New Zealand), which hosted approximately 360 members at the time. Through this method, sixty- one individuals were initially contacted and invited to participate in this study. The invitation briefly explained the purpose of the research, the anticipated time of commitment, and my contact details. Twenty- two individuals responded to the initial recruitment message and expressed interest in participating in the study and were thus provided with further details including a copy of the University of Otago Human Ethics consent form and participants' information sheet. From the total of twenty- six participants in this research, eleven individuals (including a number of disengagers) were recruited through this method (two of whom reside in Australia).

Snowball sampling was another method through which a number of disengagers were recruited in this research. Snowball sampling is a type of purposive sampling technique useful for accessing 'hidden populations'. This technique simply relies on a small pool of initial participants to nominate further eligible participants among their existing social networks. This method, although very useful for recruiting hard-to-reach participants, poses a risk of capturing a biased sample group. To avoid this danger, the initial recruited participants were chosen from all three categories (new students, old students, and disengagers) and were asked to nominate only one potential candidate each. Thus, the recruitment of the twenty- six participants consisted of a combination of recruitment in person (ten), via Facebook (nine), and snowball sampling (seven).

Moreover, with the development of the research, the criteria for participant recruitment became narrower in order to address the tonalities of disengagement such as the case study of an individual who no longer understood the world through the prism of Vipassana meditation's teachings— a deconvert. Therefore, I made use of a theoretical sampling approach (commonly used in grounded theory research) to recruit roughly half of the participants. This is because the process of data analysis ran parallel with the data collection.

In this research, I adopted a semi- structured, open- ended interviewing technique, steered to some extent by an interview guide. The aim was to maintain a level of consistency across all interviews while simultaneously allowing participants to build up their narratives at their own pace and to discuss issues they considered important. However, as a result of this flexibility, the length of the interviews varied between forty- five minutes to two hours, although the vast majority of the interviews (eighteen) exceeded sixty minutes (culminating in roughly forty hours of recordings).

Conversion (and disengagement) is not some sort of a physical object 'out there', waiting to be discovered; it is a lived experience of gradual processes. As a researcher, I do not have unmediated access to other peoples' experience; I rely on their retrospective narratives. This study thus involves a double hermeneutics; my interpretation of the participants' narratives that are already imbued with their interpretations of the phenomena. In this book, interpretations were made in relation to the aspects of the wider sociocultural and historical realities that shape and influence the participant, the phenomena, and the participants' understanding of it.

Interpretive research is inevitably value laden since the researchers' biases and assumptions are brought forth in the study. This feature of hermeneutic inquiry has long been the target of oppositional criticism in the social sciences. Some have argued that hermeneutic studies are biased towards the researchers' knowledge and are not true to the participants' lived experience. Correspondingly, Taylor reminds us that human sciences are essentially 'open-ended hermeneutical endeavours' and the knowledge and findings they produce are incomparable with the knowledge desired by the natural sciences. This is directly due to the ontological property associated with human beings— as self- interpreting beings— and therefore the human sciences should not be assessed by the criteria assigned to natural sciences. For example, what a rock may think of itself— at least at this point in history— is irrelevant to the geologist. From this perspective, the knowledge is no longer perceived as the mere reflection of some objective reality, but the construction of a social world. The anchor points have moved towards linguistics and interpretations of the meaning of the lived reality. As a result, the quest for an absolute form of knowledge and validity gives its place to multiple interpretations (or possibilities) of the lived world.

On what basis, then, are we to assess notions of validity and credibility in hermeneutic studies? Kvale suggests, when the dichotomy of facts and values is forsaken, beauty and the ethics of the constructed knowledge come into the foreground. In such circumstances, validation is best understood to resemble the craftsmanship of research. Consequently, in the absence of any fixed measurements, Taylor considers the justified movement from one interpretation to another to be the basis on which interpretations should be weighted, while others emphasise reflexivity. Through self-reflexivity some of the complex political and ideological agendas are brought to the foreground of the research. The aim is to partially undermine the writer's authority so that her/ his interpretations become one perspective with no superior claim to truth or validity.

Due to the interpretive nature of this research, a reflexive approach was adopted to overcome some of the limitations caused by my involvement in this group. Hence, while some researchers may prefer to bracket their views in the hope to see anew, 'as if for the first time', my approach is to acknowledge my orientations and to reflect on the ways in which my position influenced the direction of this research. Moreover, Reich argues that our lived experiences circumscribe the kind of research one is interested in and/ or is best equipped to undertake. In saying this, I do not claim that others cannot understand the

processes of conversion and disengagement in Goenka's Vipassana movement, but that it should not be surprising that the selection of this research topic was strongly intertwined with my personal experience with this movement.

I am a middle- class, Iranian woman, and although I come from a different cultural background, I shared with the participants in this book similar motivations for attending a Vipassana course and somewhat similar reasons for disengaging from it. For instance, like many participants in this research, my attraction to Vipassana was partially motivated by an interest in Buddhism, Asian philosophy, and a desire to learn meditation. Despite these similarities, there are several points of departure that lead to different horizons between my perspective and that of the participants: first, my position as a researcher, which allowed me to reflect on the nature of this organisation without affectional ties. Second, I do not perceive the practice to be evenly beneficial for everyone (including myself). Third, I do not entertain the possibility of attending another course for personal gain— an outlook that situated me in opposition to the vast majority of the participants consulted for this research. Finally, the process of my conversion to this movement was not tacit, and in fact, upon the completion of my first Vipassana course in 2006, I comfortably appropriated a Buddhist identity.

Reflecting on my past, I consider this to be rooted in difference in individual, cultural, and political structures. I was born in a country, which despite its religious hegemony, embodies undercurrents of diversity— from Kabbalists to Eckists, from Bahá^ís to Zen Buddhists. However, these unconventional clusters are not apparent on the surface of the society (of course, except for recognised minority groups such as Armenian Christians and the Jewish community); nor are they accessible to the masses, unless one is born into these groups, or is somehow connected with these networks, for example, through friendship. In my case, access to the Vipassana movement was gained through the latter. After developing a fascination for alternative religions— thanks to Tom Cruise— I began learning about 'world religions', Buddhism, and eventually, I located the nearest meditation centre to my region: the Iranian branch of Goenkás Vipassana meditation (Dhamma Iran) near Tehran.

At that time, my participation at this specific centre required a signed recommendation letter from a committed member, an interview with the centre's management, attendance at an Anapana day course for teenagers, and reading the Farsi translation of The Art of Living. This is to say, by the time that I had sat through Goenkás first evening discourse, I was somewhat aware of the movement's origins, had a rudimentary understanding of its doctrines, and had made a certain effort to be there. In these biographical traits, I am not radically dissimilar from some of the interviewees in this research (most participants expressed prior interest in Buddhist philosophy). The important difference from my experience was that this background knowledge was coupled with the desirability of an unconventional religious identity, in this instance a Buddhist one. Of course, I did not recognise this until I saw myself through the bewildered eyes of Andy Letcher, a substitute lecturer in religious studies, who was taken aback by the presence of an Iranian- Buddhist in his class.

During a long academic break in 2009, I attended another ten-day Vipassana course at Dhamma Dipa in Herefordshire, England. During this visit, and with exposure to academic study of religions, I became interested in the discrepancies between the content of Goenkás teachings and his representations of it to the outside world and subsequently devoted my BA thesis to an analysis of this topic. Concurrently, I drifted away from the movement's ideas and eventually disclaimed the Buddhist identity in favour of atheism. In simple terms, my disengagement was derived, to a degree, from ethical considerations and

was contingent upon individual factors (e.g. the field of education, which allowed me to objectify the movement and my experience of it).

By the time I commenced my postgraduate research, every person I knew from Goenka's Vipassana movement had effectively disengaged from this practice— some had joined other movements. Given that the technique of Vipassana meditation aims for 'deconditioning' the participants' understanding of the conventional self and reality, I was fascinated to understand the ramification of disengagement on the practitioners' perspectives and worldview. For instance, I was interested in whether (and how) the individual reintegrates into mainstream culture and its dominant understanding of reality. However, during the early stages of data collection (and the analysis phase), it became clear that there were disconnections between the participants' self- representations and the lived experiences they narrated; I became enthralled with the role of language in this process. Consequently, the anchors of my study shifted towards exploring these disconnections and explaining their implications on disengagement trajectories.

Given this biographical context, my position on the insider/ outsider continuum is complex, to say the least. In a narrow sense, and based on my previous lived experiences, I am an insider: I have an understanding of the technique of Vipassana meditation and Goenka's teachings of it; I am also familiar with certain explicit and implicit codes of behaviour that define a meditator's role within the premise of the meditation centre. From an institutional perspective, I am considered as an old student.

However, in relation to the old students, Vipassana teacher(s), and even some of the former meditators in this research (who had several years of intense participation), I am an outsider to an extent. In addition to the gap between the richness of our lived experiences, these individuals have certain insider knowledge that it is inaccessible to me. For instance, advanced course materials (e.g. Goenka's instructions for the twenty- day courses) are only available to advanced students who attend these courses, and therefore my understandings of these materials are not derived from personal experience.

More importantly, regardless of my position in relation to the institutional insider/ outsider boundaries, I am also an outsider to the cultural context of the research participants (New Zealand). While my cultural heritage has certainly shaped who I am as a researcher, I argue that, in the context of this research, my outsider position enabled me to question the function of certain Western cultural structures in ways that previous scholarship has neglected (simply because most scholars operate from within the same structures and consequently are at the risk of taking certain ideologies for granted). In other words, my unique outsider position to the culture of New Zealand allowed me to perform the task of the flâneur, classically described by Walter Benjamin.

Further complicating my position in relation to this movement and the participants in this research (i.e. old students) is my role as a researcher and the type of counter-institutional research I have undertaken in this study. That is, the comparisons I draw between the categories of religion and spirituality, conversion and self-transformation, the movement and religious organisation, and so forth are not particularly favoured, approved, or supported by the movement, or the insider's perspective. Indeed, people's attitudes towards this research ranged from interest and curiosity to suspicion, depending on where they positioned themselves on the insider/ outsider boundary and how they construed my positionality.

Given that from its inception this research was focused on disengagement, within the field, I frequently faced the questions of motivation— 'Why are you focusing on the negative side?' In order to negotiate my role as a researcher in such contexts, I exemplified my own previous involvement with the practice, and expressed my genuine interest in wanting to understand the effects of disengagement on participants' understanding of self and reality. In the most unexpected scenario, I became the subject of an interview myself. That is, one of my initial interviews turned on its head towards the end, as the interviewee revealed their role within the organisation and noted that their participation was partially motivated by a curiosity to learn what the research was about. While claiming that the movement is 'indifferent' to and 'ambivalent' towards outside research, this participant expressed a personal interest to learn whether the findings about the cause of disengagement can help the movement deliver a 'better product'. Given that this interview occurred before I gained access to the field, I suspect that my conversation with this participant influenced my access to the field.

Outline of the Book

The first chapter provides an overview of the participants' biographical narratives and scrutinises the changes associated with language at different levels of religious participation and commitment in order to distinguish disengagement pathways in subsequent chapters. In that chapter, I adopt Gooren's (2010) conversion career model as a heuristic framework to achieve the abovementioned objectives in a coherent manner. I see the linguistic transformation involved in the process of conversion analysable in two gradations of conversion and commitment. Therefore, I divide this chapter into four sections: the first section explores the participants' preaffiliation context by looking at their biographical narratives and the practices they engaged with prior to their introduction to Vipassana meditation. The second section reflects on practices that mark formal affiliation to Goenkás movement and the significance of these for the process of conversion. The third section reflects on the sociocultural and institutional factors that harbour participants' rejection of the category of conversion and the Buddhist identity. This section subsequently proceeds with detailed exploration of the participants' language, and the linguistic patterns associated with their transition to conversion. The final section on commitment depicts the characteristics of a core member identity based on the meditators' language, reasoning, and their self-representation or performance of the Vipassana meditator's role. I therefore use the linguistic markers explored in this chapter (conversion and commitment) to distinguish two broad disengagement pathways: (1) pragmatic leavers, who disengaged prior to the development of commitment, and (2) disaffiliates, who disengaged after years of intense commitment (see figure I.5).

The second chapter introduces the concept of tacit conversion as an analytical framework for conceptualising the process of personal transformation and increased commitment to Goenkás Vipassana movement. This chapter is based on a detailed examination of an old student's language and his performance of the role of a Vipassana meditator. My analysis in this chapter is inspired by Stromberg's (1993) linguistic approach to conversion narratives. By paying attention to the content of speech, as well as other modalities of communication, including the inflections, tonalities, and the delivery of the narrative, I illustrate that committed old students essentially perform a narrative that in many ways resemble what have been categorised as 'conversion narratives' in other traditions. Moreover, this chapter outlines several themes central to the participants' experience of self-transformation such as self- acceptance, agency, and the mind- body relationship.

The third chapter explores the linguistic characteristics of the narratives of pragmatic leavers, which represent the accounts of those individuals who disengaged prior to developing commitment and therefore had minimum exposure to this movement. Because empirical studies on exit are primarily built upon the experience of those individuals who leave a movement after long periods of intense devotion and commitment, this chapter prioritised a descriptive approach in order to adequately depict this phenomenon. Accordingly, I argue that pragmatic leavers are (to some extent) experience seekers, and their narrative plots were amenable to the types of meditative experiences they had (traumatic, unpleasant, or extraordinary). I present three interrelated themes that characterised the language of these disengagement narratives— (1) pragmatism, (2) dualistic discourse, and (3) ambivalence— and demonstrate how each narrative differs based on a particular dynamic between these features.

The fourth and fifth chapters explore disaffiliation narratives and disaffiliation trajectories respectively. Disaffiliation narratives describe the accounts of those individuals who disengaged after years of intense commitment to the movement. Through a detailed linguistic analysis of a case study, I argue, in the fourth chapter, that Vipassana disaffiliation narratives are characterised by an ambivalent language, which involved the participants' ongoing convictions about the transformative efficacy of the technique and a certain doubt about their own abilities to progress towards enlightenment. The fifth chapter thus goes on to outline the two common disaffiliation trajectories based on the manner these doubts were dealt with: (1) drifters in samsara, and (2) pursuers of the gateless gate. This chapter illustrates that a phenomenon known as deconversion (migration outside the movement's universe of discourse) rarely occurs in the context of tacit conversion.

The sixth chapter explores deconversion as the third and final disaffiliation trajectory. Through a detailed exploration of a single case study, this chapter explores the narrator's attempt to flee the movement's universe of discourse. In this chapter, I introduce the term authenticity talk to refer to a style of discourse that functions both as (1) a recourse for self- reconstruction postexit and (2) a rhetoric that provided the narrator with a sense of autonomy, empowerment, and self- validation. I claim that the disengagement literature takes authenticity talk at face value and mistakenly conceives of it as an actual motive behind exit.

The concluding chapter summarises the findings of this study and its contributions to the existing scholarship. The chapter subsequently addresses the limitations of this work and ends with a note on the implications of this study for future research. <>

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