Wordtrade Reviews: The Historic Grammar Where I Come From

Contents

Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

WHERE I COME FROM: STORIES FROM THE DEEP SOUTH
by Rick Bragg [Knopf, 9780593317785]

From the best-selling, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of *All Over but the Shoutin'* and *The Best Cook in the World,* a collection of his irresistible columns from *Southern Living* and *Garden & Gun*

A collection of wide-ranging and endearingly personal columns by the celebrated author, newspaper columnist, and Pulitzer Prize winner Rick Bragg, culled from his best-loved pieces in Southern Living and Garden & Gun.

From his love of Tupperware ("My Affair with Tupperware") to the decline of country music, from the legacy of Harper Lee to the metamorphosis of the pickup truck, the best way to kill fire ants, the unbridled excess of Fat Tuesday, and why any self-respecting southern man worth his salt should carry a good knife, *Where I Come From* is an ode to the stories and the history of the Deep South, written with tenderness, wit, and deep affection--a book that will be treasured by fans old and new.

Review

"Eye-popping... Eclectic... Without even trying, Bragg explains why it is humans came to believe in miracles... The larger slices of southern life are the most welcome (the reader often is still hungry when the tidbits end)"
--*USA Today* 3.5 out of 4 stars

"Bragg's unfeigned writing, knowing truisms and funny advice holds strong throughout this stress-allaying book."
--The *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*

"Bragg's secret sauce is his combination of crisp description, never-ending humor (occasionally pathos) and insight into his brain. He takes the things we think of as common and stands them on their heads. If ever we need a little funny, it is now. And this is Bragg's present to you."
-–*The Florida Times-Union*

"Reads as if designed for our current short-attention-span state, many of the pieces just a couple of pages long, each of them offering a dose of humor or nostalgia or adventure or, quite often, descriptions of food that make you feel you can't live another minute without a plate of fried chicken."
--*Tampa Bay Times*

"*Where I Come From* is vintage Bragg: comforting, thought-provoking and as heartfelt as it gets."
--*BookPage*

"A generous helping of folksy wit and charm... There are laugh-out-loud moments throughout."
--*Publishers Weekly*

"Poignant... The columns are clever, unassuming, and, most notably, told in a distinctive voice. They do what good columns do: sometimes tug at your heart, sometimes make you laugh to yourself, sometimes both. You read one and then go on with your day with a better sense of what it's like to be from somewhere."
--*Kirkus Reviews*

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Why Momma Loves Me Anyway

For half a century, I have failed at getting my mother a thoughtful gift for Mother's Day. I thought, as I stared at the pitiful condition of her kitchen's screened door, I had found a thing that could not miss. It was not just that the screened door could no longer keep out the flies; I was not altogether certain a turkey buzzard, or a pterodactyl, could not glide through. I headed for the hardware store, but I didn't even make it out of the driveway before my conviction came apart like that raggedy door.

You might think Mother's Day would be easy for me. I have written about her for three decades and should have her figured out. But in all that time, the only truly adequate gift I have given her was two grocery bags full of pork fat, but that is another story. One hit in a thousand dear misses.

I got her a classic, two-tone blue 1956 Chevrolet. She used it as a greenhouse. I got her a house. It had too many lightbulbs. I got her another. The driveway is too steep. I got her false teeth.

She spit them out in the weeds, just outside Pell City, Alabama.

It all failed. Jewelry is frivolous. Cute stuff and doodads gather dust twelve-deep on the windowsills. "How many piggy banks," she asked me once, "does a poor woman need?" Cut flowers sometimes made her sad; live flowers required digging a hole.

Finally, I decided to sit down with a No. 2 pencil and list the things I knew she enjoyed.

This amounted to good coffee, snuff, Westerns, and TV preachers who preach the Full Gospel and have excellent piano players. She is, as we have written here, also fond of mariachis.

I crossed them off one by one. You will pay hell getting a mariachi to do a command performance at the end of our driveway, and I am pretty sure I cannot afford a TV preacher. Westerns, then? I considered DVDs—which she calls "them little round things"—of her favorites, but that would require teaching her to use the DVD player, and there is no time for that, she said, before the Lord comes back

Snuff, then? And coffee? She said I was wasting money, and it was a sin to waste it on such vices.

"They're YOUR vices," I said.

But that door, now, that door needed to be replaced. But first, I asked her. I should have known better.

"Can't," she said.

"Why?" I said.

"The cats," she said.

"What do the cats have to do with it?" I said.

"The cats tore it up in the first place, hangin' on it. It would be foolish to get them a nice, brand-new door, just to hang on and tear it up like they've done."

The terrifying thing is, she kind of made sense. <>

METAPHYSICAL AFRICA: TRUTH AND BLACKNESS IN THE ANSARU ALLAH COMMUNITY by Michael Muhammad Knight [Africana Religions, Penn State University Press, 9780271087092]

The Ansaru Allah Community, also known as the Nubian Islamic Hebrews (AAC/NIH) and later the Nuwaubians, is a deeply significant and controversial African American Muslim movement. Founded in Brooklyn in the 1960s, it spread through the prolific production and dissemination of literature and lecture tapes and became famous for continuously reinventing its belief system. In this book, Michael Muhammad Knight studies the development of AAC/NIH discourse over a period of thirty years, tracing a surprising consistency behind a facade of serial reinvention.

It is popularly believed that the AAC/NIH community abandoned Islam for Black Israelite religion, UFO religion, and Egyptosophy. However, Knight sees coherence in AAC/NIH media, explaining how, in reality, the community taught that the Prophet Muhammad was a Hebrew who adhered to Israelite law; Muhammad's heavenly ascension took place on a spaceship; and Abraham enlisted the help of a pharaonic regime to genetically engineer pigs as food for white people. Against narratives that treat the AAC/NIH community as a postmodernist deconstruction of religious categories, Knight demonstrates that AAC/NIH discourse is most productively framed within a broader African American metaphysical history in which boundaries between traditions remain quite permeable.

Unexpected and engrossing, METAPHYSICAL AFRICA brings to light points of intersection between communities and traditions often regarded as separate and distinct. In doing so, it helps move the field of religious studies beyond conventional categories of "orthodoxy" and "heterodoxy," challenging assumptions that inform not only the study of this particular religious community but also the field at large.

Reviews

"In METAPHYSICAL AFRICA, Michael Muhammad Knight demonstrates a substantial grasp of the origins and "inner workings" of the AAC-NIH in a refreshingly fulsome fashion. With a wonderful fusion of journalistic zeal and scholarly rigor, each chapter of this book lends itself to an intriguing, insightful representation of a profoundly dynamic Black religious worldview coming into its own."—Juan M. Floyd-Thomas, coauthor of *The Altars Where We Worship: The Religious Significance of Popular Culture*

"This book is the best study yet of the Ansaru Allah Community/Nubian Islamic Hebrews' teachings, a major leap forward in understanding the history of this much-misunderstood group. Michael Muhammad Knight departs from existing scholarly literature on the movement by showing the continuities as well as

the changes in the group's religious thought, particularly concerning the place of its Islamic identity, and analyzes the coherence of the system rather than dismissing it as a senseless hodgepodge of a mad prophet."—Edward E. Curtis IV, editor of *The Practice of Islam in America: An Introduction*

"**METAPHYSICAL AFRICA** is significant as it provides close readings of the primary AAC/NIH materials, many of which have never been examined seriously. Michael Muhammad Knight convincingly discusses the internecine arguments over the nature of Islam, Africa, and blackness for African American religious movements."—Nora L. Rubel, author of *Doubting the Devout: The Ultra-Orthodox in the Jewish American Imaginatio*

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"The Most Dynamic Pamphlets in History"

Many experienced their first glimpse of the imam via a poster that appeared on subway station walls around the turn of the 1980s. He stands in a white robe and turban, his hands open in invitation. His forehead bears the bruise associated with frequent *sujdah* (prostration); his upper left cheek bears three parallel scars, his tribal marks. His body is framed by two territories—a red outline of the United States, captioned "WEST," and a green outline of Africa, marked "EAST"—and a variant of the Prophet Muhammad's seal, reading *la ilaha illa Allah* (there is no god but Allah). Above his head, in elegant Arabic calligraphy, we find *bismillahir rahmanir rahim* (in the Name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful); at his feet, the caption *al-Mukhlas*, rendered in Arabic with the English translation "The Purifier."

"NOW!!!" the poster commands, "RECEIVE THE ANSWERS TO LIfE-LONG QUESTIONS!!!" Promising "the most dynamic pamphlets in history," the poster offers a list of 116 publications. Scanning the titles, a reader might recognize some as anchored in Islam: *Ninety-Nine Plus One Names of Allah*; *Why Allah Should Not Be Called God*; *Why the Veil?*; *Why the Beard?*; *Fast of Ramadaan*; *Series of Hadith*; *Bilal*; *Qur'an Arabic Lesson One*. Other titles seem to express a Christian orientation (*Christ Is the Answer*; *Understanding the Book of Revelation*; *Opening of the Seventh Seal*; *Leviathan: 666*) or a commitment to the recovery of African heritage (*Yoruba*; *Great African Kings*; *Ancient Egypt and the Pharaohs*; *Science of the Pyramids*; *Tribal Encyclopedia*). Still others suggest an interest in various "metaphysical" traditions

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commonly grouped together as "New Age" (*What's Your Astrology Sign Brother?*; *Science of Healing*; *The Lost Children of Mu and Atlantis*). At the bottom right corner, the poster invites its reader to visit the Ansaru Allah Community at its flagship location on Brooklyn's Bushwick Avenue: "DO IT NOW! TIME IS RUNNING OUT!" (fig. 1).

Throughout cities in the northeastern United States, the Ansar became a well-known presence through male members' soliciting donations and peddling literature while dressed in their white turbans and robes (fig. 2). Community members even became visible on MTV, appearing in the videos of affiliated artists such as KMD and The Jaz (featuring a very young Jay-Z, whose lyrics reference Ansar concepts). Throughout the 1980s, the Ansar remained a compelling presence in the heartlands of Black Islam, particularly cities of the northeastern United States.

In the early 1990s, the community relocated from Brooklyn to a commune in the Catskills, and in 1993 it migrated to a 476-acre property in rural Georgia. The latter move accompanied an apparent self-reinvention using a bricolage of materials that included coontemporary UFO-centered religions, Freemasonry, New Age modes of mysticism and healing, and traditions of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia. Popularly known as Nuwaubians, the community members now regarded their leader as a visitor from the planet Rizq, in the nineteenth galaxy, Illyuwn. For outside observers, the community's definitive features would become its eclectic references and seemingly incoherent self-identification, as it followed its leader in and out of various affiliations, faith convictions, codes of dress, and ritual practices in accordance with his whims.

In 2002, the man from the poster having been taken into police custody, a force of three hundred FBI, ATF, and local law enforcement personnel stormed the community's land with armored trucks and helicopters, seizing weapons and cash and taking control of the property. Media coverage of the event marveled at the commune's unique architecture (including a black pyramid with gold trim seemingly styled after the Kaʿba in Mecca), and at the community's interest in pharaonic Egypt and belief that its leader was an extraterrestrial. As of this writing, the man from the poster, a convicted sexual predator in his seventies, is serving a sentence of more than one hundred years at the ADMAX facility in Florence, Colorado.

This book examines the public discourse of a community that has defied easy categorization, in part because both the community and its leader appear to have undergone numerous intellectual and aesthetic makeovers since its origins at the end of the 1960s. Self-identified through the 1970s and '80s as the Ansaru Allah Community (AAC) and/or the Nubian Islamic Hebrews (NIH), the community provoked questions of religious categorization and the modes through which its boundaries are constructed, in both popular and academic contexts (fig. 3). What exactly did it mean to be an "Islamic Hebrew"? Were members of the community Muslim or Jewish? Did they blend different religious traditions in a new mash-up all their own? When they changed their community's name and dress codes, did they also switch religions? How did the community make sense of these changes? And how were categories of "Islam" and "Judaism" affected by the community's interest in the themes of ancient Egypt and Scholarship on the AAC/NIH begins with a sectarian polemic. The main secondary source on the community in the 1980s, Abu Ameenah Bilal Philips's *The Ansar Cult in America* (1988), was published by Riyadh-based Tawheed Publications with the stated intention of exposing Al Hajj Imam Isa Al Haadi Al Mahdi—the man from the poster—as a heretical charlatan who had transgressed the boundaries of

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Islam. The tract includes remarks on an earlier draft from Saudi Arabia's Presidency of Islamic Research, Ifta and Propagation, which offers suggestions on how to better clarify the AAC/NIH's "falsehood, shamefulness, and remoteness from the correct path"; Philips comments that the finished volume represents his fulfillment of that mandate. The book's introduction, by Ahmad Muhammad Ahmad Jalli, associate professor of Islamic theology at King Saud University, places the AAC/NIH within what Jalli terms the "Baatinite (esoteric) movement," a phenomenon that he defines as including all of Shi'ism, along with the Druze, Baha'ism, the Ahmadiyya, and other traditions. This apparently monolithic "Baatinite movement," Jalli says, has "attempted to destroy the Islamic faith and lead a revolt against the teachings of Islamic law by employing free interpretations of the religious texts, claiming that all texts have an outer obvious meaning known only to the masses and an inner hidden meaning known only to a select few initiates." Such groups, he warns, "wear the cloak of Islaam while striving to destroy it from within." Relying on post-1975 media and interviews with estranged former members, Philips divides AAC/NIH history into four stages of development: "Foundation," "Mahdism," "The Christ" (in which Al Mahdi identifies himself as the returning Jesus), and finally "God Incarnate" (in which Al Mahdi exploits Sufism's "mystical short-cuts" and the "aberrant philosophy" of medieval Andalusian master Ibn al-'Arabi for his own gain).

Philips's division of AAC/NIH history into clear "stages," each marked by clear doctrinal shifts, name changes, and redesigned symbols and uniforms, became the standard narrative by which the community would be understood, perhaps informing even its own narratives. Scholarly treatments have defined the community as marked by constant change, serial mass conversions, and abrupt pivots between identities. These accounts, however, disagree with one another as to the community's precise trajectory. Among claims found in academic literature, we read that the AAC/NIH started as a Jewish group and later became Muslim;[5] started as a Muslim group and later became Jewish; "began to sound more specifically Islamic" after 1973, its leader claiming descent from the Prophet in 1988; started as a spinoff from the Nation of Islam but later abandoned racialist doctrines to become Qur'an-centered "fundamentalists"; developed unique doctrines to compete with "orthodox" Muslims and then became more Bible-centered;[9] sought greater conformity with "orthodox" Muslims by the start of the 1990s;[10] grew open to reform in the 1980s with input from the Sudanese Mahdiyya but ignored Mahdiyya objections to its Bible usage; broke ties with the Sudanese Mahdiyya in 1980; and ultimately reoriented itself around Christ's imminent return. Rather than attempt to sort this out with a comprehensive engagement of the community's immense literary output over time, scholarship has taken it for granted that the community has no interest in making sense to itself or outsiders. As NRM (New Religious Movement) studies supplanted Islamic studies as the primary academic field giving attention to the AAC/NIH, the community began to be treated as a movement of esotericist deconstruction, led by a gnostic trickster for whom instability, self-contradiction, and doctrinal incoherence serve as teaching exercises.

This book takes a different approach. Examining decades' worth of AAC/ NIH books, pamphlets, newsletters, and lecture tapes, it tells a story not only of transformations but also of continuities. I resist assumptions that the movement pinballed at random between categories of "Islam," "Judaism," "New Age," "UFO religion," and "Egyptian religion." Instead of emphasizing serial reinvention, the following discussion examines rhetorical threads through which the community maintains its sense of coherence.

Specifically, this book engages the Ansaru Allah Community/Nubian Islamic Hebrews with an interest in the movement's vision of "metaphysical Africa." I owe the term to Catherine Albanese's "metaphysical

Asia," which she employs in *A Republic of Mind and Spirit* to describe the ways in which Americans reinvented Asia "according to their Americanized metaphysical categories."[15] Metaphysical Asia signifies the reconstruction of essentialized "Eastern spirituality" under an American metaphysical rubric that features themes of mental powers, energy, healing, and the mind-body relationship, and includes not only practices of meditation and physical wellness but also traditions popularly termed "magical" or "occult." Finally, the concept of metaphysical Asia speaks to the ways in which an interest in "Eastern spirituality" engages "world religions" such as Hinduism and Buddhism while potentially rewriting them in American conceptual vocabularies.

American metaphysical religion, while marked by claims of "universal" wisdom and spirituality, often expresses the governing prejudices of its mostly white advocates. Among the traditions that typically undergo appropriation under the "New Age" rubric—Hinduism and yoga, Tibetan Buddhism, Zen, indigenous American religions, Amazonian shamanism, Taoism, Christian gnosticisms, Jewish Kabbalah— we do not typically encounter traditions of Africa (apart from pharaonic Egypt). Nor does the New Age pool of resources typically include Islam, beyond a particular construction of Sufism that imagines Sufi traditions and figures such as Rumi as separate from Islam.

Parallel to the white intellectual traditions covered in Albanese's account, there were also African American esoteric traditions that often resonated with white esotericisms and white imaginaries of a vast, undifferentiated "Orient" but sometimes differed in their resources. Susan Palmer, author of a monograph on the Nuwaubians, observes that what she calls the "black cultic milieu" is essentially unknown to "white New Agers." In contrast to white practitioners, Black metaphysical religionists have often claimed timeless and universal spiritual truths in ways that prioritized Africa (not only Egypt) and Islam (not only Sufism) as their centers. In the early twentieth century, the Great Migration of African Americans from the rural south into northern cities provoked transformations of African-derived hoodoo tradition, characterized by increasing commercialization in a metaphysical marketplace of mail-order companies and individual practitioners advertising goods and services in Black newspapers. Practitioners claiming titles such as "African scientist," "Mohammedan scientist," "Mohammedan Master of Stricter African Science," and "Arabian Mystic Seer and Master of the Ancient Mysteries," and claiming origins in Nigeria, Zulu South Africa, and the Sudan advertised their expertise to serve clients' medical, spiritual, and magical needs. These Africa-centering practitioners did not exist in a separate universe from Black religious thought and liberation struggles. The patron of occult "African science" could also have an interest in the glories of ancient Black civilizations, the true place of Black people in the Bible, the Egyptian and Ethiopian origins of Freemasonry, Black liberation in the United States, and anticolonial movements across the globe. The question of Jesus Christ's true race, esoteric reinterpretations of Christ's divinity and recovery of his "lost years" spent undergoing initiation in Egypt and India, the lost "Oriental" powers of occult African, "Mohammedan," and "Hindoo" sciences, and resistance against both domestic and worldwide white supremacy do not need to be compartmentalized into distinct "religious," "magical," and "political" dimensions. These concerns often occupied the same spaces and compelled the same thinkers.

Across the twentieth century, metaphysical Africa developed as a tradition of sacred geographies and enchanted genealogies, affirming Blackness as a unique spiritual gift and destiny. Melanin theorists argued that thanks to greater melanin concentrations in the pineal gland, Black people were naturally inclined toward greater mental, emotional, and physical wellness, extraordinary philosophical insight, sensitivity

to other humans' magnetic fields, and the ability to access information from unexpected places—as in Frances Cress Welsing's claim that George Washington Carver obtained his botanical knowledge from the plants themselves, as they "talked to his melanin." In Afrocentric thought, melanin theory sometimes serves as a counter to "ancient aliens" narratives that reduce human agency and attribute marvels of the ancient world to extraterrestrial intervention. While white occult writer Robert K. G. Temple argued that the Dogon tribe in Mali possessed advanced knowledge of the star Sirius B that could only be attributed to the tribe's tutelage under extraterrestrial teachers, Welsing suggested that the Dogon achieved this knowledge independently through their extrasensory intuition, a power credited to superior pineal glands.

This "metaphysical Africa" can also include Egyptocentrism, the identification of pharaonic Egypt with Black Africanity, particularly the construction of biological, historical, and spiritual or philosophical linkages between pharaonic Egypt and African diasporas in the Americas. Egyptocentrism (and Egyptosophy, a romanticization of ancient Egypt as the original source of all esoteric and/or occult knowledge) has become a prominent dimension of Afrocentrist thought, though Afrocentrism and Egyptocentrism should not be conflated and sometimes even appear in tension with each other. Some Afrocentrists prefer the wisdom traditions of Yoruba over those of the pharaohs, or identify with enslaved Hebrews rather than with their Egyptian oppressors. The African Hebrew Israelite community founded by Ben Ammi in the 1960s, to take just one sample from a diverse pool of Black Hebrew traditions, identifies Israel as "northeast Africa." Other seekers of metaphysical Africa, envisioning the entire continent as a singular cultural entity, conceive of a comprehensive "African spirituality" that includes Yoruba and Kemetism, as well as the African roots of "Abrahamic" religions. Advocates of African spiritualities might assert that the West has unfairly misrepresented indigenous traditions of Egyptian *neteru* and Yoruba *orishas* as polytheistic, or instead defend polytheism against Western monotheist hegemony; these claims can also appear in the same argument.

Islam entered into this matrix through various portals: occult practitioners who envisioned Africa as a land of magical, mysterious "Mohammedan science"; Masonic orders' appropriations of Islam to evoke a "mystic Orient"; non-Muslim writers such as J. A. Rogers and Edward Blyden, who praised the "Muslim world" as a realm of greater egalitarianism and historical Black glory; transnational Ahmadiyya networks and other Muslim diasporas; and what Cemil Aydin terms a "Third World internationalism" characterized by interactions between anticolonial, pan-Islamist, and pan-Asianist movements throughout the world. Aydin points to the encounter in London between Caribbean pan-Africanist Marcus Garvey and Sudanese-Egyptian pan-Islamist Duse Mohamed Ali, and their continued collaboration when Ali visited Garvey in the United States. American visions of Islam as innately connected to Blackness did not develop from one singular root, but rather from a multiplicity of entangled genealogies. In Duse Mohamed Ali's *African Times and Orient Review*, we find writings by Muslim religious reformers, pan-Africanists, and pan-Asianists, but also by theosophists such as Annie Besant, whom the journal praised as "among the first rank of sane thinkers."

Muslim movements such as the Moorish Science Temple and the Nation of Islam emerged from this context of polyculturalism, transnational connections, and creative activity. Noble Drew Ali engaged New Thought narratives of Jesus as an initiate of mystery schools, composed his *Holy Koran* by appropriating metaphysical texts such as Levi H. Dowling's *Aquarian Gospel of Jesus the Christ*, and claimed mystical initiation at the Pyramid of Cheops. As an Islamic prophet, he taught African Americans that

they were not "Negroes" but rather Moors and "Moslems," and that he was divinely chosen to restore their lost nationality and religion. A close read of the Supreme Wisdom Lessons, the teachings of Nation of Islam founder Master Fard Muhammad and his student successor, Elijah Muhammad, reveals metaphysical webs in which the Nation developed, engaging popular imaginaries of Moses as a master occultist and Jesus as a mystery school initiate, as well as New Age discourses on the power of the mind, magnetic attraction, and godhood as realization of one's inner nature. The Lessons did not present their knowledge as new or historically specific, but rather as the timeless truth of a primordial, self-created Black Man who was a "righteous Muslim" by his very nature.

Elijah Muhammad's vision of Islam informed his vision of Blackness. As Edward E. Curtis IV has observed, the Nation "constructed black identity in terms of a shared history that was defined by its Islamic character." This construction both opened and limited the Nation's encounter with African cultures and spiritualities. While Elijah Muhammad conceptualized Blackness as eternal and divine, he was by no means an Afrocentrist. Elijah recognized pharaonic Egypt as a Black achievement, but his ideas about non-Muslim African cultures also upheld white supremacist tropes. Elijah's "Asiatic" Blackness was definitively *not* African; while Ben Ammi reconceptualized Israel as "northeast Africa," Elijah redefined the African continent as "East Asia." The Messenger spoke disparagingly of non-Muslim African cultures and condemned the "savage dress and hair-styles" of African cultural revivalism in the 1960s, lamenting that many Black people in America, seeking the "love of Black Africa," had embraced "the jungle life."

The Nation's aspirations toward globalized Muslim "orthodoxy" after Elijah Muhammad's death in 1975, coupled with immigration reform that radically changed American Muslim demographics, altered the relation between Islam and Blackness. In the later twentieth century, numerous Afrocentrist intellectuals viewed Islam as an alien culture of Arab supremacy that had only entered Africa via invasion and slavery. Afrocentrists subjected Islam to the same critiques with which the Nation had denounced Christianity, presenting Islam as non-Black and even as a force of anti-Blackness. In what Sherman Jackson has termed "Black Orientalism," conversion to Islam lost much of its capital as a performance of Black "racial/cultural 'orthodoxy,'" becoming repositioned as an embrace of Arab and South Asian cultures and even as a rejection of Blackness. When "Blackamerican Muslims began to show signs of being culturally and intellectually overrun by immigrants," Jackson writes, "they began to draw the charge of cultural apostasy." For many who sought to recover an indigenous African spirituality, Islam became untenable.

While some Afrocentrists treated Islam as inauthentically African, many Muslim communities also treated Black African cultures as illegitimate experiences of Islam. Writing on troubled histories between Black and Muslim identities, Su'ad Abdul Khabeer argues that amid "chronic disavowal" of Blackness in Muslim communities, "American Muslims, Blacks and non-Blacks, rarely think of Africa as an archive for Islamic authenticity and authority," and "Africa (save Egypt, Morocco, and Mauritania) has been effectively erased from the Islamic tradition." As scholarly networks associated with the Salafiyya movement came to represent a dominant school of thought in Black Sunni communities, particularly in cities of the northeastern United States, numerous Black converts traveled to Saudi Arabia for religious training and returned home as authoritative community leaders. In the 1980s, the Saudi government established a "satellite school" in Virginia to prepare Americans for study at the Islamic University of Madinah. As Saudi Arabia became increasingly privileged as the archive of "true Islam," local traditions of

Black Islam were further marginalized as heretical and illegitimate. In turn, this trend bolstered Afrocentrist repudiations of Islam as Arab cultural hegemony.

A controversy of critical importance to the Ansaru Allah Community was Islam's place in metaphysical Africa. The AAC/NIH can be found at a nexus of competing priorities, as Al Mahdi invoked a metaphysical Africa that upheld Islam as timelessly Black. The AAC/NIH constructed a metaphysical Africa that affirmed and absorbed Afrocentric objections to "orthodox" Islam as a legacy of Arab violence against Black people, but also relocated Islam's true heartland in the Sudan—*bilad as-sudan*, translated in AAC/NIH literature as "Land of the Blacks." Between anti-Islamic Afrocentrism and Muslim anti-Blackness, or between Black Orientalism and Black Salafism, AAC/NIH media navigated these conflicts in complex and compelling ways. This book explores various ways in which the AAC/NIH, formulating truth through its own metaphysical Africa, envisioned the connection between Blackness and Islam.

Reintroducing Ansar History

The AAC/NIH began not as a "spinoff" or "offshoot" of movements such as the Nation of Islam or Moorish Science, but rather as a small circle of young Sunni Muslims in Brooklyn with links to the State Street Mosque led by Granada-born Daoud Ahmed Faisal (d. 1980). Faisal established the Islamic Mission of America (IMA) in 1928. The IMA identified as Sunni, though Pat Bowen observes that "Sunni" signified "the Muslim world in general" rather than a concrete sectarian identity, noting that the IMA relied on translations of the Qurʾan that came through networks of the Ahmadiyya—a South Asian Muslim movement scorned and persecuted as "heretical" throughout the twentieth century. By the early 1960s, friction between immigrant and Black segments at State Street inspired a handful of Black members to leave under the leadership of Hafis Mahbub, a Pakistani member of the Sunni revivalist Tablighi Jama'at who had taught at the masjid. These attritioned State Street members formed the Ya-Sin Mosque, which claimed a more strict adherence to Muslim legal traditions (characterized in part by women's use of full-face veils) while also addressing the specific needs of African American Muslims, and later gave rise to the Dar ul-Islam movement.[35]

The future Al Imam Isa Al Haadi Al Mahdi, then Dwight York (b. 1945), spent part of his teens and early twenties connected to State Street Mosque. The circumstances of Al Mahdi's conversion remain disputed. It has been claimed that Al Mahdi's introduction to Islam came through members of the Nation, whom he reportedly encountered during a 1965–67 incarceration for felony assault and other charges. This narrative seems to start with Abu Ameenah Bilal Philips, who provides no details of Al Mahdi's criminal history but simply remarks, "In prison it may be presumed that Al Mahdi came in contact with Elijah Muhammad's teachings as well as those of Noble Drew Ali's," after which he converted at State Street and began to "concoct" a "black nationalist version of Islaam." If Al Mahdi had converted in Brooklyn "around 1965," as Philips suggests, this would have been before his incarceration, not after his release. Resisting the prison conversion narrative, Al Mahdi would claim that he first attended State Street's Friday prayers in 1957, at the age of twelve, when Faisal essentially took him in as a son and renamed him Isa ʾAbd'Allah ibn Abu Bakr Muhammad. Paul Greenhouse, a documentary filmmaker who has done extensive fieldwork with the community, encountered reliable claims that his mother was already a member of State Street Mosque, and that in the late 1960s Al Mahdi would walk up and down the street to perform public dhikr, the recitation of divine names, with a talking drum.

At State Street Mosque, Al Mahdi would have encountered Sufis, Salafi revivalists, former Nation and Moorish Science Temple members, white converts (probably including author Maryam Jameelah, who converted at State Street in May 1961, received her new name from Faisal himself, and became a close friend of Faisal's wife, Khadijah), followers of Sayyid Abu A'la al-Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb, Tablighi Jama'at networks, UN diplomats from Muslim-majority countries, and various diasporic communities that had started with Muslim seamen. Of particular relevance for Al Mahdi, State Street's Muslim diasporas included a Sudanese-American community that had been planting roots in Brooklyn since the arrival of merchant marines in the 1940s. Anthropologist Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf reports that these seamen came from Dongola, the same part of the Sudan that Al Mahdi later claimed as his own place of origin, and regarded State Street Mosque as their "home away from home." Some had learned of Satti Majid, the Dongolawi scholar who traveled to the United States with a vision of spreading Islam, connected with Yemeni Muslims in Brooklyn, and mentored Faisal before leaving the country in 1929. Faisal's establishment of his Islamic Mission, writes Abusharaf, "marked the birth of an African Muslim religious body in North America." At State Street, the Dongolawis "managed to reproduce in revealing ways the community they left behind," providing Brooklyn seekers with access to an indigenous African Islam. Rather than an isolated bubble of local "heterodoxies" without exposure to a larger "Muslim world," Brooklyn offered an Islamic education that was both locally embedded and transnationally connected. Among the groups accessible at State Street alone, one could choose between Islamic revivals that privileged the Sudan and Pakistan as their natural centers.

It was in this context that young Dwight York learned of Muhammad Ahmad (1845–1885), a Sufi revolutionary from Dongola who declared himself the awaited Mahdi, called for Islam's restoration to its pure and original form, raised an army of followers, drove British and Turko-Egyptian oppressors from the Sudan, and led a short-lived Islamic state until his death in 1885. In the years during which a newly paroled York navigated State Street's complex terrain and embarked on a path of Afrocentric Sufism, the Mahdiyya made international headlines amid political turmoil in the Sudan. When the Sudan regained its independence in 1956, the Mahdiyya, also known as Ansar (Helpers), established the National Umma Party, their own political party, and took power. In May 1969, the young government fell to a military coup led by Ja'far Muhammad al-Numayri. The following year, after a failed attempt to assassinate al-Numayri, the Ansar revolted, prompting a government assault on their stronghold at Abba Island that resulted in the massacre of a thousand Ansar. Among those killed was the Mahdi's grandson, Imam Hadi al-Mahdi, whose nephew and successor, Sadiq al-Mahdi, fled the country. During his exile in Egypt, Sadiq articulated the Ansar platform against the Muslim Brothers; while the Brothers relied on a "traditional pattern" and conformed "to the Sunni school of thought and are bound by the four Sunni schools of law," the Ansar, Sadiq explained, "draw from all schools of thought and we are not bound by any school of law. We recognize the original texts and seek new formulation, conscious of changes in time and place."

In addition to Brooklyn's Sudanese community, the future Al Mahdi would have encountered visions of African spirituality from non-Muslim diasporic networks. New York was home to a Yoruba spiritual and cultural revivalist movement driven by increased Caribbean migration and African American conversions to Afro-Cuban traditions. Black converts to Santeria, recognizing that West African traditions had been transformed by their diffusion across the Atlantic, shifted attention from Cuba to West Africa and sought to "purify" African traditions. As Yoruba revivalists pursued linkages to an "older primordial

moment in Africa," Tracey E. Hucks explains, they produced a distinctly American construction of African spirituality.

When the Harlem-based Yoruba Temple disseminated literature that offered "reconnection to the continent of Africa, and a rationalization for the collective return to African religion and culture," this vision of Africa did not include Islam. Against Nation and Sunni leaders alike who disparaged non-Muslim African societies as "primitive" and presented Islam as a "civilizing" influence, Yoruba Temple media implicated Islam in the erasure of indigenous African cultures. Speaking to the various legacies of Malcolm X, however, the Yoruba Temple honored Malcolm's birthday a year after his assassination with a parade through Harlem. According to one of Greenhouse's informants within Al Mahdi's circle, another point of intersection between New York's Muslims and Yoruba Temple was Al Mahdi's own mother, who reportedly participated in a Yoruba revivalist community while also attending State Street Mosque.

Yoruba Temple literature made claims of its own about the Sudan. In *Tribal Origins of African-Americans* (1962), Yoruba leader Oseijeman Adefunmi argued that West African cultures bore ancestral connections to ancient Egyptian and Nubian kingdoms, as European invasions of North Africa provoked mass migrations across the Sahara (which Adefunmi labeled a greater "Sudan"). Specifically, Adefunmi reported that Yoruba ancestry could be traced to the ancient Nile city of Meroë, capital of the Kushite kingdom and a little more than one hundred miles from modern Khartoum, which meant that many of the West Africans taken to the Americas as slaves were Nubians.

Back in Brooklyn, Al Mahdi's public drum/dhikr marches and private study circles produced a new faction in the State Street universe. Given a critical lack of extant sources prior to the 1970s, we must rely partially on the community's retroactive accounts in later materials and Philips's interviews with former members in the 1980s. With this caution in mind, it appears that circa 1967–69, Al Mahdi headed a small group called Ansar Pure Sufi and operated a "Pure Sufi" bookstore. One of Philips's informants recalled joining in 1968 after getting "fed up" with the Dar ul-Islam and seeing Al Mahdi's group show up at a Dar celebration of the Prophet's birthday. They "looked different," he recalled, with their tarbushes, nose rings, and bone earrings, and a Dar brother told him, "Stay away from them 'cause they are crazy." He also reported that in its early days, the group consisted of fifteen members at most, "dropping off to about five when times got rough." By 1969 they had become the Nubian Islamic Hebrew Mission in America (NIHMA), and in 1971 they established a headquarters at 452 Rockaway Avenue in Brooklyn's Brownsville neighborhood, approximately a mile from the Dar's Atlantic Avenue masjid.

As among the Dar, NIHMA women fully veiled their faces. The male members of NIHMA became known for peddling literature and other products throughout New York, dressing in distinct uniforms, and visiting other masjids to engage Muslims on issues of doctrine. "When you see Nubian brothers on the street," explained a 1972 issue of the periodical the *Muslim Man*, "you'll notice that they wear tall black tarbushes [with green tassels], clean neat suits that button down the front, or the familiar *selawa*. With the silver nose rings and signet rings, their dress alone tells you a lot about the Muslim man."

The earliest surviving NIHMA pamphlets attribute authorship to Al Mahdi under the name Isa Abd Allah ibn Abu Bakr Muhammad, and they typically begin with the page-one declaration, "Muslims must realize they are alone in Their Sorrow." Contrary to narratives of constant reinvention, early NIHMA newsletters express remarkable consistency with later material. *Back to the Beginning: The Book of Names*

(1972), for example, informs readers that Adam was Black; that African Americans were descended from Kedar, son of Ishmael, who was Black and "the real Arab"; that Black people are Nubians and not only the true Arabs but also the true Hebrews; that white people are Amorites; that Muhammad Ahmad was the anticipated Mahdi; that true Muslims must abide by the Sabbath; and that hadith traditions are generally unreliable and must not be privileged over the Qur'an and other revealed scriptures, such as the Torah and Psalms. The pamphlet makes positive connections to Arabic, Hebrew, and Yoruba, and also features images of the Star of David, the Kundalini "sleeping serpent," and the Egyptian ankh, along with a serpent eating its tail captioned "Never ending life from Africa." A star's six points are captioned (clockwise from the top): Allah, Shango, Obatala, Man, Elohim, YHWH. In other pamphlets from the early 1970s, Al Mahdi articulates themes that remained crucial to his teachings for decades to come, such as the notion of Black suffering as the spell of Leviathan, Al Mahdi breaking the spell in 1970, and a promise that Black oppression would end in the year 2000. In early publications, Al Mahdi also asserts that white people (Amorites) are cursed with leprosy and pale skin. In harmony with his later writings on Jesus, he interprets the Qur'an and Bible to argue that the angel Gabriel had intercourse with Mary and was Jesus's biological father.

Speaking to divisions affecting Muslim Brooklyn, NIHMA newsletters proclaimed a need for the Black man to "speak his own language," meaning "Arabic or Kufic in its purest form" rather than the corrupted "Pakistanian Arabic" and other diluted forms learned from immigrant Muslims. These newsletters established connections between Islam and Africa that remained major concerns in AAC/NIH media for decades, expressed in Al Mahdi's vision of the Sudan as the center of divine creative activity, his treatment of "Sudan" as a name for the whole of Africa, his incorporation of the ankh, and his claims that Yoruba traditions derive from Islam. The connections found shared expression in advertisements from his NIH "tribe" for a June 4, 1972, festival at 452 Rockaway that promised "dress of Islamic countries," Islamic poetry, the "Al Ansaru Allah Dance Troupe," African drumming, and Merchants of Oyo—a group led by Al Mahdi's brother, Obaba Oyo (born David Piper York Jr.), that sold African imports (including bone jewelry that AAC/NIH members wore for a time) and Islamic literature, and traveled the country showcasing Oyo's jewelry designs. Oyo, who also worked as a fashion designer for the Harlembased New Breed Clothing brand, which popularized dashikis in the 1960s, formed his own African Islamic Mission (AIM) in Brooklyn's Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood. An AIM pamphlet from 1975 identifies Oyo's family as "Islamic Hebrew" and quotes Genesis to prophesy that Black suffering under the "iniquity of the Amorites" would end in the year 2000. The AIM became known for reprinting books on Black history and Islam, both popular books and rare and out-of-print titles, ranging from general history and cultural materials, to Nation of Islam and Moorish Science texts, to the writings of Muslim apologist Ahmed Deedat, to classical proto-Afrocentrist works.

NIHMA pamphlets defended the right of American Muslims to identify with Sufism, lamenting that "many Muslims are under the impression, and are indoctrinating others with the fallacy that you must be from the East in order to elevate yourself to the degree of a Sufi." Al Mahdi's Sufism identified Khidr as Melchizedek, the immortal priest mentioned in the Hebrew Bible; located the "Temple of Khidr" at the seventh heaven; and described the progressive opening of chakras as the soul's ascension toward the plane of divine reality ("Allah and Al Khidr ") and then the seventh and final plane of Blackness. Al Mahdi affirmed the Nation and Five Percenter declaration "the Black Man is God" but nuanced its theological impact by distinguishing between "God" and "Allah," which Al Mahdi did not regard as simply a matter

of straightforward translation. For Al Mahdi, these terms signified different things: "God" did not refer to the transcendent creator of the worlds but was an acronym for Gomar Oz Dubar, three "Kufic" words meaning wisdom, strength, and beauty. The Black man is God because he has been granted these attributes; Allah, however, is giver of the attributes and cannot be contained within them.

In the early 1970s, Al Mahdi identified himself as the grandson of the Sudanese Mahdi, presented his organization as an authorized branch of Faisal's Islamic Mission of America, and constructed an Islamic Egyptosophy with the narrative that Hajar, mother of Ishmael, was the daughter of Imhotep. Whether for his teachings, fashion choices, or aggressive proselytizing and peddling, Al Mahdi attracted negative attention from other Muslim groups in the city. In the summer of 1973, followers of Al Mahdi were attacked by a group from the Mosque of Islamic Brotherhood (MIB), a Black Sunni movement based in Harlem, for peddling newspapers in Manhattan; four MIB members were arrested. The MIB complained in a September 1973 editorial of "numerous little cults" linking Islam with "eccentric nonsense," "mythology and esoteric foolishness" that resembled "the more barbaric aspects of primitive pagan societies." The editorial specifically targeted the AAC/NIH in its mention of "cult" followers wearing "rings in their noses, bones in their ears," which were elements of AAC/NIH dress code at the time.[68] Nonetheless, Al Mahdi presented himself during the early 1970s as exhibiting greater compatibility with Black Sunni movements than with the Nation of Islam: "To all those Muslims who for the past three years have found and are still finding fault with us, at least we proclaim the Kalimah of ALLAH and adhere to the Five Pillars of Faith."

AAC/NIH pamphlets from 1973, identifying the community as the Nubian Islamic Hebrews, also display the designation "Al Ansaru Allah, the Helper of Allah." On the back cover, these pamphlets offer a manifesto titled "Goals and Purposes of the Nubian Islamic Hebrews" to parallel the mission statements found in the Nation of Islam's *Muhammad Speaks* and in the newspapers of Sunni groups such as the Islamic Party of North America. "Goals and Purposes" declares the intention to teach children "Arabic, Aramaic, Hebrew, and all the African dialect as they can learn" and to incorporate practices of "African drumming, Islamic drumming, Chanting, and dancing," and expresses an ultimate ambition to "go home, to build our own country which is in Africa." The statement also defines the group as "non-sectarian" and as committed to "Islam in its pristine purity as taught by the Qur'an and the Sunnah."

Community literature from the later 1970s describes the period of 1970–74 as the first half of a "tribulation," during which the devil infiltrated the community and caused desertions.[71] In February 1974, months before Al Mahdi instituted the practice of begging for donations, the movement struggled: during the New York Police Department (NYPD)'s investigation of a shooting at the Ya-Sin Mosque that left four dead, a grocery store owner identified with the "Islamic Hebrews" told detectives that his group no longer used its St. John's Place location and did not have a masjid at the moment but owned a green bus and gathered at the homes of its members. During the "tribulation" period, Al Mahdi traveled to the Middle East and Africa, where he made a pilgrimage to Mecca and experienced a mystical vision of Khidr/Melchizedek at the junction of the two Niles in the Sudan. These travels seem to correspond to the community's phasing out its Nubian Islamic Hebrews name in favor of Ansaru Allah Community. Mailing addresses that appear in the pamphlets of this period also suggest at least a coincidental relationship between the name change and the move from the Rockaway apartment to 496 Flatbush. Surprisingly, given the spirit of Al Mahdi's usual treatment of Saudi Arabia, pamphlets published shortly

before and after the move also feature the Saudi coat of arms on their back covers, in addition to Al Mahdi's own six-pointed star and upward-pointing crescent.

The Ansaru Allah name affirmed links to the Sudanese Ansar, which also accompanied the adoption of new dress codes for the "Ansar of the West" that more closely mirrored the "Ansar of the East." Overall, the community's rhetorical strategies remained consistent. NIHMA literature had already recognized Muhammad Ahmad as the Mahdi, prioritized Khidr as a mediator between worlds, identified Al Mahdi as a direct "student under Sheik Al-Khidr of Nubia," and even depicted Al Mahdi as a miracle worker with supernatural insights and powers. Community media continued to advocate biblical scriptures as essential to Muslim life (arguing that Muhammad only adhered to the way of Abraham and *fitrah*, "the natural practices of all the Prophets") and maintained the six-pointed star and upward-pointing crescent as its symbol.

From the later 1970s through 1983, the group identified itself as Ansaru Allah (often transliterated in double-vowel style as Ansaaru Allah). This name did not erase the community's prior history, deny previous NIHMA teachings, or mark a new emphasis on "Islam" over "Judaism." Reflecting on the community's earlier identification, a 1978 editorial remarked, "In between the years 1970 and mid-1973, we were known as Nubian Islamic Hebrews. And we do not deny that we still are."[78] Considering past "tribulations" in the newsletter titled *Id with the Ansars* (1977), Al Mahdi explains, "We did not propagate the Scriptures as profoundly" as the community did later in the decade. "We started out with Genesis . . . as we became more knowledgeable of the Scriptures . . . [we] worked our way through the Old Testament and the New Testament up to the Qur'an, into which we are now delving heavily." Al Mahdi's claim of progressing through Hebrew and Christian scriptures to a Qur'an-centered methodology, however, does not correspond with the community's observable rhetorical strategies; in *Id with the Ansars*, the newsletter that makes this claim, Al Mahdi's New Testament citations (primarily from the book of Revelation, which he identifies as Christ's *Injil*, mentioned in the Qur'an) are nearly double the combined references to passages from the Hebrew Bible and Qur'an.

Siddiq Muhammad, Philips's informant who had joined the movement in 1968, reports that around June 1974, as Al Mahdi's command that followers beg on the streets led to a massive flood of revenue, "things started to really change." A short passage in *Id with the Ansars* hints that an intellectual shift had also occurred in the community—not an abrupt turn from one religious identity to another, but rather an intensified focus on Al Mahdi himself. The community's investigations of scripture had produced new understandings of its leader's significance, as "the Lamb (Al Masih) has become known to the people as the person he was prophesied to be, rather than by what he calls himself."

Literature from the late 1970s reports that Al Mahdi (born in 1945, an even century after the birth of the Sudanese Mahdi) launched his movement in 1970 (a century after the Mahdi established his mission), upon the opening of the seventh seal mentioned in the book of Revelation. While sources from earlier in the decade present Al Mahdi as the Mahdi's grandson, 1977's *Muhammad Ahmad: The Only True Mahdi!* and later materials name him as the Mahdi's great-grandson. The seventh seal signified the Qur'an, which was "opened" with Al Mahdi's arrival as its master translator and interpreter. His mission was to teach the 144,000 helpers of Allah (Ansar Allah) in preparation for Christ's return in the year 2000. While AAC publications such as *Al Imaam Isa Visits Egypt 1981* featured a photo of Al Mahdi with the caption "Our Savior Has Returned," Al Mahdi's precise connection to Christ remained so ambiguous that some

apparently believed that Al Mahdi identified himself as the returning Jesus. Al Mahdi insists in *I Don't Claim to Be . . .* (1981) that he "never claimed to be Christ" and that his pamphlets were misunderstood. He explained that Jesus would not return as an embodied reincarnation, but that the *spirit* of Jesus would "descend into a person" and then "disperse amongst his followers," the 144,000 foretold in Revelation as followers of Muhammad's household, his *ahl al-bayt*. Al Mahdi also deployed Jesus during this period to articulate his relationship to Elijah Muhammad; the first appearance of Jesus was heralded by John the Baptist, who was endowed with the spirit of the biblical Elijah. Al Mahdi (whose first name, Isa, is the Arabic equivalent of Jesus) thereby projected the relationship between Elijah/John and Jesus onto Elijah Muhammad and himself.

In AAC literature dating from the late 1970s through the 1980s, we can observe themes relating to esoteric knowledge and advanced technology in ancient Egypt, emphasis on a globalizing Black Islam that featured both the Sudanese Mahdiyya and Elijah Muhammad as key ingredients, antagonism toward Arab Sunnis and their African American "puppets," discussions of chakras and other New Age reference points, and claims of Al Mahdi's interaction with several transcendent figures, including Khidr, Jesus, ancient pharaohs, and extraterrestrial sages. These themes do not follow one another in distinct "phases" but can be found in the same publications, along with continued commitments to "traditional" Islamic knowledge marked in part by details such as commitment to Maliki jurisprudence[87] and the study of classical Arabic.

Again, changes in names and symbols have limited illustrative power. A number of publications from 1982 refer to the movement as United Muslims in Exile, though this name change did not reflect a reorientation of discourse or practice or supplant Ansaru Allah as the movement's identity. Nor did the AAC/NIH's changes of symbols and flags consistently signify new doctrinal orientations, though these changes sometimes corresponded to shifting claims and the visual cultures of its opponents. Around the turn of the 1980s, the community used a white, green, red, and black flag bearing the *shahadah* (testimony to Allah's oneness and the prophethood of Muhammad), along with the double-bladed sword of 'Ali. This design echoed the MIB flag, which displayed the *shahadah* in the same style of Arabic with a single-bladed sword. Ironically, it was the MIB, not the Ansar, that employed a black, red, and green color scheme (as opposed to the Garveyite pan-Africanist flag, which consisted of the same colors but positioned the red stripe above the black) and gave as its flag's inspiration the Sudanese Mahdiyya (while being careful to explain that Muhammad Ahmad, a "great champion of justice," was "known to many as the Mahdi" without acknowledging that he personally claimed that title for himself).

From 1983 to 1987, community literature simultaneously used the names Ansaru Allah Community and Nubian Islamic Hebrews. It was also during this time that Al Mahdi added "Al Haadi" to his name, becoming As Sayyid Al Imaam Isa Al Haadi Al Mahdi and emphasizing his claim to be the son of Muhammad Ahmad's son Sayyid Hadi Abdulrahman al-Mahdi (1918–1971). In 1984, Al Mahdi established a Sufi order, Sons of the Green Light, which he promoted throughout AAC/NIH literature as adjacent to the larger community. From 1987 to 1991, without erasing its Ansar identity, the community rebranded itself the Original Tents of Kedar. It was as the Original Tents of Kedar that the community adopted the Mahdiyya flag.

During the late 1980s, the character of Yanaan/Yaanuwn, who was first mentioned at least as early as 1983 as an intergalactic sheikh who sometimes occupied Al Mahdi's body, entered into new prominence

and became increasingly identified with Al Mahdi. Original Tents of Kedar books frequently display an image of Al Mahdi with the Ansar masjid and a flying saucer in the background and a caption identifying him as "As Sayyid Isa Al Haadi Al Mahdi (Yanaan)."[90] When asked, "Who is Yanuwn?" during a session open to the public circa 1988, Al Mahdi confirmed, "I am an extraterrestrial incarnated."[91] Al Mahdi's 1991 commentary on the book of Revelation claims that Yanaan is the nineteenth elder in Khidr's order, and also an appearance of Khidr himself in human form.[92] In his interpretation of Rev. 1:7 ("Here he is coming upon the clouds"), Al Mahdi reveals that the Buraq, Muhammad's steed during his ascension, was not a winged animal but a fleet of spaceships within the Mothership, which will descend to earth to gather the saved 144,000.

A survey of AAC/NIH media from the 1970s to the early 1990s reveals considerable stability. Despite changes in name, flag, symbols, and clothing, the AAC/NIH did not abandon the resources that had previously authorized its truth claims in favor of a whole new set of materials. In a single pamphlet from 1983, Al Mahdi hits notes that observers would treat as marking separate phases of his career, presenting his body as a medium through which Khidr, Jesus, an ancient Egyptian pharaoh, and Yanaan speak. Rather than presume that Al Mahdi's choices perform a postmodernist mysticism designed to break down all categories and produce enlightenment through incoherence, we can examine the ways in which items related to one another within the particularities of his own toolbox and the world of preexisting connections that made this toolbox possible—and even intelligible—to a community.

At the start of the 1990s, Al Mahdi and numerous followers relocated to the community's Jazzir Abba campground in the Catskills (named after Abba Island in the Sudan). Rebranding Jazzir Abba as Mount Zion, Al Mahdi also changed his own name to Rabboni Y'shua Bar El Haady and embarked on reforms that led observers to call this period his "Jewish" phase. Shortly thereafter, the community relocated en masse to Georgia. Material from 1992–93 identifies the community as the Tents of Abraham or Tents of Nubia, renames Al Mahdi Dr. Malachi Z. York or affectionately calls him the Lamb (again, a designation used for him since the 1970s), and tells a story of the movement's changes. At Mount Zion in 1992, York reportedly informed community members that they would "stop living the life of a Muslim" because Islam was about to become increasingly associated with terrorism, and Sunni Arabs would never accept African American Muslims as equals.

In 1993, the community, having adopted the name Holy Tabernacle Ministries, migrated to its Tama Re commune in Eatonton, Georgia. Post-1993 media intensified York's attention to pharaonic Egypt, new resources such as ancient Sumerian religion, indigenous American sovereignty movements, and narratives of extraterrestrial civilizations, while simultaneously denigrating and reconstructing Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions. In the second half of the 1990s, the community came to be known as the United Nuwaubian Nation of Moors (UNNM). York also led numerous Masonic lodges, such as the Ancient and Mystic Order of Melchizedek, which adhered to the lessons of his earlier Sufi order and simply switched out references to Khidr with Melchizedek (a move consistent with York's historical conceptualization of the figure).

York regularly acknowledged his Brooklyn past, often explaining, "I came giving you what you wanted, so you would want what I have to give." Though the community had always acknowledged changes in name, symbol, and prescribed dress, and made claims of an intellectual progression, it was only after the move to Georgia that York retroactively spoke of his mission as having passed through a sequence of

distinct phases or "schools." Amid these narratives of change, however, there are continuities. Even in his ostensibly "post-Islamic" work, while distributing lecture tapes with titles such as "Islam Is Poison," York still praised figures such as Elijah Muhammad and Daoud Faisal, claimed a connection to the Sudanese Mahdiyya, treated the Qurʾan as a meaningful source for his teachings, and wrote of restoring Islam to its "pristine purity."

In 2004, roughly two years after his arrest and the government raid on Tama Re, York was convicted of multiple charges relating to RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) conspiracy, including racketeering and the interstate transportation of minors for sexual abuse. In 2005, upon government confiscation of the land, bulldozers purged Tama Re of its pyramids and statues. In the years since York's conviction, Nuwaubians have sought to free him through a number of strategies, including assertions of his innocence and claims that his trial was illegitimate, by challenging federal jurisdiction, whether on the grounds of legal sovereignty (as a Native American tribal leader) or diplomatic immunity (as a Liberian consul). While increasingly decentralized and intellectually diverse, the community continues to develop without his physical presence.

Outline of the Book

The chapters of this book focus on various resources and strategies through which AAC/NIH formulated and communicated its truth. Chapter 1 explores key themes in Al Mahdi's metaphysical Africa. It discusses Al Mahdi's construction of the Sudan as a land of mystical knowledge, deeply connected to human origins and the coming fulfillment of divine plan; as a refuge for Muhammad's "unmistakenly black" daughter Fatima and son-in-law ʿAli, as they fled persecution by "pale Arabs" Abu Bakr and his daughter A'isha; as an archive of timeless Islamic knowledge, because Fatima and ʿAli left secret scriptures in the protection of Nubian custody; as the center of the modern Nubian Islamic revolution against both European and Turko-Egyptian exploitation and oppression; and as the site from which Al Mahdi found his footing in the American context, from which to navigate between anti-Muslim Afrocentrism and the anti-Blackness of encroaching Arab and South Asian Sunni hegemonies.

Chapter 2 examines the ways in which Al Mahdi constructed an ostensibly contradictory genealogy of forerunners—most significantly Elijah Muhammad and Al Mahdi's Sunni mentor, Sheikh Daoud Faisal—that includes Noble Drew Ali, Malcolm X, Allah (the former Clarence 13X), and Marcus Garvey (whom Al Mahdi claims had become Muslim), all of whom appear as figures of authorization in his claim to inherit a singular tradition of Nubian Islam in the West.

Chapter 3 complicates the popular narrative, put forth in academic literature and retroactively embraced in community media, that the AAC/NIH passed through distinct "Muslim" and "Jewish" phases. Apart from a period in 1992–93 in which the community did appear to shed coded markers of its Muslim identity (such as turbans for men and face veils for women) in favor of practices that could code as Jewish (such as Al Mahdi changing his title from imam to rabbi and wearing a yarmulke), these various sources do not agree as to how exactly we can date the "Muslim" and "Jewish" phases. Even at different points in community literature, we find multiple ideas of when the movement was most invested in the "Hebrew" dimension of its Nubian Islamic Hebrew identity. Highlighting significant continuities in the community's literature across these allegedly distinct phases, and the ways in which the community conceptualized itself in materials contemporary to the supposed mass conversions, this

chapter problematizes the notion that we can easily carve AAC/ NIH history into a series of successive affiliations.

Chapter 4 focuses on a figure who became an important site of both linkage and rupture: Bilal ibn Rabah, an Ethiopian who rose to prominence as one of the early companions of the Prophet Muhammad. In modern Muslim discourses, Bilal's legacy became particularly meaningful as evidence of Islam's racial egalitarianism. Al Mahdi, however, charged that "pale Arabs" had reduced Bilal to a condescending anti-Black stereotype—a slave who can sing—while denying the Blackness of other early Muslims, including the Prophet himself. Promising to reveal Bilal's true significance, Al Mahdi presented Bilal as protective custodian of the Mihjan, the scepter that had belonged to all of the Israelite prophets, which he carried on an epic quest from Ethiopia to Mecca in order to bequeath it to the awaited Ishmaelite prophet, Muhammad. This chapter discusses Bilal's significance in AAC/NIH discourse for the connections that he enabled between Israelite and Ishmaelite prophethood, the relevance of his Ethiopian Israelite backstory in Al Mahdi's imaginary of metaphysical Africa, and his polemical utility as Al Mahdi weaponized his legacy against "pale Arab" Sunnis and their Black allies—including W. D. Muhammad, who had briefly referred to his followers (and to African Americans at large) as "Bilalians."

Chapter 5 explores the AAC/NIH's underexamined relationship to Sufism, marked not only by its origins as Ansar Pure Sufi but also by its founding of an in-house Sufi order, Sons of the Green Light, in 1984. I argue that Al Mahdi was perhaps the most successful Sufi master in the United States through the 1970s and '80s, while academic studies of American Sufism have completely ignored his community in part because of the flawed categories and prejudices that continue to inform the study of American Islam more broadly.

Chapter 6 pushes back against the notion that the AAC/NIH embraced Egyptosophic spirituality only late in its history as part of a post-Muslim makeover. I demonstrate that an investment in pharaonic Egypt appeared early in the AAC/NIH archive and remained present throughout its overtly "Islamic" and "Jewish" material. When the community migrated to a compound that it declared its "Egypt in the West" and decorated the property with sphinxes, ankhs, and pyramids, this reflected not a sudden embrace of Egyptosophy out of nowhere but rather the turning of a rhetorical dial that the community already possessed.

Chapter 7 examines the community's exodus from New York to rural Georgia in 1993 and its development as the United Nuwaubian Nation of Moors (UNNM). This chapter surveys key themes of Nuwaubian discourse that are typically taken to highlight the "random" and "incoherent" nature of the community's narratives—Egyptosophy, UFO religion, claims of Native American heritage, and Freemasonry—and calls attention to the various ways in which these themes are historically linked both within the community's own archive and in broader African American intellectual traditions. Things certainly do change, but I resist the assumption that the Nuwaubian-era community has surrendered its attempt to achieve a rationally satisfying argument or a meaningful narrative of its own history.

Chapter 8 examines Al Mahdi's theories of music and sound and briefly expands the scope of community media to include artists whose work may or may not have been published by official AAC/NIH institutions. While Al Mahdi did own a recording studio and music label, and made use of music in numerous ways (and was even an aspiring R&B star himself), not all artists who disseminated AAC/NIH messages in pop culture did so through his personal resources in the music industry. Though the Five

Percenter presence in hip-hop has been extensively documented, the AAC/NIH made a substantial contribution to hip-hop culture that has gone largely unnoticed. This chapter seeks to make a critical intervention in a growing body of scholarship that examines hip-hop's varied relationships to Islam but has thus far ignored Al Mahdi's community.

In the coda, I offer a short reflection on the arguments advanced in preceding chapters and the key themes of the work, particularly the problems of overemphasizing the community's apparent instability and engaging the eclecticism of its archive through frameworks of "syncretism."

Before we proceed, a few notes, the first regarding names. As the community identified itself as the Ansaru Allah Community (AAC) and/or Nubian Islamic Hebrews (NIH) for most of its history prior to the government's raid on Tama Re, sometimes privileging one name over the other, I usually refer to it as the AAC/NIH. The community's leader has become notorious for employing a plethora of aliases, but he was known for much of the period covered here (with slight variations in spelling) as As Sayyid Al Imaam Isa Al Haadi Al Mahdi. Throughout this book I generally refer to him as Al Mahdi, while occasionally using the other names he adopted when discussing those periods of his life and AAC/NIH history (he remained Al Mahdi even when literature referred to him as Isa Muhammad, for example; these names were not mutually exclusive). When discussing the community and its leader after significant transformations in the early 1990s, I use the names by which they identified themselves at that time.

Al Mahdi's names aside, the question of authorship remains complicated. AAC/NIH media usually reflect the official voice of Al Mahdi himself, though works often describe him in the third person without attribution to another author, and Al Mahdi has been accused of writing by committee. Each of Al Mahdi's wives reportedly headed an aspect of the community's operations, meaning that one wife would have supervised the production of media content. In her memoir, Al Mahdi's former wife Ruby S. Garnett recalls the research department: "Book shelves lined the wall in that section; full of all kinds of books that . . . the sisters used to do research out of. The sisters work area was stationed right there in front of the bookshelves, and there were rows of computers where some of them sat quietly typing and looking through books and some were making photo copies of things."[98] One survivor of Al Mahdi's abuse informed me that it was her job to read books that he wanted to appropriate (she particularly enjoyed reading Zecharia Sitchin), and could identify content in Al Mahdi's works that she had personally written. When he spoke through these publications, Al Mahdi operated not only as an individual author but as a collective of thinkers. I am not interested in determining which materials "really" come from his own pen; nor, for that matter, am I overly concerned with the issue of Al Mahdi's plagiarizing material from outside sources. I thus refer to the community and Al Mahdi himself interchangeably as the producer of AAC/NIH discourse. When I write, "Al Mahdi argues *x*," I present Al Mahdi as an assemblage of actors who participate in his ongoing construction.

This approach also helps to move consideration of the AAC/NIH beyond Al Mahdi's abuse and exploitation of community members and to decenter him as our primary interest, even while exploring thousands of pages attributed to him. The Ansaru Allah Community's significance is not reducible to Al Mahdi's discourse or crimes; its media represent not a singular "cult leader" but a *community* that has included thousands of members through five decades and counting. Beyond "official" membership, the community's narratives also inform countless readers who have encountered its pamphlets, books, and

tapes. Taking these media seriously, I take the community and its extended sphere of conversation partners seriously as well. <>

DEEP KNOWLEDGE: WAYS OF KNOWING IN SUFISM AND IFA, TWO WEST AFRICAN INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS by Oludamini Ogunnaike [Penn State University Press, 9780271086903]

This book is an in-depth, comparative study of two of the most popular and influential intellectual and spiritual traditions of West Africa: Tijani Sufism and Ifa. Employing a unique methodological approach that thinks with and from—rather than merely about—these traditions, Oludamini Ogunnaike argues that they contain sophisticated epistemologies that provide practitioners with a comprehensive worldview and a way of crafting a meaningful life.

Using theories belonging to the traditions themselves as well as contemporary oral and textual sources, Ogunnaike examines how both Sufism and Ifa answer the questions of what knowledge is, how it is acquired, and how it is verified. Or, more simply: What do you know? How did you come to know it? How do you know that you know? After analyzing Ifa and Sufism separately and on their own terms, the book compares them to each other and to certain features of academic theories of knowledge. By analyzing Sufism from the perspective of Ifa, Ifa from the perspective of Sufism, and the contemporary academy from the perspective of both, this book invites scholars to inhabit these seemingly "foreign" intellectual traditions as valid and viable perspectives on knowledge, metaphysics, psychology, and ritual practice.

Unprecedented and innovative, DEEP KNOWLEDGE makes a significant contribution to cross-cultural philosophy, African philosophy, religious studies, and Islamic studies. Its singular approach advances our understanding of the philosophical bases underlying these two African traditions and lays the groundwork for future study.

"A *barzakh*, or isthmus, is a liminal space 'where two seas meet.' Voyaging these two seas of esoteric knowledge—the Fayda Tijaniyya and Ifa divination—this book promises a sea change in Africana studies, Islamic studies, intellectual history, and academic philosophy. The community of the flood is likely the world's largest Sufi movement, and Ifa a primary vessel for traditional sacred knowledge in West Africa and the Atlantic, yet both remain marginal in the academy. Ogunnaike offers an exploration of their shared praxis and metaphysics, writing from inside them to produce insights of stunning brilliance. This revolutionary book is a scholarly watershed."—Rudolph T. Ware, author of *The Walking Qur'an: Islamic Education, Embodied Knowledge, and History in West Africa*

"*Deep Knowledge* is refreshingly interdisciplinary, strikingly innovative, and deeply insightful, and the chief subjects of analysis—namely, epistemologies in Ifa divination and Sufi practice, primarily in Nigeria and Senegal—are of a great and growing significance that has become increasingly global. Ogunnaike possesses profound knowledge of each of these forms of religious and philosophical practice as well as the requisite linguistic fluencies to study them in depth, and he has an uncanny knack for explaining

complex ideas in accessible language. This is a groundbreaking book of major importance to the study of African religion. Highly recommended!"—Terry Rey, author of *The Priest and the Prophetess: Abbé Ouvière, Romaine Rivière, and the Revolutionary Atlantic World*

Contents

African Philosophy?

Are those who know equal with those who know not? But only those of understanding will remember. —QUR'AN 39:9

So ask the people of remembrance, if you do not know. —QUR'AN 16:43

Odo to ba gbagbe orisun, o ma gbẹ ni.
The spring that forgets its origin will run dry. —YORUBA PROVERB

While browsing through a bookstore during my first year of college, I saw the title of a book that got me so excited that I almost shouted out loud. The book was called African Philosophy, an anthology edited by Emmanuel Eze. I bought the book on the spot and almost ran into a few trees and lampposts on my way home because I could not take my eyes off it. But the more I read, the more my excitement cooled into disappointment. Aside from one or two articles, the book's title seemed to me to be false advertisement. I felt as if I had bought an album labeled The Royal Drummers of Burundi, but when I played the music it was Taylor Swift—enjoyable in its own right, but not what I was looking for.

A little bit of context will help explain why I felt this way. At the time, I had been reading, spellbound, a translation of al-Ghazālī's **DELIVERANCE FROM ERROR** while borrowing the books and handouts from my roommate's Indian philosophy course, most of which were translations of mind-blowing primary texts by Buddhist philosophers such as Nagarjuna (d. 250 CE) and Dignaga (d. 540 CE) and the Vedantin philosophers Adi Shankara (d. ca. 820 CE) and Sri Harṣa (d. 1180 CE). In middle school and high school (besides the books on Greek and Norse mythology that my brothers and I wore the spines

off), my favorite book was another anthology, **CLASSICS OF PHILOSOPHY** edited by Louis Pojman, which contained the equally mind-blowing (at least to me at the time) excerpts of the writings of some of the most influential figures in Western philosophy from the pre-Socratics to Wittgenstein, along with short introductions designed to contextualize the readings and make them more accessible. So, when I saw Eze's anthology, I was excited to have my mind blown again, but this time by the thinkers and traditions of Africa! I was expecting to be introduced to radically new ways of seeing the world (as Indian philosophy had done), to have my assumptions exposed and challenged (as both Indian and Western philosophy did), and to find the concepts and words for, and origins of, some of the ideas I already had half-formed in my head.

Instead, I found a group of academic articles, almost exclusively by Western-trained scholars, about what should count as African philosophy, and about the philosophy of race, gender, slavery, colonialism, and so forth. Almost all of the articles in the book seemed to be writing around the things I wanted to read about,1 and virtually all of them seemed written from a perspective with which I had become familiar through years of schooling, but in which I never fully felt at home. With the exception of an article by the seventeenth-century Ethiopian philosopher Zera Yacob, I felt more at home in the works of al-Ghazālī, Nagarjuna, Plotinus, St. Augustine, and even Kierkegaard, Hume, Spinoza, and Wittgenstein, than I did in the articles of the African Philosophy anthology. I remember asking myself the following questions: If this was African philosophy, and I'm African, should I just suck it up and learn to love it, like I do with my great-aunt's moin-moin (bean cakes)? Is there no African equivalent to Greek, European, Indian, and Islamic philosophy? Does it matter if there is or is not? Should it matter?

I now have a bit of perspective on this important experience of disappointment. Part of the problem, I think, was that I was looking for the wrong thing. I was looking for an African version of the works of philosophy with which I already had some familiarity—that is, I was looking for a treatise with clearly stated premises, standard logical arguments, refutations of other known positions, and relatively clear conclusions that defined the author's position on a certain topic. I already knew what I was looking for and was just hoping to find a new flavor or style that perhaps had some resonances with my ancestry and upbringing. What I have since concluded is that while the works of many African intellectuals do fit this description (such as those of the neo-Platonic, North and Northeast African Christian, and the even more voluminous Islamic traditions of the continent), part of what makes the indigenous philosophies or intellectual traditions of the continent so interesting and worthy of study are the ways in which they do not fit this description. Practitioners of African traditions such as Ifa pursue knowledge and truth and engage in critical debates with one another, but they do so in very different ways, which I may not have recognized as philosophy back in the bookstore in 2003 during my first year of college.

Because of this, not only was I not looking for the right thing, I was also not looking in the right place. I began to realize this while reading Amadou Hampâté Bâ, the seminal Malian Africanist, belle-lettrist, activist, and scholar of traditional West African culture, orature, and religion. A Tijani Sufi himself, Bâ quotes his master Tierno Bokar's observation, "Writing is one thing and knowledge is another. Writing is the photographing of knowledge, but it is not knowledge itself. Knowledge is a light which is within man. It is the heritage all the ancestors knew and have transmitted to us as seed, just as the mature baobab is contained in its seed." Or more succinctly, in the words of Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse (one of the focal points of this study), "Secrets are in the chests [ṣudūr] of the spiritual heroes [rijāl], not in the

bellies of books." Thus I came to realize that in order to find what I was looking for back in the bookstore, I would have change my ideas about what philosophy looks like and where I could find it.

The present work is the result of this effort to learn about, learn from, learn with, and present two "ways of knowing" popular in West Africa: Tijani Sufism and Ifa. The term "ways of knowing" has two meanings: (1) the process or manner in which something is known; and (2) a program, a path, a way of life characterized by knowledge. In this book, I present an account of the "ways of knowing" (first meaning) that are used in Tijani Sufism and Ifa, which are themselves "ways of knowing" (second meaning).

Ifa and the West African branches of Tijani Sufism are perhaps the most widespread and influential of African religious traditions, claiming millions of adherents throughout the continent as well as in Europe, North America, East Asia, and the Middle East (Sufism), and Europe, the Americas, and the Caribbean (Ifa). Texts and spiritual leaders of West African origin have wide influence and authority in these traditions, both of which have their geographic centers in the region: Ile-Ifẹ, Nigeria, for Ifa; and Medina Baye, Senegal, for the most widespread branch of Tijani order, the Fayḍa, founded by Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse (d. 1975). While issues of "African" authenticity are largely outside the scope of this project, both traditions had a significant presence in precolonial West Africa. Moreover, the practices and opinions of communities in Senegal and Nigeria are regarded as authoritative and normative by many adherents worldwide, and people come from around the globe to study with babalawo (priests of Ifa) in Nigeria and shaykhs (Sufi masters) in Senegal. There is a modest but growing secondary literature on these traditions in European languages, which attests to the intellectual sophistication and wide appeal of both traditions. Thus Tijani Sufism and Ifa represent two different African worldviews and ways of knowing, similar in transnational appeal and profound influence.

After providing a brief introduction to each tradition (chapters 1 and 5), I discuss how each tradition defines knowledge, how these forms of knowledge are acquired, and how they are verified (chapters 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8). Finally, I conclude with a comparison of these two traditions to each other and to contemporary academic perspectives (chapters 9 and 10, respectively). Chapters 1 and 5 can serve as stand-alone introductions to Tijani Sufism and Ifa, respectively; alternatively, chapters 2 through 4 can serve as a detailed study of Tijani epistemology, while chapters 6 through 8 can serve as a completely separate in-depth study of epistemology in Ifa. The two traditions are neither compared nor addressed together before the ninth chapter.

But before moving on to these discussions, it is important to consider the reasons I did not find what I was looking for in the bookstore all those years ago. Why did the anthology (with a few exceptions) not have the kind of African philosophy, the "photographs of knowledge," I sought? And why was I looking for that kind of philosophy in the first place? To answer these questions, we must first understand a bit of the history of philosophy itself, and how I (and most of the rest of the Western-educated world) came to have the particular conception of it that I did back in 2003.

Clearing The Ground: Africa, Religion, Philosophy, And Rationality

A Brief History of the Conception of Philosophy in the West

Although it is now a professional academic discipline and subject of study like mathematics, physics, economics, or history, philosophy started out as something rather different. The first person to call himself a "philosopher" (philosophos, which means "friend or lover of wisdom") was probably Pythagoras (d. 495 BCE), whom we all know for his theorem about triangles. But just as Pythagoras's geometry was about much more than shapes and angles, his school of philosophy, which we today would probably call a religion, cult, or monastic order, was concerned with achieving a divine mode of life. Through initiation, strict moral discipline, secret lessons on the esoteric symbolism of numbers and forms, the study of the world through this numeric symbolism, and other ritual exercises, including listening to music, Pythagoras's school sought to mold the characters of its members into this divine ideal. This school is believed to have profoundly influenced Plato (d. 348 BCE) and his Academy, which was but one of many such philosophical schools that operated in Greek and Roman antiquity.

These schools or brotherhoods of philosophers differed greatly on some points, but all of them were concerned with using argument and reason (as well as other rituals) as "spiritual exercises" in order to cultivate an ideal way of life. As Pierre Hadot writes:

> Philosophy thus took on the form of an exercise of the thought, will, and the totality of one's being, the goal of which was to achieve a state practically inaccessible to mankind: wisdom. Philosophy was a method of spiritual progress which demanded a radical conversion and transformation of the individual's way of being. Thus, philosophy was a way of life, both in its exercise and effort to achieve wisdom, and in its goal, wisdom itself. For real wisdom does not merely cause us to know: it makes us "be" in a different way. . . . First and foremost, philosophy presented itself as a therapeutic, intended to cure mankind's anguish.

Thus the idea of the "philosopher" and "philosophy" of the ancient Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman eras was something very different from the contemporary idea and practice of academic philosophy, although something of the older notion still resonates in today's popular imagination.

The coming of Christianity eventually eclipsed these philosophical schools, but many of their texts, practices, ideas, and terminology (including that of "philosophy" itself) were assimilated (and transformed) by Christian thinkers to the extent that many Christian intellectuals interpreted and presented Christianity itself, especially the monastic life, as philosophy.6 The texts, doctrines, and exercises of the Greek and Roman philosophical schools did not only find a receptive home in Christianity, they were also taken up with great enthusiasm and creativity in Islamic civilization (by Muslims, Christians, and Jews living under Islamic rule) from the ninth century onward, as well as by some pre-Islamic Jewish intellectuals, such as Philo of Alexandria (d. 50 CE).

What many today call Islamic philosophy took the form of many distinct traditions that engaged with Greek and Roman philosophical traditions in various ways. The discipline or science known in Arabic as falsafa or ḥikma creatively engaged with Pythagorean, Aristotelian, neo-Platonic, Stoic, and other traditions and sought to wed them with, and interpret them in the light of, Islamic prophecy and spirituality. To a large extent, this discipline maintained the goal of cultivating an ideal mode of life that characterized Greek and Roman philosophy. The most important and influential philosopher of this tradition was Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037), known as Avicenna in the medieval West. However, his influence in the West was eclipsed by that of Ibn Rushd (Averroës) (d. 1198), who, ironically, never had much influence

in the Islamic world as a philosopher, being better known as a first-rate jurist of the Mālikī school of jurisprudence (fiqh). As he was the last Muslim philosopher to have a significant impact on Western thought, some Western scholars (and their Muslim students) declared Islamic philosophy dead after Ibn Rushd, but the fact is that the traditions of falsafa and ḥikma have continued to thrive and produce remarkable works and thinkers such as Suhrawardi (d. 1191), Naṣir al-Din Ṭūsi (d. 1275), Quṭb al-Din al-Shirāzi (d. 1311), Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1640), Sabzawari (d. 1873), `Allāma Ṭabāṭabā̄i (d. 1981), and Seyyed Hossein Nasr (b. 1933).

Since the twelfth century CE, however, the discipline of falsafa/ḥikma began to become more integrated with the disciplines of kalām (theology) and taṣawwuf (Sufism, a tradition of Islamic mysticism or spirituality). The discipline of kalām was primarily concerned with the dialectic exposition, proof, and defense of Islamic doctrines about God, man, and the cosmos, and its various schools engaged in highly sophisticated arguments with one another and with schools of falsafa and Sufism that would be considered philosophical by any measure. The work of al-Ghazāli (d. 1111), the most celebrated Islamic theologian (mutakallim) of the Ash`ari school, shows the increasing convergence between Sufism, theology, and falsafa in Islamic philosophical thought. Sufism will be introduced more fully in the next chapter, but for the purposes of the current discussion, it designates an important tradition of Islamic spirituality and thought that posited and sought a direct, experiential knowledge of God (maʿrifa) through an intensive regimen of spiritual exercises. The Sufis articulated this knowledge in various forms, often borrowing from, debating, and engaging with the traditions of theology and falsafa, to the extent that it became difficult to distinguish the three disciplines in the works of many figures from the twelfth century (the sixth Islamic century) onward. Prominent examples of such syntheses that came to dominate Islamic intellectual life include Suhrawardi's "Philosophy of Illumination" (ḥikmat al-ishrāq) and the Andalusian Sufi Ibn `Arabi's (d. 1240) school, both of which were integrated into Mulla Ṣadrā's school of "Transcendent Philosophy" (al-ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya). In the Western lands of the Islamic world, even the most popular texts of theology, such as the Umm al-Barāhīn (Source of Proofs) of al-Sanūsi (d. 1486), which was and still is widely used in North and West Africa, comprise a synthesis of ideas and terminology from Avicennan philosophy (falsafa), Ash`ari theology (kalām), and Sufism (taṣawwuf).

Overall, the tradition of Islamic philosophy was and is characterized by a synthesis of reason, mystical intuition, and revelation, and an abiding interest in cultivating an ideal way of life, just as it was for the philosophers of Greek and Roman antiquity. For the Islamic philosophers, righteous living, logical thinking, ritual practice, and spiritual realization supported and reinforced one another.

However, Islamic philosophy's sister tradition of Christian philosophy/theology was to go in a very different direction, especially during the Renaissance and Enlightenment. In Western Europe, from the thirteenth century onward, philosophy and theology began to drift apart—philosophy being reduced to its technical and discursive aspects and made the "handmaiden of theology"—until the two disciplines became completely separate and even antagonistic with the arrival of Descartes. The gradual hardening of the Catholic Church's dogmatic Aristotelianism combined with the new availability of Greek and Roman texts led to the decline of scholasticism and the rise of new forms of philosophy and new relationships between philosophy and Christianity. Most significant, however, was the gradual collapsing of the classical triad of noetic faculties: intellect (Latin: intellectus; Greek: nous), reason (Latin: ratio; Greek: dianoia), and the senses (Latin: sensus; Greek: aisthesis) into just reason and sense. In Platonic,

neo-Platonic, and many Christian schools of philosophy and theology, the intellect was a faculty that allowed one to directly perceive truths of a metaphysical nature and, in some cases, was even described as being mysteriously united with God or the Holy Spirit. Hadot illustrates the distinction between reason and intellect in Plotinus's philosophy by explaining that his philosophy was not meant "to be a discourse about objects, be they even the highest, but it wishes actually to lead the soul to a living, concrete union with the Intellect and the Good. . . . Reason, by theological methods, can raise itself to the notion of the Good, but only life according to Intellect can lead to the reality of the Good."

In the late Renaissance and early modern period, philosophers gradually abandoned this distinction between intellect and reason, rejecting or reducing the former to the latter, and reading this rationalist tendency back into the Greek, Latin, and Arabic texts they translated. Thus, the only valid sources of knowledge became reason and the senses. As a result, the "wisdom" that was philosophy's goal became more mental and practical and less existential and divine. In this way, the conception of philosophy gradually shifted away from "a way of life" to a mode of rational discourse, or as Hadot says, from "philosophy" to "philosophical discourse."

With this gradual disappearance of the intellect from Western philosophical discourse in the early modern period (fifteenth–eighteenth century), philosophy also became more distant from theology and mysticism. Furthermore, as the senses and reason came to be regarded as the only sources of knowledge, "the immaterial became immaterial," and the elaborate metaphysical cosmologies of medieval Europe gradually faded from mainstream intellectual life and thought. Moreover, reason replaced intellect as the imago Dei, the divine trace that marked man as being made in God's image, and rationality rather than spirituality or conformity to the Divine through the intellect became the measure of humanity. But as God was no longer directly perceived by the intellectus, but abstracted from sensory data and the rational faculty, His role in Western intellectual thought became more and more vague and distant, culminating in the nineteenth-century view of the divine as a creation of the mind of man—a god made in man's own image.

While the possible reasons for these related shifts are many and complex, the early modern thinkers seemed to want to create a space for themselves to think outside the theological dominion of the church. From its inception, the Enlightenment project of the modern period was concerned with creating and defining itself against its past through categories based on the newly enthroned reason. For example, the post-classical, pre-Renaissance period became known as the "medieval" period, or Middle Ages, or "Dark Ages" based on the early modern notion that this period marked a lapse in Europe's history between two glorious ages of reason: the Greco-Roman classical period, and its "rebirth" in the Renaissance. And so modern philosophy emerged as a privileged category of difference, to define "reborn" or "enlightened" Western Europe against and elevate it above its ancestral past and other civilizations.

Relatedly, the new philosophy of the Enlightenment (as opposed to the religious theology of the Middle Ages) emerged as one of a number of new categories created to define modern Europe against and above its "other," what it considered itself not to be. For example, the medieval category "mystical" (Mustikos) was used to refer to three closely linked elements: a method of allegorical biblical interpretation (such as Dante's anagogical), liturgical mysteries (such as the Eucharist), and the contemplative or experiential knowledge of God. However, the Enlightenment philosophers, especially

Kant, took up the task of oppositional definition and defined the new, rational "philosophy" against "mysticism," which was in turn defined against rationality and characterized as subjective as opposed to objective, emotive as opposed to intellectual, private as opposed to public, irrational as opposed to rational, and so forth. Mystical worldviews were dismissed as backward and prerational, mystical experiences became subjective psychological states (usually described as the result of some kind of disorder), mystical practices and rituals were dismissed as "superstition" and "magic," and mystical modes of interpretation such as allegory were largely relegated to secular literary criticism and poetry. This deeply affected modern readings of classical and medieval thinkers, as the seemingly "rational" elements, texts, and figures were emphasized and the seemingly "mystical" elements, texts, and figures were excised and devalued. For modern thinkers such as Kant, "the mystical" was the death of philosophy, in part because the modern conception of "philosophy" was given life through its definition against "the mystical."

As the work of Emmanuel Eze and Peter K. J. Park has demonstrated, this dynamic had profound significance for Enlightenment Europe's understanding of itself in relation to other civilizations and peoples. With the disappearance of the intellectus/nous, and the noetic realms of reality perceivable only by it (the divine and angelic realms or world of Platonic Forms), Western man found himself in the curious position of being at the top of the "great chain of being," the neo-Platonic and medieval hierarchy of the cosmos. To be sure, God and heaven still lurked in the background or up in the clouds somewhere; but in terms of the knowable, perceivable universe of philosophers and scientists, Western, rational man was at the summit, with his newly defined rationality as the mark of his superiority. Whereas in the Middle Ages humanity was judged by participation in or proximity to a transcendent, divine ideal (Christ or God), the secularization process of the Enlightenment resulted in humanity being judged by proximity to the immanent ideal of rational, enlightened European man.

In the nineteenth century, Hegel explicitly enunciated this doctrine, declaring Western Europe "the land of the elevation of the particular to the universal"; and eighteenth-century English dissident philosopher James Beattie wrote, "That every practice and sentiment is barbarous which is not according to the usages of Modern Europe seems to be a fundamental maxim with many of our critics and philosophers." The particular mode of reasoning that came to characterize Enlightenment thought was elevated to the level of "universal reason," the mark and determiner of humanity. This allowed Enlightenment thinkers, and their descendants, to "speak from nowhere and for everyone." Just as the Enlightenment thinkers defined themselves against their "dark," "mystical," and "irrational" past, they also defined themselves against their "dark," mystical," and "irrational" neighbors. Thus, membership in this elite class of humanity—"rational Europeans" (what later became "whiteness")—emerged as the transcendence of "race," which was seen as a privation of full humanity, an impediment to participation in that which makes one human: rationality.

Kant and Hegel also contributed to the development of a temporalization of this "great chain of being," creating a narrative in which the rational faculty was responsible for man's progress from "primitive" to "civilized." In his works on geography, on which he lectured more than any other subject, Kant argued that "lower" human beings exist for the sake and use of those at a "higher level of humanity"—of greater rationality—just as plants exist for the sake of animals. Similarly, Hegel's evolutionary theory established a temporal continuum with evil, ignorance, darkness, the past, the "primitive" and the nonwhite races of humanity on one end; and good, knowledge, light, the future, "civilization," progress,

and the white race on the other. In his **LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF WORLD HISTORY**, Hegel combined this teleology with environmental determinism to argue for the right and duty of the conquest, subjugation, and even elimination of the dark side of the continuum by the light.

This is the philosophy at the foundations of modern notions of progress and development. Socially and politically, the markers of "full humanity" have shifted from "rationality" to "scientific and technological innovation," "liberal democracy," and "human rights," but the basic architecture and the complexion of the people at the top of the hierarchy generally remain the same. Thus, philosophy became more than just a means of rational inquiry; by exemplifying the functioning of rationality, it became an important criterion for "civilized humanity," and provided the rationale to "civilize," often with great force, those segments of humanity deemed lacking in it. So as imperial Europe came into contact with the intellectual traditions of other civilizations, it compared them to the "mystical" thought of the European medieval period, categorized them as "irrational," and generally considered none of them to "rise to the level of philosophy."

This has begun to change in recent years due to the careful study by Western-trained scholars of Islamic as well as South and East Asian texts and thinkers whose sophisticated logic, dialectics, critical acumen, and well-developed theories made it difficult for scholars to categorize these traditions as "irrational." As Jay Garfield writes, illustrating this new approach and broader understanding of "philosophy":

> Ignoring the philosophical traditions of other cultures in fact, whether we like it or not, continues the colonial project of subordinating those cultures to our own. That project was "justified" by the white man's burden of bringing civilization to the benighted heathen, a burden of which we can only make sense if we deny their manifestly existent intellectual traditions the epistemic status we grant ours. Giving the Western philosophical tradition pride of place as "philosophy" while marginalizing in our departments or in our individual life all other traditions . . . hence implicates us directly in institutional racism. Recognizing that we are so implicated and refraining from changing our individual practice and from working to change our institutional practice constitutes, however passive it may be, individual racism. It also constitutes a profound epistemic vice, that of willfully ignoring sources of knowledge we know to be relevant to our own activities.

But what of those traditions that do not so closely resemble modern European philosophy, and are thus not so easily recognized? What of the intellectual traditions of the Amerindians, of the Polynesians and Aboriginal Australians, and what of those of Africans, the ultimate racial other of the Enlightenment?

African Philosophy?

Most of the contemporary debates about what should and should not be called African philosophy appear to boil down to arguments over the worth or status of the tradition in question, and thus whether it is worthy of the privileged category of "philosophy," or debates about the authenticity of the tradition, and thus if it is worthy of the appellation "African." Because such concerns are foreign to the traditions I have studied (most babalawo and Sufis do not care whether people call them "African philosophers"), this issue is not urgent for my work; however, were I to suggest a definition of philosophy, it would be the original Socratic or Pythagorean sense of the term, "the love of wisdom," the love and pursuit of that sophia (Greek), sapientia (Latin), ḥikma (Arabic) that is at once knowledge and an ideal mode of being. Defining the "African" half of "African philosophy" is more difficult (not least of all because the adjective "African" is a largely peripheral and foreign category to these traditions that

divide the world up in different ways), but I would reserve it for those continuous indigenous (itself a problematic term), Christian, and Islamic traditions that have shaped and been shaped by people living on the continent for several generations. So, for example, a Russian man initiated into Ifa and practicing in England would qualify as a member of an African philosophical tradition, while a Yoruba woman living in Lagos who is a student of Buddhist Madhyamika philosophy would not. The work of Africans on the continent and in the diaspora in various traditions of Western philosophy may be insightful, incisive, and interesting philosophical discourse, but in this definition, it would not qualify as what I would call "traditional African philosophy."

The following contrasting historical examples should help to clarify this point. Anton Wilhem Amo (ca. 1703–ca. 1759) was an Akan man from the Axim region of present-day Ghana who was brought to Germany as a child, where he was raised as a member of the family of the Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel. He studied at the Universities of Helmstedt, Halle, and Wittenberg, and received his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Wittenberg in 1734 for his dissertation, an argument against Cartesian dualism titled "On the Absence of Sensation in the Human Mind and Its Presence in Our Organic and Living Body." He lectured at the Universities of Halle and Jena, but after his patron, the duke, died, life in Germany became more difficult for him. In 1747, Amo returned to Ghana, and little is known about his life thereafter, save that he died around 1759.

Susanne Wenger (1915–2009) was an Austrian artist who married the German scholar Ulli Beier and moved with him to Nigeria in 1949, when the latter accepted a post at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. She was attracted to the traditional Yoruba religious ceremonies she heard going on down the street and, after a bout with tuberculosis, was initiated by the priest Ajagẹmọ into the mysteries of the Orişa Ọbatala (a Yoruba deity). She became a respected and important priestess, and eventually settled in the town of Oşogbo, where she revived the worship at the town's Sacred Grove of Ọşun (the Yoruba goddess of beauty and magic), building shrines for the Orişa (Yoruba deities) and fostering a whole "school" of traditional worshippers and artists. In large part thanks to her efforts, the Sacred Grove was declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2005. Upon her death in 2009, one of her students offered the following tribute:

> "Her internment completes Susan Wenger's transformation into a spirit, as devotees will henceforth make supplications to her, too."

In this definition, Susanne Wenger (and any who have followed in her footsteps) could be considered as a traditional African philosopher, whereas Anton Amo (and those who have followed in his footsteps) would not.

This is what I think I was looking for all those years ago in the bookshop, and why the piece by the seventeenth-century Ethiopian philosopher Zera Yacob was the one that spoke to me the most out of all of the articles in Eze's anthology. Now, as with any definition, this suggested one becomes fuzzier the more one investigates it. It is possible and increasingly common for someone to be a member of, and have training in, several different intellectual traditions, both traditional African and modern Western ones. Moreover, given the strong influence some of these traditions still exert on the general cultures of their societies (such as those of the Yoruba- or Dogon-speaking peoples among others), it is often difficult to say who belongs to a tradition and who does not. However, these traditions often draw their own boundaries through rites of initiation. Nevertheless, this provisional definition differs most strongly

from those discussed above, not by the way it defines "African," but by the way it defines "philosophy," distinguishing "philosophical discourse" from "philosophy itself," which is envisioned as a way of life, a love and pursuit of wisdom. Within this definition, some African philosophers may engage in written philosophical discourse, some (like Socrates) may engage in oral philosophical discourse, and others may not engage in philosophical discourse at all. It is not the discourse, but rather the practice of philosophy, as in Plato's definition from the Phaedo, as a "preparation for death," that is of greatest significance. The critiques that these traditions should not be called philosophical because they are not "critical" or "written" or "discursive" would thus be irrelevant. It would be like arguing that Genghis Khan should not be called a "world conqueror" because he did not play the video game of the same name—the two definitions of philosophy deal with different domains.

There is something of an inferiority complex that drives many scholars on the African continent and in the major centers of learning abroad to beg for the recognition and acceptance of these traditions (and/or their own work) into the privileged category of philosophy by trying to emphasize their similarities with contemporary academic philosophical theories. This has not been terribly successful, and with good reason, since what should be of interest is not the mere fact that precolonial Africans learned Aristotelian logic, but the distinct ideas, theories, perspectives, and modes of life developed by these African thinkers (e.g., why they learned, and what they did with Aristotelian logic). Musicians do not go to West Africa to hear local symphonies play Beethoven and Bartók; they go to appreciate, learn from, and be inspired by the region's many incredible indigenous musical traditions. Moreover, these musical traditions do not rely on Western approval for their continued relevance, popularity, and success, and neither do traditional African intellectual traditions. While traditional African philosophies may be of interest to non-Africans and Africans alike for the alternative perspectives they offer to recently dominant ways of life and knowing, I argue that, like traditional African musical traditions, they should be of interest, not because they are African, but because they are good—because their accounts of reality, the self, virtue, knowledge, and so forth, and the ways of life they exemplify, are compelling.

The facts, as I see them, are these:

1. The African continent has been and currently is home to a number of intellectual traditions, including some of the earliest to bear the name "philosophy" (North African Pythagoreanism, Platonism, neo-Platonism, etc.).
2. Some of these traditions are relatively recent importations from modern Europe, take place primarily in European languages, are taught in modern universities, and are primarily based on modern Western European worldviews, philosophies, and pedagogies.
3. Some of these traditions have a longer history on the continent, primarily take place in non-European languages, and are based on traditional worldviews, philosophies, and pedagogies that are distinct from those of modern, Western Europe.
4. Many of these traditions have long written traditions of discursive, rational argument (in Greek, Latin, Ge'ez, Arabic, Swahili, etc.) in addition to their oral traditions, while others, while still critical and dynamic, are "unlettered."
5. Virtually all of these older, traditional, non-Europhone traditions are categorized as "religious" and bear a family resemblance to the ancient Greco-Roman schools of philosophy in terms of methods and goals: ritual practices and exercises leading to the cultivation of "wisdom," an ideal mode of life. On the other hand, virtually all of the newer, modern, Europhone traditions do not

share in this family resemblance, and focus instead on philosophical, academic, or modern scientific discourse.

6. The members of these older, non-Europhone traditions have done and are doing sophisticated, compelling, and profound intellectual work that is worthy of academic attention.

7. Virtually all of these traditional, non-Europhone traditions exist quite independently of the modern academic traditions, have their own names for their traditions and categories of thought, and many of their members are largely unconcerned with whether what they are doing is called "philosophy" by those outside the tradition.

Given these facts, the question now becomes, how does one engage with these traditional, primarily non-Europhone traditions?

Valentin Mudimbe's **INVENTION OF AFRICA** convincingly demonstrates many of the dangers and pitfalls involved in trying to represent "Africa" in Western discourses. His basic argument is that discourse about Africa, even by Africans, takes place firmly within dominant Western discourses and philosophies, and thus tells us more about the Western training of the author than it does about anything "African." Mudimbe asserts that the vast imbalance in political and epistemic power between Western discourse about Africa and the reality of Africa itself prevents "Africa" from becoming anything more than a product of Western theory and imagination. He labels this secret "knowledge" that experts claim to represent in their books and articles about Africa as "gnosis."

As this discussion illustrates, academia has inherited a tradition of ignorance and arrogance when it comes to other intellectual traditions, especially those of Africa. This has provoked the problematic reactions of négritude, Afrocentrism, and certain new age movements, which (like other colonized nationalisms—e.g., Arab, Turkish, Persian, and Hindu) accept the basic categories of the "oppressive" discourse (such as "racial essence," "rational," "mystical," "philosophical," and "civilization") they seek to counter in their representations of Africa. In their many forms, these reactionary movements describe an imaginary Manichean dichotomy in which the "African" is natural, intuitive, and spiritual in contrast to the artificial, rational and material West. While such reactions are understandable, they are limited by their acceptance of these colonial categories.

Similarly, as Mudimbe, Paulin Hountondji, and others have demonstrated, Western attempts to understand and engage with traditional African worldviews and philosophies are fraught with the difficulties inherent in trying to learn and then represent a particular tradition from the perspective, and in the language, of another tradition. Traduttori traditori, the Italian saying goes—"Translators, traitors." And yet, translation, or at least something like it, does happen.

Following other postmodern thinkers, one of the main contentions of Mudimbe's work seems to be that the representation of "Africa" will never be the thing itself, and will thus always be the product of Western imagination, a mental construction of Western discourse. To use a linguistic analogy, when writing a translation of an Arabic text in English, I have to obey the conventions and rules of English prose, punctuation, and capitalization (which are not shared by Arabic), and when reading (especially if I am a nonnative speaker), I bring my own categories of thought, deeply shaped by my own mother tongue, to bear on the text. Similarly, when presenting African traditions in Western academic discourse one must follow the academic conventions of logic, argument, genre, and even theory that are often not

shared by the "translated" tradition. Moreover, one often brings one's own theoretical assumptions, often unshared by the tradition, to bear on the study of it.

For Mudimbe, as for many poststructuralist and postmodern theorists, the task of representation and translation seems to be an impossible one. What one produces is a work "inspired" by the object of inquiry, but not an "accurate" representation. Some accounts may be better than others, but this superiority can only be relative, since one can never access the truth or reality of the original, which is located "outside of the text," the discourse, and the self. This account of representation is based on something akin to the Kantian distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal, "things as they really are" and "things as they appear to us." Ironically, this distinction is not universally held, and is certainly not absolute in many traditions I would classify as "African philosophies." For example, in Sufism and some traditions of Islamic philosophy (and other neo-Platonic philosophies), the intellect (al-ʿaql), especially in its highest form (the Universal Intellect [al-ʿaql al-kullT] or the Divine Intellect [al-ʿaql al-rabbānT]), can know things directly, "as they are," because it is identical with their ontological root. The resulting knowledge, coincidentally, is also known as "gnosis." Thus Mudimbe's "problem of translation" derives from the very fact that he situates himself within a particular Western (primarily Foucauldian) epistemology in which such "gnosis" is not a real possibility.

Returning to the metaphor of translation, in his essay the "The Task of the Translator" Walter Benjamin quotes a passage by the German philosopher Rudolf Pannwitz that I believe both elegantly describes and points the way out of this impasse:

> Our translations, even the best ones, proceed from a mistaken premise. They want to turn Hindi, Greek, English into German instead of turning German into Hindi, Greek, English. Our translators have a far greater reverence for the usage of their own language than for the spirit of the foreign works. . . . The basic error of the translator is that he preserves the state in which his own language happens to be instead of allowing his language to be powerfully affected by the foreign tongue. Particularly when translating from a language very remote from his own, he must go back to the primal elements of language itself and penetrate to the point where work, image, and tone converge. He must expand and deepen his language by means of the foreign language. . . . However, this last is true only if one takes language seriously enough, not if one takes it lightly.

Similarly, I would argue that many, if not most attempts at engaging with, describing, or performing African philosophies (and other, traditional intellectual traditions from around the world) have tried to turn them into contemporary Western philosophies and theories. Especially when dealing with intellectual traditions that differ greatly from those of the (post)modern West, it behooves scholars to go back into the historical and philosophical origins of their own discourses to examine where categories such as "reason," "mysticism," "religion," "practice," and "theory" converge and emerge.

Western-educated scholars who wish to understand African thought would do well to revisit the premodern philosophical traditions of Greco-Roman antiquity (especially Platonism and neo-Platonism) as well as medieval and Eastern Orthodox Christian theology. By this I do not mean the caricatures of this thought that have emerged after the Enlightenment. Any scholar familiar with the Pythagoreans, the Orphic mysteries, Socrates's daimon, Plato's mythology, the theurgy of the neo-Platonists,37 the spiritual exercises of the early church fathers, the syntheses of critical reason, revelation, and mystical experience and exegesis found in medieval Catholic and Orthodox theologians, philosophers, and

mystics, would instantly recognize parallels with traditional African rituals, modes of expression, and thought, and would be in a much better position to understand these diverse African traditions, and their similarities to and differences from various Western traditions. The spiritual and mystical dimensions of these philosophical traditions can no more be excised from their "rational" elements than the racist dimensions of Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant and Hegel can be excised from their more "rational" elements. My point here is not that these Enlightenment thinkers are wrong because they are racist, but rather that they are racist because they are wrong about knowledge, its conditions, and the universality of their theories.

Moreover, just as Pannwitz suggested that the translated language should "powerfully affect" and "expand and deepen" the language into which it is translated, African traditions can and should "powerfully affect," expand, and deepen Western conceptions of philosophy and theory, and transform its discourses, but this can only happen if they are approached with reverence and taken seriously. To give a concrete linguistic example, this expansion and reshaping can be seen in the influence of Arabic on languages as diverse as Wolof, Swahili, Persian, and Malay, many of whose speakers have learned Arabic, and many more of whom interact with the Arabic language through daily religious rites—all of which has had a deep and lasting influence on the vocabulary, categories, and in some cases even the grammatical structures of these languages. Or, to give an example a bit closer to home, in describing Wọle Ṣoy inka's "Big English" (Igilango Gẹẹsi), Biọdun Jeyifo remarked, "When you use language in the Igilango Gẹẹsi manner, you are transforming the English language, you are doing things with it and in it that the owners of the language themselves had not thought imaginable." I argue that we should do the same with Western theories and the philosophies behind them.

In light of the difficulties highlighted in the above discussion, prominent scholars from a wide range of disciplines, including Latin American studies, South Asian studies, sociology, anthropology, religious studies, Islamic studies, history, and African studies have proposed the development of a "theory from the South" or "indigenous theory." For example, the scholar of Yoruba art Babatunde Lawal writes, "Unfortunately, some scholars have become so obsessed with theories which attempt to relate the 'particular' to the 'universal' that their conclusions often reflect the Eurocentric bias of the theories per se rather than the traditions of the culture they purport to analyze. Moreover, the search for paradigms often results in intellectual fantasies that mystify rather than clarify the subject being studied. A number of scholars . . . have called for a new critical approach that will allow African traditions to be studied on their own terms, instead of being viewed through Eurocentric lenses."

This dynamic is particularly troublesome when the theories and the theorized differ in power, place, and culture, but is especially so when they differ radically in their worldviews and philosophies that define "power, place, and culture." It's hard enough for an American university student to understand an English-language article about colonial history written by a West African academic, but it can be an even more complicated task to get the same student to understand an Arabic poem by a West African Sufi, because the worldviews expressed therein are even more different. However, from another perspective (perhaps that of the Sufi poet), the poem could be easier to understand than the article, because it addresses universal matters of the heart (or at least more so than does the academic work). These dynamics illustrate the inescapable effects of perspective and theory and highlight the importance of this call for new methods that allow cultures and traditions to "speak for themselves."

However, such methods are not necessarily "new," as demonstrated by the seminal works of Ananda Coomaraswamy on Asian art and philosophy, Toshihiko Izutsu on East Asian and Islamic philosophy, Seyyed Hossein Nasr and William Chittick on Islamic philosophy and Sufism, and Jacob Olupọna and Rowland Abiọdun on Yoruba religion and art (to name but a few). What all of these figures have in common is a strong grasp of Western philosophy and a remarkably profound understanding not only of the languages of the traditions they study, but also of the metaphysics and epistemologies of these traditions, with which they have a great affinity, and even identity. Moreover, their works are largely presented from the perspective, and in the terms of, the traditions studied, and so one frequently finds Arabic, Persian, Chinese, Sanskrit, and Yoruba terms—not "sprinkled in for flavoring," but as the fundamental categories of thought and analysis. Additionally, they all emphasize the relevance of the works and figures they study not merely for an academic understanding of the intellectual, artistic, or political history of a particular sector of humanity, but also for the merits of their arguments and their relevance to the art of being human, a position very much in line with the traditions themselves. Thus, at times, these works can seem to stretch the contemporary conventions of academic language and genre, although never abandoning scholarly rigor in the process.

The present work is inspired by Toshihiko Izutsu's groundbreaking **SUFISM AND TAOISM**, which demonstrates the power of taking seriously two non-Western thinkers and their arguments on their own terms (much as academics would with figures like Spinoza or Descartes) and the profound insights that can emerge from such a comparison. William Chittick's books on the Sufi thinkers Ibn ʿArabi and Rumi (d. 1273) have also been particularly useful in demonstrating how to let texts and traditions "speak for themselves." These books mostly consist of original translations from the primary texts of these two figures. However, through careful arrangement, discussion, and contextualizations of these texts, what emerges is much more than a straightforward translation; rather, it is a masterful exposition of the oeuvres of thinkers, almost entirely in their own words, and seemingly from their own perspectives. I have tried to follow suit in this work, allowing the texts and members of the tradition to speak for themselves as much as possible, and I beg the reader's indulgence and patience with the resulting long quotations from interviews and translations of texts, which I deemed necessary in order to preserve the unique voices of each tradition. Valerie Hoffman's Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt also provided an important model for combining the study of classical texts and contemporary representatives of a tradition.

Ibn ʿArabi as a Theorist

However, the primary theoretical inspiration and model for the present work comes from the work of the thirteenth-century Andalusian Sufi, Ibn ʿArabi. Another one of Chittick's works, Imaginal Worlds, invites us to consider Ibn ʿArabi, known as the Shaykh al-Akbar, "the greatest master," as a theorist of religion. Chittick writes:

> The bewildering diversity of religion's historical actuality is accentuated by the great variety of methodological approaches that are employed by specialists to study religion. Each of these approaches makes important contributions to our understanding of religion . . . but most are firmly rooted in the experience of modernity undergone by the West. . . . Ibn al-ʿArabi's perspective on religion differs profoundly from that of contemporary Western methodologies in its assumptions about the role and function of human beings in the cosmos. Of course, most scholars of religion do not voice their assumptions on such matters, but it is precisely the

unspoken assumptions that provide the greatest commonality among them. These assumptions are perhaps easier to express in negative than positive terms. For example, modern scholarship—in contrast to traditional Islamic scholarship—does not presuppose an ultimate reality that unifies all of existence, a clear purpose to human life, a moral dimension to both human activity and the natural world, the divine origin of religion, or the truth of scripture.

For the purposes of the present study, Ibn ʿArabi can serve as a theorist since he is by far the most influential theorist of the Sufi tradition itself, and his works are frequently cited in the Tijani tradition. Moreover, the Shaykh al-Akbar's work is uniquely suited to this task not only because of its subtlety, depth, and dizzying breadth, but also because of its unique understanding of different perspectives on or theories of the Real (al-Ḥaqq, one of the ninety-nine Names of God in Islam). For Ibn ʿArabi, the Islamic declaration of unity (tawḥīd)—that "there is no god but God" (lā ilāha illā Llāh)—therefore also means that "there is no reality but the Reality."

This "Ultimate Reality," by virtue of its nature, is also all-powerful ("there is no power but God"), all-living ("there is no life but God"), and all-knowing ("there is no knower but God"). By virtue of being all-knowing, this Ultimate Reality must know Itself both in and of Itself, and as another—or if you like, both perfectly and imperfectly. Thus, creation comes into being as means for this Reality to know Itself both in Itself and as another. Thus, Ibn ʿArabi often describes the cosmos as a "mirror of nonbeing" or a "dream" of the Real, in which it can contemplate Itself as not-Itself. While everything in a dream is distinct, but also nothing other than the dreamer, the characters through which the dreamer experiences the dream are somehow different. Because the dreamer (the Real) "sees through their eyes" they are more directly connected to him, and therefore to everything else in the dream. In Ibn ʿArabi's account, these "dreamers in the dream" are human beings, and their diverse and unique perspectives on and beliefs about reality are described as so many "self-portraits" of the Real (Ibn ʿArabi calls them "gods created in belief"). Because they are just representations, they are not and should not be confused with the Real itself, but because there is no other reality save the Real, they are also identical with the Real, like images in so many mirrors.

Ibn ʿArabi describes all these different approaches ("religious" or not) to reality as "knots" in the fabric of reality, because they represent so many limitations of the Real. To mix metaphors, as "dreamers in the dream," human beings are only truly themselves, and therefore truly happy, when they "wake up inside the dream" or "untie all of their knots," fulfilling their function of knowing the Real. Ibn ʿArabi calls this "knot-free" state, the "station of no station" or the "perspective of no perspective"—the perspective the Real has on Itself. Because the Real wants to be known, or because God is merciful, concerned with human felicity, He helps guide people toward felicity, toward knowledge of the Real. That is, He helps them untie their knots (or from another perspective, He unties the knots in Himself). This is usually accomplished through the forms of revelations/religions, which as particular limited self-portraits of the Real are knots in themselves. However, they have the distinction of being knots that undo other knots, including themselves. These "not-knots" and the process of untying they involve require the use of both reason and imagination.

The function of reason is analytic, to distinguish between the Real and its manifestations, the dreamer and the dream. The function of imagination is synthetic, to connect the manifestations to the Real, to see the dreamer in the dream. Because the purpose of these religious traditions is to connect human beings back to the Real, religious forms often emphasize imagination through poetic language and ritual

symbolism. However, when taken too far, imagination leads to confusing and conflating the dream and the dreamer; while if reason is taken too far, it destroys the imaginal coherence of the religion, and makes the dreamer (the Real) seem out of reach, if not out of the picture altogether. Thus, according to Ibn ʿArabi, people must learn to "see with two eyes"— reason and imagination—in order to untie their knots.

But what does all of this have to do with theories and methodologies of religion? Chittick explains:

> Any methodology can be nothing but a knot in terms of which reality is construed. In the name of objectivity or other norms, certain assumptions are made about experienced reality. Modern methodologies are often considered to have achieved a superior view of things because of their critical approach, but the belief that one's approach is "critical" already represents a particularly intractable knot. As the Shaykh would point out, the gods of critical belief have no privileged place in the pantheon. God is also the Critic, no doubt, but God as the Guide has a far greater claim to human loyalty.

He then sketches an outline of an Akbarī (i.e., an Ibn ʿArabi–based) approach to the study of religion:

> Ibn al-ʿArabi's approach provides a predisposition toward the study of religion that is also a knot, no doubt. Nevertheless, by recognizing the existence of knots and appreciating their value, and by acknowledging the position (perhaps never attainable) of untying all knots, this approach may provide certain insights unavailable to other points of view. By taking up the Shaykh's standpoint, one is predisposed to deal with religious diversity as follows: Religion appears among human beings because the Real as Guide desires to bring about human wholeness and felicity. But manifestations of the Guide can never embrace the total truth of the Real as such, which lies beyond expression and form. Hence each religion has its own specific mode of expression that is necessarily different from other modes of expression. . . . The specific imaginal forms that guidance assumes in a given religion will be determined by the cultural and linguistic receptacles as much as by the specific self-disclosure of the Guide—the prophet, avatara, buddha, sage— who initiates the religion. In the last analysis, these two sides of reality are inseparable: The cultural and linguistic receptacles, like the revelations, are self-disclosures of the Real. "The water assumes the color of its cup," but the cup is nothing but frozen water.

Thus, Ibn ʿArabi's unique appreciation of the diverse and differing perspectives (self-portraits of the Real) on reality, his understanding and use of both of rational and imaginal modes of discourse and thought, and his sensitive appreciation of sociohistorical context without becoming reductionist all make him a compelling theorist. Moreover, as a result of the "theory" outlined above, Ibn ʿArabi takes each of these "knots" or perspectives seriously "on their own terms," since each is a divine self-portrait that reveals aspects of the Real not explicitly contained in any other. Thus he writes, "Beware of becoming delimited by a specific knotting and disbelieving in everything else, lest great good escape you. . . . Be in yourself a matter [kyle] for the forms of all beliefs, for God is wider and more tremendous than that He should be constricted by one knotting rather than another."48 And elsewhere advises, "He who counsels his own soul should investigate, during his life in this world, all doctrines concerning God. He should learn from whence each possessor of a doctrine affirms the validity of his doctrine. Once its validity has been affirmed for him in the specific mode in which it is correct for him who holds it, then he should support it in the case of him who believes in it."

For this reason, in his writings, Ibn ʿArabi constantly shifts between different perspectives, always evaluating the topic at hand from multiple points of view, in a manner that contemporary theorists

would call "perspectivist" or "polyvocal." Ibn ʿArabi's peculiarly flexible style of arguing from and for multiple different positions (while still remaining mysteriously coherent) is such that even if you do not agree with him or all of his arguments, his undeniable acumen forces you to see the issue at hand from new perspectives, and always illuminates the issues at stake in these various discussions. Ibn ʿArabi gave answers (many, many different answers) to many questions similar to those we would ask of a contemporary theorist of religion: What is the relationship between practice and doctrine? What is the purpose of prayer? What is knowledge? What is truth? Who has the authority to answer these questions, and why?

Thus, Ibn ʿArabi is well suited to serve as a model and a theorist for approaching religious traditions, particularly those that appear to have much in common with his plural metaphysics. Nevertheless, while I use Ibn ʿArabi a great deal in presenting Tijani Sufism, when presenting Ifa, a non-Islamic tradition of at least equally staggering profundity, breadth, subtlety, and insight, I try to use the terms, categories, and theories of the tradition itself. From time to time, in explaining Ifa, I also contrast and compare Ifa to other traditions in order to clear up confusions and false analogies that I anticipate may arise in the mind of the reader. As Abrahamic traditions, Christianity and Islam share a great deal of intellectual history and conceptual categories, and thus the categories of Sufism typically require less of an explanation for Western-educated readers (whatever their religious affiliation) than do those of Ifa.

Comparative Philosophy

In this book, I also draw on Barry Hallen's work in comparing Yoruba and Western epistemologies. One of Hallen's most important insights is that when moving back and forth between different traditions, discourses, or languages, one has to be careful to understand the role that each term plays in its own context before constructing equivalencies and translations. His masterful analysis of the categories of "witchcraft" in English versus aft in Yoruba and of "knowledge" and "belief" in ordinary language and Anglophone philosophical discourse and imọ and igbagbọ in the discourse of Yoruba ritual specialists (oniṣtgun) inspired my own methods in comparing forms of "knowledge" in Ifa and Tijani Sufism.

Ibn ʿArabi's kaleidoscopic method of shifting perspectives also deeply influenced the way I conduct and present these comparisons: examining Tijani Sufism from the perspective of Ifa, examining Ifa from the perspective of Tijani Sufism, and then examining certain topics from various positions within each of these traditions and those of Ibn ʿArabi's work.

This structure is also related to the main motivation for the comparative nature of this project. Comparing these traditions in this way allows us to experience how they can operate as theoretical perspectives in and of themselves and understand that they are more than just "data" to be theorized about from other perspectives. The exercise of adopting the perspective of each of these traditions to analyze the other also makes us more aware of the limitations and specificity of academic theoretical perspectives derived from Western intellectual traditions.

Sources

This study is based on textual and oral sources, as well as my own observations during extended periods of research in Ile-Ifẹ and Modakẹkẹ, Nigeria (June–August 2011 and September–December 2013), and in Dakar and Medina Baye, Senegal (January– February 2012 and January–May 2014). The oral sources from Senegal come primarily from formal interviews with Tijani shaykhs conducted in Arabic and French, as

well as formal interviews with disciples conducted primarily in French, but also in Arabic and English. A few group discussions and interviews in which I participated (through the kind translation of friends) took place in Wolof (the most common language of Dakar), but the lack of Wolof oral sources is a major gap in the source material. My primary access to the community was through the incredible generosity of the Kane family, the sons and grandchildren of Shaykha Maryam Niasse, the daughter of Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse. Through their mediation I was able to interview shaykhs from several different branches of the family and spiritual lineage of Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse, and interact with a wide variety of disciples. Disciple interviews in Dakar primarily came from the time I spent in the zawiyas of Baba Lamine, Shaykh Mamour Insa, Shaykh Babacar N'Diaye, the home of Shaykha Maryam Niasse, and "Keur Baye" in Dakar. As for textual sources, I made frequent reference to the Tijani sourcebooks Jawāhir al-Ma`ānī and the collection Aḥzāb wa Awrād, as well as the prose works of Shaykh Ibrahim, particularly his collection of letters, Jawāhir al-rasāʾil; his Qurʾanic commentary, Fī Riyāḍ al-Tafsīr; his Kāshif al-Ilbās (translated as The Removal of Confusion); and Maigari's edition of his al-Sirr al-Akbar. Shaykh Ibrahim's published collections of poetry—Dawāwīn al-Sitt, Jāmi` al-jawāmi` al-dawāwīn, and Sayr al-qalb—were also frequently consulted, but seldom cited in the present work (the translations and analyses of these poems form part of another work). I was a participant observer in many communal prayers as well as gatherings both formal and informal in Medina Baye and Dakar, but as a noninitiate there were strict limits to my participation in these rites and discussions. As a matter of methodological integrity, I shared the drafts of my chapters on Tijani Sufism with the Anglophone disciples and shaykhs I interviewed, and have tried to incorporate their suggestions into the present work.

In Nigeria, oral sources came primarily from interviews and conversations with babalawo, especially Chief Ifarinwale Ogundiran, the Araba of Modakẹkẹ, Professor A. F. Agboola of Ọbafẹmi Awolọwọ University, and Awo Fajimi Faniyi, which were primarily conducted in Yoruba with some English, as well as informal conversations with apprentices (ọmọ awo). I made video recordings of performances of a number of Ifa verses with the Araba of Modakẹkẹ, and Ayọdeji Ogunnaike's digital database of Odu Ifa was another important oral source. I was an observer, but not a participant, in the Araba's daily practice of divination as well as several rites of worship and festivals. Textual collections of verses of Ifa such as William Bascom's Ifa Divination, Epega and Neimark's The Sacred Ifa Oracle, Wande Abimbọla's books, and verses recorded in the works of Rowland Abiọdun and Jacob Olupọna were also important textual sources. In addition, I shared several of my ideas and chapters with the babalawo whom I interviewed and have tried to incorporate their feedback.

The Present Work

The primary purpose of this book is to provide philosophical accounts of the "ways of knowing" of the branch of Tijani Sufi order founded by Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse, and that of Ifa. That is, taking Hadot's definition of philosophy as a "way of life," I propose to examine how each tradition defines, acquires, and verifies "knowledge" through various ritual and discursive means—or in Hadot's terms, through "spiritual exercises" and "philosophical discourse," which can itself be a spiritual exercise. These accounts, for the most part, will be developed in the categories of the traditions themselves, and will attempt to represent the intellectual dimensions of these "ways of knowing" as a rigorously as possible. Basically, I ask the representatives of each tradition: "What do you know?," "How did you come to know it?" and "How do you know that you know it?" and critically investigate and "think with" or "think through" their responses as well as those provided by the texts, orature, and practices of each tradition.

That is, I attempt to not only ask how each tradition defines different forms of knowledge in the ways that it does, but also why, intellectually, it does so. I endeavor to not only outline the means of acquiring knowledge, but ask how and why these means yield this knowledge, and I try to not only explain how these forms of knowledge are verified in each of these traditions, but also investigate the theories of verification in each tradition. Taking care to respect the plurality of voices and opinions, I construct a representation of the epistemology of maʿrifa among contemporary disciples of Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse (chapters 2, 3, and 4) and of the epistemology of imọ ijinlẹ (deep knowledge) of contemporary babalawo (priests of Ifa) (chapters 6, 7, and 8). While my goal is not to write an apology for or defense of either Ifa or Tijani Sufism, if I have done my job well and effectively communicated the ways in which these traditions "make sense" of and "make a case" for themselves, it may appear as such. This is because, following Ibn ʿArabi's lead, I make an effort to "learn from whence each possessor of a doctrine affirms the validity of his or her doctrine. Once its validity has been affirmed in the specific mode in which it is correct for he or she who holds it, then I attempt to support it in the case of he or she who believes in it." I have generally not included critiques of the claims of the traditions in question, as I believe such critiques first require the positive work of understanding them, a task that takes up the entirety of the present volume.

The secondary purpose of this work is, on the basis of these characterizations, to construct a comparison of Ifa and Tijani Sufism. Although currently neighbors in Nigeria, Benin, and some places in the African diaspora, Ifa and Tijani Sufism appear to have developed in radically different spiritual, intellectual, and cultural contexts. However, the primary purpose of this comparative exercise is to examine each tradition from the perspective of the other, demonstrating how each tradition can and does serve as a critical, theoretical perspective that can analyze other perspectives. Moreover, the epistemologies of both traditions appear to share certain structural traits that make comparison not only possible, but potentially fruitful. Namely, the epistemologies of both traditions seem to be based on a kind of self-knowledge, one in which the knowing subject is identical with the known object. As such, these modes of self-knowledge are cultivated through various ritual practices, especially the watershed rites of initiation, which are believed to transform the knowing subject, leading to a kind of identification with the founder of the tradition, who is conceived of as the perfect embodiment of knowledge. It should be noted that this structure is in no way unique to these two traditions, but seems to be found in other religious traditions and forms of philosophy around the world. Thus, I attempt to construct an academic dialogue between contemporary perspectives from Ifa and Tijani Sufism, to complement and perhaps enrich the limited but ongoing dialogues between the two traditions outside of the academy.

That being said, I try to guard against facile and superficial comparisons through both the structure and method of this comparison. Following Izutsu, I divide the work into three parts: the first is an exploration of the epistemology of maʿrifa (direct knowledge) in Tijani Sufism, the second is an exploration of knowledge (specifically imọ ijinlẹ, or deep knowledge) in Ifa, and only in the third section do I attempt a comparison of the two traditions. Furthermore, this third part is further subdivided into four parts: In the first part, I present the opinions of practitioners of Ifa on Tijani Sufism, and then conduct a comparison of the two traditions from the perspective of Ifa. In the second part, I present the opinions of representatives of the Tijani tradition on Ifa, and then conduct a comparison from the perspective of Tijani Sufism. In the third part, I attempt to compare, and use the two traditions and Ibn ʿArabi's work to "think through," certain topics that emerge from the descriptions of the traditions

given in the first and second parts of the book. Finally, in the fourth and final section of the book, I take some of the points where Ifa and Tijani Sufism appear to converge and suggest ways in which their perspectives can expand conceptions of these topics among contemporary academics.

Metaphysics and Epistemology

I decided to focus my research on epistemology or "ways of knowing" in these traditions because it links their metaphysical doctrines and the rituals and practices designed to realize or actualize them in the souls and bodies of their adepts. Without an understanding of the epistemology of these traditions, one can study the doctrines of Sufism and remain baffled by its rituals (What does the oneness of being have to do with sitting in a dark room and repeating an Arabic phrase?), or conversely learn all about the rituals of Ifa and remain mystified by its mythology (What do incantations and sacrifices have to do with the relationship between the Supreme God and other deities?). Moreover, as the site where doctrine meets practice, epistemology can provide important insights into both and their relationship to one another.

From a certain point of view, the metaphysics or ontology of a given philosophical system is the result of the application of a particular epistemology: it is a knowledge arrived at through certain means. However, this epistemology itself is dependent on a particular metaphysics or ontology, because this particular ontology will, in turn, determine a psychology or anthropology: the nature of the knowing subject. In order to know something, I have to put some practice of knowing into action. For example, I may come to the conclusion that electrons exist through the application of a certain epistemological process. However, this epistemological process is itself determined by a priori assumptions about the nature of reality and knowledge (i.e., messages from angels in dreams about superstring theory may not count as valid knowledge). I have chosen to focus on the epistemological pole of this philosophical loop, because it allows me to bracket some of the more difficult metaphysical disparities between these African traditions and contemporary Western academic worldviews and to explain how they arise.

Conclusion

However, the point of all this research and theory and critical engagement with philosophy is to produce a work that would be able to speak to that seventeen-year-old back in the bookstore. Hopefully, the present project can add to the growing literature that provides introductions to the intellectual dimensions and philosophical discourse of non-Western worldviews and traditions. Such literature is important not only because it introduces alternative perspectives on reality, knowledge, ethics, and so forth into Western discourses, but because these perspectives can be compelling and transformative in their own right. At the very least, they can make us aware of unexamined assumptions and prejudices, and perhaps they can even help us "untie our knots," as Ibn ʿArabi suggests. But this can only happen if we allow ourselves to take these traditions not only as anthropological or historical data, but seriously as "philosophical" accounts of knowledge and knowing—if we take them "on their own terms"—much as we are trained to do with Western theorists and philosophers. Such serious consideration does not require that we embrace these traditions or blindly accept all their claims, but rather that we acknowledge the possibility that our difficulties in understanding them may have more to do with our history and training than with the particularities of the traditions themselves. As Amadou Hampâté Bâ writes, "To discover a new world, one must be able to forget one's own; otherwise one merely carries that along with one and does not 'keep one's ears open.' The Africa of the old initiates

warns the young researcher, through the mouth of Tierno Bokar, the sage of Bandiagara: 'If you wish to know who I am, if you wish me to teach you what I know, cease for a while to be what you are, and forget what you know.'" This is much more easily said than done, but I hope the following chapters can facilitate this kind of serious consideration and reflection. This is indeed a serious endeavor; for to take the epistemologies of Tijani Sufism and Ifa seriously on their own terms means to be open to possibilities that may seem foreign, strange, or uncomfortable, such as the possibility of a "deep knowledge" that is a discovery or remembrance of one's true self, at once one's origin and destiny. <>

THE CRITIQUE OF RELIGION AND RELIGION'S CRITIQUE ON DIALECTICAL RELIGIOLOGY edited by Dustin J. Byrd [Studies in Critical Social Sciences, Brill 9789004419032]

In **THE CRITIQUE OF RELIGION AND RELIGION'S CRITIQUE ON DIALECTICAL RELIGIOLOGY**, Dustin J. Byrd compiles numerous essays honouring the life and work of the Critical Theorist, Rudolf J. Siebert. His "dialectical religiology," rooted in the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, especially Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Leo Löwenthal, and Jürgen Habermas, is both a theory and method of understanding religion's critique of modernity and modernity's critique of religion. Born out of the Enlightenment and its most important thinkers, i.e. Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, religion is understood to be dialectical in nature. It contains within it both revolutionary and emancipatory elements, but also reactionary and regressive elements, which perpetuate mankind's continual debasement, enslavement, and oppression. Thus, religion by nature is conflicted within itself and thus stands against itself. Dialectical Religiology attempts to rescue those elements of religion from the dustbin of history and reintroduce them into society via their determinate negation. As such, it attempts to resolve the social, political, theological, and philosophical antagonisms that plague the modern world, in hopes of producing a more peaceful, justice-filled, equal, and reconciled society. The contributors to this book recognize the tremendous contributions of Dr. Rudolf J. Siebert in the fields of philosophy, sociology, history, and theology, and have profited from his long career. This book attempts to honour that life and work.

Contributors include Edmund Arens, Gregory Baum, Francis Brassard, Dustin J. Byrd, Denis R. Janz, Gottfried Küenzlen, Mislav Kukoč, Michael, R. Ott, Rudolf J. Siebert, Hans K. Weitensteiner, and Brian C. Wilson.

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Rudolf J. Siebert and Dialectical Religiology

Few academics have careers that are as long and productive as Dr. Rudolf J. Siebert. The author of dozens of books and hundreds of articles on a wide variety of topics, Siebert has over his long career shaped the trajectory of comparative religion, critical theory, and the critical-political approach to understanding the dialectical nature of religion and theology. Rooted both in his theological education, as well as the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory of Society, he is the initiator of what he called *Dialectical Religiology*, which seeks to understand religion as a dialectical phenomenon – both embodying emancipatory, liberation, and revolutionary elements, while also holding fast to its dogmatism, obscurantism, and authoritarianism. Like the first generation of critical theorists before him, Siebert is not a proponent of a positivistic "outsiders" perspective to the study of religion, as if religion is merely an "interesting" sociological phenomenon, the claims of which one can study without ever taking seriously. Rather, he has attempted to emancipate those prophetic, recalcitrant, and non-conforming elements within the world religions from the reactionary, conservative, and stasis-inducing historical forms in which they reside. Although he appropriated their well-founded critiques, and advanced them against positive religion, Siebert did not wholly follow the anti-religion intellectuals of the 19th century, Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx, Ludwig Feuerbach, Sigmund Freud, and Vladimir Lenin, just to name a few, who saw religion one-sidedly. Being men of their times, religion, as it was defined and embodied by the ruling Bourgeoisie and the dogma of "progress," was seen merely as a reactionary impediment to humanity's earthly emancipation. In other words, they totalized the ideologically distorted Christianity of Emperor Constantine (and his successors) and the many who distorted Christianity by transfiguring it into a means of domination, but forgot the anti-ideological and anti-idolatry Christ, Jesus of Nazareth, and his revolutionary *weltanschauung*. For the 19th century critics, religion had to vacate history. For the dialectician, religion had to be rescued.

Throughout his work, Dr. Siebert has returned to Immanuel Kant and Georg W.F. Hegel, and their dialectical approach to religion. Through *aufhaben* (determine negation), that which was salvageable within the historical world religions, i.e. their inherent negativity towards the world-as-it-is (*contra mundum*), can be delivered to an emancipatory critical-political philosophy, wherein the antagonism

between the sacred and the profane, reason and revelation, the religious and the secular, may find reconciliation and fulfillment.

Dr. Siebert's dialectical religiology has its roots not only in Kant, Hegel, Marx, and other Enlightenment intellectuals, but also in numerous Left-wing theologians, such as Walter Dirks, Hans Küng, and Johannes Baptist Metz, as well as the first generation of the Frankfurt School, who, like Siebert, saw elements within religion that were still salvageable, precisely because they were still loaded with emancipatory potentials, i.e. they lent themselves towards an exodus from human misery towards a future reconciled society, wherein the entrenched antagonisms that now defines the damaged and degraded conditions of human existence, are alleviated. Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, Leo Löwenthal, and Erich Fromm, etc., were all keenly aware that religion was dialectical, and not an entirely *positive* (status-quo affirming) epiphenomenon of human misery, rooted solely in humanity's longing for a world better than this one, a merely delusion, or a reactionary ideology. Rather, it was also a powerful motivating force and critique against the *world-as-it-is*, in the name of the *world-as-it-should-be*, and thus, as Walter Benjamin stated, certain theological elements could be "enlisted" by historical materialism into the struggle against the structures of human oppression, exploitation, necrophilia, and unnecessary human suffering.[1] As such, Critical Theory was the successor of prophetic religion, and allowed revolutionary religious potentials to remain alive after the functional death of their exterior forms. The first generation of critical theorists, writing within the catastrophes of World War I and II, Auschwitz, and the ever-looming threat of a nuclear holocaust, could not, like many of their philosophical predecessors, abstractly negate religion. Such a deflation of human intellectual and moral potentials would have contributed to the further suffering, debasement, and enslavement of mankind – the "slaughterbench of history" or "universal Golgotha" – thus preparing the way for further barbarism. At a time of civilizational crisis, wherein (1) the true individual, who is capable of resisting irrational outbursts of fascist collectivism, continues to collapse; (2) serious literature has degenerated into superficial word-bound-entertainment; (3) music is a mere widget of corporate capitalism; (4) critical philosophy is abandoned for "self-help" guruism; (5) history is forgotten amidst national amnesia; (6) cheap entertainment and consumerism is the predominant method for anesthetizing the meaninglessness of modern life; (6) wherein war increasingly becomes the norm because it is profitable; (7) "education" is mere training for careerism; (8) positivism is made into a metaphysical dogma; and finally critical thought itself is absorbed into the capitalist totality and thus nullified, the lack of critical religion as a source of being-outside of the status quo, while being committed to the humanity of those still ensnared within the status quo, is a serious setback. The Frankfurt School, including Dr. Siebert's dialectical religiology, did not only wish to avoid such a collapse, but attempted to fight against such a trend. Religion, the critical theorists thought, had its rightful place within that struggle, and therefore its emancipatory and liberational elements had to be rescued from the ideological cover that so distorted it.

Dialectical Religiology has its roots not only in the modern condition, but also in the on-going perpetual tragedy of history and humanity's attempt to understand and live with the meaning of such senseless suffering within a seemingly "Godless" world, which ironically is said to be saturated with the presence of a merciful and loving God. The theodicy problem is an ever-present spectre in Siebert's dialectical religiology. From his study of the global class conflict, World War I and II, the Holocaust, anti-Semitism, the rise of Fascism in Italy and National Socialism in Germany, and their reemergence and

reconfiguration in the 21st century West through palingenetic ultra-nationalism, the return of which the Frankfurt School had predicted already at the end of the second world war, the pain of longing for a merciful and compassionate God (the Totally Other) in the face of a merciless and uncompassionate world historical process, lingers behind every word he has written. Such work is also born out of the suffering of his own biography; from the death of his parents, his brother Karl, his beloved wife Margie, his son Steve, and his numerous friends, not to mention the tragedy of witnessing the destruction of Frankfurt, Germany, his hometown, and its innocent inhabitants, by the saturation bombing of the Americans and the British; each tragedy informs his dialectical religiology. His participation in the *Battle of Aschaffenburg* (1945); his experiences as a prisoner of war, both in Europe and in the United States; his experiences with Jews during the war – amidst the *Endlösung der Judenfrage* (final solution to the Jewish question); the anti-Hitler Catholic youth movement, his experience with a Protestant minister who shared his water after young Siebert had been struck by a protester's stone while being transferred via train to another P.O.W. camp; all of these episodes were formative to the development of his dialectical religiology.

The Frankfurt Mentor and his Students

Dr. Rudolf J. Siebert has spent more than fifty years at Western Michigan University, where I first met him my freshman year (1994–1995). While studying music and comparative religion, I was repeatedly drawn to Siebert's popular classes, *Psychological Elements of Religion*, *Religion and Revolution*, and *Religion and Social Ethics*, not to mention the numerous graduate courses he offered in the Frankfurt School, many of which were taught in his home, the "House of Peace," wherein numerous graduate students stayed for free as they pursued their graduate degrees at WMU. In my experience as a young undergraduate, Dr. Siebert's analyses of current affairs, his time diagnosis and prognosis, rooted in a dialectical understanding of the historical processes that brought history to that particular point, was matched only by one other person I had studied: Malcolm X. Both had the uncanny ability to penetrate through the ideological camouflage that perpetually blurred the vision between reality and fiction, essence and appearance, truth and ideology. His inter-disciplinary approach to comparative religion, and the broader study of society and history, rooted in dialectics, appealed to me, just as it did for many other former students of his, some of whom have contributed to this festschrift, including Dr. Michael R. Ott, Siebert's most prominent intellectual heir. Over the course of decades, Siebert has educated thousands of students from all over the world. He has taught in the United States, Canada, Europe, the former Soviet Union, as well as Japan, and is known throughout for his Critical Theory of Religion, or *Dialectical Religiology*, which has come to cross-fertilize many other disciplines, such as political science, sociology, psychology, philosophy, and history. He has served on numerous master's thesis committees and doctoral dissertation committees, and has directed two international courses, one in Dubrovnik, Croatia (formally Yugoslavia): *The Future of Religion*, and the other in Yalta, Russia (formally Ukraine): *Religion in Civil Society*. Both of which many of the contributors to this volume have attended and benefited from.

I personally had one of those truth-revealing moments while traveling abroad with Dr. Siebert. In 2004, while at the *Future of Religion* conference in the Crimea, he and I visited the little castle commonly called the "swallow's nest," just outside of Yalta. As a graduate student, coming from the United States, which is devoid of castles, but plagued with corporate architecture, I was amazed by this small Neo-Gothic structure that seemed to defy gravity, as it sat on a cliff overlooking the Black Sea. I said to Siebert, 'Isn't

that amazing,' to which he replied: 'It is a catastrophe!' Stunned, I asked why he would say that. Analyzing it intently, he said, 'think of all the workers who died falling off the cliff to build that monstrosity for the German nobleman (Baron von Steingel), just so he could meet his lover here.' What I was seeing was the exoskeleton – the outward appearance of the castle: no more, no less. What he was seeing was its essential reality; the human cost of its existence – a cost that still remained within its walls and turrets. He was engaged in anamnestic, present, and proleptic solidarity – a "being-with" form of intense solidarity that doesn't forget the innocent victims, even when they fail to appear in the footnotes of history. In 2004, I was still lost in the realm of appearances. However, the ability to see through the façade of the given, the ideological distortion that camouflages the horror and terror of history and nature, and develop an openness for the innocent victims, are two of the most important abilities I've learned from Siebert throughout our years studying, writing, traveling, and developing the Critical Theory of Society and Religion. As it is demonstrated on a daily basis, the "labor of the negative" never ends.

The Critical Theory of Religion, as developed by Dr. Rudolf J. Siebert is dynamic; it rejects any attempt at dogmatization and/or reification. True to the nature of Critical Theory, as written in Max Horkheimer's 1937 essay, *Traditional vs. Critical Theory*, Dr. Siebert has always encouraged his students to take dialectical religiology into other realms – opening up new avenues of inquiry, mining other subjects and disciplines for valuable insights, concepts, and notions, and challenging the dogmatism and authoritarianism of all other seemingly closed semantic universes. The evidence of such an theoretical openness towards other schools of thought, academic disciplines, ways-of-beings, as well as the thought of the ideological "enemies," is characteristic of Siebert's own work, as it is expressed in the millions of words he's penned over the course of his long and prestigious career. For his work and his revolutionary-compassionate praxis, both at home and abroad, he has engendered respect and admiration from many scholars outside of his own discipline and outside of academics altogether.

I would like to thank my dear friend and brother, Dr. Michael R. Ott, for assisting me in the reading of the manuscript. His sharp eye catches what I miss. If there are any mistakes in the manuscript, the fault is wholly mine. If there are none, credit should be given to him. I would also like to thank Jamie Groendyk for assisting me in preparing the manuscript for publication. Without her help, support, and encouragement, rest assured, this book would never have come to fruition. I would also like to thank my parents, Joyce Weber and Roger Byrd, who to this day continue to motivate me to work hard and honor their lives by living a good and moral life myself. And to my children, Benjamin, Layla, Maxwell, and the newest addition, Alexander. They are the reasons why I continue to work for a peaceful and reconcilied society dreamed of in our Critical Theory – a society that is worthy of their existence.

It is fitting that we show our well-deserved gratitude to Dr. Rudolf J. Siebert for his friendship, mentorship, guidance, and influence upon us and our work. We are forever in his debt. On behalf of all the contributors and those who could not contribute but would have liked to, we thank Dr. Siebert for his over fifty years of teaching, lecturing, researching, and writing. We would not be who we are if he was not who he is. Remember, as the great humanist Desiderius Erasmus said, 'i*n regione caecorum rex est luscus*.' ("In the country of the blind, the eyed man is king." <>

LOVE DIVINE: A SYSTEMATIC ACCOUNT OF GOD'S LOVE FOR HUMANITY by Jordan Wessling [Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology, Oxford University Press 9780198852483]

In **LOVE DIVINE: A SYSTEMATIC ACCOUNT OF GOD'S LOVE FOR HUMANITY**, Jordan Wessling provides a systematic account of the deep and rich love that God has for humans. Within this vast theological territory, Wessling's objective is to contend for a unified paradigm regarding fundamental issues pertaining to the God of love who deigns to share His life of love with any human willing to receive it. Realizing this objective includes clarifying and defending theological accounts of the following: how the doctrine of divine love should be constructed; what God's love is; what role love plays in motivating God's creation and subsequent governance of humans; how God's love for humans factors into His emotional life; which humans it is that God loves in a saving manner; what the punitive wrath of God is and how it relates to God's redemptive love for humans; and how God might share His intra-trinitarian love with human beings. As the book unfolds, Wessling examines a network of nodal issues concerning the love that begins in God and then overflows into the creation, redemption, and glorification of humanity. The result is an *exitus-reditus* structure driven by God's unyielding love.

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Introduction

Excerpt: In what is referred to as the 'high priestly prayer' (John 17:1–28), Jesus addresses the Father and describes a relationship of glory and love that was present between them 'before the foundation of the world' (John 17:24; cf. 17:5). In this prayer, Jesus expresses the desire to share the exchange of life and love between He and the Father with those who might believe in Him (e.g. 17:26), and He indicates that this sharing of the divine life transforms Christians and reveals that the Father loves them even as the Father loves Christ (17:23). The prayer's emphasis concerns God's love for those who are rightly related to Christ, but it could be argued that the author of this Gospel means to teach that the Father sent the Son to provide everyone with the opportunity to participate in their eternal life of love (e.g. John 3:16–18; 12:32). Whatever the case, the high priestly prayer points to a God with a profound love for humans. Read theologically, the Son petitions the Father to share their intra-trinitarian life of love with those who will receive it, and Jesus compares the Father's love for believers with the Father's eternal love for the Son. It is difficult to imagine a God who could sensibly love humans more deeply.

Of course, the high priestly prayer is not the only place in Scripture where God reveals an intense love for humans. In the book of Deuteronomy, God explains to Israel that, although 'heaven and the heaven of heavens' belong to Him, He has 'set his heart in love' on Israel and graciously chose her for His good purposes (Deut. 10:15; cf. Exod. 34:5–7). The prophet Jeremiah describes God's love of Israel as an 'everlasting love' (Jer. 31:3), and other prophetic writers utilize evocative language—sometimes even the language of suffering—to describe the depth and faithfulness of God's love for His people. Isaiah testifies to the various ways in which God, 'in his love and in his pity', has redeemed Israel (Isa. 63:9; cf. 54:8; 63:7; Mic. 7:18–19), and Hosea paints a picture of God who loves Israel like a groom loves a bride and whose compassion 'grows warm and tender' even when she is unfaithful (Hos. 11:8). Within the New Testament, Jesus teaches that the Heavenly Father loves both the righteous and the unrighteous (Matt. 5:43–48), and Christ manifests God's love for those on the margins (Matt. 9:10–11; 21:31–32). St John twice says that 'God is love', and following each reference is the claim that God's love is revealed among and for humans in Christ (1 John 4:7–20). The Apostles Peter and Paul both teach, or at least are often understood to teach, that God loves each and every human person such that He desires everyone's salvation (e.g. 2 Pet. 3:9 and 1 Tim. 2:4; cf. Acts 17:28); and Paul speaks of Christ's love as a rooting and grounding love that 'surpasses knowledge', excels in 'breadth and length and height and depth' (Eph. 3:18–19), and cannot be overcome (Rom. 8:31–37). If all of this were not enough, the immensity of

God's love for humanity is exemplified vividly within the central message of Christianity, whereby God became human and died a brutal criminal death so that all might participate in God's eternal life. So far as I am aware, no other religion or enduring system of thought places greater emphasis on God's love for humanity. In his often-cited historical exploration of the concept of love, Irving Singer forms a similar judgement. He concludes that 'Only Christianity . . . defines itself as the religion of love', since Christianity 'alone has made love the dominant principle in all areas of dogma'. At bottom, the reason for this, in Singer's estimation, is that Christians worship the God who is identified with, even as, love.

This book provides a systematic account of the deep and rich love that God has for humans. While the associated theological territory is vast, the goal is to defend a unified account of central perennial issues pertaining to the God of love who deigns to share His life of love with any human willing to receive it. This task shall involve gaining clarity on what God's love is, what role love plays in motivating God's creation and redemption of humans, whom it is that God loves, and how it might be that God shares the intra-trinitarian life of love with human beings.

The first chapter of this study is methodological and sets the stage for many of the modes of reasoning found within the remainder of the book. In it, I argue that it is permissible to utilize reflection upon ideal human love as a significant source for considering how we should conceive of God's love (especially when this is conducted in concert with Scripture and Christian tradition). More specifically, I present reasons for believing that various New Testament authors presuppose that divine and human love (or a species of each) are similar in such a way that scrutiny of how humans ideally should love ought to inform how we think of God's perfect love. This methodological conclusion provides a foundation for the construction of a model of God's love that aims to represent features of the divine character in a manner that at least approximates the truth. The model, in turn, not only aids our understanding of what God's love is, it also provides some measure of intellectual traction on certain kinds of actions that God might be inclined to perform.

Chapter 2 is where I proffer this model of God's love, 'the value account'. According to the value account, God's love is an appreciative response to intrinsic worth (dignity in the case of a human), wherein God values the existence and flourishing of the one loved as well as union with the beloved individual. After expounding this model of love, I argue that conceiving of God's love in this manner is independently plausible, compatible with im portant kinds of biblical data, and nourished by a traditional Christian stream of thinking about God's love.

In Chapter 3, the value account of divine love is first put to work. Here, against Jonathan Edwards and others, I contend for the widely advocated but rarely rigorously defended doctrine that God created the world in general and humans in particular out of love. If adopted, this doctrine frames much of the Christian conception of God's dealings with humanity. For if God created humans out of love, grounds are furnished for maintaining that all or much of God's subsequent interaction with humans will be led by His initial creative motivation.

If God created the world out of love, how do events in the world impact Him, if at all? Does He commiserate with human suffering, or is there something about the divine nature which renders it impossible for the world to alter the shape of God's happiness? Against many contemporary proponents of divine impassibility who argue that there is nothing particularly valuable about divine commiseration, the contention of Chapter 4 is that God's commiserative suffering is an intrinsically valuable manner of

identifying with His rational creatures. Thus, we should interpret biblical depictions of a suffering God as providing a window into God's inner life. Presupposed by this defence of divine passibility is the idea that God enjoys an 'affective love' for humans; that is to say, God is affectively open and responsive to those He loves dearly. The conclusion that God loves humans affectively, even though this introduces suffering into God's life, fills out the value account of divine love defended in Chapter 2 and provides a foundation for the conception of deification presented in Chapter 7.

Chapter 5 concerns the scope of God's love, specifically the scope of what I label God's supreme love: a love that values and seeks an individual's supreme or highest good. Contrary to a tradition that stretches back to the writings of St Augustine, I argue that God possesses supreme love for each and every human, and is thereby not limited to a select few. The universal scope of God's supreme love, I contend, flows naturally from the value account of divine love, especially when that account is spelled out in terms of God's maximal perfection.

Chapter 6 transitions from the scope of God's love to God's love of individuals whom He has just cause to punish. While a number of theologians describe a significant difference, even a 'duality', between God's love and punitive wrath, I argue that God's just wrath is a facet of His love, and that God's punishment of sinners, even in hell, is an expression of this relentless love. To make the case, I first contend that God's creation out of love, as well as the ministry of Christ, support the notion that God's love and wrath are fundamentally one. Next, I build upon the work of Gregory of Nyssa and the contemporary philosopher R.A. Duff to construct a communicative model of divine punishment. According to this model, God's punishment intends to communicate to sinners the censure they deserve, with the aim of persuading these individuals to start down the path of spiritual transformation.

Whereas Chapter 6 follows God's love into the pit of hell, Chapter 7 examines how God's love lifts humans into heaven. For in the latter chapter I propose a manner of conceiving of God's deifying love, whereby God shares His intra-trinitarian life of love with men and women through the life and death of Christ. The proposal requires partial accounts of both the Atonement and deification, along with an explanation of how these two doctrines fit together. Chapter 7 also provides a way of harmonizing various conclusions that emerge throughout the book. There we see how it might be that the God who loves within Himself, in accordance with the value account, creates out of love for the purpose of being united in an affective love with all of humanity. This way of harmonizing several conclusions within the book is touched upon in Chapter 7, and then this study wraps up with a brief and separate Conclusion.

In these ways, then, the present book provides an integrated paradigm for thinking about God's love for humanity as attested by the Christian faith. The project might be viewed as an attempt to trace foundational issues related to God's love as it begins in Him and then overflows into the creation, redemption, and glorification of humanity—a kind of exitus-reditus structure driven by the unyielding love of God. In tracing these issues, it is not my goal to survey what great theologians of the past have said about the topics covered, nor is it to review all of the contemporary literature on God's love. Instead, I present mostly new arguments for specific conclusions; historical and contemporary figures are brought into the discussion only as they facilitate that end. I add that this book has been constructed by a theologian primarily for theologians, but I also hope that my mode of argumentation, and some of the debates in which I engage, will be of interest to philosophers who enjoy thinking about the Christian faith. I doubt I will fully satisfy either of these very different audiences, yet I would like to believe that I

advance the discussion on God's love for humanity in important respects that will be helpful to many readers— even if only to provide a target for counterarguments.

Few would deny the importance of the subject matter before us. Nevertheless, I submit that two features of the current academic landscape make a book on God's love for humans especially timely. One of these features comes from the philosophical academy, another from the theological guild. In contrasting the aims of the present work with that of others, I do not intend to set a polemical tone to this manuscript.

The first relevant feature of the academic landscape has to do with a growing movement among contemporary Christian philosophers of religion to limit, or in certain ways moderate, the intensity of God's love for humans. The motivation for doing so often comes from the desire to defend the coherence of the Christian faith against the problems of evil and divine hiddenness that are pressed against them by their non-believing philosophical colleagues. 'If God loves us with a perfect love as Christians proclaim', say these colleagues, 'then God wouldn't allow horrendous suffering, and God would make His presence obvious. But God doesn't seem to be present to many, and the world is suffused with unspeakable suffering. So, it looks as if no God of perfect love resides in heaven.' The response to which I now make reference proceeds by rejecting the understanding of God's love that underwrites such objections. For a variety of reasons it is said, in effect, that God's love is so radically different than ideal human love that His love can be perfect while remaining indifferent to much of human welfare. Yes, God loves humans in some deeply mysterious sense, so the line of reasoning goes, but one should not exaggerate the depth and comprehensibility of that love.

Without wishing to dismiss the reality that humans can exaggerate their own importance, I am of the opinion that we should tread carefully when we suggest ways in which God's love for humanity might be less strong than we otherwise may have thought. Perhaps, on occasion, Christians have overstated the intensity of God's love for His creatures, and maybe the Christian philosophers at issue help us discern some of the ways that this is the case. That said, the God found in the dying face of Christ reveals a love that far exceeds what we would independently imagine. I do not know what action God could perform to show that He is more serious about His love for humanity. Thus, while I recognize that opinions on these matters divide, it seems to me that however we choose to respond to the problems of evil and divine hiddenness, downplaying God's love for humanity rarely will place us on a sure theological foundation.

I treat neither of the noted challenges to theistic belief within the present book. But I will outline a particular way of thinking about God's love that, if accurate, sets certain parameters on how Christians might address such challenges. In addition, at various places in this book, I argue against positions that I believe dilute God's love for humans, and I fear, by consequence, threaten to weaken God's message of love found on Calvary.

It should also be mentioned that many Christian philosophers, perhaps still the clear majority, respond to the problems of evil and divine hiddenness while making use of conceptions of God's love and goodness that are consonant with most or all of the major theological conclusions defended within this book.5 In such instances, our projects can be seen as mutually reinforcing. Plus, it might be said that the existence of such responses to these challenges to Christian theism alleviates me from the responsibility of diving into the relevant deep waters within this work.

The second feature of the academic landscape that makes the topic of the present book timely comes from the current state of theological literature on God's love. Just a short time ago, there was something of a consensus that the doctrine of divine love had been largely ignored by theologians, or treated in an 'oblique, indistinct, or awkward' manner.6 Now the tides have changed. Kevin Vanhoozer writes that 'the love of God has become one of, if not the most, prominent themes in contemporary systematic theology', especially when it is 'paired with the theme of suffering and divine passibility'. Much of the work to which Vanhoozer refers is valuable and has impacted my own thinking in various respects. But contemporary theologians tend to erect far-reaching paradigms for thinking about the divine nature based significantly and explicitly on God's love (e.g. open theism, process theism, panentheism, and/or kenotical theism), without first pausing to discuss in systematic detail how we should approach the doctrine of divine love, what God's love is, how it might relate to other attributes of God, and so on. Even arguments for or against divine impassibility centred upon love are often carried out without much prior theorizing about the nature of God's love.

A separate theological research trajectory that often exhibits a similar shortcoming is more biblically oriented. The goal of this trajectory is to treat the 'dark' portions of Scripture that ostensibly implicate God in all manner of cruelty and violence (e.g. the erecting of unjust Israelite laws and the commanding of genocide), and show how these passages might be jettisoned responsibly in light of God's revelation of love found in Christ, or else be incorporated into a fuller Christian conception of God. This immensely important body of literature regularly informs my own theological judgements about divine love. However, there is a tendency in this literature to leave assumptions unscrutinized about what is or is not compatible with God's love, and how God's love and wrath might or might not be able to coexist.

There are, of course, solid exceptions to all this within both avenues of theological research; and I do not mean to suggest that the positions offered by many of these theologians are false or unhelpful simply because a more detailed analysis of the doctrine of divine love is not carried out first. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that such an analysis will aid our thinking about the relevant theological issues and viewpoints.

I will not speak to a number of the mentioned large-scale issues about the interrelation between the divine nature and divine love that garner the attention of many within the theological guild, nor will I address all the biblical verses and topics that might be deemed incompatible with the God of love revealed in Christ. All the same, my hope is that the following reflections on God's love of humans can contribute in principle to some of the debates about these subjects. More fundamentally, arriving at a well-reasoned and intricate doctrine of divine love is tremendously valuable in its own right, and hence could use more attention from theologians. I hope this book plays some small role in furthering the project of thinking carefully and systematically about the Love that is truly divine. <>

HUMAN FLOURISHING: ECONOMIC WISDOM FOR A FRUITFUL CHRISTIAN VISION OF THE GOOD LIFE edited by Greg Forster and Anthony R. Cross, Foreword by Matthew Croasmun [Pickwick Publications, 9781725259430]

Beyond an internal transformation or mere "moment of salvation," how does Christian faith envision the good life? This question demands not only a Christian view of how individuals should live, but of how social institutions are best arranged for human flourishing. In the advanced modern world, our common public life is mainly lived out in the domains of work and commerce, so a Christian view of economic life is essential to a modern Christian view of human flourishing. In this volume, established evangelical scholars in theology, biblical studies, and history explore their disciplines in connection with economic wisdom to yield insights about what it means to live wholly, fruitfully, and well. Faithful and provocative, these essays uncover fresh ground on topics ranging from poverty to work ethic to capitalism/socialism to slavery to non-profit entities to the medieval indulgence industry.

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General Index

Endorsements of the Oikonomia Network's new "Collaborative Theology" Project

"There is a widespread concern among seminary leaders these days that theological education must look for new directions. I hope that they will look in the directions where the 'Collaborative Theology' project is pointing. This is precisely the kind of preparation for ministry that we desperately need: equipping church leaders to equip, in turn, a new generation of Christian disciples to be serve God's purposes beyond the walls of the churches. This marvelous Collaborative Theology project shows us how we can take hold of what are often seen as frustrating challenges and transform them into exciting and creative opportunities for new forms of kingdom service!" — *Richard Mouw, Fuller Theological Seminary*

"The vision laid out in 'Collaborative Theology' is exactly what's needed to break through the institutional barriers and silos that are holding us back from forming the vast majority of Christians for whole-life discipleship. After twelve years and hundreds of interviews, conferences and collaborations with theologians both inside and outside the academy, I agree with the assessment that many are aware of the problems and are eager to move forward, but the institutions needed are either absent or, even worse, have proven to be hindrances. At the Theology of Work Project, we have several times come close to trying some of these ideas; they're the right ideas, but the TOW Project has concluded that our organization is not positioned or gifted for this kind of work. The Oikonomia Network is well-positioned and capable to develop this kind of work. I heartily support this initiative and hope the ON will be able to launch it soon!" —*Will Messenger, Theology of Work Project*

"Oikonomia Network's vision for *karam* collaboration speaks to a central missiological need in this cultural moment. The diagnosis of the locus of contemporary ills in the fragmentation of modern praxis and its impact, not simply on the institutions of western cultural life, but also on the church and in particular the theological academy, is insightful and important. A radical new approach to the biblical and theological formation of a new generation of leaders is at the heart of the 'repairing and rebuilding of the broken walls' that is our foundational missional task. The Oikonomia Network are world leaders in this endeavor and deserve all the support we can give. I wholeheartedly support this initiative." —*Paul Williams, British and Foreign Bible Society*

"Education used to be about more than training people for occupations. It used to be about building up men and women for their most important vocations: being human and living wise, flourishing lives with one another, before God, to God's glory. In an age where theological education has become pathologically fragmented, I heartily welcome this new initiative in collaborative theology. Fostering interdisciplinary communities of learning that combine theory and practice, knowing and doing: this is the way to bridge the gap between church and academy for the good of both bodies—and society too." —*Kevin Vanhoozer, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School*

"This vital initiative gets to the heart not just of a US challenge, but of a global challenge. With a few exceptions, our research shows that theological education has indeed failed to offer a compelling vision of what flourishing, everyday, holistic discipleship looks like, and consequently has neither taught it to its students nor taught them to pass it on to others. What is required to address such a systemic, cultural problem is not ranks of 'add-on' modules or specialist centers for 'this, that or the other,' but an

entirely new integrative approach to the whole task. And that is precisely what this bold, creative, well-researched, well-structured, well-led collaborative venture is designed to do. I couldn't be more enthusiastic about its potential." —*Mark Greene, London Institute for Contemporary Christianity*

"I love the 'Collaborative Theology' project! This has great potential to bring theological education to a wider audience than the traditional seminary and pastoral preparation. It fits well with the goal of the church to 'seek the welfare of the city' and pursue human and community flourishing, ultimately in the context of a vibrant relationship to God and neighbor. I'm very supportive of the project." —*Scott Rae, Biola University*

"Most of my fifty years since graduating from Berkeley have been dedicated to a pursuit of the integration of my biblical Christian faith with my life, my thinking, my work and my behavior. My forty-year career as a professor and my nine books are all about that mission. What a massive difference it would have made (as I drew all the pieces together) to be helped and sustained by a truly 'Collaborative Theology' as described in this proposal. With the technologically-enabled cultural fragmentation of our world in high gear, the 'Collaborative Theology' project rises to top priority. We have no time to waste." —*David Gill, Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary*

"The 'Collaborative Theology' project is a tangible means through which theologians can offer a robust corrective to the fragmentation they have had a significant hand in perpetuating. The project can build on the many recent efforts to reconnect the church and seminary in a way that is mutually fruitful. I am excited about this collaboration because it moves beyond diagnosis toward promising prescriptive alternatives that advance God's redemptive work through his people." —*Donald Guthrie, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School*

"As someone who has both a deep appreciation as well as growing concern for the theological academy, I believe there is a compelling and urgent need for structural reform. While the Sunday-to-Monday gap is greatly crippling the flourishing of the local church, the theory-to-practice gap is fundamentally compromising the mission of the theological academy. I know of no greater need than for theological education to make a decisive turn from silos of specialization to scholarly communities of collaborative integration. The Oikonomia Network is perfectly positioned to be a primary change agent for desperately needed reform. I wholeheartedly believe this is not only a highly strategic opportunity, but an investment with far-reaching impact for generations to come." —*Tom Nelson, Made to Flourish*

Excerpt: This book is a step forward for an urgent conversation in theology. In our time, there is a growing consensus that theological knowledge ought to help cultivate authentic human flourishing in the church and, through the church's participation in the cultural structures of the nations, in the world as well. The natural next step is for theological scholars to explore how their knowledge in its particularity—knowledge about such topics as what Proverbs and Paul say about poverty, Karl Barth's encounters with capitalism and socialism, or how the gospel relates theologically to the cultural mandate—could contribute to the real-life flourishing of truck drivers, administrative assistants, stay-at-home parents or leaders in business and government as each of these carries out their daily tasks in a pluralistic and fragmented world.

In the past generation, the theological disciplines have been struggling to overcome the dismissive perception that they are just historical and technical studies. To do this, they must show that they

provide knowledge—real insight—into the deep structures of reality. Through the works of Mirsolav Volf and Matthew Croasmun, Kevin Vanhoozer, Jonathan Pennington and many others, theological scholars are increasingly recognizing that in order to show that theology is knowledge, they must show how it can help cultivate human flourishing. That is the tangible test of whether the ideas produced by the theological disciplines really provide knowledge about reality. If theological knowledge is knowledge at all, it must be useful—though of course it has other value as well.

Moreover, in addition to this external imperative, there is a powerful internal imperative to deploy theological scholarship for human flourishing. While we can in principle pursue theological knowledge for its own sake, the knowledge about reality that we actually discover through theology demands that it be pursued for more than its own sake. We can ask, "What does God's word say?" without intending to put the answer to use. But if it turns out that one of the things God's word says is that you should put God's word into action, that discovery has consequences. If theological knowledge is knowledge at all, it must inspire the people who know it to make it useful.

These recent realizations, naturally, build on older theological thought. Indeed, concern for how theological knowledge can serve human flourishing has always been part of the church's reflection on God's word, as some of the historical essays in this volume explore. More recently, the current interest in human flourishing grows out of prior work done by such figures as Richard Mouw, Dallas Willard and Lesslie Newbigin on the theological side, and Oliver O'Donovan, Graeme Goldsworthy and Christopher Wright on the biblical side. Even figures like John Howard Yoder and Walter Wink, who take a more unambiguously oppositional stance toward existing cultural structures, or contemporary "two kingdoms" theologians like David Van Drunen, who emphasize the distinctiveness of church institutions from civil institutions, incorporate a profound concern for authentic human flourishing at the center of their theologies. The disputed questions between Mouw, O'Donovan, Yoder and VanDrunen are not about whether theological knowledge should serve human flourishing, but about what theology tells us about human flourishing, and how theology can cultivate it.

Economic Wisdom against Fragmentation and Resentment

The background of all these developments is the fragmentation of cultures under conditions of advanced modernity, and the growth of polarized resentments that this fragmentation naturally creates. Cultures become fragmented in advanced modernity largely as a byproduct of developments that are in themselves good and necessary. Religious freedom and increased concern for human rights make it difficult to maintain a morally coherent culture in a way that is not felt to be unjust and oppressive; economic and technological development increase our power to isolate ourselves and to minimize negative consequences from bad behavior.

While the deepest causes of fragmentation are developments that in themselves we neither can nor should regret, this fragmentation constitutes a major challenge to human flourishing. Incoherent cultures lack the normal social conditions to support moral formation and ethical standards—the overcoming of our congenital tendencies toward materialism, complacency, narcissism and injustice. The breakdown of institutions that are essential to human flourishing is both a cause and an effect of fragmentation.

One problem of special importance is the division of cultures into mutually hostile groups locked in perpetual conflict. By far the easiest strategy for a social group to maintain a coherent sense of its

identity and purpose under conditions of fragmentation is to identify an enemy who has hurt the group, and focus the energies of personal and social formation on the battle to "defend ourselves" (i.e., aggressively attack the other) and "take back what is rightfully ours" (i.e., forcibly seize resources and status symbols). Fragmentation also makes it easy to construct a plausibility structure for such resentments, as the loss of coherence, stability and power that every group experiences because of fragmentation can be blamed on the enemy. And, of course, resentment-driven conflict puts money and power into the hands of people who are skilled at cultivating resentment, and is thus a self-perpetuating enterprise.

However, advanced modernity also opens a path to a potential solution. While the old loci of social coherence are in decline, there is a new openness to action in a different social sector—a sector that is also less susceptible to takeover by resentment-driven conflict. Christian activity in that cultural domain can help coherence reemerge.

In the ancient world, political structures were the source of social coherence. As the advanced religions (the "Axial" or "world" religions) grew, a shift occurred. Religious structures joined with—or even supplanted—political structures as the locus of social coherence. Both these types of institutions are unable to create cultural coherence in a social world where people have the right (as a result of religious freedom and respect for human rights) and the power (as a result of economic and technological development) to believe whatever seems right to them about ultimate reality. Where people choose their own beliefs, religion is the subject of social conflict, and politics is the primary platform where that conflict is carried out—through proxy battles over the moral foundations of public policy, and sometimes more openly, through competition to seize political status symbols.

In the advanced modern world, to the extent that we have a common public life at all, it is mainly lived out in the domains of work and commerce. This phenomenon has a variety of causes. At the simplest level, among those whose primary vocations take them into the public square, the overwhelming majority do their work in the commercial world; political, religious, artistic and other kinds of non-commercial professionals are numerically small. In the frankly inegalitarian social world of premodernity, the non-commercial class could comfortably maintain itself as a social elite in spite of its small size. But the moral egalitarianism of the modern world demands that whatever the overwhelming majority of people in the public square are doing is the real center of public life. In other words, democracy in politics and the priesthood of all believers in theology not only reinforce each other, but work together to elevate commerce over both politics and the church as the locus of shared life. Another cause is the transformative power of wealth creation and technological development, for good and ill, unleashed by the modern economic regime of property and contract rights.

The new power of commerce over social life is an opportunity for Christians. It means that a Christian view of economic life is essential to a modern Christian view of human flourishing. But it also means that Christians have the power to pursue human flourishing in a domain where openness to the creation of new structures is greatest, and the incentive structures that maintain conflict-driven resentment are relatively weak. There is, admittedly, a growing penetration of the "culture war" into commerce—but this is relatively recent and peripheral compared to the near-total multigenerational captivity of our political and religious structures. Commerce is to some extent colonized by the culture war, but the colonizers are not primarily economic actors; they are political and religious resentment machines.

Seeking Coherence across Disciplines

Theological scholarship can provide coherence in a fragmented world because it is a knowledge tradition with a supernatural source. Two thousand years of accumulated wisdom in understanding the Bible's testimony have produced a living body of insight we can draw on today. Ancient and yet always new, grounded in eternity but capable of informing practical life, the accumulated theological wisdom of God's people is the storehouse of the "big story" within which leaders can find truth, coherence and stability as they craft solutions to specific problems.

A key obstacle to coherence in the theological knowledge tradition—and hence to its contribution to human flourishing—is the separation of the theological disciplines from one another. There is nothing inherently wrong with the existence of multiple theological disciplines. However, when the different disciplines operate using deeply dissimilar conceptual categories and methods, integration will not occur for most people, and it will not come easily to the few who do pursue it. Under these conditions, theological knowledge has become as fragmented as the advanced modern world itself.

This is not a coincidence. The current structure of the theological disciplines does not create fragmentation by accident, but by design. It is fragmented, and fragmenting, on purpose. Advocates of an aggressive and uncritical embrace of modernization—Friedrich Schleiermacher foremost among them—designed the fourfold disciplinary structure (systematic, biblical, historical, practical) that now dominates the theological academy. It did not grow organically out of the two-thousand year theological knowledge tradition, but was invented in the nineteenth century by radical modernizers who saw the theological tradition as an outdated legacy the church needed to overcome to be relevant.

Thus, interdisciplinary work—as difficult and frustrating as it often is—is the only path to a theology that cultivates human flourishing. However, such work does not begin with immediate interdisciplinary interaction. It begins with each discipline considering the question of human flourishing for itself, and then bringing the results of those inquiries into interdisciplinary dialogue.

This book had its origin in three colloquia held by the Oikonomia Network in January 2019: theology, biblical studies and history. However, the chapters in this volume are not grouped by discipline. Rather, they are arranged in cross-disciplinary sections according to the three traditional "theological virtues" of faith, hope and love. Our hope is that this will stimulate the reader to see connections across disciplinary divisions—as, for example, between a biblical paper on the meaning of the mandate to "subdue the earth" in Genesis 1.27–28 and a theological paper on how the pursuit of human flourishing must be in harmony with the pursuit of flourishing for the nonhuman creation; or a biblical paper on poverty in Paul and a historical paper on Barth's wrestling with the capitalism/socialism dilemma.

The first section, "Faith," contains papers whose most immediate implications are doctrinal—or, in one case, apologetic. J. Michael Thigpen considers how pursuit of human flourishing, justice and even proclamation of the gospel can be seen as fulfilling the Genesis mandate to "subdue" the earth. Greg Forster traces the role of "the nations" in the Bible's gospel metanarrative, and why this implies a need for a theology of public life. Lynn H. Cohick and John Anthony Dunne respond to the claim that Paul profited from slavery in his missionary work. Suzanne McDonald makes a theological case that flourishing must include all of creation, not just humans.

The second section, "Hope," contains papers that trace the development of Christian thought and practice over time. Greg Forster examines a key theological claim in Augustine's *City of God* that set the stage for much of both medieval and early modern Christian approaches to public life. Greg Peters reviews medieval thought and practice on the subject of "economies of salvation." Nathan Hitchcock traces the interdependence of technology, economics and theology in the indulgences crisis of the early sixteenth century. Robert E. Wright holds up the enormous social role of nonprofit companies, many of which were religious, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The third section, "Love," contains papers that focus on applied social ethics—including some historical cases where the focus is on ethical issues of enduring importance rather than on historical development. Daniel J. Estes looks at poverty in Proverbs, while John W. Taylor looks at poverty and justice in Paul. Jonathan Lett walks us through the challenging but provocative subject of Martin Luther's writings on trade and usury, while Kimlyn J. Bender looks at Barth's capitalism/socialism dilemma, which is also our own.

There is much more work still to be done. Reconnecting theological knowledge to the way people actually live their daily lives and do their daily work will be a generational endeavor. In the long run, deep reforms in the structure of the theological academy may be required. The next step toward this exciting and challenging future for theological scholarship is to go beyond the generic claim that theology should cultivate human flourishing, and show how it can do so in detail. The essays in this volume do this with wisdom, skill, faithfulness and compassion. <>

PRIMARY SOURCES AND ASIAN PASTS edited by Peter C. Bisschop and Elizabeth A. Cecil [Beyond Boundaries: Religion, Region, Language and the State, De Gruyter, 9783110674071]

PRIMARY SOURCES AND ASIAN PASTS unites a wide range of scholars working in the fields of history, archaeology, religion, art, and philology in an effort to explore new perspectives and methods in the study of primary sources from premodern South and Southeast Asia. The contributions engage with primary sources (including texts, images, material artefacts, monuments, as well as archaeological sites and landscapes) and draw needed attention to highly adaptable, innovative, and dynamic modes of cultural production within traditional idioms. The volume works to develop categories of historical analysis that cross disciplinary boundaries and represent a wide variety of methodological concerns. By revisiting premodern sources, Asia Beyond Boundaries also addresses critical issues of temporality and periodization that attend established categories in Asian Studies, such as the "Classical Age" or the "Gupta Period". This volume represents the culmination of the European Research Council (ERC) Synergy project Asia Beyond Boundaries: Religion, Region, Language and the State, a research consortium of the British Museum, the British Library and the School of Oriental and African Studies, in partnership with Leiden University.

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Preface
Contributors   Peter C. Bisschop and Elizabeth A. Cecil:

Excerpt: The present book is the outcome of an international conference held at the Museum Volkenkunde in Leiden in August 2018, organized by the editors within the framework of the European Research Council (ERC) Synergy project Asia Beyond Boundaries: Religion, Region, Language, and the State. During the five days of presentations and conversations, the scholars in attendance from Europe, North America, and South Asia shared new research related to the cultural and political history of premodern Asia and explored historical intersections and parallels in modes of state formation, religion, economy, and cultural production in South and Southeast Asia in light of patterns from adjacent regions – the ancient Mediterranean, ancient Near East, and East Asia.

Visiting scholars also experienced some of the rich collections of primary historical sources held in Leiden's renowned museums, libraries, and archives. On the third day of the conference, participants were introduced to the South and Southeast Asian materials at the Museum Volkenkunde by Francine Brinkgreve, curator of Insular Southeast Asia. Professor Marijke Klokke (Leiden University) provided an introduction to the special exhibition on Indonesian bronzes and discussed the production and transmission of the remarkable portable images. In the afternoon, Doris Jedamski and Maartje van den Heuvel guided visitors through a display of some of the University Library's extensive special collections, with highlights including the massive copper plates of the South Indian Cola dynasty, manuscripts of Indonesia's expansive epic La Galigo, and the earliest images of the Borobudur in the form of rare daguerreotypes.

The conference united a diverse group of scholars working in the fields of history, archaeology, religion, anthropology, art history, classics, and philology in an effort to explore new perspectives and methods in the study of primary sources from the premodern world. Our inquires converged around topics such as inscriptions and textual sources, material culture and environment, the role of narrative in crafting ideologies, and religious landscapes and monuments. Deepening the discussions that animated the conference event, the present book adopts a more focused geographical perspective, looking specifically at primary sources bearing on premodern South and Southeast Asia…

We dedicate this book to the memory of Janice Stargardt, who unfortunately passed away before its publication. Janice was a major contributor to the Asia Beyond Boundaries project from its inception and was an engaging and lively presence at the Leiden conference. Her groundbreaking work on the archaeology of Southeast Asia, particularly in Myanmar at the early Pyu site of Sri Ksetra, helped to define a field and will be of lasting value.

Beyond the Boundaries of the "Gupta Period" by Peter C. Bisschop and Elizabeth A. Cecil

Stone inscriptions, manuscripts, monuments, sculptures, ceramic fragments: these are just some of the primary sources for the study of premodern Asia. How might scholars chart new directions in Asian studies following these historical traces of past societies and polities? To address this question, this book unites perspectives from leading scholars and emerging voices in the fields of archaeology, art history, philology, and cultural history to revisit the primary historical sources that ground their respective studies, and to reflect upon the questions that can be asked of these sources, the light they may shed on Asian pasts, and the limits of these inquiries.

This volume contributes to a more expansive research aim: the research initiative Asia Beyond Boundaries: Politics, Region, Language, and the State, a collaborative project funded by the European Research Council (ERC) from 2014 to 2020. One of the core aims of this ERC project has been to rethink and revisit established scholarly narratives of premodern social and political networks in early South Asia. In doing so, the scholars involved considered how complex trajectories of cultural and economic connectivity supported the development of recognizable transregional patterns across Asia, particularly those patterns that have been commonly regarded as "classical." Anchored in "Gupta Period" South Asia – a remarkably productive period of cultural and political change that extended from the fourth to the sixth century CE – Asia Beyond Boundaries situates the innovations of these centuries within the broader South and Southeast Asian ecumene through the integration of archaeological, epigraphic, art historical, and philological research.

While the research initiative of the Asia Beyond Boundaries project occasioned both the conference and the volume inspired by it, the current publication also looks beyond it. Situating the "Gupta Period" and South Asia in a broader context, the present volume expands upon some of the core research questions that animate the larger project by considering what primary historical sources may tell us about the premodern world. To challenge traditional boundaries and create a more capacious view of Asian studies, varied sources, methods, and perspectives are joined in conversation. This introduction frames the volume's contributions in light of advances in adjacent fields, augmenting the core methodologies

long established as the strengths of each regional discipline as traditionally conceived – philology, archival research, archaeological excavation, field research, etc.

The "Gupta Period": Established Paradigms and New Questions

The "Gupta Period" is a commonly invoked heading used to designate not only an historical period, but also a high point of premodern South Asian culture. It has become synonymous with terms like "classical" or "golden age," a period in which artistic production flourished and great works of literature, science, philosophy, architecture, and sculpture were produced, presumably under the patronage or influence of the Gupta rulers and their associates. Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, for example, in their much-used textbook, A History of India, begin their discussion of "the classical age of the Guptas" as follows: "Like the Mauryas a few centuries earlier, the imperial Guptas made a permanent impact on Indian history."I A. L. Basham makes an even bolder valuation in his introduction to Bardwell Smith's Essays on Gupta Culture: "In India probably the most outstanding of [. . .] periods was that of the Gupta Empire, covering approximately two hundred years, from the fourth to the sixth centuries A.D. In this period India was the most highly civilized land in the world [. . .]." Despite looming large in the historiography of early South Asia, the term "Gupta Period" is imprecise since it fails to distinguish the influence of the Gupta rulers as historical agents from the extra-Imperial influences and networks that contributed to the cultural and political developments of this period.

In the study of religion, the fourth to sixth centuries have been understood as critical, since they marked the advent of the temple and image centered religious practices that have come to define Brahmanical Hinduism. Identifying these developments exclusively with the Guptas overlooks, however, the temples of Nagarjunakonda, built in the late third century, and the image centered religious practices of Buddhism in the Deccan in the late second and early third century CE. In the field of South Asian art history, Gupta period sculpture is viewed as "classical," a term used to characterize a naturalism and restraint in ways of representing human and other natural forms that distinguishes the works of these centuries from the extravagance of later medieval or baroque forms. Yet attempts to categorize what constitutes Gupta art face significant challenges since the contributions of the rulers to material culture are confined largely to coins, while their allies, the Vakanakas, are credited with developments in architectural and iconographic forms that defined the period. Thus, while "Gupta Period" arguably serves as a convenient scholarly shorthand for an significant period of cultural production, it remains difficult to extricate the Guptas from the grandiose and romanticized estimations of their role in South Asian history.

Several studies in recent years have problematized elements of this periodization and the tendency of Gupta-oriented historiography to prize cultural and artistic production from fourth to sixth century North India over and against sources from later periods. Scholars working in the field of art history have voiced criticism of the historian's propensity for the "golden age." As Partha Mittar writes, "Despite the high level of civilization reached during the Gupta Era, the legend of its unique character was an invention of the colonial and nationalist periods." Like many colonial constructs, this legend is an enduring one. A recent exhibition held in Paris in 2017, for example, still invokes the "classical" and the "golden age" as synonyms for the Gupta Period.8 For criticism of the golden-age paradigm

in relation to the production of courtly poetry (Kavya), one might quote Romila Thapar's gender-based study of the poet Kalidasa's telling of Sakuntala: "The choice today of the Kalidasa version as almost the

sole narrative is an endorsement of the views of both classical Sanskrit and Orientalist scholarship, which affirmed the superiority of the play and therefore the centrality of its narrative." The editors' introduction to a recent collection of studies toward a history of kavya literature echoes similar sentiments: "It is thus somewhat ironic that a later perspective has enshrined Kalidasa as the first and last great Sanskrit poet, a changeless and timeless standard of excellence in a tradition that has steadily declined. One result of this stultifying presumption is that most of Sanskrit poetry has not been carefully read, at least not in the last two centuries." As the words of these scholars make clear, the emphasis on the singularity of the Gupta period has often marginalized other forms and eras of cultural production.

While calling attention to the dubious hegemony of the "'Gupta Period" in valuations of premodern South Asian history, the nature of the polity over which these rulers presided and the extent of the territories they controlled are also debated. The vision of a universal sovereignty expressed in the Allahabad pillar inscription of Samudragupta became a widely deployed political idiom, as has been convincingly shown in Sheldon Pollock's model of the "Sanskrit cosmopolis." The legacy of this expression can also be observed in the historian's reference to the Imperial Guptas and their expansive empire. While a significant epigraphic event, Samudragupta's imperial claims and monumental media borrow from those of earlier rulers and, as such, participate in, rather than invent, public representations of sovereignty. Taking at face-value such expansive claims to power and sovereignty neglects the particular contexts in which these idioms were expressed and the specific local agents who employed them for their own political purposes. It thereby subsumes under the general heading "Gupta" what is in fact a disparate range of historical agents, localities, and practices. Instead of a Gupta-centered imperial history, recent studies have emphasized the ways in which localized polities and rulers negotiated the political idioms of their day, challenged them, and created spaces for innovation. The North Indian bias and Sanskritic paradigm that accompanies a Gupta-centered history of India also bears rethinking in light of the equally significant political and cultural formations in the South, such as those of the earlier Satavahanas, who used and supported the writing of Prakrit rather than Sanskrit, or the slightly later Pallavas, who took up Sanskrit as well as Tamil.

Questioning the status of the Guptas in South Asian historiography – both in terms of the political formations associated with the recorded rulers of the dynasty, and the forms of cultural production associated with the period of their rule, has significant implications for our understanding of the transregional conception of the "Gupta period." As mentioned above, Pollock's hypothesis about the spread of Sanskrit language and Sanskrit-inflected cultural forms positions the Gupta rulers as critical influences in this process. In fact, the complex dynamics of transmission that led certain Indic forms of art, architecture, language, and religious and political ideology to be incorporated within the developing polities of Southeast Asia reveal equal affinities with developments in the southern regions of South Asia in addition to the Ganga-Yamuna doab that formed the ostensible heartland of the Gupta polity. These processes of "Indianization" incorporate a broad spectrum of religious, political, and economic agendas, and much important work has been done, particularly in the field of archaeology, to locate the material evidence of these processes.

In addition to tracing the emergence of early polities, archaeological work in mainland Southeast Asia has located dynamic networks of exchange via the maritime and overland routes – between the two shores of the Bay of Bengal and between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea – that linked these polities. Not surprisingly, the emphasis on economic ties has foregrounded the role of merchants and

non-royal and non-priestly elites, social groups who find comparatively little emphasis in the historiography of South Asia, which has long been fascinated by royal personae and genealogy. Returning to the theme of primary sources may account, in part, for the different historiographical emphases that emerge when juxtaposing research trajectories in early South and Southeast Asia. Scholarship on the latter, in particular mainland Southeast Asia, has traditionally been more archaeologically driven and marked by an absence of early literary sources. South Asia, by contrast, preserves an overwhelmingly expansive corpus of Sanskrit texts. Study of these sources has long dominated the field, while developments in fields of archaeology of sites associated with the Gupta Period have been comparatively more modest. This divergence in the availability and use of primary sources has often resulted in a misrepresentation of the dynamics of exchange – i.e. assuming a unidirectional flow of influence rather than recovering patterns of cultural reciprocity. And, as recent studies show, these imbalances have occasioned an overestimation of the "Gupta period" and its usefulness as a heuristic for engaging the Southeast Asian sources.

Structure and Organization

Although many of the bodies of evidence surveyed in the articles that follow may be well known – e.g. the Sanskrit Mahabharata, the Gupta frieze from Ganhwa, Faxian's "Record of the Buddhist Kingdoms," or the Allahabad pillar inscription of Samudragupta – and the site names familiar, this general familiarity does not imply a critical understanding. By contrast, the individual contributions show clearly that the very material and textual sources integral to the critical recovery of the "Gupta period" – broadly conceived – remain understudied and undertheorized. As a consequence of these serious lacunae in our knowledge, we posit that rethinking the Guptas, the cultural agents involved, the period in which they were active, and its reception history must start from the ground up. By returning to these texts, images, inscriptions, and sites with fresh questions, each of the studies included addresses overarching historical questions through a finely grained analysis of primary sources.

The book explores three related topics: 1) primary sources; 2) transdisciplinary perspectives; and 3) periodization.

Primary sources: All articles in this volume engage with primary sources – texts (manuscripts, inscriptions, but also genres or aesthetic modes of literary production), images, material artifacts, and monuments, as well as archaeological sites and landscapes. By focusing on primary sources in this way, we aim to expand the categories in which the study of premodern South and Southeast Asia has traditionally been divided – in particular, by troubling the binary of text-focused (philological) or archaeologically driven (centering around material objects and sites) modes of scholarship. Complicating the parameters of individual categories of sources (e.g. "texts," "material objects") and drawing attention to the interconnections between different bodies of evidence opens up new spaces for dialogue between scholars with a particular expertise in one or more of these categories.

Transdisciplinary perspectives: In conceiving the sections of this book we have, as a consequence of our understanding of primary sources, identified categories that cross boundaries and intersect with each other in order to represent a plurality of perspectives (e.g. ritual, narrative, landscape, and so on). This arrangement allows us to highlight the ways in which scholars use sources and the kinds of questions we can ask of these sources. The organization of papers, combined with the theoretical framing of the introduction, works to make explicit some of the implicit working assumptions that have long guided the

approaches to the sources on the basis of supposedly well-defined categories (texts, objects, etc.). Finally, we highlight the relevance of the individual articles beyond their traditional disciplinary associations in order to facilitate a "transdisciplinary dialogue."

Periodization: In framing this volume, we also address issues of temporality and periodization. One aim of this discussion is to complicate the notion of the "classical age" or the "Gupta period" (which formed the specific temporal horizon of the original ERC project) by revisiting premodern sources. What is or has been the role of primary sources in categorizing "ages"? By contrast, how might classical sources also attest to the dynamism and innovative potential of a period? While classical modes of cultural production identified in sources of the Gupta period appear to be fixed or crystallized, the papers of this volume reveal highly adaptable, innovative, and dynamic modes of cultural production even within traditional idioms.

To create topical and thematic links between diverse bodies of textual and material evidence, the book is organized into three sections: 1) "Narrative Form and Literary Legacies"; 2) "Political Landscapes and Regional Identity"; and 3) "Religion, Ritual, and Empowerment."

The section "Narrative Form and Literary Legacies" investigates the use of narrative to craft rhetorics of community and identity in the premodern world. The papers in this section are particularly concerned with the ideological dimensions of narrative, and accompanying questions of authorship, audience, and patronage. Destabilizing the association of narrative with textual or literary productions, these papers also consider how stories are told in material and visual representations, and consider the social lives of epic tales and characters as they are transformed by memory and reception history. To what extent did narratives serve as vectors for social change, as stages to contest norms, or as tools to perennialize boundaries? How were narratives embedded in particular places and times? Alternatively, how did narrative forms and literary ideologies transcend spatial and temporal constraints?

This section includes the following four articles:

– James L. Fitzgerald, "Why So Many Other Voices in the 'Brahmin' Mahabharata?"
– Peter C. Bisschop, "After the Mahabharata: On the Portrayal of Vyasa in the Skandapura?a"
– Laxshmi Rose Greaves, "The 'Best Abode of Virtue': Sattra Represented on a Gupta Frieze from Ga?hwa, Uttar Pradesh"
– Hans T. Bakker, "The Skandapura?a and Ba?a's Harbacarita"

The Mahabharata, a founding epic of the Sanskrit cosmopolis, forms the entry point of this section. The four papers included here move beyond traditional scholarly approaches to narrative form by exploring the social, economic, and historical realities that motivated and informed literary production. Fitzgerald reads the Mahabharata epic against the grain – that is, he focuses on supplemental narratives that depict life outside of the court of the Bharatas and their rivals – and, in doing so, uncovers a diversity of voices that challenge the text's Brahminic ideology from within. These include some remarkably harsh critiques of brahmins and their behavior, reflecting different ideological registers within a single textual tradition that has undergone significant changes in the course of its composition and transmission. Bisschop, by contrast, looks beyond the Mahabharata and considers the historical reception of the authoritative epic, in which one voice, that of its narrator, Vyasa, has been co-opted by later authors. By tracing the translation of Vyasa in new contexts, Bisschop reflects upon the strategies employed by religious

communities to develop and expand upon the canon after the Mahabharata, either by continuing the epic's narrative frame or by producing entirely new authoritative religious texts in the form of the dynamic genre of Purana.

The question of genre runs through all four papers in this section. Greaves's paper alerts us to the fact that narrative exists not only in textual but also in visual form. It is well known that Indic cultural agents used visual narratives not just for embellishment but also for rhetorical and didactic purposes (as, for example, in the famous narrative reliefs from Sanchi). In her fresh reading of the imagery employed on the magnificent Gupta-period frieze from Ga?hwa, Greaves provides a striking example of the communicative aspects of material form: the elevation and grounding of a ritual practice in a specific locale, through visual reference to the Mahabharata's characters and themes. The question as to how cultural agents work across different genres is taken up by Bakker, who speculates on the interrelationship, and the potential for mutual awareness, between two texts, the Skandapurana and the Harbacarita, belonging to two distinct literary genres – Purana and Kavya, respectively – but operating within a shared geographical and historical space. Recovering the interface between the two texts allows him to make better sense of some formerly obscure references in both texts. In doing so, Bakker brings together textual and material sources, showing, for instance, how a singular object (a Gupta-period seal depicting an enigmatic goddess) can be read in relation to the description of a gruesome place dedicated to the goddess at Kuruknetra in both of these texts.

As presented by the authors, these papers give voice to an eagerness on the part of premodern cultural agents to engage with narrative form as a means to make authoritative claims. Such a claim may be expressed in oblique ways, as in the case of the non-brahmin voices studied by Fitzgerald, which ultimately, and somewhat dramatically, serve to promote the reactionary agenda of the epic. We can observe this process in a more manifest and radical way in Bisschop's paper, in which the Saiva authors of the Skandapura?a portray Vyasa, the narrator and composer of the Mahabharata, as a Pasupata devotee, a role unheard of in the previous tradition. The profound change in meaning of the sattra studied by Greaves, from an extended Vedic ritual to a charitable almshouse, likewise needed to be incorporated within a canonical framework to make the innovation credible. As argued by Greaves, this was achieved through the innovation of the artist(s) of the frieze, who depicted the sattra, perennialized in stone, in an imagined Mahabharata setting. And when the poet Bana evokes the goddess Sarasvati in his description of the recitation of the Purana at the start of his Harnacarita, this serves, as Bakker argues in his contribution, to legitimize Bana's role as a court poet through veiled allusions to his own legendary ancestry. Uncovering such claims of authority requires an act of reimagination on the part of the historian, who is by definition distanced in time and place from the contemporary setting in which such claims mattered and were accepted, or challenged. Much of the literary legacy of these premodern sources depends precisely upon the outcome of this historical process.

The section "Political Landscapes and Regional Identity" engages with recent scholarship on the development, expansion, and transformation of political landscapes. Combining the study of particular sites, [inter]regional economic networks, and imperial geographies, the papers of this section examine the ways in which interventions in the physical and built terrain served as a means of self-styling for rulers of imperial and regionally embedded polities. These studies also raise broader questions concerning the participation and investment of other social groups – e.g. religious specialists, artisans, merchants, and scribes – in shaping a regional identity. Moving between the disciplines of art history,

epigraphy, archaeology, and anthropology, these papers use objects, inscriptions, monuments, and physical terrain to access the development of economic, political, and social networks across regions. How were regimes of power articulated and contested spatially and over time? How might we approach disparate objects and sites as evidence of the interactions of humans with their environments over time? Can we conceive of these sources as materialized expressions of identity and community in the premodern world? And to what extent can the lived world of premodern agents be accessed through the surviving material evidence?

This section includes the following four articles:

– Max Deeg, "Describing the Own Other: Chinese Buddhist Travelogues Between Literary Tropes and Educational Narratives"
– Emmanuel Francis, "Imperial Languages and Public Writing in Tamil South India: A Bird's-Eye View in the Very Longue Durée"
– Miriam T. Stark, "Landscapes, Linkages, and Luminescence: First-Millennium CE Environmental and Social Change in Mainland Southeast Asia"
– Janice Stargardt, "Sri Ksetra, 3rd Century BCE to 6th Century CE: Indianization, Synergies, Creation"

The section's title takes its cue from Adam Smith's The Political Landscape, a work that has raised fundamental questions about the spatial and sociopolitical organization of "early complex polities." While Smith's book deals with the manipulation of space in different cultural contexts (Mesopotamia, Urartu, and the Maya state), the active constitution of a "political landscape" has been just as crucial to the various regional and subregional formations stretching across premodern Asia. As the papers in this section make clear, this landscape is not homogenous, but inherently plural and complex. Distinct "political landscapes" were carved out over long stretches of time, even as these frequently operated in a shared space and continuum of cultural and political discourse. While the framework of the "Sanskrit cosmopolis" provides a certain explanatory model for organizing the rich available sources that evince a transregional adoption of certain Indic cultural forms and sociopolitical regimes, the papers in this section each address the inherent tensions between the universalist ideology that motivated the creation of empire, and processes of cultural integration that aimed to bridge both distance and difference.

Of the three sections in the book, the papers included under this heading address the widest geographic range and analyze the greatest variety of primary sources, both textual and material – including pilgrims' records, ceramics, temple landscapes, hydrological systems, and inscriptions. A concern for regional identity within a world of increasing connectivity is key to all the papers in this section. Linked to the subject of genre explored in the previous section, Deeg shows how the travelogues to the land of the Buddha composed by Chinese pilgrims, while not forming a "genre" per se, nonetheless shared distinct features that made them recognizable to the "home audience" at the T'ang Court. Regional identity is carved out in these ideological constructions of foreign regions through literary descriptions of the land and its people as a foil to one's own "homeland." The following paper by Francis provides a longue durée overview of the imperial language formations in South India on the basis of inscriptions. That the insider/outsider perspective is not at all straightforward becomes particularly manifest from the example of the historical development of epigraphic Mahippiravaam, in which Sanskrit words which were originally marked as such became assimilated to Tamil script.

The last two papers in this section address the vexed question of the formation of regional identities in the complex process of "Indianization." Stark provides a perspective of environmental and social change in mainland Southeast Asia, with specific attention to the archaeological research carried out by her team in the Lower Mekong Basin in recent years. Stargardt presents some of the major findings of her excavations in the Pyu site of Sri Ksetra, arguing for a preexisting network that facilitated the subsequent process of "Indianization." Both papers engage with the formation of regional identity through the study of building practices, reminding us that spatial syntax can be just as, or even more, powerful than textual language in the formation of political landscapes.

The section "Religion, Ritual, and Empowerment" starts from the perspective that religion, ritual, and power in the premodern world were thoroughly enmeshed. The contributions investigate, more specifically, the various ways that a sense of empowerment created by and associated with objects, places, people, and rituals was integral to the expression and experience of religious authority. Examining texts, ritual practices, and the use of monuments and landscapes, each contribution treats processes and modes of empowerment realized through a variety of religious media. How and why did historical agents – religious specialists, rulers, and other actors – use and manipulate religious media to empower themselves, their lineages, and their regimes? How were practices and ideologies of empowerment co-opted, challenged, or subverted? And, perhaps most importantly, how did the potential of gaining power (ritual, political, or social) make religion persuasive in the premodern world?

This section includes the following four articles:

- Csaba Dezso", "The Meaning of the Word arya in Two Gupta-Period Inscriptions"
- Bryan J. Cuevas, "Four Syllables for Slaying and Repelling: A Tibetan Vajrabhairava Practice from Recently Recovered Manuscripts of the 'Lost' Book of Rwa (Rwa pod)"
- Amy Paris Langenberg, "Love, Unknowing, and Female Filth: The Buddhist Discourse of Birth as a Vector of Social Change for Monastic Women in Premodern South Asia"
- Elizabeth A. Cecil, "A Natural Wonder: From Li?ga Mountain to 'Prosperous Lord' at Vat Phu"

The papers in this section each address the subject of religion in relation to early Hindu and Buddhist communities, although not in explicitly theological terms or as a matter of belief. Religion here is not a category distinct from politics, society, or economy; rather, it is integrated within and informs political and social policies, gender norms, and engagements with place. In these ways, we can see the category of religion expanded and explored as a repertoire of political, social, and emplaced practices – although, it is important to note, these observations are not ones that the premodern authors, ritual specialists, and architects would have us see. Each of the authors reads against the grain and between the lines in an effort to contextualize their sources and, by doing so, subjects them to an analysis that critiques the social institutions that the sources worked to perennialize and support.

Dezso" examines the religiopolitical rhetoric of some of the best-known Gupta inscriptions and reflects on the implications of the poets' use of the term arya – a Sanskrit term with a significant semantic charge: noble, worthy, and, in the case of the Gupta rulers, chosen by the Goddess of Royal Fortune herself. The use of this term to describe Skandagupta served to elevate, at least ideationally, an illegitimate son to the status of a god-like king and support claims to kingship through divine intervention. The power of language and the weaponization of powerful mantras by religious specialists form the subject of Cuevas's article. Presenting editions and translations of recently discovered Tibetan

manuscript sources of the Rwa pod, attributed to the enigmatic teacher Rwa lo tsa ba Rdo rje grags, Cuevas reflects on the tension in Tibetan Buddhist tantric tradition between the violent potential of ritual and the virtue of benevolence. Following Cuevas, Langenberg's explication of Buddhist birth narratives similarly hinges on the power, and often violent power, of authoritative religious discourse. Here she examines the ways in which Buddhist canonical sources ostensibly designed to denigrate women and devalue their creative potential could, perhaps paradoxically, create both discursive and social spaces in which women could explore roles outside of the restrictive "mother paradigm." In the final paper of this section, Cecil returns to Sanskrit epigraphic texts, here from early Southeast Asia, and shows how the development of a royal religious culture centering on the God Siva anchored the emergent Khmer polity. While attuned to the power of Sanskrit poetics, she argues that reading the epigraphic sources in the landscape contexts reveals the formative power of place and natural landscape features in these early expressions of "Hinduism."

In their efforts to situate these religious ideologies and practices, the papers in this section specifically foreground the ways in which religion was a means of empowerment for individuals, institutions, and the norms they espoused – as, for example, in Dezso's discussion of the role of the Gupta inscriptions in political self-styling, Langenberg's argument that repulsive birth narratives support the monastic ideal, and Cecil's emphasis on politics as a spatial and material practice as evinced by the need for rulers to express control of and connection with the land. Accessing modes of empowerment in their respective sources reveals that these practices are plural and can also involve the empowerment of individuals and groups who are otherwise marginalized: women and sons lacking a legitimate claim to the throne. Rituals of empowerment, too, can have recourse to practices that push against established social boundaries and that involve the intentional transgression or subversion of accepted norms, as addressed clearly in Cuevas's work. Finally, while rituals and modes of empowerment might typically rely upon the agency of human subjects, we also see the manipulation of natural places as a strategy for gaining power that recognizes non or more-than-human sources.

Conclusions

We began with the question of how scholars of premodern Asia might chart new directions in Asian studies by the study of primary sources in a transdisciplinary dialogue. The papers assembled here manifest a particular interest in discourses on material agency and object-based histories, dynamics of textual production, and modes of narrative analysis that read normative texts against the grain, as well as political and religious ecologies that situate sites and monuments in physical landscapes. Attention to these approaches permits new perspectives on cultural innovation and imagination using sources long deemed "classical" or "canonical." In doing so, these papers engage with larger intellectual and methodological developments within the humanities and social sciences – the archival turn, new materialism, future philology, global history, and digital and spatial humanities, to name just a few. For innovation and progress in the study of past societies, critical dialogue between specialists of the different disciplines and their primary sources is key. <>

BUDDHIST APPROACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS: DISSONANCES AND RESONANCES edited by Carmen Meinert, Hans-Bernd Zöllner [Being Human: Caught in the Web of Cultures - Humanism in the Age of Globalization, Transcript-Verlag ISBN 9783837612639

The demonstrations of monks in Tibet and Myanmar (Burma) in recent times as well as the age-old conflict between a predominantly Buddhist population and a Hindu minority in Sri Lanka raise the question of how the issues of human rights and Buddhism are related. The question applies both to the violation of basic rights in Buddhist countries and to the defence of those rights which are well-grounded in Buddhist teachings. The volume provides academic essays that reflect this up to now rather neglected issue from the point of view of the three main Buddhist traditions, Theravada, Mahayana and Vajrayana. It provides multi-faceted and surprising insights into a rather unlikely relationship.

Introduction by Carmen Meinert and Hans-Bernd Zöllner

In September 2007, not only human rights activists were shocked when the protests of Buddhist monks in Myanmar against their government — also composed of Buddhists — were brutally put down. Some months later, Chinese soldiers forcibly suppressed demonstrations by Tibetan monks. For the editors of this book, both events provided the initial impulse to once more reflect upon the relationship between Buddhism and human rights. How is it, we asked, that there are obvious human rights violations in places with such a long Buddhist tradition as Burma, China and Tibet?

A quick look into the literature on the theme showed that Buddhism and human rights do not fit together as easily as conventional wisdom might assume. Both realms have their own reasoning — a particular non–theistic religious reasoning, and a secular reasoning, respectively. Whereas the former is based on 2500 years of traditions that developed in various Buddhist schools and are even within Asia

embedded (or not embedded) in at least ten different legal systems, the latter is often referred to as a result of a certain breaking with traditional cultures and is thus described as a phenomenon of modernities, most often developed in stable democracies.I Although there appears to be quite a gap that needs to be bridged in order to bring Buddhism and human rights together at one table, a very prominent interest is already shared in both discourses, namely the wish to eliminate suffering. Whereas in the former this very wish to remove suffering is contextualized within an other–worldly soteriological aim, namely the very attainment of Buddhahood, the latter is confined to the protection of the individual against any form of oppression in this world. What happens when these two perspectives meet was a further question for us.

From the Buddhist point of view of "ultimate truth" (Skr. paramartha-satya, P. paramattha-sacca), the concern of human rights activists to eliminate suffering appears rather limited, namely to the freedom of a human being in a specific social setting in this world. It neither takes into account all sentient beings, which is the scope of the Buddhist concern, nor the ultimate elimination of suffering, which entails cutting the ties to worldly existence (Skr. samsara) for all sentient beings and the attainment of peace (Skr. nirvana, P. nibbana). In this regard, to secure human rights may be seen as an "expedient means" (Skr. upaya) to provide through legal codes a setting that is conducive for the individual to develop "wisdom" (Skr. prajña, P. pañña) which may lead to higher spiritual attainments. Thus the Buddhist concerns by far exceed the jurisdiction of any legal system.

However, on the level of "conventional truth" (Skr. samvßtisatya, P. sammutti-sacca), worldly reality proves that adherents of both discourses, Buddhist and human rights, do meet or seem to meet. In recent years not only Burmese and Tibetan, but also Thai and Sri Lankan monastics started demonstrating against various forms of human rights violations in the countries concerned. One feature that unifies all of these groups is the experience of some kind of injustice, so that their demand for protection of human rights is an answer to this very experience. Admittedly, one cannot be sure if the term "human rights" adequately represents what a Buddhist monastic in Asia has in mind when he or she is protesting against what he or she regards as unjust actions of the authorities. Likewise, one may argue that within the global village there is no other choice than to answer to experiences of injustice in a "modern" way — if only to be heard and understood by other people around the world.

Anyway, the very fact that Buddhist monastics, the representatives of the various Buddhist traditions, call for the observance of human rights, also alludes to the insight that in modern societies it is not sufficient any longer to demand justice solely on the basis of particularistic religious, in this case Buddhist, ethical norms. And, perhaps more importantly in some respect, such norms prove to be an insufficient means to establish equality within Buddhist traditions as well — for example, to provide equal rights for nuns when monks in power often still act to preserve an unequal status quo in their own interest. Therefore, human rights discourses among Buddhist communities are discovered as an expedient means to protect individuals against powerful institutions threatening or suppressing from the outside and from within. Although in this way, rights may create a conducive culture, through this process there may also develop another non-conducive culture, for example one that is overloaded with false claims of universality coded in the form of legal rights. Thus the big task that still needs to be accomplished in a Buddhist approach to human rights is to find a middle way between these two extremes. And this is, in fact, where Buddhism might be able to offer a great deal and possibly could

make a major contribution to the discussion of, and demand for, multiple foundations of human rights regulations.

We, the two editors of the book, have over the years separately observed developments in Buddhist communities and human rights violations, particularly in Burma and Thailand (Hans–Bernd Zöllner) and in China and Tibet (Carmen Meinert) before we, through a series of unexpected events in the winter of 2007/08, at the time of the protests in Burma and Tibet, were bound by common destiny to share room 129 of the Asia-Africa Institute at Hamburg University. As new officemates we decided to make a virtue out of necessity and embarked on a joint project to raise concerns about major human rights violations in Buddhist communities. Our first step was the international symposium on Buddhism and Human Rights held in November 2008, a few weeks before the sixtieth anniversary of the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as a joint project of the Center for Buddhist Studies at Hamburg University and the project "Humanism in the Era of Globalization" at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities (KWI) in Essen, Germany. The second step in our endeavors is this volume, Buddhist Approaches to Human Rights, which gathers some topics discussed during the symposium as well as later contributions.

The story of the book's genesis, the "room-129-story", might be taken as metaphor alluding to the contents of this book: namely a selection of contingent case studies contributing to a necessary debate within a general context. We see this publication as a continuation of research in this important yet still neglected field, which was first opened up by the publication Buddhism and Human Rights edited by Damien V. Keown, Charles S. Prebish and Wayne R. Husted in 1998.

The contributors of the present volume are either rights theorists, regional or political scientists, practicing Buddhists, or specialists who have studied Buddhism as a living tradition in Asia. Thus the perspective is generally not only that of a theorist of Buddhism. Rather, most of the authors look at these issues in living contexts and try to analyze how Buddhists have actually reacted to human rights problems.

In other words, this volume attempts to look at our topic of interest in an interdisciplinary manner. Besides the variety of the authors' scholarly specialisation, this book brings together case studies from, and remarks on, the three major Buddhist traditions — Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana — as they are practiced in different parts of Asia, and thus provides some insight into the differences and similarities between and within the Buddhist oikumene that is as global and diverse nowadays as within the world's Christian population.

This interdisciplinary and "ecumenical" aspect has its price. This volume does not claim to be exhaustive neither in respect of discussing the variety of Buddhist traditions, nor in regard to the inclusion of all countries with large Buddhist communities that suffer or deplore human rights violations. As such, this book does not cover, for example, Sri Lanka, Burma, Nepal, Singapore, Japan or Vietnam.

Even this small selection of articles, however, points to a central problem inherent in the attempt of looking at the variety of Buddhist approaches to human rights, namely the important question: Who is authorized to put forward an "official" Buddhist position towards human rights? In fact the problem of reaching consensus among a group of saÉgha elders was obvious at the First International Conference on Buddhist Womens' Role in the SaÉgha held in Hamburg in 2007. Here a large number of

representatives of all Buddhist traditions worldwide gathered for discussions on how to legitimately ordain women. Yet a formal consensus remained elusive even when there was broad agreement about what should be done. In a volume like this we must not propose any type of "official" Buddhist answers to human rights, as was offered in the above-mentioned volume Buddhism and Human Rights by means of a Buddhist Declaration of Interdependence — no doubt a remarkable and thoughtful objective, graced with an ingenious title pointing to a core conviction of Buddhism, namely, the interdependence of all sentient beings and phenomena. However, we would like to invite the reader to look at the following articles as eye-openers for new questions that could be as valuable as the finding of (semi-)final answers in the promotion of both worldly justice and peace of mind based on other-worldly, transcendental insight. In this sense, each of the contributions assembled here — both in itself and as part of a greater ensemble — is a thrilling walk into still widely unexplored territory.

The contributions to this book can be compared to a collection of snapshots approaching the greater theme from a particular perspective and portraying an appealing subject in some detail. When put together, these shots may reveal the outlines of a greater picture of the *conditio humana* at the beginning of the 21st century. It will be up to the reader to choose which portrait should be placed at the center of the whole image. And in any case, she or he will necessarily be obliged to add some of her or his own imagination to complete the patchwork of insight assembled here.

If the reader chooses Alfred Hirsch's article as his starting point, she or he will be exposed to the great occidental discourses on how to get along with the "other," the foreigner who despite their strangeness is part of the worldwide network to which "I" belong, and to various concepts of organizing human co-existence within the global village. Alfred Hirsch illustrates his tour d'horizon through the philosophical and historical-hermeneutical approaches of how to reconcile relativism and universalism, forward-looking modernization and cultural heritage, focusing on the example of how the Islamic world might have developed an allergic reaction against Western hegemony. Here, Edward Said's challenging and thought-provoking thesis comes into view, and can be extended by the deliberation that Western orientalism brought forth occidentalism as its twin. Enlightened by these deliberations, the reader is well-prepared to discover later that a kind of "allergy" against Western crusades for the implementation of human rights does exist in the Buddhists' worlds as well. Nonetheless, it might be added that in comparison to Alfred Hirsch's chosen Islamic example, the Buddhist traditions seem to be more pliable and more able to adjust their teachings to different cultural and social realities, as may be seen in the other authors' contributions.

If Alfred Hirsch's contribution can be compared to looking upon the larger topic of human rights through a wide-angle lens, Perry Schmidt-Leukel's article narrows the perspective a little and thus offers a smooth transition to the variety of case studies on Buddhist approaches to human rights that form the main body of this volume. Schmidt-Leukel stresses the critical function of human rights, and thus establishes a sophisticated argument with regard both to the "relativists" and the "universalists" in the human rights debate. The "Golden Rule" put forward in different contexts, transcending cultural and religious boundaries, may be regarded as a common denominator for Buddhists of different denominations and secular Western human rights activists. It is the Buddhist version of responsibility as a moral obligation to respect and protect the freedom of others that corresponds to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but this correspondence is not without tensions. Buddhist thought contains a fundamental reservation towards the principles of Western liberal rights based on the

principle of no-self (Skr. anatma, P. anatta). This concept may lead to a collectivist theory of society, illustrated by the idea of a benevolent "Dictatorial Dhammic Socialism" as conceived by the eminent Thai monk Bhikkhu Buddhadasa and, one may add, practiced in the "Burmese Way to Socialism" with well-known disastrous effects. Such dissonances, Schmidt-Leukel argues, call for efforts for complementing instead of confronting distinct concepts of human nature and their consequences for society and environment.

With Martin Seeger's essay, the reader is invited to take the first close-up view of how human rights are discussed in Buddhist Thailand both in practice and theory. Being a country in which Theravada Buddhism, the "Teaching of the Elders", forms one of the pillars of the nation's official identity, the controversies depicted and reflected upon are closely related to Thailand's manifold troubled internal politics. This holds true for the nun-ordination controversy and the supposedly deviant teachings of two Buddhist sects. While the latter cases touch on the issue of religious freedom, the former concerns the more direct concern of activists advocating women's rights.

Besides portraying and analyzing the respective conflicts and public controversies within the Thai intellectual community, the article provides a detailed portrait of one of the most prominent contemporary Buddhist learned monks, Phra Payutto. Like Bhikkhu Buddhadasa, whose writings are discussed by Perry Schmidt-Leukel, Phra Payutto is also regarded by Thais and sympathetic foreigners alike as a "modernist". The presentation given by Seeger, based on an intimate knowledge of the scholar-monk's writing and public action, shows that such an appraisal is highly problematic. It seems more appropriate to make use of the Buddhist concept of the "Middle Path" to adequately assess Payutto's stance.

Like Seeger, Kenneth Fleming lived in Thailand, where he spent some time as a Buddhist monk. Fleming is, however, a theologian and involved in the Buddho-Christian dialogue to which Schmidt-Leukel has contributed as well. Fleming's contribution takes up the latter's call for an ongoing process of interaction and mutual learning. After discussing the consonances and dissonances of Buddhist approaches to human rights from a broader Theravadin perspective, his article concentrates on the challenges that become visible when representatives of both sides meet.

For the human rights activist, purification of the mind may help to deepen the understanding of their concern and to enlarge their scope of action to the "root causes" of global suffering. On the other hand, Theravadin Buddhists might be asked to consider the challenge of liberating and purifying society as a whole and not just the individual. It is interesting, one may add, that those countries in which the "Teaching of the Elders" dominate — despite many revolutions taking place — have not yet undergone a deep process of "reformation" as it for example occurred in Europe some 500 years ago.

Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer, taking up the question of whether Mahayana Buddhism can be called a "humanism", takes us to Thailand's large neighbor China and the "Great Vehicle" of Buddhism, which in China has a history of more than 1500 years. He highlights the different roles of laymen according to Mahayana teachings and thus adds another outlook to Buddhist concepts vis à vis the global world. Schmidt-Glintzer's search for traces of humanism in Mahayana Buddhism is based on a reconstruction of the tradition rather than on an attempt to prove its harmony with human rights. He clearly shows that although the core ideal of Mahayana Buddhism — a bodhisattva who with his or her strong sense of compassion tries to eliminate suffering — is resonant with the human rights approach, the foundations

of both discourses are, nonetheless, dissonant; for example, Mahayana Buddhism does not comply with Western theories of human rights based on a certain concept of the individual. His argument that in China Mahayana Buddhists also form a natural alliance with human rights as an expedient means — when it comes to the process of modernization and concomitant suppression of Buddhist institutions — directly leads us to the following contribution on Buddhism and state control in China by Shi Zhiru.

Shi Zhiru, a scholar-nun originally from Singapore, is well-trained in both Mahayana Buddhist theory and practice. Through her lucid essay, the reader may explore discussions of various paradigms followed by Chinese Buddhist leaders during the QingRepublican transition in the first decades of the 20th century, as measures to protect religious rights, and here in particular Buddhist rights, and ensure the survival of Buddhism amid antireligious state policies. Zhiru finds an exemplary Buddhist response to political oppression in the doctrinal and institutional reforms of the progressive Buddhist intellectual Taixu (1890–1947), who literally embodied the ideal of a bodhisattva. Here the reader might sense the potential of social engagement and reform that is inherent in the spirit of Mahayana Buddhism, and by extension in China itself. Taixu may even serve as a model example of a monk ready to break with his traditional Chinese and Buddhist culture, in a certain respect, in order to achieve higher goals for society and the survival of Buddhism in China. He might be seen as a reformminded figure similar to the Thai monks Bhikkhu Buddhadasa and Phra Payutto discussed by Schmidt-Leukel and Seeger above. Taixu's reputation as a "globe-trotting" monk, which he gained due to his international travels at a later stage in his life, might even make him a forerunner of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, the Tibetan religious leader and head of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, who similarly travels around the globe for the cause of furthering human rights. Although China under communist rule has not yet allowed Buddhism to recover to its full former extent, this contribution of a Chinese Buddhist nun-scholar about a progressive Buddhist reformer in the early 20th century may offer a sign of hope for forward-looking movements within Chinese Buddhism.

The three remaining contributions of this volume invite the reader to explore different aspects of the relationship between Tibetan Buddhism and human rights. With the recent escalation of violence in the Sino-Tibetan conflict in Tibetan areas of the People's Republic of China, the Tibetan Buddhist response to human rights violations is formed under tremendous real-world pressures. Here the contributions of Jan-Ulrich Sobisch and Trine Brox and of Stephanie Römer discuss developments that stem from the Tibetan exile communities, whereas Jampa Tsedroen's focus is on women's rights in the Tibetan VajraySna tradition.

The joint contribution of Jan-Ulrich Sobisch and Trine Brox is written from the Tibetologist's perspective of a broad knowledge of Tibetan VajraySna Buddhism and of the situation of the Tibetan exile communities in India. Jan-Ulrich Sobisch and Trine Brox critically ask whether traditional Buddhist societies have to bring themselves into line with Western concepts at all. They approach this issue by discussing problems arising in the process of cultural translation of ideas and terms and indicate the difficulties entailed in the assumption of universal ideals and cross-cultural standards. The translation of secular terms proves particularly challenging in the Tibetan context, where the Dalai Lama and many leading politicians still exercise both secular and religious functions. Sobisch and Brox show that despite the public Western perception of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama as a human rights activist, among Tibetans the human rights concept is itself contested. It is the inherent predicament of an exile and the need to respond to various issues of modernity that most likely forced the Tibetan exile leadership to master

the language of human rights in order to obtain recognition in the international community. The cultural translation of human rights terminology thus has clear political implications. The authors demand time for an independent autochthonous development of Tibetan (Buddhist) human rights concepts that might in fact enlighten and expand Western concepts as well. Thus their contribution may be seen as another call for multiple foundations of human rights regulations.

Stephanie Römer provides the reader with another snapshot of the intricately linked duo of Tibetan politics and human rights from a political science point of view. Her article illustrates how the concept of human rights is politicized in the Tibetan context. In a similar fashion to the modernists surrounding the Chinese scholarmonk Taixu in the first half of the 20th century, discussed by Shi Zhiru, Stephanie Römer outlines institutional reforms of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile which were implemented in order to facilitate a human rights discourse on an international level as well as a communal level. It is intriguing to read how the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) actually managed to merge Buddhist traditional values with Western political concepts based on democracy. One important promoter of a human rights discourse is the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy, set up as an independent office, yet which closely cooperates with the Central Tibetan Administration. The so-called "universal rights strategy" of the CTA advocates human, environmental and women's rights as a vehicle for the Tibetan struggle. Although this concept finds a lot of support in the international community, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama's core motivation and continuous effort of nonviolence to settle the Sino-Tibetan conflict has not shown tangible results — even after fifty years. Is this then also a failure for the democratic voices in the international communitiy.

With the final contribution of Bhikkhuni Jampa Tsedroen (Carola Roloff) the reader may gain insight into issues of gender inequity in the Tibetan Buddhist VajraySna tradition from the first-hand experience of a German scholar-nun in this tradition. Although the Tibetan Government-in-Exile introduced women's rights in their political agenda, as discussed in the contribution of Stephanie Römer, they are not (yet) rigorously implemented in a religious context. For instance, in Tibetan Buddhist institutions all leading positions are held by men — even in some nunneries. Whereas in secular contexts Tibetans are largely, maybe only out of necessity, embarking on the course of modernization of a traditional society, similar aspirations in a religious context still meet a lot of resistance. In fact, Jampa Tsedroen is a vocal advocate of "equal opportunities" (Tib. go skabs gcig pa or go skabs 'dra mnyam) for both women and men. Because of the worldwide Tibetan diaspora it is Tibetan Buddhism that is among all Buddhist traditions most widely exposed to Western modernity in all its facets, including feminism. It is from her position between two cultures that Jampa Tsedroen challenges "the rigidities of established traditions" and asks for a reinterpretation of old texts in accordance with contemporary needs. We are very happy to conclude this volume with the view of an engaged German female "modernist" within an ancient wisdom tradition — in some respects, another voice of hope and an indication of a progressing "individualization" of the great Buddhist tradition.

This process, as with most other societal and academic trends, proceeds with ambivalence. Only if the phenomenon is accounted for can the fruits of an interdisciplinary adventure like this be reaped as the following examples may demonstrate.

The editors of this volume, to start with, gained a lot of enlightenment through the exposure to the intellectual experience and insight of the contributors and hope that the reader might similarly profit as

well. On the other hand, a glance at the index at the end of the book demonstrates that a high amount of possibly confusing complexity is necessarily created when one tries to transgress the usual boundaries of academic disciplines and at the same time stick to German scholarly efficiency.

The meeting of Buddhism and human rights results, among other things, in manifold discourses within Buddhist communities challenged to come to terms with tradition in the face of new practical and theoretical challenges which in most cases are intertwined, as the case studies of this volume show. But these discourses do not necessarily point towards the same direction or, even more disappointingly, produce convergence and dissonance at the same time. Imagine how the Dalai Lama, as a virtual political leader of an imagined independent Tibet, would comment on Buddhadasa's concept of "Dictatorial Dhammic Socialism" at a conference of the International Network of Engaged Buddhists that was chaired by both as patrons prior to the passing of the Thai monk.

Finally, the contributions of this book, besides pointing towards the spiritual needs of human rights activists, are useful for assessing the societal and political situation in many Asian countries. But such wisdom might widen the gap between the "enlightened few" and the political authorities both in East and West.

The consequence of such deliberations cannot be to stop attempts to transgress boundaries. On the contrary, such attempts and reflection on their possible results have to be increased. To this end, we would like to express our gratitude to all institutions that supported the publishing of this book and the conference preceding it. We would like to thank the Foundation for Buddhist Studies (Hamburg), the Gustav Prietsch Stiftung (Hamburg), the Hermann und Marianne Straniak Stiftung (Salzburg), the Mikado AG (Berlin), the Stiftung Mercator (Essen), and the KWI (Essen), who facilitated the symposium, and for financial support of the Andrea von Braun Stiftung (Munich), the Stiftung Mercator and the KWI for covering costs for editing and printing of this volume.

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May the texts printed in this book and the meaning behind these texts leave some humanistic footprints on this earth, may the awareness of suffering stimulate compassion in the world of academic discourse and beyond and may the faults and shortcomings of the collection presented here be graciously tolerated and taken as motivation for trying harder.

POSTCOLONIAL IMAGES OF SPIRITUAL CARE: CHALLENGES OF CARE IN A NEOLIBERAL AGE edited by Emmanuel Y. Lartey, Hellena Moon, Foreword by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Epilogue by Bonnie Miller-McLemore [Pickwick Publications, 9781532685552]

This anthology is about caring for all persons as a part of the revolutionary struggle against colonialism in its many forms. In recognition of the varied ways in which different forms of oppression, injustice, and violence in the world today are traceable to the legacy and continuing effects of colonialism, various authors have contributed to the volume from diverse backgrounds including differing ethnic identities, religious and cultural traditions, gender and sexual orientations, as well as communal and personal realities.

As a postcolonial critique of spiritual care, it highlights the plurality of voices and concerns that have been overlooked or obscured because of the politics of race, religion, sexuality, nationalism, and other structures of power that have shaped what discursive spiritual care entails today. Postcolonial Images of Spiritual Care presents voices of practical and pastoral theologians, academics, spiritual care providers, religious leaders, students, and activists working to provide greater intercultural spiritual care and awareness in the areas of healthcare, community work, and education. The volume, as such, expands the discourse of spiritual care and participates in the ongoing paradigm shifts in the field of pastoral and practical theology.

Review

"Postcolonial Images of Spiritual Care is a volume sorely needed. Spiritual care in the last twenty years has more often than not been commodified as part of the capitalist project. As such, the liberation of humans from systemic suffering has been, at best, peripheral. Postcolonial Images of Spiritual Care redefines the practice of spiritual care by exposing the legacy of colonial aims and offering images of spiritual care wherein person, systems, and communities are inextricably linked and, therefore, the heart of postcolonial care." --Phillis Isabella Sheppard, Interim Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Religion, Psychology, and Culture, Vanderbilt Divinity School and Graduate Department of Religion

"A pastoral caregiver symbolizes the presence of a concerned and passionate God in times of celebration and crisis. If God, however, is viewed as a colonizer who victimizes and forces people into submission in the name of salvation, then the living soul is distorted by a victimizing God. Postcolonial Images of Spiritual Care encourages the symbolic Divine presence to be transformed from malevolence into liberating compassion by post-colonizing the Divine-human relationship." --Lee H. Butler Jr., Vice-President of Academic Affairs, Academic Dean, and William Tabbernee Professor of the History of Religions and Africana Pastoral Theology, Phillips Theological Seminary

"The field of spiritual care has turned a significant corner from its origins, and this volume will help chart a more inclusive, appreciative course for educators, practitioners, and students. Beginning in Africa--the source of human origins--and concluding with connections to our global climate, the authors decenter

rationalist hegemony, providing a variety of lenses through which the reader can imagine spiritual care as practices of mutuality, reverence, and hope." --Trace Haythorn, Executive Director/CEO, ACPE

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Foreword by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'Im, Emory University School of Law

In this brief foreword, I argue that spiritual care includes the concept of mutuality: spiritual care as reciprocal self-liberation, whereby both sides are at once recipients and providers of care to each other and to wider society for reaffirming the value of spiritual care. I see this as mutual self-liberation because all sides are contributing to their own liberation by providing spiritual care for other persons in exchange for the care they receive. As this exchange model is accepted and practiced by more people, the source of care becomes as plentiful as the need for it. Another advantage of this exchange model is

that it upholds the dignity and self-worth of all recipients of care because they give of the same resources from which they receive.

Drawing on the Muslim Sufi tradition that defines my worldview and spiritual perspective (or equivalent in other traditions),1 I propose that the conception and practice of the provision of spiritual care is the means to mutual self-liberation, instead of being a hierarchical relationship of a presumably "compassionate" care provider to a passive care recipient. The relevance of the Sufi tradition in this context is that it transforms what may be a source of selfish pride, into that which contributes to the spiritual growth of the provider. Another advantage of citing the Sufi tradition is that it is likely to remind people of institutions of equivalent resources in their own traditions.

I should emphasize, however, that some aspects of the broad Muslim Sufi traditions (in the plural) which prevailed over vast regions that spread across several centuries, was also as diverse and contested as the Sunni and Shia theologies of the Muslim population at large. Yet, the Sufis of the various Sunni traditions across the expanse of the Muslim world (from west Africa to southeast and central Asia) also had to negotiate, contest, and reaffirm aspects of their tradition. In modern terms, one can speak of "progressive" and "traditional" Sufis, although I believe that traditional Sufis were still more progressive than the progressive of the broader Sunni perspectives. To conclude this brief digression, progressive Sufi Muslims still had to struggle to enlighten and humanize their wider Sunni communities.

As a Sufi Muslim, I have struggled most of my life (since the 1960s) to uphold what I believe to be my progressive Muslim convictions. It is this reality which derives my determination to ensure the freedom to engage in civil and orderly contestation of religious and other views among Muslims and in their relationship with humanity at large. Such spiritual contestations and the need to preserve the social and political space for them are better known historically as struggles for human dignity and social justice. The challenge for advocates of modern human rights discourse is whether this framework can be identified as a human rights discourse or not.

The question of the universality of human rights is at the core of this challenge, especially in view of the geopolitical and economic relationship between former colonial powers and their former colonies. In my view, for instance, the long shadow of former colonial relations continues to influence postcolonial relations between the former colonized and former colonizer. The closer the focus is on immediate postcolonial relations, the more colonial those relations seem to be. Conversely, the further away the analysis moves from the colonial period, the more autonomous and independent will the former colony appear to be. Although it may seem that the continuity of postcolonial relations depends on the degree of economic, political, security, and other forms of dependency the former colony has with its former colonial power; I believe that the situation can change, depending on the ability of people to liberate themselves.

I am also proposing a shift in terminology to use the term "entitlement," instead of "right," and by-passing the state altogether by relying on people-centered strategies of protection instead of legal enforcement through the state.2 Avoiding the liberal narrow definition of the term, "right" as a justiciable claim that is enforceable by the domestic courts of a country is closer to the global non-liberal terminology used as the clear majority of societies in Africa, Asia, and indigenous South American communities. This shift in terminology also invokes the principle of reciprocity, whereby the value of the

Golden Rule is enhanced by the exchange of spiritual and material service to become a stronger motivation for both sides to engage in the process of promoting mutual benefits.

In this light, I believe that spiritual care is a universal entitlement of all human beings by virtue of their humanity. This proposal is more accurate in applying to a universal human right because it affirms the entitlement of every human being as such to the benefit or fulfillment of the promise of care, without any distinction on such grounds as race, color, gender, religion, or nationality. The term "nationality" is not commonly used in human rights discourse, but I use it here deliberately to emphasize the irrelevance of political national identity to entitlement to the human rights of all human beings by virtue of their humanity.

Since human rights are necessarily universal because they are the rights of all human beings by virtue of their humanity, none of the states of the entire world has risen to the level of conformity with human rights in the sense of true universality of protecting the rights of all human beings, equally and without discrimination. Even a state which has ratified all human rights treaties (without any reservation) and immediately implemented the rights provided for by each treaty, the outcome would be civil rights (i.e., rights of citizens and lawful residents) and not for every human being who may have crossed the border of the state illegally, or was "arrested" or tortured by agents of the state abroad. In view of the realities of present human rights practice, it would be tragic to continue judging the human rights paradigm by the practice of states which claim self-appointed leadership in the field while violating the most fundamental principles of the rule of law in international relations.

The thrust of my argument here is that human rights norms are what peoples in their communities accept as the entitlement of all human beings, regardless of the policies and practice of states. Indeed, the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) clearly stipulates the following:

> The General Assembly Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

It is therefore ironic that states have succeeded in highjacking the high moral mantle of universal human rights in order to advance their narrow, relativist purposes. By the same token, however, supporters of human rights must strive to recover the initiative to uphold the principle of the universality of these rights. Unfortunately, these competing perspectives are not mediated on the merit of each perspective.

Although the UDHR does not entrust states with the right or obligation to implement the UDHR as such, Member States of the UN have in fact hijacked the Declaration and assumed the authority to operationalize and implement it. Moreover, instead of adopting appropriate strategies for the implementation of this unique document, throughout which, it addresses individual persons as the exclusive rights-holder; states assumed that they have the obligation to implement the Declaration through the application of traditional international law. Since states are the exclusive subjects of traditional international law, they are the only entities that can have rights and obligations under international law. States are the only entities which have the standing to sue and be sued under

international law. The paradox of the international protection of human rights is that individual persons are the exclusive holder of human rights against the state; yet, states hold the exclusive power to enforce or implement those rights.

In the final analysis, the meaning and implication of human rights norms is the product of negotiations among states, whereby rights are binding only on states and can only be enforced or implemented by states. It was inconceivable from that perspective for human rights norms to be defined, interpreted, or applied independently from the same states that hold the exclusive ability to violate as well as the obligation to protect those rights. To conclude this foreword, postcolonial relations are often what they inspire human beings to do or be, like what the Mahatma Gandhi is reported to have said: "be the change you want to see in the world." I see this volume and the contributors' chapters as an important step in challenging ongoing paradigms of what constitutes the human in human rights, as well as demonstrating that spiritual care is a human rights practice. As stated (implicitly or explicitly) in almost all of the following chapters, recognizing the dignity and self-worth of humans is spiritual care. It is a human right to be treated with dignity.

Prefatory Reflection: "To Love One Another as We Are, to Become All We Are Meant to Be" by Omid Safi

There is a story told and retold in the Middle East about how to help someone who's drowning. The story goes that a man had fallen into a river. He was not much of a swimmer and was in real danger of drowning. A crowd of concerned people wanted to rescue him. They were standing at the edge of the water, each of them urgently shouting out to him:

Give me your hand, give me your hand!

The man was battling the waves and ignored their urgent plea. He kept going under and was clearly struggling to take another breath. A saintly man walked up to the scene. He too cared about the drowning man. But his approach was different. Calmly he walked up to the water, waded in up to his knees, glanced lovingly at the drowning man, and said:

Take my hand.

Much to everyone's surprise, the drowning man reached out and grabbed the saint's hand. The two came out of the dangerous water. The drowning man sat up at the edge of the water, breathing heavily, looking relieved, exhausted, and grateful. The crowd turned towards the saint and asked in complete puzzlement: "How were you able to reach him when he didn't heed our plea?" The saint calmly said:

You all asked him for something, his hand. I offered him something, my hand. A drowning man is in no position to give you anything.

Let us remember not to ask anything of someone who is drowning.

I saw a friend of mine over the weekend. It was the first time I had seen him since turbulent events in my own life, and he lovingly asked about that. I know him to be a loving father, a caring husband, one whose face glows when he speaks about his children. So I inquired about his family. He shared with me the difficult news that his own daughter had gone through some of the same challenges I had. We spent the rest of the time discussing how we can best be there for the people we love.

He shared, with a pained voice, how hard it was to see someone he loves so much hurting. It almost sounded like it would be less painful for him if he could be the one carrying the burden. We talked about the energy our loved ones spend to shield us, to protect us from their pain at the times when they are most in need of having someone take them by the hand and lead them to the shore.

We talked about this issue of how to be there for, and with, someone who was hurting, drowning. In other words, how to lend a hand, rather than asking them to give us their hand.

One thing we talked about stayed with me: When a person is breaking, broken, they are so exhausted, so drained. Asking them to come to us and share their brokenness is asking them to do more when all they can do to stay alive is to tread water.

And then there is shame. So many of us have felt a great shame when our lives, our marriages, our careers fall apart. To come to the people who can help us with our shame is . . . well, shameful. Ironically, we end up spending more energy trying to shelter our family and loved ones from our brokenness. This is energy that we don't have, energy that we should be using to tread water.

So if you are that saintly soul, if you want to reach out to someone who is struggling to stay above water, go to them.

But don't ask them to give you their hand. Instead, offer them your hand. Don't ask for their heart, offer them your heart. Offer them your ear, your love, your shoulder. Release your friends, your family, from the shame of their brokenness. Let them know that you love them through the brokenness, because of the brokenness, and God-willing, after the brokenness.

Free your loved ones of the energy they spend to hide their brokenness from you. Free them of the shame of coming to you as they are. Let them spend that energy on surviving, on healing, on thriving. Let us love one another as we are, so that we may become all we are meant to be.

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This anthology enters the revolutionary history of the struggle of victims of colonialism in its many forms to overcome the deleterious effects of imperialism and colonialism, at one of its crucial points—that of the care of persons. In recognition of the many different forms of oppression, injustice, and violence in the world today that are traceable to the legacy and continuing effects of colonialism; various authors have contributed to the volume from diverse backgrounds in terms of ethnic identities, religious and cultural traditions, gender and sexual orientations, as well as communal and personal realities. The volume commences with the juxtaposition of Abdullahi An-Na'im's legal, analytical discourse of spiritual care as human rights practice, with Omid Safi's poetic and eloquent story of care. Both An-Na'im's and Safi's contributions are variations of radical love—to love one another radically and meaningfully means allowing people to be who they are through the practice of mutual reciprocity and deep listening. An-Na'im's vision of radical love challenges the legal framework to allow self-love and self-determination to flourish. An-Na'im underscores the centrality of mutuality in spiritual care in that he sees "spiritual care as self-liberation, whereby both sides are at once recipients and providers of care to each other." An-Na'im's human rights paradigm also shows that only through deep listening to the needs of others can we arrive at an overlapping consensus as to what is important to, and valued in, a community.

Safi's reflection also highlights mutuality and deep listening. His story demonstrates the power of language and genuine empathy. One is struck how a drowning man was expected to hold out his hand; this demand could not be comprehended in the face of impending danger. When the language was re-framed for the drowning man to take the helper's hand, it was more readily accomplished. Herein lies the beauty of offering unaffected care and sincere listening when it is not forced on us. Offering care versus demanding someone to do something becomes key to building trust and relationality. All of us have been both the saint and the one struggling in the water. To know that we can be in the position of needing care can help us better provide the care when we are in such a situation. In this volume, we offer such perspectives and practices of care. We offer diverse perspectives and stories, narratives and voices of difference, and we offer images for radically re-imagining spiritual care.

The title of Safi's reflection, "To Love One Another As We Are, To Become All We Are Meant to Be," eloquently encapsulates the work of all the contributors and also becomes the principal aim for this volume. While Omid Safi identifies as a Muslim, his voice is a human voice—his story evokes quotidian spiritual practices that are contextually translatable into various cultures and communities. In this regard, the contributors in this volume similarly demonstrate that the sacred practice of allowing others to flourish in their becoming—and to support such becoming—is the rich work of spiritual care. Decolonized spiritual care embraces the human in human rights discourse; it becomes human rights practice.

Why Spiritual over Pastoral Care

Decolonized spiritual care entails practices of mutuality, reciprocity, and deep listening. In that regard, the editors give preference to the terminology of spiritual care, over that of "pastoral care." While pastoral theologian Robert Dykstra does defend the shepherding model of care; the term, "pastoral," historically has been associated with a hierarchical, top-down model of care. We are not arguing, however, that the term is exclusively a Judeo-Christian concept as some do. As early as the eighteenth century (1681–1762), a shepherding model of "pastoral care" was used in Korea by Neo-Confucian scholars of practical learning in the work of Yi Ik. The Practical Learning scholars focused on political matters and care of the people. Chong Yagyong's most well-known work focused on the understanding that in order to have good society, one needed good governance/ good rule. Good government began with care for the people—this was written in his Core Teachings for Shepherding the People. Pastoral care and governance were imbricated and not separate ideologies in Korea prior to the people's exposure to Christianity via Catholicism. Yet, this pastoral care/shepherding model was very much a top-down, hierarchical, patriarchal, and paternalistic model of care.

While the concept of pastoral care, therefore, is not exclusive to Judeo-Christian or monotheistic care models, we problematize its usage for several reasons. In historicizing "pastoral," the term was used primarily to convey a metaphorical model of shepherding care that showed authority and power of one species (i.e., the human) who was considered superior to the sheep (i.e., unthinking animal who needed guidance). This communicates an uneven message of leader being superior and human, while the image of flock somehow is beneath that of the leader and less than fully human (read: colonialism). We, the editors, therefore associate "pastoral care" with the Linnaean classification and hierarchical system that became the prime tool for colonial and imperial conquests, as well as environmental devastation, leading to the subjection and subjugation of Africans, Asians, and native peoples in the Americas. We in the field

of pastoral theology are challenged by the legacies of colonialism and the ways in which "care" is—and has been—a colonizing practice, especially when Third World spiritual practices were not recognized as legitimate or as on par with that of Christian practices.

This volume seeks to challenge the association of the concept of pastoral care with such historicist understandings of the term. In that regard, we acknowledge the need to have a thoroughly historicized critique of the term, especially in the ways the image of shepherding has been used to reinforce Christian-centered norms in the practices and theories of spiritual care. We need to rehabilitate the term, "pastoral," just as "queer" has been rehabilitated from the pejorative ways it has been used in the past. At the same time, some contributors have chosen to use the term "pastoral" in their chapters. In using such language, they disturb its conventional meaning, thereby upending the assertion that it is unique to Judeo-Christian care.

As a postcolonial critique of spiritual care, this anthology highlights the plurality of spiritual voices and concerns that have been overlooked or obscured because of the politics of race, religion, sexuality, nationalism, and other structures of power that have shaped what discursive spiritual care entails today. US society tends to "normalize" and not problematize what the West has dictated as constituting religion or spiritual practices (what is sacred and what is deemed "barbaric" and profane). We have blindly obliged to the oppressive categories constructed for "us" by Renaissance and Western European Enlightenment (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) thinking. Prior to and after these periods of European thought, the boundaries of what was considered to be religion and what was secular/ sacred and profane were redrawn and gerrymandered multiple times to favor European Christian thought as normative. The creation of a discipline of Religious Studies was to support what practices and beliefs Europeans saw as most compatible (or comparable) with Christianity, or what might most follow the trajectory of Enlightenment "rational" thinking. Some "religious" practices were "othered" and categorized as extremely different from Western Christian sensibilities. The alleged superior mind of the West was rationale for engaging in a civilizing "pastoral" mission to shepherd and guide the allegedly less enlightened (sub-human) peoples. The image of shepherding that is associated with pastoral care, then, is extremely problematic, racist, and colonizing.

This logic of European racist thought is explicit in the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel, who saw persons from the Asian or African continent as not fully developed humans and as inferior to those races with white skin. The Hegelian view of Asia and Africa as "static, despotic, and irrelevant to world history" has shaped Western thinking about its people and cultures. Hegel's account of race is embedded in his conception of personhood, where he believed in biological distinctions between persons. He saw the soul as embodying racial distinctions. According to Hegel, Europeans/White subjects were seen as the very paradigm/model of freedom and rationality because of their biology. He states, "It is in the Caucasian race that spirit first reaches absolute unity with itself," while the people of the Orient and Africa were considered to be ignorant and superstitious.9 Third world peoples have apparently improved through our contact with European civilization and Christianity. Hegel saw Africans and Asians as inferior—with regard to Mongolians and Chinese (et al.), he critiqued their religious practices as unworthy of free persons because they did not embody a "faith" tradition.

This Hegelian mindset—of the European person as the model of full human subject-hood and that "religions" have to be a separate corporate "belief"—is still operative in politico-economic arenas,

human rights discourses, and US society today. This volume post-colonializes the nineteenth-century ideology that foregrounded such racist, dehumanizing Eurocentric philosophy and thought that colonized what constituted "spirit" and defined spiritual or pastoral care. A goal of this anthology, therefore, is to decolonize spiritual care as defined by a Hegelian understanding of spirit and history, as well as Western understandings of what constitutes "religion" or "spiritual." Religion has been a tool, a methodological weapon for colonizing the two-thirds world by creating and constructing categories of what were considered secular, sacred, and profane—obliterating practices that were considered unrecognizable and illegible to the civilized Western knowing subject; as well as dehumanizing the practices of local communities in the Americas, Africa, and Asia. We need to reinvigorate the meaning of spiritual care in light of how Hegel's meaning of spirit has dictated what is spiritual and what is not.

Most of the non-white world did not believe in a monotheistic G*d or Savior (until the period of colonizing conquests in the 1500s). This by no means denotes they were not spiritual or as human as their white Christian subjects. Today, atheists and humanists have to constantly defend their right to spiritual care (to convince others they have spiritual needs and to argue that they can be providers of spiritual care as well). We do not think for a practice to be pastoral and/or spiritual, it must also be corporate or linked to and rooted in a faith community and its traditions. We understand that "religious traditions" are socially constructed or invented European categories, which are constantly changing.

"Spiritual" or "pastoral" care should not be circumscribed to "faith" traditions. Such a mindset limits what is considered spiritual or even religious. If by "faith" or belief system, one refers to a broadly understood faith meaning as it was understood in medieval times, then "faith" refers to a concept of trust in someone, not belief in an epistemological sense of higher beings. If we apply such a definition of a faith community, then atheists who state, "I believe there is not a God as understood in Christianity," would be considered part of a faith community. A postcolonial critique of "spiritual" includes scrutinizing how certain humans were excluded and seen as subhuman because their personhood did not fit the Hegelian definition of "spirit." Knowledge of "what was considered to be human" changed and shifted throughout the centuries. When we limit what is "spiritual" to "faith" traditions, it reinforces Christian hubris: a combination of white Christian superiority as normative, with racism intertwined in those standards of the norm. Toni Morrison poignantly stated how racism keeps you from doing your work. It keeps you explaining, over and over again, your reason for being. Somebody says you have no language, and you spend twenty years proving that you do. Somebody says your head isn't shaped properly, so you have scientists working on the fact that it is. Somebody says that you have no art, so you dredge that up. Somebody says that you have no kingdoms, and you dredge that up. None of that is necessary. There will always be one more thing.

Intersecting with Morrison's statement on racism, it becomes daunting and overwhelming for non-Christians or non-white Christians to have to prove to others that they are as spiritual or as human as their white Christian colleagues or neighbors—whether in the workplace, schools, clinical pastoral education settings, seminaries. It is de-humanizing to constantly have to prove one's humanity by explaining they are "spiritual"—but not religious, or spiritual but atheist!

Metaphor or Image of the Work
This project was partly inspired by the book, Images of Pastoral Care: Classic Readings, edited by Robert Dykstra. Published in 2005, none of the contributors were of any other religious background,

apart from Christianity. All of the contributors were white Protestants, except for one scholar/minister. We have brought together diverse voices, beliefs, and work backgrounds for a book that more adequately reflects the spiritual practices of United Stateseans (Janet Halley's neologism). The editors of this volume are well aware of tokenism or narratives depicting the single voice as authoritative or as speaking on behalf of all in a particular community. We want to emphasize that these following chapters are but a few voices within a kaleidoscopic lens of spiritual care. Spiritual care is as rich and varied as the billions of people, plants, and fauna on this earth.

This anthology hopes to contribute to the voices of practical and pastoral theologians, academics, spiritual care providers, religious leaders, students, and activists working to provide greater intercultural spiritual care and awareness in the areas of healthcare, community work, and education. The project highlights the expertise of spiritual care from those who may not have institutional power. The volume is not a "how to provide pastoral care"—as many volumes purport to do. Rather, the contributors share the knowledge of spiritual care garnered from their deep-listening work with patients, families, students, and community members. As these chapters attest, those in power are not the only ones who get to decide what constitutes spiritual care. It is our hope that this book provides a much-needed impetus for listening to many more voices, stories, and histories of spiritual care.

As co-editors, we believe in the necessity for greater spiritual care literacy in the training of spiritual care providers who work in public spaces. Having deliberated on how to bring the diverse chapters together and organize the text, we have identified a few, overlapping central themes in the chapters. Each of the author's images contribute, in some form, to dismantling colonialist and white supremacist ideological frameworks in spiritual care. Through the work in this volume, we hope to expand and widen the discourse of spiritual care and participate in the ongoing paradigm shifts in the field of pastoral and practical theology.

Chapters

We have ordered the chapters in relation to the breadth of subject, commencing from the micro-focused (personhood) through sociality (society, community) and into globality (culture, international politics). Themes of neoliberalism, economics, resistance, and care in the face of injustice reverberate through each of the chapters since these all affect persons in the current global nexus. In addition, each chapter contributes to the theoretical framework of spiritual care as decolonizing and challenging the dominant inhuman human rights paradigm. An-Na'im rightly states that human rights laws and frameworks are colonized.16 Institutionally, norms were agreed upon by States and by people who were not representative of their own communities. He argues that state-centric legality was a crucial element of European colonization, spreading ideas of norms to non-European countries. States allegedly were—but have not been—in the business of protecting human rights.

Spiritual care recognizes the importance of the de-institutionalized religious practices that emerge from the daily lives of people that give them the tools to find their agency and flourishing. Spiritual care is concerned about caring for self, for those in our community, and for improving the daily lives of people by recognizing and underscoring agency in their lives. A central goal of spiritual care is to liberate and empower the wholeness of human beings, families, and communities. In that regard, these chapters uphold the human in human rights discourse and work towards the decolonization of human rights

norms. We contest the neo-liberal, capitalist, de-humanizing values that have shaped and structured human rights norms and what is considered to be spiritual care.

Another theme or thread of commonality in the chapters is the revelation of a "third space" that occurs via postcolonial spiritual care. In the words of postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha, Legitimating narratives of cultural domination can be displaced to reveal a "third space." Most creative forms of cultural identity are produced on the boundaries in-between forms of difference, in the intersections and overlaps across the sphere of class, gender, race, nation, generation, location.

Spiritual identities are produced in concert with cultural identities of the third space. Not only are our spiritual identities fluid and constantly changing; we argue that the field of pastoral theology itself needs to be open to the many apertures and closures, fissures and fractures when it comes to diversity and inclusion within an academic discipline. These "third spaces" are the interstitial spaces that are overlapping and laden with new theories. By being present with—and listening to—the stories of youth, students, the elderly, the poor, et al., the contributors conjure a discursive "third space" and reinvigorate the sacrality of humanity and community that is constantly being challenged in a neoliberal world. For too long, the discursive space of pastoral care has been exceedingly narrow and provincial. It has elided the diversity of spiritual practices and voices, because we have focused on what is considered to be the dominant "norm" of society. This volume seeks to overturn normative structures of spiritual care by engaging and energizing the margins of the 'third space,' the holy in-between space where we can authentically explore stories and practices about our becoming.

Part One: Spiritual Care of the Person

Professor Emmanuel Lartey's chapter explores the concept of relational holism in African life and thought. He references the work of practitioners of African spirituality in its rich and varied forms by examining its significance in the care of persons across the entire world. At the heart and center of personality within African notions of personhood lies, not a soul, but rather 'spirit.' Spirituality in African life and thought is a matter of relationality, and spirituality comprises five inter-related and inter-connected dimensions. These are: (a) relation with the divine, (b) relation with self, (c) relation with (an)other, (d) relations among groups of people—community, and (e) relation with nature/earth/space. African spiritual practices aim at relational holism resulting from harmonious relations along all five of these dimensions.

As the Director of Spiritual Care at Stanford Hospital, Lori Klein articulates an image of "cultural humility and reverent curiosity" for the work of intercultural spiritual care in a hospital setting. Patients, their loved ones, and staff come to hospitals embodying complex identities. They draw upon intersecting cultures and norms to meet expectations of their gender, communit(ies), and religious tradition(s). They come with histories of access, privilege, vulnerability, and/or discrimination. Medical centers in the United States also function based on often unacknowledged cultural norms. Klein beautifully demonstrates how to navigate this people-and institution-scape to provide spiritual care, while adhering to cultural humility and being with people in reverent curiosity. The chaplain's goal is to help all people experience the hospital as a place of compassion and healing. Accompanying people through decisions made in grief's shadow, transitions, loss, and uncertainty can lead to meaningful transformation not only for patients and their loved ones, but also for chaplains. It is transformative mutuality.

Buddhist chaplain Sumi Kim explores the interconnectedness of humans and nature. She observes the current paradigm shift in which our interconnectedness with local economies is entwined with globalization, and how racial and social injustices are understood through systemic oppressions. Our survival is now clearly dependent on Earth's ecological web. She concludes her chapter by reflecting on how we find personal agency while feeling trapped in large-scale political, economic, and social systems. The image of the flower of interbeing, as taught by the Vietnamese Zen master Thích Nhat Hanh, serves as her metaphor.

In Images of Pastoral Care, Robert Dykstra contended that pastoral theologians have long used metaphorical images as guiding frameworks for theoretical analysis and therapeutic practice. To frame Greg Ellison's teaching and practice as a pastoral theologian and new faculty member at Candler School of Theology in 2010, he published a journal article to cast his own image of pastoral care, entitled, "From My Center to the Center of All Things: Hourglass Care (Take 1)." A decade later, he contributes his "second take" on that original article. He makes some revisions, which highlight the importance of pilgrimage, fearless dialogue, and a full-sensory pedagogy, to aid students in caring for self and other.

Amani Legagneur, manager of Spiritual Health at Northside hospital, asks the following questions: "Is your healing welcome to you? Is my healing welcome to me?" These questions serve as touchstones and guides for spiritual care responders who may identify themselves as healing welcomers. A healing welcomer is a spiritual care responder who intends to offer a respectful, hospitable presence to those served while endeavoring to facilitate the amelioration and/or alleviation of their pain and suffering. Legagneur demonstrates how healing welcomers seek to promote restoration, positive connections, comfort, hope, self-compassion, and grace as they encourage greater spiritual wellbeing in those for whom they care.

In experiencing the welcoming healing of self-love, we introduce the beautiful work of Alexander Brown, an undergraduate student at a university in the South. He contributes a most poignant, thoughtful piece of his ongoing spiritual journey, as he reflects on his gender, religious, and sexual identity. Weaving his own personal Muslim-Christian spiritual narrative with the theories of feminist and womanist scholars and activists, he constructs a spiritual care prescriptive for transgendered individuals.

Part Two: Spiritual Care of Communities
Bilal Ansari, Muslim chaplain, contributes a brief synopsis of his work-in-progress on the image of the Black Sheep and how shepherding and care of one's flock is a repeated theme in the Qur'an, hadith (prophetic narratives), the prophetic biography, Islamic jurisprudence, theology and spirituality. There is a clear pastoral theology and concept of care in Islam. Muslim pastoral care can be imagined and best understood as the marginalized Black Shepherds and sheep. This brief chapter comes from his dissertation work, which will be published in the near future. By introducing his work in this volume, he hopes to diversify the notion and image of pastoral care to include the deep roots inherent in Islam, expand the identity of Muslim caregivers beyond the relegated Christian realm, and contribute meaningfully to the professional literature in the field of pastoral theology and spiritual care.

Pastoral theologian Mindy McGarrah-Sharp's chapter begins with the imagery of basketry as a metaphor for what is necessary for pastoral care in a "flammable" world. Baskets bear intergenerational, intercultural wisdom while also carrying future stories. Baskets are also flammable in a world shaped by

colonial impulses. The second part of the chapter describes an image of collective phoenix poetry that arises amidst such dehumanizing risks. The chapter argues that intercultural, postcolonializing pastoral care practices cultivate the conditions for and contribute to phoenix poetry in a flammable world where persistent joy and prophetic grief co-reside.

Greg Epstein, humanist chaplain at Harvard and MIT, offers the image of midwifery for spiritual care. With a dramatic rise in the number of atheists, agnostics, humanists, and nonreligious people in the United States today—in particular among young, highly educated people (self-professed atheists and agnostics now outnumber all Christians combined at Harvard and MIT, according to detailed recent surveys of campus demographics)— there is a strong need and called-for demand for professionally trained helping professionals who can work with members of this population to address spiritual questions on topics such as meaning and purpose, death and despair, and ethical well-being. Epstein describes the rich ways he has connected to students in this anthology by sharing some of his own ethical struggles and challenges in his spiritual journey.

Elementary school librarian Natalie Bernstein's chapter explores the variety of ways that an elementary school library offers support to students, parents, and teachers. The space itself is welcoming and comforting, offering a quiet place to be calm, read, or ask for help. The relationship between the librarian and individual library users can be surprisingly intimate, with individual consultations about choosing a book sometimes developing into personal confessions about fears or hopes. At the heart of the library program, however, are books—especially stories—that create connections to personal experience, deepen our understanding of the interior lives of others, help solve problems, build resilience, and, ultimately, nurture compassion. Bernstein embraces a Paolo Freirean method in the library to allow for liberative critical thinking and reflection. She focuses on teaching, modeling, and cultivating the joy of reading—whether individually or communally—and through that reading, has taught children how to appreciate themselves and connect empathically with others. Bernstein invites us into her elementary library sanctuary, where we are privy to her awe-inspiring work and spiritual practice of reading and engaging in community-building with children, parents, and teachers.

The next chapter looks at the compassionate care and community organizing work of Baptist pastor Jeremy Lewis and the members of a food co-op in Atlanta called Urban Recipe. Urban Recipe is not a typical food bank or food distribution center for low-income families. The rituals of gathering, distributing, and organizing the food is not done in a paternalistic or hierarchical manner. The co-op endeavors to create community and food security for its clients in a way that respects and honors the dignity of each individual of the community. Food is not simply handed out; the members participate together and deliberate, organize, distribute the food, etc. The members do the bulk of the co-op tasks themselves, as well as help solve whatever problems may arise. The co-op members have dignity in their shared responsibility with one another, and through that agency, they help each other to build community based on radical love for one another. Rhythms and routines of life have formed and shaped the co-op members, as well as the care they give and receive from one another. In this chapter, Lewis explores the rhythm of one person's relationship with her co-op at Urban Recipe (and how the rhythm of each individual is integral in shaping the unique dynamics of the co-op). The expression of care articulated in this co-op model provides helpful insights into other life contexts and communities with regard to spiritual care. Resources (such as love and care), when provided, can contribute to building a thriving community.

Part Three: Spiritual Care and Global Well-Being

Pastor, academic, and activist Cedric Johnson investigates neoliberalism as a central framework through which to investigate the human suffering that has resulted from a growing economic divide that is now global in its scope. The image of the cultural broker metaphorically structures various realms of practice that inform soul care in the neoliberal age. Cultural brokering is defined as the act of bridging, linking, or mediating between groups or persons of different cultural backgrounds for the purpose of reducing conflict or producing change. Cultural brokers also function as mediators, negotiating complex processes within communities and cultures. The practitioner of prophetic soul care in the neoliberal age is called upon to build bridges of communication, manage the dynamics of cultural and socioeconomic difference, help groups mediate those differences, and advocate for transformation. The image of the cultural broker thus brings into view continuities among critical realms of practice that otherwise appear to be unrelated.

Theologian and scholar Bruce Rogers-Vaughn discusses the changing structures of colonialism and proposes a reimagining of spiritual care that includes an understanding of how the internet has become an effective tool of this global colonization. Rogers-Vaughn asks us to complicate and reimagine Bonnie Miller McLemore's "living human web" metaphor. He suggests attending to the "dark web" as a way to visualize the decolonizing gaps, recesses, and interstices of the human web. After delineating the corrosive alterations of human subjects within today's dominant web, producing what he calls "dying human documents," he identifies four practices existing within the dark web—hope, humility, love, and mourning—that might guide spiritual care in the current age.

Feminist theologian Hellena Moon metaphorically illustrates how the "immured spirit" is the spiritual erasure and oppression of communities due to the European categorization of religions deemed sacred (those beliefs seen to be similar to European belief systems) and profane (that which was categorized as unimportant). Not only does the "immured spirit" symbolize the marginalized or "caged" spiritual practices of previously colonized communities to prevent their/our true liberation; it also symbolizes the immured g*d—that is, the lack of imagination and creativity that could emerge if we engaged in the true work of decolonization. The possibility and vision for liberation is immured in the traps of "freedom" established by a neoliberal world. The living human web has been a Eurocentric web— with a desperate need for the infra-human. The freedom and liberation of white Euro-Americans have been dependent on various forms of violence (colonial, imperial, neo-liberal, capitalist) wrought on human and nonhuman communities. While the structural and physical forms of violence have been theorized and critiqued, the clement and curative forms of violence have been less discussed. The metonym of an immured spirit is a heuristic for us to contemplate the less noticeable, yet equally toxic, forms of violence (clement and curative) that are perpetrated against—and endured by—infra-humans, thereby circumscribing our genuine liberation. In contemplating our freedom, Moon also considers how our liberation has been tethered to other forms of violence, such as our dependence on fossil fuels. In that regard, how free are any of us when we are so utterly immured by the forces of nature? While we are responsible for environmental damages, we are the ones who are suffering the consequences. The Earth can continue without us, but we cannot continue without Earth. Paradoxically, we are destroying the very force that gives us life.

Conclusion

We see the potential of metaphors to help contribute to—and expand—the language, vision, and practice of spiritual care. It is our hope that new metaphors can stimulate our imaginations to create new language and creative ways of theorizing and envisioning what constitutes spiritual care. Spiritual care is the care of the everyday that is part of our circadian rhythm. It is a vision, an image, of the ordinary work of people in their everyday healing (healing of self and being present with others). Postcolonial spiritual care creates the situations that allow our dignity, as well as that of others, to be granted so that we can become who we were meant to be. We hope readers can journey with us into the quotidian practices of care. We want to emphasize the importance of the de-institutionalized religious practices that emerge from the daily lives of people whereby their agency and dignity are able to flourish. Mutuality of listening and support, as An-Na'im and Safi have described, creates a space for the emergence of dignity and for becoming who we were meant to be, and this is a synecdoche for spiritual care. <>

AËTIANA (1996–2020) THE 5 PART SERIES:

Aetius, the 1st–2nd-century CE philosopher is now restored as the doxographer and Eclectic philosopher of note. This meticulous effort of painstaking scholarship will server future generations of historians of classical ancient philosophy for much of the rest of this century. The work of reconstruction and text of the *Placita* of Aëtius to move it from a secondary corrupted source to an primary source of the content and arguments of the presocratics through middle Platonism with enough assured evaluation as to significantly alter the textbooks about philosophical opinions and development.

The present edition reviewed here is Part V includes reconstruction and commentary of the text of the *Placita* of Aëtius has been a very long time in the making. In the case of Jaap Mansfeld, its origins go as far back as the research he did on ps.Hippocrates De hebdomadibus in the late 1960's. David Runia first came into contact with doxographical texts when analysing Philo of Alexandria's puzzling work De aeternitate mundi in the late 1970's. We made the decision to work together on the Aëtian Placita in 1989 and the project entitled Aëtiana: the Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer' was born. The present volume consisting of four parts is the project's culmination. Four preparatory volumes (in five parts) have preceded it and are noted below with contents. Go to main review and evaluation for Aetius V.

AËTIANA: I (ISBN: 9789004105805, 1996),
AËTIUS: II (PARTS 1 & 2; SET ISBN 9789004172067; 2008),
AËTIUS: III (ISBN 9789004180413; 2009),
AËTIUS: IV (ISBN: 9789004361454, 2018),
AËTIUS: V (PARTS 1-4)(ISBN: 9789004428386 SET)
See review below for Aetius V below

An Edition of the Reconstructed Text of the Placita with a Commentary and a Collection of Related Texts edited by Jaap Mansfeld and Douwe (David) Runia [Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Brill]

Aëtiana The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, Volume I, The Sources by Jaap Mansfeld and Douwe (David) Runia [Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Volume: 73, Brill, 9789004105805]

In 1879 the young German scholar Hermann Diels published his celebrated *Doxographi Graeci*, (in which the major doxographical works of antiquity are collected and analysed). Diels' results have been foundational for the study of ancient philosophy ever since.

In their ground-breaking study the authors focus on the doxographer Aëtius, whose work Diels reconstructed from various later sources. First they examine the antecedents of Diels' Aëtian hypothesis. Then Diels' theory and especially the philological techniques used in its formulation are subjected to detailed analysis. The remainder of the volume offers a fresh examination of the sources for our knowledge for Aëtius. Diels' theory is revised and improved at significant points.

Subsequent volumes will examine the contents and methods of the doxographer and his antecedents in earlier Greek philosophy.

No scholar concerned with the history of ancient philosophy can afford to ignore this study.

Contents

AËTIANA II (2 VOLS.) VOLUME ONE: THE METHOD AND INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT OF A DOXOGRAPHER. VOLUME TWO: THE COMPENDIUM by Jaap Mansfeld and Douwe (David) Runia [Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Volume: 114, Brill, Hardback: 9789004172067; E-Book (PDF): 9789047425373]

The theme of this study is the Doxography of problems in physics from the Presocratics to the early first century BCE attributed to Aëtius. Part I focuses on the argument of the compendium as a whole, of its books, of its sequences of chapters, and of individual chapters, against the background of Peripatetic and Stoic methodology. Part II offers the first full reconstruction in a single unified text of Book II, which deals with the cosmos and the heavenly bodies. It is based on extensive analysis of the relevant witnesses and includes listings of numerous doxographical-dialectical parallels in other ancient writings. This new treatment of the evidence supersedes Diels' still dominant source-critical approach, and will prove indispensable for scholars in ancient philosophy.

Contents

AËTIANA III: THE METHOD AND INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT OF A DOXOGRAPHER, VOLUME 3, STUDIES IN THE DOXOGRAPHICAL TRADITIONS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY by Jaap Mansfeld and Douwe (David) Runia [Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Volume: 118, Brill, Hardback: 9789004180413; E-Book (PDF): 9789004193239]

Ancient doxography, particularly as distilled in the work on problems of physics by Aëtius, is a vital source for our knowledge of early Greek philosophy up to the first century BCE. But its purpose and method, and also its wider intellectual context, are by no means easy to understand. The present volume contains 19 essays written between 1989 and 2009 in which the authors grapple with various aspects of the doxographical tradition and its main representatives. The essays examine the origins of the doxographical method in the work of Aristotle and Theophrastus and also provide valuable insights into the works of other authors such as Epicurus, Chrysippus, Lucretius, Cicero, Philo of Alexandria and Seneca. The collection can be read as a companion collection to the two earlier volumes of Aëtiana published by the two authors in this series.

Contents
Preliminary Material
1. Doxographical Studies, Quellenforschung, Tabular Presentation And Other Varieties Of Comparativism
2. Physikai Doxai And Problêmata Physika In Philosophy And Rhetoric: From Aristotle To Aëtius (And Beyond)
3. Xenophanes On The Moon: A Doxographicum In Aëtius
4. Chrysippus And The Placita
5. Deconstructing Doxography
6. Aëtius, Or What's In A Name?
7. Physical Doxai In The Phaedo
8. Aristote et la structure du De sensibus de Théophraste
9. Epicurus Peripateticus
10. Lucretius And Doxography
11. Philo And Hellenistic Doxography
12. Additional Fragments Of Arius Didymus On Physics
13. Critical Note: Empedocles And His Interpreters
14. Atheists In Aëtius: Text, Translation And Comments On De Placitis 1.7.1–10
15. Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle, The Peripatetics, The Stoics, And Thales And His Followers "On Causes"
16. Aëtius, Aristotle And Others On Coming-To-Be And Passing-Away
17. Cosmic Distances: Aëtius 2.31 Diels And Some Related Texts
18. From Milky Way To Halo. Aristotle's Meteorologica, Aëtius, And Passages In Seneca And The Scholia On Aratus
19. The Placita Ascribed To Doctors In Aëtius' Doxography On Physics
Additional Remarks
Concordance

Index Nominum et Rerum
Index Locorum potiorum

AËTIANA IV PAPERS OF THE MELBOURNE COLLOQUIUM ON ANCIENT DOXOGRAPHY edited: Jaap Mansfeld and David Runia [Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Volume: 148, Brill, Hardback: 789004361454; E-Book (PDF): 9789004361461]

The articles collected here are based for the most part on papers read at the Colloquium "The *Placita* of Aëtius: Foundations for the Study of Ancient Philosophy," held in Melbourne in December 2015. The *Placita*, a first century CE collection of systematically organised tenets in natural philosophy ranging from first principles to human physiology is incompletely extant in several later sources. Its laborious reconstruction and the identity of its author are discussed from various angles. The text of the treatise is further elucidated by a novel statistical exploration of what is extant and what is missing. Its relation to various currents in the history of Greek philosophy and its reliability are also examined in some detail.

Contents

The Downside of Doxography Author: Richard McKirahan

Aëtiana V (4 vols.) An Edition of the Reconstructed Text of the Placita with a Commentary and a Collection of Related Texts

edited by Jaap Mansfeld and David Runia [Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Volume: 153, Brill, Hardcover: 9789004428386 E-Book (PDF): 9789004428409]

A new reconstruction and text of the *Placita* of Aëtius (ca. 50 CE), accompanied by a full commentary and an extensive collection of related texts. This compendium, arguably the most important doxographical text to survive from antiquity, is known through the intensive use made of it by authors in later antiquity and beyond. Covering the entire field of natural philosophy, it has long been mined as a source of information about ancient philosophers and their views. It now receives a thorough analysis as a remarkable work in its own right. This volume is the culmination of a five-volume set of studies on Aëtius (1996–2020): Aëtiana I (ISBN: 9789004105805, 1996), II (Parts 1&2; set ISBN 9789004172067; 2008), III (ISBN 9789004180413; 2009), IV (ISBN: 9789004361454, 2018), and V (Parts 1-4). It uses an innovative methodology to replace the seminal edition of Hermann Diels (1879).

BRIEF CONTENTS PART V IN 4 VOLUMES

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Aetius Placita Book 1 The Principles of Nature: Text and Commentary
User's Guide to the Edition and Commentary
Aetius Placita Book 2 Cosmology: Text and Commentary
Aetius Placita Book 3 Meteorology and the Earth: Text and Commentary
User's Guide to the Edition and Commentary
Aetius Placita Book 4 Psychology: Text and Commentary
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Liber 1 ⟨promium⟩
Liber 1 Caput 1

Appendix List of Chapter Headings in the Translation of Qus ibn L'q

in: **A'tiana V (4 vols.)** translated from German into English

The oldest of the three mss. of Q used by Daiber in his edition, Ẓāhirīya (Damascus) 4871, dated to 1161 CE, contains a translation of the indices of the five books. Unlike in the Greek mss. all the headings have been assembled together in a single list and are not distributed at the beginning of the individual books. Daiber did not include this initial list in his edition and translation of Q, but he has kindly provided the editors with a translation, which we print in this Appendix.

This is the book of Plutarchos on the scientific views that the philosophers represented. There are five treatises.

The first treatise. 30 chapters.

What is nature?

What is the difference between the principle and the element?

About the principles and what they are?

How did the strength of the world emerge?

Is the whole thing one?

How does the existence of God enter into people's thoughts (consciousness)?

What is the Godhead?

About the high forces that the Greeks call "Daimones" and "Heroes".

About matter.

About the shape.

About the causes.

About the bodies.

About the smallest things.

About the figures.

About the colors.

About the division of bodies.

About the concentration and the mixture.

About the empty space.

About the place.

About the room.

Over time.

About the essence of time.

About the movement.

About becoming and passing away.

About the shape.

About the essence of form.

About skill.

About the essence of skill.

About chance.

About nature.

The second treatise. 31 chapter.

About the world.

About the shape of the world.

Is the world animated and guided by the leadership?

Is the world imperishable?

What is the world fed on?

From what first element did God begin—he is sublime and powerful—the creation of the world?

About the arrangement of the world.

What is the cause why the world is tilting?
Is there a vacuum outside?
What is the right and left sides of the world?
About the substance of the sky.
About the division of the sky.
What is the substance of the stars?
About the shapes of the stars.
About the arrangement of the stars.
About the movement of the stars.
Where are the stars illuminated?
About what is called "Dioskoroi".
About the (weather) constellations of the seasons.
About the substance of the sun.
About the size of the sun.
About the shape of the sun.
About the solstice.
About the solar eclipse.
About the substance of the moon.
About the size of the moon.
About the shape and enlightenment of the moon.
About the lunar eclipse.
About the appearance of the moon and why ⟨er⟩ appears earthy ⟨⟩.
About the distances of the moon.
Over the years, how long each of them lasts from the planets.
The third treatise. 18 chapter.
About the light-filled celestial sphere.
About the bemused stars.
About the lightning, the thunder, the lightning strikes and what is called "Prester" and "Typhon".
Above the clouds, rain, snow and hail.
Over the rainbow.
About what appears in the light called "Roden".
Over the winds.
Over winter and summer.
About the Earth.
About the shape of the earth.
About the position of the earth.
About the inclination of the earth.
About the movement of the earth.
About the division of the earth.
About the earthquakes.
About the sea, how its condition is and how it is bitter.
How do floods and ebbs arise?
How does the farm around the moon come into being?
The fourth treatise. 23 chapters.
About the increase of the Nile.
What is the definition of the soul?
Is the soul a body and what is its essence?

About the parts of the soul.
About the leading part among the soul parts.
About the movement of the soul.
About the survival of the soul.
About sensory sensations and sensory objects.
Are the sensations and the conceit true?
How many senses are there?
How do the sensory sensations, thought and logic of thought become?
What is the difference between the conceit and the conceited?
What does the sense of face look like?
About the pictures that are seen in the mirrors.
Is the eclipse visible?
About hearing.
About smelling.
About the taste.
About the sound.
Is the sound a body and how does the echo come about?
How does the soul perceive and what is its leading part?
About breathing.
About the physical infections and whether the soul knows them?
The fifth treatise. 30 chapters.
About the art of fortune telling.
How does the dream come about?
What is the essence of the seed?
Is the seed a body?
Is a seed sent out of the females?
How does conception happen?
How does the production of the male and female happen?
How do the (birth) victims arise?
Why does the woman not get pregnant despite frequent sleep?
How do the twins and the triplets come into being?
How does the resemblance to fathers and ancestors come about?
How do many of those born become like other people and not their fathers?
How do women become infertile and men sterile?
Why are the mules infertile?
Is the embryo a living being?
How do the Embrya feed?
What is the first thing created in the womb?
Why can they be raised in seven months, but not reared in eight months (born)?
About the becoming and passing of living beings.
About the species of living beings, are they all sensitive and reasonable?
At what time are the living beings formed when they are in the womb?
What elements do each of the genus parts that are in us consist of?
How does man begin with completion?
How does sleep come about and does it mean a death for the soul and the body?
Is sleep a death for the soul or for the body?
How are the plants grown up and are they living beings?

About nutrition and growth.
How do the desires and joys arise in the living beings?
How does the fever develop and is it a production?
On health, disease and age.

<>

Review

Aetius, the 1st–2nd-century CE philosopher is now restored as the doxographer and Eclectic philosopher of note. This meticulous effort of painstaking scholarship will server future generations of historians of classical ancient philosophy for much of the rest of this century. The work of reconstruction and text of the *Placita* of Aëtius to move it from a secondary corrupted source to an primary source of the content and arguments of the presocratics through middle Platonism with enough assured evaluation as to significantly alter the textbooks about philosophical opinions and development.

The present edition and commentary on the Placita has been a very long time in the making. In the case of Jaap Mansfeld, its origins go as far back as the research he did on ps.Hippocrates De hebdomadibus in the late 1960's. David Runia first came into contact with doxographical texts when analysing Philo of Alexandria's puzzling work De aeternitate mundi in the late 1970's. We made the decision to work together on the Aëtian Placita in 1989 and the project entitled Aëtiana: the Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer' was born. The present volume consisting of four parts is the project's culmination. Four preparatory volumes (in five parts) have preceded it.

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The Aim and Scope of this Edition

Ever since the German scholar Hermann Diels published his landmark text edition entitled Doxographi Graeci in 1879, the compendium of the Placita and its author Aëtius have been a familiar presence in the study of ancient philosophy. If the truth be told, however, the majority of scholars when using or referring to the Placita will have little idea about the nature of the work or the identity of its author. The main purpose of Diels' edition was to provide a foundation for the study of early Greek philosophy and he made copious use of its results for another great work of scholarship, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, first published in 1903. It is no exaggeration to say that for many years afterwards, there was little progress in the understanding of the tradition to which the work belongs. During the past three decades or so, this situation has altered markedly. There have undeniably been considerable advances in the field of doxographical studies. But Diels' great works themselves have remained largely unchallenged.

The present study takes as its starting-point Diels' reconstruction and edition of the Placita. It undertakes to investigate that text anew and to replace the edition that he made of it. In so doing, it has two chief aims.

Firstly, it adopts a revised methodology, and on that basis aims to present a more accurate and serviceable version of the Placita. Its main innovation is that it reconstructs the no longer extant original of the work in a single column. It also includes the complete evidence available for that reconstruction, including important material not accessible to Diels, together with an English translation of the finalised text.

Secondly, it aims to place the contents of the compendium in the broader perspective of the long history of ancient philosophy. This includes the early period of Greek philosophy from Thales onwards, for which it is such an important source. It also includes the period from the Peripatos in the fourth century to the first century of the Common Era when the method of doxography on which the compendium relies was developed and the work itself received its final form. It then ends with the period stretching to the end of antiquity (and beyond), when the work in its various and often derivative forms was extensively utilized and thereby transmitted, albeit imperfectly, to us in the present. To achieve this second purpose, we furnish the text with a detailed commentary. Its aim is not only to elucidate the basis and method of our reconstruction, but also to cast a flood of light on its sources, witnesses and general content. And to broaden the context even further, we also add a collection of additional texts which illustrate parallel traditions and demonstrate the place of the work even more fully within the development of ancient philosophy as a whole.

Through the totality of our scholarly labours, we wish to show that the Placita, often patronizingly regarded as a jejune introductory handbook, is in fact a seminal work for the study of ancient philosophy. It is the only reasonably complete extant example of a highly significant strand of doxographical literature. Its predominantly dialectical method goes back to Aristotle and his school and enables the incorporation of important material from the Hellenistic period and the beginnings of Imperial philosophy. It provides a comprehensive and remarkably compact presentation of the key questions and topics of natural philosophy, from its first principles to the physiology of the human body. With the aid of a recently developed detailed statistical analysis we can be confident that we possess about six-sevenths of the original work. It will now be possible to read and study it by means of a text and translation that is the closest approximation to the work when it was still available in its complete and original form.

The present General Introduction to our edition will proceed in five steps. In section 2 we introduce the compendium and its author, starting with an outline of the main features of its transmission and its contents. We also locate the present work in the context of earlier volumes that we have published in the course of our research. Next in section 3, we discuss the question of how the work should be reconstructed, first reviewing the method used by Diels, then explaining and justifying the method that we ourselves have chosen to adopt. In section 4 the witnesses to the text of the compendium, both primary and secondary, are more fully introduced, including information about the editions of their works that we have used. Section 5 analyses the doxographical context of the Placita, both the proximate tradition in which it stands, and the earlier tradition initiated by Aristotle and his collaborator Theophrastus. Finally, in section 6 we give a detailed explanation of the edition's contents, method and layout. It serves as a user's guide for all those who wish to make full use of the scholarly resource that we are offering.

The Compendium and Its Transmission
The No Longer Extant Original Work
It is deeply to be regretted that the compendium is no longer extant in its original form. We know that it was available to three writers in later antiquity: the author of the Epitome attributed to Plutarch, the anthologist Ioannes Stobaeuss (John of Stobi, in today's North Macedonia), and the Church Father Theodoret, bishop of Cyrrhus (in Northern Syria). The most likely date for the production of the

abridged version is in the second half of the second century. Stobaeus and Theodoret composed their works much later in the first half of the fifth. Due to the popularity of the abridged version, the original work disappeared from view. Based on the information that we now have Theodoret—who informs us about the author's name and the title of his work—may have been the last known author to have had the compendium in his possession.

The Three Chief Witnesses

In our edition and commentary we make the crucial distinction between sources and witnesses. Sources are the authors and works that Aëtius used to compile his compendium, whether at first or, as will more often have been the case, at second or third hand. Witnesses are the ancient authors who through their extant texts inform us about the contents of the compendium' The witnesses, which for every chapter are listed before the Greek text, differ in their proximity to the original. The three primary witnesses are, as mentioned above, ps.Plutarch, Stobaeus and Theodoret. Each of these three differs in turn in how they themselves have been preserved and in the scope of what they preserve.

Ps.Plutarch and His Tradition

The practically complete Greek text of ps.Plutarch's 'On the Physical Doctrines Accepted by the Philosophers, Abridged Version', is extant in several Byzantine manuscripts dating to the twelfth century and a little later, and also in a complete ninth century translation into Arabic. The final pages of the Greek archetype were damaged. Fortunately the translation has preserved lemmata that were later lost. In accordance with the law of the least effort, the abridged edition preserves the compendium's original structure in books and chapters with little change.

On the basis of our reconstructed edition we are in a position to say that ps.Plutarch's 133 chapters and 563 lemmata preserve about 75% of the extant remains and about 63% of the estimated total contents of the work.5 Therefore, though it seems that a little under 4o % of the text was edited out, the macro-sequence of the chapters must have remained the same with only minor variations.

The crucial fact that the Epitome preserves the basic structure of the original work is proved by the corroborative evidence of Stobaeus. As we will note below in section 2.4, the order of themes from Aëtius in Stobaeus is basically the same as the chapter order of ps.Plutarch, although there are a few noteworthy differences. Even more remarkably, the order of the lemmata in the individual chapters he copied out in various ways, that is, either without interpolating other material, or with such material interspersed among the Action lemmata, or again by coalescing these lemmata with selected lemmata from other chapters (which means disturbing the lemma order of these other chapters), is quite often the same as the order of the lemmata in ps.Plutarch. This also holds for the interior order of clusters of chapters that have been located elsewhere, as for example chs. 1.25-29 from the end of Placita Book 1 to the beginning of Eclogae Book 1. This shows that the chapter order as well as the lemma order of ps.Plutarch are a calque of those of in Aëtius.

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The Extent of the Original Work

We have seen above that Aëtius' original compendium has survived in an incomplete condition, since its main witnesses have sustained losses, either deliberately through epitomization, as in ps.Plutarch, or

through small-scale abstraction, as in Theodoret, or by unfortunate subsequent redaction, as in Stobaeus. Using advanced statistical techniques Edward Jeremiah has demonstrated that nevertheless we still possess approximately 86 % of the original work.57 Most of the missing lemmata derive from chapters where ps.Plutarch is our only witness. For chapters where apart from ps.Plutarch the complete testimony of Stobaeus is still extant, we can be reasonably certain that very few if any lemmata are missing. Almost every ps.Plutarchean lemma has a match in Stobaeus. When Stobaeus copied out an Aëtian chapter he took over almost all there was. If it occurred often that he copied out less than the entire chapter, there would be many more ps.Plutarchean lemmata without a match in Stobaeus. This argument can also be extrapolated to the chapters for which Stobaeus is lost, for it is wholly unlikely that the relation would suddenly be different and that for the chapters thrown out by the Byzantine editors considerably more ps.Plutarchean lemmata would have lacked a match in Stobaeus than for those we still have. Consequently, for those 87 chapters for which we have multiple witnesses there probably are only about 42 lemmata missing. For the remaining chapters, for which we have only the evidence of ps.Plutarch, the missing number is expected to be around a further 81. Thus the grand total amounts to 123 missing lemmata yielding a total of 892 lemmata for the complete original work. Furthermore, taken individually, all the chapters for which we have the testimony of S in addition to P (apart from those in which the transmission of S has been affected) are most likely complete. These are a remarkable and highly important results.

In its 135 chapters in five Books the Placita extend over the history of physical philosophy from the early sixth century BCE, beginning with Thales (named fifteen times) and Pythagoras (named twenty-six times), and ending with the Peripatetic Xenarchus of Seleucia in the second half of the first century BCE (named once at ch. 4.3.10). There are no chapters specifically devoted to individuals, or to schools, or to Successions. The focus is wholly on topics presented n a systematic order and on points of view in physical philosophy, not on persons. In the majority of chapters the topic is presented as an issue to be dicussed, by means of a listing of more or less different or conflicting views of different persons or (sometimes) schools. The method is thus basically dialectical. not historical or purely descriptive.

The opening words of the prooemium of Book I define the purpose, later commonly called of the work: our objective is to teach the physical theory, or alternatively `to hand down the account of nature. The Latin translation of the substantive that belongs with the verb is traditio. The purpose of the treatise is to contribute to the continuation of the tradition of the study of nature by keeping this tradition alive.

As part of the Introduction to the treatise Book 1. continues with a discussion ot the parts of philosophy and the nature of physics. It presents a selection of experts from Thales to Strato with their dissimilar views on the principles of physics, provides a brief account of the genesis of the single cosmos to be discussed in detail in Books z and 3, and in a slight detour touches on various vlews concerning the number of kosmoi that can be assumed. The remainder of Book 1 is a detailed presentation of foundational concepts of theoretical physics such as matter, body, motion, time, and necessity, all considered dialectically. Book 2 deals with cosmology, from the cosmos in general to the duration of the year via the heaven, the stars, the sun, and the moon, according to their nature and quantitative, qualitative and other categorical properties. Book 3 treats meteorology in the ancient sense of the word, i.e. the phenomena in the atmosphere above the earth, and then the earth itself and the sea. Book 4 begins with a chapter on the summer flooding of the Nile, but for the rest deals with psychology, that is the soul and the senses, including sensation and cognition insofar as appropriate in the context of

physics, and ends with a chapter on psychosomatic issues. Book 5 first contains a couple of chapters on divination and dreams, and then continues with a detailed presentation of spermatology and problems of heredity and embryology. It also presents a number of particular and more general issues concerned with living beings, concluding with some medical topics: fever, health, disease and—rather appropriately—old age.

By and large the movement from Books 1 to 5 is from periphery to centre and from macrocosm to microcosm, and there is a clear division between Books 1-3, dealing with the macrocosm, and 4-5, dealing with the microcosm. The pivotal procemium of Book 4, which states, 'The parts of the cosmos having now been treated systematically, I shall continue in the direction of the particular phenomena, explicitly both separates and unites the two main parts.

Looking in somewhat more detail at the relations between these Books and between the sub-disciplines of physics displayed in them, we note that the brief final chapter of Book 1,1.30 'On nature, is an appendix ('mantissa', Diels DG 57) to ch. 1.1 'What is nature'. It has the same function for the Book as a whole, for as we leave the last of the theoretical chapters and return, at least formally, to nature qua process, this chapter forms a transition to the next Book on cosmology. This structural feature thus aims to demonstrate the unity of the Book, but also of the compendium as a whole. A similar transitional purpose may be attributed to the first chapter, 'On the Milky Way', of the meteorological Book 3 in relation to the cosmological Book 2, while the misplaced final chapter at ps.Plutarch ch. 3.18 may be seen as an attempt, however unfortunate, to emphasize the unity of the Book. The first chapter of Book 4, 'On the flooding of the Nile, links up with the penultimate chapter of Book 3 'On the tides, which shows that the final position of ps.Plutarch ch. 3.18, however well intended, indeed creates a problem. (In fact we have moved ch. 3.18 in Diels to its rightful place earlier in the Book and renumbered it as ch. 3.5a.) That the first chapters of Book 5 could also have been be the last of Book 4 (see the Introductions to Books 4 and 5) demonstrates that these Books, dealing not with nature in general like the first three but with (mostly) human nature, in a certain sense belong together.

To be sure, all five Books appear to be rigorously separated from each other by chapter numbers and Book numbers. But their contents are in fact more fluid and to some extent tend to mesh with each other. The cumulative effect of these janus-faced endings and beginnings is to underline the unity of the treatise, and correspondingly of our world. For a comparison we may for instance recall that the precise point where one book of an epic ends and another begins can be problematical—the tale goes on, as ancient commentaries attest. Divisions between Books and allocation of contents will also have been imposed by the length of the papyrus scrolls on which they were written.

A Retrospective Glance at Aëtiana Volumes 1-2

In Aëtiana vol. 1 our first purpose was the critical evaluation of Diels' famous Aëtius hypothesis against the backdrop of nineteenth-century classical scholarship, exemplified in the stemmatology, or cladistic analysis of manuscripts, linked with the name of Karl Lachmann, and the source criticism linked with that of Diels' Doktorvater Hermann Usenet This helped to situate and even to improve upon Diels' overview of the doxographical traditions, as pictured by means of a chronological and genealogical stemma, or tree diagram, with several paths and lateral branches, illustrating the relations at successive stages between the most important manuscripts and/or sources or witnesses involved. We have

reproduced these two diagrams, one representing the Dielsian schema, the other our own, as appendices to this Introduction, in the latter case making one or two small improvements.

In order to provide the necessary background, we also looked at forgotten earlier scholarship from the Renaissance onwards concerned with the relations between ps.Plutarch and ps.Galen and Stobaeus, for it had long been noted that these witnesses present similar or even largely identical material. Another philological method, very popular in the nineteenth century and beyond, but with a venerable history going back as far as antiquity, is the presentation of parallel texts side by side in two or more columns for comparative purposes. This comparison may lead to the conclusion that a common source has to be posited, and thus to the construction of a genealogical stemma. For these techniques, classical scholarship proved to be indebted to the philological study of the Gospels inaugurated by the eighteenth-century German theologian Johann Jacob Griesbach. Their combined and successful application to what till then had looked like a rough and unordered mass of data gave Diels' hypothesis its aura of quasi-mathematical and unassailable certainty.

However, Diels' approach to the sources for his tabular reconstruction of Aëtius in two columns, with some extra evidence in an apparatus parallellorum, was oddly prejudiced. He saw the development, from his postulated pure and unsullied Urquell Theophrastus—on whom see below, section 5.2.2—in the fourth/third century BCE, to Aëtius in the first century CE and the even later ps.Plutarch and his tradition, as one of progressive deterioration, increasing corruption and continuous decline. In his view later in time was equivalent to worse in quality. The Ciceronian motto that he placed at the very beginning of his Doxographi Graeci was telling: *tardi ingenii est rivulos consectari, fontes rerum non videre*, which we might render 'it is the hallmark of a dull disposition to pursue the little streams and not to see the sources of things, the former by implication being muddied and of minor importance, the latter limpid and pure. The focus of his interest was on the thought of the largely lost early Greek philosophers. So in Aëtius he looked in the first place for reliable evidence on the Presocratics, and he found what he sought. He was convinced of its reliability because he believed that, ultimately, it derived more or less unscathed from Theophrastus.

We disagreed with this evaluation then, and we still do. We chose to differ from Diels because we had a different understanding of the tradition. In our view it was a tradition that was essentially open, responding to changing times and circumstances, receiving the necessary updates from time to time, subject to rearrangement, catering to a variety of publics, and therefore losing material as well as regularly acquiring new content. The Placita belongs to the genre of functional literature (if genre is what it may be called), comparable to lexica and compendia of all kinds. In fact, as pointed out at section 2.6 above, a sort of vademecum or handbook is what it really is. Accordingly we presented an unprejudiced and full analysis of the three main witnesses (including, in the case of ps.Plutarch, his complicated tradition), and tried to understand their respective aims and to work out their methodologies before gauging their worth and setting out their respective contributions to the reconstruction of their common source. In the course of this analysis we came to the conclusion that Diels' brilliant hypothesis regarding the role of the three chief witness and a few others was in general correct, but had to be revised in several important respects. In his critical review of Aëtiana vol. i Michael Frede showed that Diels' (and our) analysis of Theodoret's contribution had its vulnerable side. This lacuna in our analysis has since been closed.

The purpose of Aëtiana vol. 2 was to prepare the ground for the present edition of the Greek text of the Placita accompanied by a translation, commentary and apparatus of parallel passages. In vol. 2.1 we provided a full analysis of the treatise's macrostructure and the dialectical microstructure of its pters, the results of which, occasionally updated, constitute the main rationale of today's edition and commentary. It also emerged that this macrostructure to a significant extent reflects the order of the principal themes and sub-themes in Aristotle's physics (including psychology) on the one hand, and on the sequence of topics according to the Stoic division of the physikos logos physical theory, 'account of physics, the term prominent as we saw in the opening line of the Placita), beginning with theoretical physics and ending with psychology and spermatology, on the other. The fused reverberations of these Aristotelian and Stoic examples comprise practically the entire extent of the Placita, from Book 1 to Book 5.72 Let us look at this feature in some more detail.

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The fact should never be lost from view that the Placita merely provides material for instruction, discussion and reflection, possibly also for making one's choice if that is what one wants to do (cf. section 2.6 above). Neither a suspension of judgement, more sceptico, nor a positive outcome, more aristotelico or stoico, is ever formulated, no explicit advice ever given either way. Only very rarely is there a critical note."

As a systematic overview of the methodology of the Placita this volume of Aëtiana is still recommended. Further issues that are discussed are the authenticity and role of chapter headings and their numbering, and the use and function of verbatim quotations." In addition, a substantial section was devoted to ch. 1.3 in the context of the role of Successions and Sects and the absolute and relative chronology of name-labels. Note however that the structural analysis now proposed at ch. 1.3 as a blend of arrangement according to number of principles and an ordering according to Successions (Diadochai) represents a noteworthy advance compared with that of eleven years ago. What is more, our understanding of the role of relative and absolute chronological ordering in relation to arrangement via diaeresis and diaphonia has now profited from the detailed inquiries of Edward Jeremiah. On the basis of a statistical analysis of the differences in this respect between the individual books he has argued that `the balance tipped towards dialectic as time went on, likely indicating the systematic importance of dialectical practice in the Hellenistic era'. We return to the subject of dialectic in Aristotle and Theophrastus below at section 5.2.

Aëtiana vol. 2.2 offered a detailed specimen reconstructionis of Book 2 of the treatise. Book 2 lends itself better to this exercise than the other Books, because our witnesses have preserved its chapters in an almost complete state. For each of its 32 numbered chapters and the three we saw fit to add (numbering them as 2a, 5a and 17a) we printed and patiently analyzed the evidence of the individual witnesses in sequence. First the doxai of the Greek text of ps.Plutarch are numbered and printed, followed by an account of its structure and the differences of completeness and *variae lectiones* present in members of the traditio ps.Plutarchi. The text of Stobaeus came next. Its doxai, as a rule more numerous, were also numbered, and compared in respect of structure, completeness and *variae lectiones* with those of ps.Plutarch. The text of Theodoret, as a rule much shorter, came third and was scrutinized in the same way. The results were analyzed in relation to evidence elsewhere in Aëtius. We also took care to compare parallels from the wider dialectical-doxographical tradition, both earlier and

later, a selection from which was printed at the end of each chapter. These parallels did not as a rule pertain to the individual doxai but rather to the topic of the chapter as a whole and the interrelations of its lemmata. They often yielded important supportive evidence on the diaeretic and diaphonic structures of the Aëtian chapters as determined in our analysis and illustrated by a variety of diagrams.

Each chapter of our specimen reconstruction is ended with a preliminary reconstructed text, accompanied by a negative critical apparatus and English translation. The entire procedure demonstrated, to our conviction, that our chosen method of reducing the two columns (and further material in the apparatus) of Diels' edition to a single text was viable and superior. It should be emphasized that the edited text was provisional and is now superseded by a text which is far superior again. Not only is it based on all the available evidence, fully accounted for in the list of witnesses and in a positive critical apparatus. It also benefits from increased insight, developed as our research progressed, into the respective value of the direct and indirect tradition of our main witnesses.

The analysis of the structure of each chapter, carried out by means of a step-by-step approach which is repeated in detail for each Placita chapter, required considerable time and space. Its study is still recommended because of its meticulous and detailed analysis. It has meant that we are in a much better position to present the cumulative evidence for the entire compendium, but now in a manner that is both more compact and more complete. The general analysis of Aëtiana vol. 2.1 has therefore been fully integrated into the present edition and commentary, and the same can be said, mutatis mutandis, for the results of the partial and preliminary analysis, text and translation published in Aëtiana vol. 2.2. It goes without saying that in the intervening eleven years that have been spent preparing the present edition, our understanding and insights have developed and progressed, aided by contributions and critiques of other scholars. Accordingly it not seldom occurs that on (mostly minor) points we have revised our views. Such changes and developments are noted wherever relevant. <>

Grande Grammaire Historique du Français (GGHF) (Great Historical Grammar of French) edited by Christiane Marchello-Nizia, Bernard Combettes, Sophie Prévost, and Tobias Scheer [De Gruyter Mouton, 9783110345537] in French

The existing major works on the history of the French language were published more than fifty years ago and are characterized by a largely a-theoretical approach. More than a hundred years after Ferdinand Brunot began to publish his monumental work, the ambition of the **Grande Grammaire Historique du Français (GGHF)** is to present the evolution of the French language in its totality, building on the contributions achieved by descriptive and theoretical research in recent decades. It also offers several innovative aspects.

The GGHF is a grammar organized by themes rather than by periods, and it reflects all major areas currently under debate in linguistics (phonetics / phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, etc.). In addition, it is based on a balanced corpus of several million words that has been designed especially for the GGHF (with a selection of representative texts for each century). The consideration of this corpus

and the quantification of facts enable the authors to establish a close relationship between variation and change: we believe that the interaction of these two aspects is the cornerstone for the interpretation of the evolution of French and of language in general. In addition to the description of the evolution of French, the analysis of language change thus also aims to contribute to the study of the evolution of language as such.

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Contents

VOLUME 1

INTRODUCTION PRINCIPES DE LA GRANDE GRAMMAIRE HISTORIQUE DU FRANÇAIS (GGHF)

Appendix full Contents

Une Grammaire historique de l'an 2020

1. Equiper la langue

C'est autour de 1400 qu'ont commence a apparaitre des ouvrages en francais destines a decrire et a enseigner la langue francaise : le Donait francois de John Barton (1408) ou les Manieres de langaige (1396, 1399). Un peu plus tard, au 16C s., it y eut une veritable explosion de grammaires et de dictionnaires, de Palsgrave a Robert Estienne. Et depuis plus de six siecles s'est etablie une longue tradition d'ouvrages qui ont contribue a « requipement » de la langue francaise : consciemment ou non, on savait déjà qu'une langue depourvue de tels outils est a terme une langue menacee.

La Grande Grammaire Historique du Francais de ce debut du 21e s. (desormais GGHF 2020) se situe dans la continuite des grands ouvrages du debut du 20e s. : c'etait une demarche novatrice alors de vouloir faire une histoire globale de revolution du francais. C'est Ferdinand Brunt, avec sa vaste Histoire de la langue francaise, des origines a nos fours, qui a initie cette dernarche it y a un siècle (9 tomes pants de son vivant entre 1905 et 1938 et deux tomes posthumes couvraient la periode allant des origines a 1815 ; Ch. Bruneau puis un collectif ont assure la suite, entre 1945 et 2000, et republie l'ensemble en 24 volumes au total).

La GGHF n'est pas seulement destine a s'ancrer dans tine tradition. Depuis quelques decennies, il se manifeste un indeniable interest pour l'histoire des langues et leur evolution, et c'est egalement pour repondre a cette demande qu'il nous a pare utile de realiser cet ouvrage. Nous avons reuni pour cela une trentaine de contributeurs, parmi les meilleurs specialistes internationaux dans leur domaine.

Concernant revolution du francais, it manquait en effet en ce 21e s. un nouvel ouvrage qui en donne une vision d'ensemble mise a jour, et qui en decrive dans sa globalite la diversite et les variations. Bien des avancees theoriques sont desormais acquises concernant les processus a l'ceuvre dans revolution des langues (grammaticalisation, reanalyse, analogie, etc., + chap 2, chap. 12.5 pour la phonetique). En outre, la constitution depuis un demisiècle de ties vastes corpus (Frantext, Base de Francais Medieval-BFM, etc.) ainsi que de dictionnaires infonnatises (FEW, TLFi, DMF, Tobler-Lommatzsch, AND, Godefroy, etc.) et le developpement parallele de la linguistique de corpus fournissent des outils inconnus jusqu ' alors.

Les dix points que nous developpons brievement ci-dessous exposent les principes essentiels qui ont guide note entreprise.

2. Une grammaire sur corpus

L'histoire du francais couvre douze siecles de textes ecrits, soft une bonne trentaine de generations, et bien davantage si l'on prend en compte le proto-francais (langue qui n'est plus le Latin et non encore l'AF), uniquement oral, qui est essentiel en particulier pour le developpement du phonetisme du francais (Partie 3).

Mais sa description souffre d'un double manque sans remede : d'une part il est impossible d'avoir recours a des locuteurs natifs pour prononcer un jugement sur les enonces etudies pour les siecles passes ; d'autre part it est impossible d'avoir un acces direct a de l'oral : toute parole prononcee nous est parvenue a travers de l'ecrit. Le linguiste « diachronicien » est ainsi confronts a une double limitation : d'une part it a pour source essentielle, et parfois exclusive avant l'enregistrement de la voix (dernier quart du 19e s.), les textes, ecrit ; et pour reconstruire ou du moins formuler des hypotheses sur cet oral inaccessible directement, it doit recourir a des biais complexes (* chap. 11 et chap. 37). D'autre part, en l'absence du jugement autorise d'un locuteur natif, it est contraint de rester dans l'hypothese — une ascese parfois frustrante.

Mais cette situation est partiellement compensee par une richesse de donnees inconnue jusqu'ici, grace a l'existence de nouveaux moyens techniques et au developpement de tres vastes corpus historiques et dictionnaires informatises, qui se sont ajoutes a l'accumulation des informations fournies par les grammaires depuis le 19e s. Des a present, des outils permettent de les exploiter d'une maniere sans equivalent anterieurement. L'analyse de ces corpus et la theorisation de l'approche quantitative ont conduit a mettre au jour des phenomenes qui jusqu'alors etaient ignores ou inaccessibles, en particulier en morphologie, syntaxe et lexique, et a proposer pour la langue de ces epoques anciennes des analyses approfondies.

Ces avancees dans la documentation nous ont permis, non seulement d'enrichir nos dormees et nos descriptions, mais aussi d'affiner et de preciser la chronologie traditionnellement retenue, en la fondant stir les grandes stapes de l'evolution de la langue (voir cidessous, et chap. 4). Ainsi, outre la prise en compte explicite de la longue etape du protofrancais pour la phonetique (4 Partie 3), nous avons ete conduits d'une part a elargir encore la vaste periode medievale, en la faisant alter du 9e s. jusqu'au milieu du 16e s., et d'autre part nous avons segments cette longue periode en trois sous-periodes, le tres ancienfrancais (TAF : 9e-11e s.), l'ancien francais (AF : 12e-13e s.), et le moyen francais (MF : 14e-s.). Pour la periode suivante, la notion de Renaissance etant plus historique et litteraire que linguistique, les linguistes specialistes de cette periode ont propose de specifier une nouvelle etape, le francais preclassique (FPreclass), qui, allant du milieu du 16C s. au milieu du 17e s., precede le francais classique (FClass), ce dernier couvrant la periode comprise entre le milieu du re et la fm du lr s. Enfin, le francais modern (FMod : 19e-20e s.) est suivi du francais contemporain (FContemporain, 21e s.), chacun ayant ses specificites.

3. Nouveaux domaines de la grammaire historique : graphematique, semantique grammaticale, knonciation et pragmatique

Les avancees clans la reflexion et la theorisation menses sur la langue au cours des cinquante dernieres amides ont permis de poser l'existence de domaines linguistiques specifiques, defmissables par des phenomenes ressortissant a une meme problematique.

Ainsi, aux quatre champs habituels de la phonetique historique (Partie 3 : Phonetique historique), de la morphologie (Partie 5 : Morphologie et morphosyntaxe), de la syntaxe (Partie 6 : Syntaxe) et du lexique (Partie 9 : Lexique et semantique lexicale), qui ont necessairement ete inflechis eux aussi par les decouvertes recentes, nous avons adjoint trois nouveaux domaines d'etude, consacres a la « graphematique » (Partie 4 : Codes de l'ecrit, graphies et ponctuation), a la Semantique grammaticale (Partie 7), et a l'enonciation et a la pragmatique (Partie 8 : Enonciation et textualite, pragmatique).

Enfm, apres une rapide presentation des principes de l'ouvrage, deux vues d'ensemble ouvrent la GGHF 2020: une synthese sur les developpements theoriques et methodologigues structurant la pens& contemporaine sur la diachronie (Partie I : Fondements theoriques et methodologie), et une vue d'ensemble sur l'histoire extern de la langue francaise (Partie 2), permettant de situer par la suite les etapes du developpement du systeme du francais, que decrit le cceur de l'ouvrage. Une Conclusion (Partie 10) synthetisera les acquis de l'ouvrage.

4. Incompletudes, et souhaits

Dans ce vaste ouvrage, it apparait que certains points n'ont pas ete abordes, ou a peine evoques, ou traites de facon marginale. Certaines absences sont le resultat d'un choix, afm de privilegier une analyse plus poussee de certains aspects, mieux a meme d'eclairer les resultats d'une approche novatrice dans sa dimension diachronique. Ainsi, concernant les relations anaphoriques, n'a ete traite que le cas particulier de la cataphore ; ou encore, pour ce qui est de l'enonciation, l'accent a ete mis sur le seul discours rapporte.

Dans d'autres cas, seuls certains aspects d'un theme ont ete abordes. Ainsi, l'attribut de l'objet direct n'apparait que dans ses differences avec l'attribut du sujet (d'une frequence d'emploi, it est vrai, bien superieure), sans etre traite en tant que tel. De mane, les constructions avec complement a l' infinitif, les auxiliaires, les verbes supports, ou encore la subordonnee participiale ou la subordonnee consecutive, auraient merite une analyse specifique.

II est par ailleurs des points de difficultes qui, en francais contemporain ou dans les siecles passes, font ou ont fait l'objet d'hesitations ou d'erreurs : l'accord du participe passé aux formes composees du verbe en est un. Its auraient pu etre analyses en tant que tels, pour mesurer l'ampleur du phenomene et tenter de l'expliquer.

Enfm, la grammaire d'une langue est aussi, ou d'abord, la description et l'analyse des usages pluriels qu'en font ses locuteurs, mais egalement celle des varietes regionales et nonhexagonales. Or, la GGHF a, tres majoritairement et souvent presque exclusivement, centre son analyse stir le francais « central », sans donner leer place merit& aux autres varietes. La prise de conscience de ces imperfections par les responsables de la GGHF invitera peut-etre des collegues a combler ces manques.

5. Une histoire en longue duree : focus sur la partie ancienne

L'histoire du francais couvre douze siecles pour sa tradition &rite, de 842 a 2020, et bien davantage si l'on prend en compte sa proto-histoire.

La langue francaise, comme les autres langues romans, se situe dans la continuite de sa source essentielle, le latin, qui lui-meme a une histoire document& depuis une plus longue periode encore. Peu de langues au monde beneficient d'une telle profondeur chronologique, tant pour la source essentielle qu'est le latin, que pour les sources d'emprunts ou d'influence au cours des siecles, ainsi que d'une pratique aussi continue de l' ecrit, et d'une presence aussi reguliere du temoignage de grammairiens, en particulier a partir du 16e S.

Les avancees cumuldes de plus de deux siecles de descriptions historiques de toutes les periodes passees ont puissamment contribue a procurer une analyse en longue periode de notre langue, grace aussi au developpement parallele de theories linguistiques qui ont permis d'en eclairer revolution d'une facon innovante. Ces theories, bien que majoritairement destines a l'analyse synchronique des langues, se sont en effet revelees partiellement utilisables pour une exploration diachronique   chap. 2, chap. 12 pour la phonetique).

Cependant, dans les grandes descriptions diachroniques du francais realisees jusqu'ici, les premiers siecles du francais ont toujours ete un peu moins bien decrits dans une visee evolutive que les suivants — sauf peut-etre en phonetique ou l' effort principal a depuis le 1.9e s. toujours porte sur les evenements anterieurs a l'AF. Il fallait combler cette lacune et mieux integrer les periodes tres anciennes a la diachronie generale du francais ; nous nous y sommes efforces, grace en particulier aux remarquables monographies dont beneficie l'AF depuis quelques decennies.

Une premiere decision a done ete de &placer le focus diachronique vers la periode la plus ancienne, ce qui nous a permis de mettre en evidence l'existence d'une etape transitoire entre le Latin tardif et l'ancien francais, le « tres ancien francais », que revelent les quelques textes ecrits entre le milieu du 9e et le milieu du 11e s.

Une seconde decision a ete de tenter, au cours de nos avancees, de proposer lorsque c'etait necessaire des periodisations fondees sur une chronologie affmee des phenomenes de changement.

6. Une grammaire du changement

Une des caracteristiques de cette grammaire est de se presenter non comme la juxtaposition de tranches synchroniques successives, mais comme une grammaire du changement, l'accent etant mis sur les facteurs de l' evolution et sur la prise en compte de la variation. Cette volonte a des consequences dans la construction meme de l'ouvrage.

Une premiere consequence est celle de la *iodisation : le fait de mettre l'accent sur la continuite de revolution conduit parfois, dans l'analyse des phenomenes, a supprimer, ou au moins a gommer, la distinction a priori en periodes successives auxquelles les etudes historiques renvoient ordinairement. Ce decoupage s'appuie le plus souvent sur un mélange de criteres d'ordre non linguistique (litteraires, culturels, historiques : ? chap. 4), souvent inadequats pour la langue. Si l'on s'en tient a des faits relevant purement du systeme de la langue — ce que nous nous sommes efforces de faire l'analyse des divers domains et sous-domaines montre que tour n'evoluent pas au meme rythme : ainsi les changements

syntaxiques sont-ils loin d'aller du meme pas que les changements phonetiques ou que les changements lexicaux. Et a rinterieur d'un meme domain, par exemple la syntaxe, it est difficile de parler d'une homogeneite de revolution ; par exemple, la regularisation des deux categories du determinant et du pronom ne s'accomplit pas aussi rapidement pour les demonstratifs, pour les possessifs ou pour les indefmis.

Il nous a semble toutefois possible de reunir suffisamment d'indices pour determiner des moments de rupture (innovation, puis changement), et des moments sinon de stabilite, du moins de variabilite moins active. Pour cela, nous mettons en evidence la facon dont se realisent, dans les divers sous-systemes de la grammaire concernant les unites de premiere articulation (unissant une forme et un sens : Martinet 1961), les principales tendances de revolution du francais : evolution vers une langue plus analytique, hierarchisation progressive des syntagmes, resserrement des liens de dependance, specialisation des categories morphosyntaxiques. C'est ainsi par exemple que l'on a pu rassembler plusieurs arguments qui, dans l'histoire du francais, plaident en faveur de la reconnaissance d'une periode de francais preclassique (mi-16e s. a mi-17e s.), durant laquelle arrivent a leur terme bon nombre d'evolutions morphosyntaxiques importantes (+ chap. 4).

7. « Tout changement est une variante qui a reussi » : penser la variation

Presque toujours, un changement linguistique etait au depart une simple variante synchronique. Des Tors, une question importante est celle du role que jouent les facteurs externes dans l'apparition, le maintien ou la transformation d'une variante, qui soit devient un changement perenne, soit subsiste etat de variante, soit disparait. Ces facteurs ne relevent pas tous, proprement parler, du systerne de la langue, mais ils ne peuvent etre ignores.

Ainsi, pour analyser la variation dans le systeme d'une langue, doivent 'etre pris en compte la typologie textuelle, les diverses situations d'ecrit et d'oral, ainsi que les jugements normatifs portes sur les enonces, et les changements lies a des modifications dans la conception de la coherence discursive et de la textualite. Il serait necessaire aussi, dans la meme optique, de prendre en compte, d'un point de vue historique et psycholinguistique, les changements qui ont eu lieu dans les pratiques de la lecture et de la redaction, de recriture, c'esta-dire d'explorer une maniere de « tectonique », d'archeologie des pratiques intellectuelles qui conditionnent l'usage de la langue.

Tout cela rejoint, d'une maniere ou d'une autre, l' architecture differenciee proposee par E. Coseriu it y a un demi-siècle (1966, 1973) pour penser la variation dans les langues. Il a distingue quatre facteurs essentiels qui jouent un role dans ce processus d'incessant changement qui produit la variation, les quatre angles d'attaque qui en rendent possible l'analyse : la diachronie (variation dans le temps), la diatopie (variation dans l'espace : variantes dialectales par exemple), la diastratie (variation Bee a la dimension sociale des usages de la langue) et la diaphasie (variation hoe au style personnel du locuteur). S'est ajoute par la suite le facteur de la diamesie (variation de medium, entre langue &rite et langue orale : Z011 1974, Mioni 1983).

Plus recemment, P. Koch et W. Oesterreicher (2001 en particulier) ont elabore un type d'analyse different mais complementaire, transversal en quelque sorte, fonde sur le concept de « mediatete communicative », vs. « immediatete communicative » : chaque production langagiere peut ainsi etre situ& sur une echelle, ou un axe, allant de la proximite communicative maximale a la distance

communicative maximale, grace a la prise en compte d'une dizaine de parametres (ancrage referentiel vs. detachement referentiel, emotionnalite forte vs. emotionnalite faible, communication spontande vs. preparee, etc.).

Toutes ces notions permettent de comparer la variation entre les enonces suivant des criteres constants, ou en tout cas communs, et d'eviter des jugements purement aleatoires ou subjectifs. On peut ainsi par exemple mieux situer l'apparition d'une « innovation » (variante) dont revolution ulterieure montre qu'elle etait destine a devenir un changement perenne, et en expliquer le developpement par sa situation regionale, ou par le type de texte on elle apparait, ou par le fait qu'elle apparait surtout dans des discours directs, etc.

8. La langue comme système dynamique, le signe linguistique comme muable

Une approche diachronique implique une réflexion préalable sur la notion de langue comme système synchronique actif chez chaque locuteur. Depuis Saussure, cette conception a été reprise par les grammaires structurales, y compris la grammaire universelle. Saussure conçoit que synchronie et diachronie ont partie liée, leur difference resultant du regard que porte le linguiste sur la langue : la langue est potentiellement synchronie et diachronie en même temps, système et signe linguistique en mouvement.

Mais déjà au 19e s. quelques linguistes avaient pose les prémices d'une conception dynamique du langage, ainsi Whitney et les néogrammairiens (Paul 1975 [1880]), ou auparavant déjà Humboldt, pour qui le langage « est non pas un ouvrage fait [ergon] mais une activité en train de se faire [energeia] » (1974 [1836] : 183). Saussure par la suite a étendu cette réflexion à sa conception du signe, consacrant un chapitre de son Cours (chap. II) à « l' immutabilité et la mutabilité du signe linguistique ».

Les grandes theories du 20e s., structurales et génératives, sont certes fondées sur une analyse synchronique, mais elles ont presque toutes tenté une approche de la diachronie et ont, chacune avec ses moyens, cherché à apprécier les phénomènes de changement. Et depuis, Bien des propositions ont té élaborées (par exemple * chap. 2, chap. 45 et chap. 12.5 pour la phonétique), qui permettent de mieux penser la complexe evolution des langues.

La GGHF se situe dans cette ligne de pensée, concevant la langue, dans sa complexité et son evolution continue, comme un « système dynamique », et le signe comme une entité non figée.

9. Les types de changement

Chaque fois que possible, nous avons désigné le type ou les types de changement, simple(s) ou complexe(s) à l'oeuvre dans les phénomènes étudiés. On en dénombre d'ores et déjà plusieurs, suffisamment pour que soft couverte une bonne partie des faits, depuis l'analogie mise en evidence des le 19e s., jusqu'à l'exaptation, ou à la rémanence en cours de description, en passant par la reanalyse (et la recatégorisation qui lui est souvent subsequente), les changements phonétiques, l'emprunt (lexical mais pas uniquement), la grammaticalisation, la lexicalisation, la disparition et ses avatars éventuels.

Parallèlement, les modalités et les aspects des changements font eux aussi l'objet d'analyses et de modélisations : leur plus ou moins grande rapidité de realisation, ou leurs modes de déroulement, ou encore leurs enchaînement, ont généré des modeles qui sont en cours d'évaluation (par ex. la S-curve,

mise en evidence dans le champ linguistique par A. Kroch (1989), après quelques autres, + chap. 2 ; ou encore les « changements lies »).

Le but de la GGHF n'est cependant pas d'approfondir d'un point de vue théorique les divers types de changements, mais de permettre, à terme, d'établir des comparaisons et donc de situer leur importance relative dans l'ensemble de revolution des langues. On a ainsi pu mettre en evidence le role considerable qu'a joue tel ou tel type de changement dans revolution de tel ou tel paradigme ou construction : par exemple, le système des possessifs 1 français apparaît comme le champion de l'analogie (+chap. 30.5) : it n'a pas fallu moins

de Sept modifications analogiques pour passer du simple paradigme du latin classique au double paradigme du français contemporain, via des &apes fort complexes. Quant au paradigme des adverbes, it offre une synthese sur l'utilisation particulierement inventive des differents sous-types de grammaticalisation. Et l'on sait déjà que, dans l'evolution de la morphologie du français, la grammaticalisation est à l'oeuvre dans plus d'un tiers des changements. Le lexique, lui, est Bien entendu le lieu privilegie des emprunts de toute sorte.

10. Metalangage et categories

Les categories à travers lesquelles on nomme les unites, et done grace auxquelles on pense la langue, changent elles aussi. Si certaines categories majeures comme le verbe ou le nom ne posent guere de probleme majeur depuis la grammaire antique, it n'en va pas de même pour des categories comme celles des determinants et des pronoms ; le latin en effet ne presente pas ce type de distinction pour des formes comme ille (`ce' determinant vs. `celui' pronom), ou meus (equivalent de 'mon' ou 'le mien') ; or le français distingue progressive-ment les series cel- / cet-, mon / mien, etc. Des Tors, à partir de quel moment n'est-on plus devant une structure de type « adjoint + nom » (qui serait identique à celle dominant en latin) mais devant une hierarchisation du groupe nominal rendant pertinente la denomination de « determinant » nominal ?

Ces changements dans la structuration et done dans la categorisation rendent obliga-toire dans cet ouvrage l'emploi de termes designant des types de morphemes qui ont existe à certaines periodes et ont disparu par la suite, tels que « particules », « preverbes separables », ou d'autres termes encore, qui pourraient sembler relativement vagues mais qui permettent toutefois de ne pas biaiser l'observation et la description des etats de langue anciens par le recours à des categories peu adaptees, qui en faussent la comprehension. Il y a done eu perte de categories anciennes (preverbes separables, adverbes polyvalents portant sur divers niveaux), mais aussi apparition de categories nouvelles (determinants, connecteurs), et nous mettrons ces changements systematiquement en evidence.

Nous rencontrons dans l'analyse des unites de l'enonce et du texte, touter proportions gardees, une difficulte identique à celle qui vient d'être evoquee à propos des categories. L'emploi d'une expression comme « phrase complexe », par exemple, laisse entendre que des propositions sont organisees dans des relations de dependance. Or on sait que ce type de relations s'ancre progressivement sur un continuum qui va de la parataxe à la rection la plus etroite, et aux faits d'enchissement. Ici encore, l'emploi de la terminologie destinee à la description du français modern (ou du moins du français moderne &fit) peut empêcher de rendre compte de façon pertinente des evolutions qui se sont produites dans ce domaine.

On constate en effet, en MF ou en FPreclass, une moms grande autonomie de la « phrase » par rapport à la dimension textuelle : bon nombre de faits syntaxiques se reglent au niveau d'une sequence de propositions (on rappellera ici la notion de « periode », qui a ete trop vite renvoyee au champ de la rhetorique et de la stylistique). Et la question ne se pose pas seulement pour l'unite « phrase », mais egalement pour la « proposition » : ce noyau minimal, cette cellule construite autour du verbe, est, elle aussi, en evolution. Parler de proposition (ou de « phrase noyau », ou de « phrase de base ») laisse penser que seules des differences de position entre les constituants separent les enonces d'epoques successives

(OVS vs. SVO, par exemple). Or c'est l'organisation même de la proposition qui se modifie, en particulier par la formation d'un syntagme verbal hierarchise, l'ordre des elements n'etant qu'une consequence de cette restructuration. Tout ceci conduit à utiliser des expressions plus prudentes, telles que, par exemple, celle de « zones (preverbale, postverbale) » de enonce.

11. Une longue et dense tradition

La GGHF 2020 se situe, on l'a dit en commençant, dans la tradition des grammaires historiques du français, dont plusieurs ont accompagne l'ouvrage initial de Brunot ou lui ont succede, et leur apport a ete capital : la Grammaire historique de la langue francaise de K. Nyrop (1899-1930), le Cours de grammaire historique de la langue francaise d'A. Darmesteter (posthume, avec E. Muret et L. Sudre, 1889-1891, reimpr. 4 vol., 1930) ; et la Grammaire historique de la langue francaise de L. Kukenheim (2 vol., 1967-1968), ouvrages qui seront evoques ponctuellement.

On y ajoutera des ouvrages exemplaires en syntaxe ou phonetique historiques tels que la Syntaxe historique du frangais de C. Sneyders de Vogel (1919), la Historische franzosische Syntax d'E. Lerch (1925-1934), et la Historische franzosische Syntax d'E. Gamillscheg (1957), ou encore les Elements de linguistique roman d'E. Bourciez (1967/1956/1930 [1910]) ; en phonetique historique, on evoquera, parmi Bien d'autres (? chap. 11, §1), le Precis de phonetique francaise, publie en 1889 par Edouard Bourciez (et ensuite decline dans diverses editions), la Grammaire Historique de la Langue Francaise de W. Meyer-Lake publiee en 1908, ou la Phonetique Historique du Francais de Pierre Fouche publiee entre 1952 et 1961.

Par ailleurs, dans la seconde partie du 20e s., plusieurs ouvrages de synthese plus concis ont ete publies, à la suite du Précis de Grammaire historique de la langue francaise de F. Brunot et Ch. Bruneau (1937) ; entre autres ceux de J. Picoche et C. Marchello-Nizia, Histoire de la langue francaise (1989 — acces en ligne), ou de J. Chaurand, Nouvelle histoire de la langue francaise (1999). Et surtout, un grand nombre de descriptions synchroniques d'etats anciens du français, consacrees à des periodes particulieres, ont pare des le 19e s., et specialement depuis une cinquantaine d'annees. Tous ces ouvrages ont ete extrêmement precieux dans l'elaboration de la GGHF 2020.

Mais ces realisations, immenses pour les premieres, plus modestes pour les autres, ne representent pas seulement pour nous une « tradition ».

En effet, si nous avons pour note part fortement souligne, dans les pages qui precedent, les points sur lesquels note volonte d'innovation est intervenue, ce n'etait pas une maniere de nous opposer ou de nous demarquer fondamentalement de ces grands predecesseurs. Au contraire. Par là aussi, nous nous situions dans la lignee de nos predecesseurs, nous suivions sinon leurs traces, du moths leur ambition :

car tous, et chacun à sa maniere, à sa place et dans son époque, ont modifie, inflichi — et parfois fortement, definitivement — notre maniere moderne de penser le changement, non seulement en linguistique, mais plus largement dans les sciences humaines.

Une derniere chose, en conclusion, à propos de cet ouvrage : nous avons voulu rendre le plus lisibles possible ces chapitres ou sous-chapitres parfois tres denses et fort techniques. Chacune de ces monographies, de la plus breve (les huit pages des Numeraux en 30.7) à la plus longue (les 71 pages traitant de la Syntaxe du sujet en 34.1), constituent des recits en soi. Notre effort a tendu à faire que ces petites histoires — dont on ne connaît pas la fin — generent au total les elements pour une theorie du changement. Pour nous, au terme de ce travail, quelques visions se sont formees ou consolidees, des perspectives se sont dessinees, que resume la Conclusion. Nous esperons qu'il en sera de même pour les lecteurs.

References bibliographiques :

Barton 1408 ; Bourciez 1889, 1910 ; Brunot 1905-2000 ; Brunot et Bruneau 1937 ; Chaurand 1999 ; Coseriu 1966, 1973 ; Darmesteter 1891-1897-1930; Poncho 1952-1961 ; Gamillscheg 1957; Humboldt 1836 ; Koch et Oesterreicher 2001 ; Kroch 1898 ; Kukenheim 1967-1968 ; Lerch 1925-1934 ; Martinet 1961 ; Meyer-Lilbke 1908 ; Mioni 1983 ; Nyrop 1899-1930 ; Picoche et Marchello-Nizia 1989 ; Saussure 1972 [1906-1911] ; Sneyders de Vogel 1927 ; Z011 1974.

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English Translation
A Historic Grammar for the Year 2020
1. Equipping the language

Around 1400, French works began to appear, intended to describe and teach the French language: John Barton's Donait Francois (1408) or the Langaige Manieres (1396, 1399). A little later, at 16C s., there was a veritable explosion of grammars and dictionaries, from Palsgrave to Robert Estienne. And for more than six centuries, a long tradition of books has been established that has contributed to the "equipment" of the French language: consciously or not, it was already known that a language devoid of such tools is ultimately a threatening language.

The Great Historical Grammar of The Frenchman at the beginning of the 21st century (now GGHF 2020) is in the continuity of the great works of the beginning of the 20th century: it was an innovative approach then to want to make a global history of the revolution of French. It was Ferdinand Brunt, with his vast History of the French language, from the origins to our ovens, who initiated this dernarche it a century ago (9 volumes pants during his lifetime between 1905 and 1938 and two posthumous volumes covered the period ranging from the origins to 1815; Ch. Bruneau and then a collective took over, between 1945 and 2000, and republished the ensemble in 24 volumes in total).

The GGHF is not only intended to be anchored in the tradition. For the past few decades, there has been an undeniable interest in the history of languages and their evolution, and it is also to respond to this request that he has made it useful for us to realize this book. We have brought together some thirty contributors, among the best international specialists in their field.

Regarding the revolution of French, it was indeed missing in this 21st century a new work that gives an overview of it updated, and which describes in its globality the diversity and variations. Many theoretic advances are now acquired concerning the processes of the work in language revolution (grammaticalization, reanalysis, analogy, etc., chap 2, chap. 12.5 for telephonetics). In addition, the constitution for half a century of vast corpus ties (Frantext, Medieval-BFM French Base, etc.) as well as infonunise dictionaries (FEW, TLFi, DMF, Tobler-Lommatzsch, AND, Godefroy, etc.) and the parallel development of corpus linguistics provide previously unknown tools.

The ten points that we develop briefly below set out the essential principles that have guided note business.

2. A grammar on corpus

The history of French covers twelve centuries of written texts, soft about thirty generations, and much more if we take into account the proto-French (language that is no longer Latin and not yet AF), only oral, which is essential especially for the development of French phonetism (Part 3).

But his description suffers from a double lack without re-edited: on the one hand it is impossible to use native speakers to pronounce a judgment on the enonces studied for the centuries passes; on the other hand it is impossible to have direct access to the oral: every word spoken has reached us through the writing. The "diachronician" linguist is thus confronts a double limitation: on the one hand it has as an essential source, and sometimes exclusive before the recording of the voice (last quarter of the 19th century),), the texts, written; and to reconstruct or at least formulate hypotheses on this oral inaccessible directly, it must resort to complex biases (chapter 11 and chap. 37). On the other hand, in the absence of the authorized judgment of a native speaker, it is forced to remain in the hypothese — a sometimes frustrating ascese.

But this situation is partially compensated by a wealth of data unknown until now, thanks to the existence of new technical means and the development of very large historical corpuses and computer dictionaries, which have been added to the accumulation of information provided by grammars since the 19th s. Now, tools can be used in a way that is not equivalent. The analysis of these corpuses and the theorization of the quantitative approach led to the uncovering of phenomena that were previously unreachable or inaccessible, especially in morphology, syntax and lexicon, and to propose in-depth analyses for the language of these ancient epochs.

These advances in the documentation have allowed us not only to enrich our sleeps and descriptions, but also to refine and clarify the chronology traditionally chosen, by basing it stir the great stapes of the evolution of the language (see below, and chap. 4). Thus, in addition to explicitly taking into account the long stage of the proto-French for the telephonetic (4 Part 3), we were led on the one hand to further expand the vast medieval period, alternating it from the 9th century to the middle of the 16th century, and on the other hand we segmented this long period into three sub-periods, the very old French (TAF: 9th-11th s.) , the former Frenchman (AF: 12th-13th s.), and the French middle (MF: 14th-s.). For the following period, the notion of Renaissance being more historical and literal than linguistic, the linguists specialists of this period proposed to specify a new stage, the preclassical French (FPreclass), which, ranging from the middle of the 16C s. to the middle of the 17th century, precedes the classic French (FClass), the latter covering the period between the middle of the era and the fm. Finally, modern

French (FMod: 19th-20th s.) is followed by contemporary French (FContemporain, 21st century), each with its own specificities.

3. New areas of historical grammar: graphmatics, grammatical semantics, enunciation and pragmatic

The advances clans reflection and theorization menses on the language during the last fifty amides have made it possible to lay the existence of specific linguistic domains, defmissable by phenomena abroad a meme problematic.

Thus, in the four usual fields of historical telephonetics (Part 3: Historical Phonetics), morphology (Part 5: Morphology and morphosyntaxe), syntax (Part 6: Syntax) and lexicon (Part 9: Lexicon and lexical semantics), which have neassiously and also inflesed by recent discoveries, we have added three new areas of study, dedicated to "graphmatics" (Part 4: Codes of Writing , spellings and punctuation), has grammatical Semantics (Part 7), and has enonciation and pragmatism (Part 8: Enonciation and textuality, pragmatic).

Enfm, after a quick presentation of the book's principles, two overviews open the GGHF 2020: a synthese on theoretic and methodology developments structuring the thinking and contemporary on diachrony (Part 1: Theoretic foundations and methodology), and an overview of the history of the French language (Part 2), allowing to situate the steps of the development of the French system , as described by the cceur of the book. A Conclusion (Part 10) will synthesize the work's achievements.

4. Incomplete studies, and wishes

In this vast work, it appears that certain points have not been addressed, or barely mentioned, or dealt with in a marginal way. Some absences are the result of a choice, afm to privilege a more extensive analysis of certain aspects, better even to illuminate the results of an innovative approach in its diachronic dimension. Thus, with regard to anaphoric relations, only the particular case of the cataphore has been dealt with; or, in terms of enonciation, the emphasis has been on the only discourse that pays off.

In other cases, only certain aspects of a theme have been addressed. Thus, the attribute of the direct object appears only in its differences with the attribute of the subject (of a frequency of use, it is true, much greater), without being treated as such. From mane, constructions with complement to the infinitive, auxiliaries, support verbs, or even the participant subordonne or the consecutive subordinate, would have merited a specific analysis.

They are also points of difficulty which, in contemporary French or in the centuries passes, are or have been the subject of hesitations or errors: the agreement of the participant passed to the composed forms of the verb is one. It could have been analyzed as such, to measure the magnitude of the phenomenon and try to explain it.

Enfm, the grammar of a language is also, or first of all, the description and analysis of the plural uses made by its speakers, but also that of regional and nonhexagonal varieties. However, the GGHF has, very mostly and often almost exclusively, centered its analysis stir the "central" French, without giving the place merit and other varieties. The awareness of these imperfections by the GGHF officials may invite colleagues to fill these gaps.

5. A long-lasting story: focus on the ancient part

The history of French spans twelve centuries for its tradition, from 842 to 2020, and much more if one takes into account its proto-history.

The French language, like other Romanesque languages, is in the continuity of its essential source, Latin, which itself has a documented history for an even longer period. Few languages in the world benefit from such chronological depth, both for the essential source of Latin, as well as for the sources of borrowing or influence over the centuries, as well as such a continuous practice of writing, and such a regular presence of the testimony of grammarians, especially from the 16th century.

The cumulative advances of more than two centuries of historical descriptions of all the periods passed have powerfully contributed to provide a long-term analysis of our language, thanks also to the parallel development of linguistic theories that have made it possible to illuminate revolution in an innovative way. These theories, although mostly intended for synchronic analysis of languages, have indeed proved to be partially usable for a diachronic-chap exploration. 2, chap. 12 for phonetics).

However, in the great diachronic descriptions of French realized so far, the first centuries of French have always been a little less well described in an evolving sight than the following — except perhaps in telephonetic or the main effort has since the 1.9th century. always deals with the events outside the AF. It was necessary to fill this gap and better integrate the very old periods to the general diachrony of French; we have tried to do this, thanks in particular to the remarkable monographs that the AF has been enjoying for a few decades.

A first decision was made to place the diachronic focus towards the earliest period, which allowed us to establish the existence of a transitional stage between the late Latin and the old French, the "very old French", which reveal the few texts written between the middle of the 9th and the middle of the 11th century.

A second decision was to try, during our advances, to propose when it was necessary periodizations based on an affmee chronology of phenomena of change.

6. A Grammar of Change

One of the characteristics of this grammar is to present itself not as the juxtaposition of successive synchronic slices, but as a grammar of change, the emphasis being placed on the factors of evolution and on the consideration of variation. This will has consequences in the very construction of the work.

A first consequence is that of 'iodization': the emphasis on the continuity of revolution sometimes leads, in the analysis of phenomena, to remove, or at least erase, the distinction in successive periods to which historical studies usually refer. This decoupling is most often based on a mixture of non-linguistic criteria (litteraires, cultural, historical: ? chap. 4), often indockous for the language. If we stick to facts purely within the language system — what we have tried to do is analyze the various domains and sub-domains shows that turn are not evolving at the same pace: so syntactic changes are far from the same as phonetic changes or lexical changes. And inside the same domain, for example syntax, it is difficult to speak of a homogeneite of revolution; for example, the regularization of the two categories of the determinant and the pronoun is not done as quickly for the demonstratives, for the possessive or for the endemic.

However, it seemed possible to gather enough clues to determine moments of rupture (innovation, then change), and moments if not stability, at least less active variability. To this end, we highlight the way in which the various subsystems of grammar concerning first articulation units (uniting a form and a meaning: Martinet 1961) are realized: the main revolution trends of the French: evolution towards a more analytical language, progressive hierarchy of syntagms, tightening of the links of dependance, specialization of morphosyntaxic categories. For example, several arguments have been put together which, in the history of French, argue in favour of the recognition of a preclassical period of French (mid-16th century to mid-17th century), during which many important morphosyntaxic developments come to an end (plus chap. 4).

7. "Any change is a successful variant": thinking about the variation

Almost always, a linguistic change was at the beginning a simple synchronic variant. Of the Tors, an important question is that of the role that external factors play in the appearance, maintenance or transformation of a variant, which either becomes a perenne change, or remains a state of variant or disappears. Not all of these factors are, strictly speaking, part of the language system, but they cannot be ignored.

Thus, to analyze the variation in the system of a language, must be taken into account textual typology, the various situations of writing and oral, as well as the normative judgments doors on the enonces, and the changes related to changes in the design of discursive coherence and textuality. It would also be necessary, from the same perspective, to take into account, from a historical and psycholinguistic point of view, the changes that have taken place in the practices of reading and redaction, of recriture, that is to say to explore a way of "tectonics", of the archeology of intellectual practices that condition the use of language.

All this joins, in one way or another, the differentencie architecture proposed by E. Coseriu it half a century ago (1966, 1973) to think of variation in languages. He distinguished four essential factors that play a role in this process of incessant change that produces variation, the four angles of attack that make it possible to analyze: diachrony (variation in time), diatopia (variation in space: dialectal variants for example), diastratia (Bee variation has the social dimension of language uses) and diaphasia (variation in personal style). Later, the factor of diamesis (variation of medium, between language and oral language: Z011 1974, Mioni 1983) was added.

More recently, P. Koch and W. Oesterreicher (2001 in particular) have developed a different but complementary type of analysis, cross-sectional in a way, based on the concept of "communicative mediatete" vs. "immediate communicative": each language production can thus be situated on a scale, or axis, ranging from the maximum communicative proximity to the maximum communicative distance, thanks to the consideration of a dozen parameters (referential anchorage vs. referential detachment , strong emotionnality vs. low emotionnality, spontande vs. preparee communication, etc.).

All these concepts make it possible to compare the variation between the enonces following constant, or at least common, criteria, and to avoid purely aleatory or subjective judgments. For example, we can better situate the emergence of an "innovation" (variant) whose revolution ulterieure shows that it was intended to become a perenne change, and explain its development by its regional situation, or by the type of text it appears, or by the fact that it appears mainly in direct speeches, etc.

8. Language as a dynamic system, the linguistic sign as muable

A diachronic approach involves prior reflection on the notion of language as an active synchronic system in each speaker. Since Saussure, this conception has been taken up by structural grammars, including universal grammar. Saussure conceives that synchrony and diachrony are linked, their difference between the linguist's view of language: the language is potentially synchronous and diachrony at the same time, system and linguistic sign in motion.

But already in the 19th. some linguists had laid the groundwork for a dynamic conception of language, such as Whitney and the Neogrammairians (Paul 1975 [1880]), or previously Humboldt, for whom language "is not a work made [ergon] but an activity being done [energeia] " (1974 [1836]: 183). Saussure later extended this reflection to his conception of the sign, devoting a chapter of his Course (Chapter II) to "the immutability and mutability of the linguistic sign."

The great theories of the 20th century, structural and generative, are certainly based on a synchronic analysis, but they have almost all attempted an approach to diachrony and have, each with its means, sought to appreciate the phenomena of change. And since then, many proposals have been developed (e.g. Chap. 2, Chap. 45 and Chap. 12.5 for phonetics), which allow us to better think about the complex evolution of languages.

The GGHF is in this line of thought, conceiving the language, in its complexity and continuous evolution, as a "dynamic system", and sign it as an unfrozen entity.

9. Types of change

Whenever possible, we have identified the type or types of change, simple or complex,50 in the phenomena studied. There are already several, enough that soft covered a good part of the facts, from the analogy of the 19th s., to exaptation, or remanence being described, through reanalysis (and the subsequent recategorization), phonetic changes, borrowing (lexical but not only), grammaticalization, laxicalization, laxicalization , the disappearance and its possible avatars.

At the same time, the modalities and aspects of the changes are also the subject of analysis and modelling: their greater or lesser speed of realisation, or their modes of unfolding, or their sequences, have generated models that are being evaluated (e.g. the S-curve, highlighted in the linguistic field by A. Kroch (1989), after a few others, chap. 2; or even the "changes").

The aim of the GGHF, however, is not to delve theoretically into the various types of changes, but to allow comparisons to be made in the long run and thus to situate their relative importance in the whole of language revolutions. We have thus been able to highlight the considerable role that a particular type of change has played in a particular paradigm or construction: for example, the french possessive system 1 appears as the champion of analogy (chapter 30.5): it took no less

seven analog modifications to move from the simple paradigm of classical Latin to the double paradigm of contemporary French, via very complex "acts". As for the paradigm of adverbs, it offers a synthese on the particularly inventive use of different subtypes of grammaticalization. And we already know that, in the evolution of the morphology of French, grammaticalization isat work in more than a third of the changes. The lexicon, on the other hand, is of course the privileged place of borrowing of all kinds.

10. Metalangage and categories

The categories through which unites are called, and through which we think of language, also change. While some major categories such as verb or name do not pose a major problem since ancient grammar, it is not the same for categories such as those of determinants and pronouns; Latin does not present this type of distinction for forms such as ille ('ce' determinant vs. 'he' pronoun), or meus (equivalent of 'my' or 'mine'); or French gradually distinguishes the cel-/this-, my/mine, etc. Tors, at what point are we no longer in front of a structure of type "assistant -name" (which would be identical to the dominant one in Latin) but before a hierarchization of the nominal group making relevant the denomination of "determinant" nominal?

These changes in structuring and done in categorization make the use of terms designing morphemes types that have existed at certain times and subsequently disappeared in this book, such as 'particles', 'separable preverbs', or other terms, which might seem relatively vague but which, however, allow the observation and description of ancient language states to be not biased by the use of unsuitable categories. , which distort its understanding. There has been a loss of old categories (separable preverbs, versatile adverbs covering various levels), but also the appearance of new categories (determinants, connectors), and we will put these changes in order.

We encounter in the analysis of the units of the enonce and the text, aller proportions guards, a difficulty identical to that which has just been mentioned about categories. The use of a term such as a "complex phrase," for example, suggests that proposals are organized in relationships of depending. However, we know that this type of relationship is gradually anchored on a continuum that goes from paratax to the most obvious rection, and to the facts of enteveration. Here again, the use of terminology to describe modern French (or at least modern French) may prevent a relevant account of the developments that have occurred in this area.

Indeed, in MF or FPreclass, we see a great autonomy of the "sentence" in relation to the textual dimension: many syntactic facts are settled at the level of a sequence of proposals (we will recall here the notion of "periode", which was too quickly referred to the field of rhetoric and stylistic). And the question arises not only for the "sentence" unit, but also for the "proposal": this minimal nucleus, this cell built around the verb, is also in evolution. Talking about a proposal (or "core phrase," or "basic phrase") suggests that only differences in position between the constituents separate the enounces of successive epochs.

(OVS vs. SVO, for example). However, it is the very organization of the proposal that changes, in particular by the formation of a verbal syntagma hierarchises, the order of the elements being only a consequence of this restructuring. All this leads to the use of more cautious expressions, such as, for example, that of "preverbale, postverbale) of enonce.

11. A long and dense tradition

The GGHF 2020 is, it was said, beginning, in the tradition of the historical grammars of French, many of which accompanied or succeeded Brunot's original work, and their contribution was crucial: the Historical Grammar of the French Language by K. Nyrop (1899-1930), the Historical Grammar Course of the French Language of A. Darmesteter (posthumous, with E. Muret and L. Sudre, 1889-1891, reimpr.

4 vol., 1930); and the Historical Grammar of the French Language by L. Kukenheim (2 vol., 1967-1968), works that will be evoked occasionally.

Examples of historical syntax or phonetic works such as the historical Syntax of Vogel's Frangais (1919), E's Historische franzosische Syntax will be added. Lerch (1925-1934), and the Historische franzosische Syntax of E. Gamillscheg (1957), or E.S. Linguistic Elements. Bourciez (1967/1956/1930 [1910]); in historical phonetics, among many others (? chap. 11, 1), the Precis de telephonetique Francaise, published in 1889 by Edouard Bourciez (and then declined in various editions), W. Meyer-Lake's Historical Grammar of the French Language published in 1908, or Pierre Fouche's Historical Phonetics of the French published between 1952 and 1961.

Moreover, in the second part of the 20th century, several more concise synthese works were published, following the Precise Historical Grammar of the French Language by F. Brunot and Ch. Bruneau (1937); among others those of J. Picoche and C. Marchello-Nizia, History of the French Language (1989 — online access), or J. Chaurand, New History of the French Language (1999). And above all, a large number of synchronic descriptions of ancient French states, devoted to particular periods, have been adorned with the 19th century, and especially for some fifty years. All these works were extremely valuable in the development of the GGHF 2020.

But these realizations, immense for the former, more modest for others, do not only represent for us a "tradition".

Indeed, if we have a strong note, in the pages that preceded, the points on which the voluntarist note of innovation has intervened, it was not a way of opposing us or of distinguishing ourselves fundamentally from these great predecessors. On the contrary. By this too, we were in the line of our predecessors, we followed their traces, if not their traces, of the moths their ambition: for all, and each in his own way, in his place and in his time, have changed, infichid — and sometimes strongly, definitively — our modern way of thinking about change, not only in linguistics, but more broadly in the human sciences.

One last thing, in conclusion, about this book: we wanted to make these chapters or sub-chapters as readable as possible, sometimes very dense and technical. Each of these monographs, from the most breve (the eight pages of the Numeraux in 30.7) to the longest (the 71 pages dealing with the Syntax of the subject in 34.1), constitute recits in themselves. Our effort has tended to make these little stories — the end of which we do not know — completely generate the elements for a theory of change. For us, at the end of this work, some visions have been formed or consolidated, perspectives have emerged, which the Conclusion summarizes. We hope that the same will be true for readers. <>

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Bibliography

Where I Come From: Stories from the Deep South by Rick Bragg [Knopf, 9780593317785]

From the best-selling, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of *All Over but the Shoutin'* and *The Best Cook in the World,* a collection of his irresistible columns from *Southern Living* and *Garden & Gun*
A collection of wide-ranging and endearingly personal columns by the celebrated author, newspaper columnist, and Pulitzer Prize winner Rick Bragg, culled from his best-loved pieces in Southern Living and Garden & Gun.

From his love of Tupperware ("My Affair with Tupperware") to the decline of country music, from the legacy of Harper Lee to the metamorphosis of the pickup truck, the best way to kill fire ants, the unbridled excess of Fat Tuesday, and why any self-respecting southern man worth his salt should carry a good knife, *Where I Come From* is an ode to the stories and the history of the Deep South, written with tenderness, wit, and deep affection--a book that will be treasured by fans old and new. <>

Metaphysical Africa: Truth and Blackness in the Ansaru Allah Community by Michael Muhammad Knight [Africana Religions, Penn State University Press, 9780271087092]

The Ansaru Allah Community, also known as the Nubian Islamic Hebrews (AAC/NIH) and later the Nuwaubians, is a deeply significant and controversial African American Muslim movement. Founded in Brooklyn in the 1960s, it spread through the prolific production and dissemination of literature and lecture tapes and became famous for continuously reinventing its belief system. In this book, Michael Muhammad Knight studies the development of AAC/NIH discourse over a period of thirty years, tracing a surprising consistency behind a facade of serial reinvention.

It is popularly believed that the AAC/NIH community abandoned Islam for Black Israelite religion, UFO religion, and Egyptosophy. However, Knight sees coherence in AAC/NIH media, explaining how, in reality, the community taught that the Prophet Muhammad was a Hebrew who adhered to Israelite law; Muhammad's heavenly ascension took place on a spaceship; and Abraham enlisted the help of a pharaonic regime to genetically engineer pigs as food for white people. Against narratives that treat the AAC/NIH community as a postmodernist deconstruction of religious categories, Knight demonstrates that AAC/NIH discourse is most productively framed within a broader African American metaphysical history in which boundaries between traditions remain quite permeable. <>

Deep Knowledge: Ways of Knowing in Sufism and Ifa, Two West African Intellectual Traditions by Oludamini Ogunnaike [Penn State University Press, 9780271086903]

This book is an in-depth, comparative study of two of the most popular and influential intellectual and spiritual traditions of West Africa: Tijani Sufism and Ifa. Employing a unique methodological approach that thinks with and from—rather than merely about—these traditions, Oludamini Ogunnaike argues that they contain sophisticated epistemologies that provide practitioners with a comprehensive worldview and a way of crafting a meaningful life.

Using theories belonging to the traditions themselves as well as contemporary oral and textual sources, Ogunnaike examines how both Sufism and Ifa answer the questions of what knowledge is, how it is acquired, and how it is verified. Or, more simply: What do you know? How did you come to know it? How do you know that you know? After analyzing Ifa and Sufism separately and on their own terms, the book compares them to each other and to certain features of academic theories of knowledge. By

analyzing Sufism from the perspective of Ifa, Ifa from the perspective of Sufism, and the contemporary academy from the perspective of both, this book invites scholars to inhabit these seemingly "foreign" intellectual traditions as valid and viable perspectives on knowledge, metaphysics, psychology, and ritual practice. <>

The Critique of Religion and Religion's Critique On Dialectical Religiology edited by Dustin J. Byrd [Studies in Critical Social Sciences, Brill 9789004419032]

In **The Critique of Religion and Religion's Critique On Dialectical Religiology**, Dustin J. Byrd compiles numerous essays honouring the life and work of the Critical Theorist, Rudolf J. Siebert. His "dialectical religiology," rooted in the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, especially Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Leo Löwenthal, and Jürgen Habermas, is both a theory and method of understanding religion's critique of modernity and modernity's critique of religion. Born out of the Enlightenment and its most important thinkers, i.e. Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, religion is understood to be dialectical in nature. It contains within it both revolutionary and emancipatory elements, but also reactionary and regressive elements, which perpetuate mankind's continual debasement, enslavement, and oppression. Thus, religion by nature is conflicted within itself and thus stands against itself. Dialectical Religiology attempts to rescue those elements of religion from the dustbin of history and reintroduce them into society via their determinate negation. As such, it attempts to resolve the social, political, theological, and philosophical antagonisms that plague the modern world, in hopes of producing a more peaceful, justice-filled, equal, and reconciled society. The contributors to this book recognize the tremendous contributions of Dr. Rudolf J. Siebert in the fields of philosophy, sociology, history, and theology, and have profited from his long career. This book attempts to honour that life and work. <>

Love Divine: A Systematic Account of God's Love for Humanity by Jordan Wessling [Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology, Oxford University Press 9780198852483]

In **Love Divine: A Systematic Account of God's Love for Humanity**, Jordan Wessling provides a systematic account of the deep and rich love that God has for humans. Within this vast theological territory, Wessling's objective is to contend for a unified paradigm regarding fundamental issues pertaining to the God of love who deigns to share His life of love with any human willing to receive it. Realizing this objective includes clarifying and defending theological accounts of the following: how the doctrine of divine love should be constructed; what God's love is; what role love plays in motivating God's creation and subsequent governance of humans; how God's love for humans factors into His emotional life; which humans it is that God loves in a saving manner; what the punitive wrath of God is and how it relates to God's redemptive love for humans; and how God might share His intra-trinitarian love with human beings. As the book unfolds, Wessling examines a network of nodal issues concerning the love that begins in God and then overflows into the creation, redemption, and glorification of humanity. The result is an *exitus-reditus* structure driven by God's unyielding love. <>

Human Flourishing: Economic Wisdom for a Fruitful Christian Vision of the Good Life edited by Greg Forster and Anthony R. Cross, Foreword by Matthew Croasmun [Pickwick Publications, 9781725259430]

Beyond an internal transformation or mere "moment of salvation," how does Christian faith envision the good life? This question demands not only a Christian view of how individuals should live, but of how social institutions are best arranged for human flourishing. In the advanced modern world, our common public life is mainly lived out in the domains of work and commerce, so a Christian view of economic life

is essential to a modern Christian view of human flourishing. In this volume, established evangelical scholars in theology, biblical studies, and history explore their disciplines in connection with economic wisdom to yield insights about what it means to live wholly, fruitfully, and well. Faithful and provocative, these essays uncover fresh ground on topics ranging from poverty to work ethic to capitalism/socialism to slavery to non-profit entities to the medieval indulgence industry. <>

Primary Sources and Asian Pasts edited by Peter C. Bisschop and Elizabeth A. Cecil [Beyond Boundaries: Religion, Region, Language and the State, De Gruyter, 9783110674071]

Primary Sources and Asian Pasts unites a wide range of scholars working in the fields of history, archaeology, religion, art, and philology in an effort to explore new perspectives and methods in the study of primary sources from premodern South and Southeast Asia. The contributions engage with primary sources (including texts, images, material artefacts, monuments, as well as archaeological sites and landscapes) and draw needed attention to highly adaptable, innovative, and dynamic modes of cultural production within traditional idioms. The volume works to develop categories of historical analysis that cross disciplinary boundaries and represent a wide variety of methodological concerns. By revisiting premodern sources, Asia Beyond Boundaries also addresses critical issues of temporality and periodization that attend established categories in Asian Studies, such as the "Classical Age" or the "Gupta Period". This volume represents the culmination of the European Research Council (ERC) Synergy project Asia Beyond Boundaries: Religion, Region, Language and the State, a research consortium of the British Museum, the British Library and the School of Oriental and African Studies, in partnership with Leiden University. <>

Buddhist Approaches to Human Rights: Dissonances and Resonances edited by Carmen Meinert, Hans-Bernd Zöllner [Being Human: Caught in the Web of Cultures - Humanism in the Age of Globalization, Transcript-Verlag ISBN 9783837612639]

The demonstrations of monks in Tibet and Myanmar (Burma) in recent times as well as the age-old conflict between a predominantly Buddhist population and a Hindu minority in Sri Lanka raise the question of how the issues of human rights and Buddhism are related. The question applies both to the violation of basic rights in Buddhist countries and to the defence of those rights which are well-grounded in Buddhist teachings. The volume provides academic essays that reflect this up to now rather neglected issue from the point of view of the three main Buddhist traditions, Theravada, Mahayana and Vajrayana. It provides multi-faceted and surprising insights into a rather unlikely relationship. <>

Postcolonial Images of Spiritual Care: Challenges of Care in a Neoliberal Age edited by Emmanuel Y. Lartey, Hellena Moon, Foreword by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Epilogue by Bonnie Miller-McLemore [Pickwick Publications, 9781532685552]

This anthology is about caring for all persons as a part of the revolutionary struggle against colonialism in its many forms. In recognition of the varied ways in which different forms of oppression, injustice, and violence in the world today are traceable to the legacy and continuing effects of colonialism, various authors have contributed to the volume from diverse backgrounds including differing ethnic identities, religious and cultural traditions, gender and sexual orientations, as well as communal and personal realities.

As a postcolonial critique of spiritual care, it highlights the plurality of voices and concerns that have been overlooked or obscured because of the politics of race, religion, sexuality, nationalism, and other structures of power that have shaped what discursive spiritual care entails today. Postcolonial Images of

Spiritual Care presents voices of practical and pastoral theologians, academics, spiritual care providers, religious leaders, students, and activists working to provide greater intercultural spiritual care and awareness in the areas of healthcare, community work, and education. The volume, as such, expands the discourse of spiritual care and participates in the ongoing paradigm shifts in the field of pastoral and practical theology. <>

Aëtiana (1996–2020) The 5 Part Series:

Aetius, the 1st–2nd-century CE philosopher is now restored as the doxographer and Eclectic philosopher of note. This meticulous effort of painstaking scholarship will server future generations of historians of classical ancient philosophy for much of the rest of this century. The work of reconstruction and text of the *Placita* of Aëtius to move it from a secondary corrupted source to an primary source of the content and arguments of the presocratics through middle Platonism with enough assured evaluation as to significantly alter the textbooks about philosophical opinions and development.

The present edition reviewed here is Part V includes reconstruction and commentary of the text of the *Placita* of Aëtius has been a very long time in the making. In the case of Jaap Mansfeld, its origins go as far back as the research he did on ps.Hippocrates De hebdomadibus in the late 1960's. David Runia first came into contact with doxographical texts when analysing Philo of Alexandria's puzzling work De aeternitate mundi in the late 1970's. We made the decision to work together on the Aëtian Placita in 1989 and the project entitled Aëtiana: the Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer' was born. The present volume consisting of four parts is the project's culmination. Four preparatory volumes (in five parts) have preceded it and are noted below with contents. Go to main review and evaluation for Aetius V.

Aëtiana V (4 vols.) An Edition of the Reconstructed Text of the Placita with a Commentary and a Collection of Related Texts edited by Jaap Mansfeld and David Runia [Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Volume: 153, Brill, Hardcover: 9789004428386 E-Book (PDF): 9789004428409]

A new reconstruction and text of the *Placita* of Aëtius (ca. 50 CE), accompanied by a full commentary and an extensive collection of related texts. This compendium, arguably the most important doxographical text to survive from antiquity, is known through the intensive use made of it by authors in later antiquity and beyond. Covering the entire field of natural philosophy, it has long been mined as a source of information about ancient philosophers and their views. It now receives a thorough analysis as a remarkable work in its own right. This volume is the culmination of a five-volume set of studies on Aëtius (1996–2020): Aëtiana I (ISBN: 9789004105805, 1996), II (Parts 1&2; set ISBN 9789004172067; 2008), III (ISBN 9789004180413; 2009), IV (ISBN: 9789004361454, 2018), and V (Parts 1-4). It uses an innovative methodology to replace the seminal edition of Hermann Diels (1879).

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